Az absztrakt tényállás alanyi oldalának interdiszciplináris vizsgálata
Date: 2022
Subject: bűnösség
szándékosság
mesterséges intelligencia
szabad akarat
neurobiológia
szándékosság
mesterséges intelligencia
szabad akarat
neurobiológia
Abstract:
A PhD kutatásom fő vizsgálati köre a bűnösség – azon belül kiemelt tekintettel a
szándékosság – a kérdéseinek, a bűncselekmény tudományos fogalmán belül elfoglalt
helyének és a kapcsolódó interdiszciplináris problémafelvetések a vizsgálata. A
választott mottó is ezt a kettősséget tükrözi – az emberi gondolkodás megismerését és a
szembenézést azzal, hogy hamarosan a mesterséges intelligencia tudata is egy létező
problémává válik a science fiction világából. A konferencián megtartott előadás során a
szabad akarat kérdésköre és annak a büntetőjogi felelősségre gyakorolt hatását
vizsgáltam, mely probléma átvezet a mesterséges intelligencia vizsgálatának
kérdéskörére is.
Abstract:
My research examines the issues in connection with criminal liability. Many
monographs and articles exploring this topic review the question of the indeterminismHodula
determinism argument, usually mentioning that recent tests and results may suggest that
the method of human thinking (or the human will) is not involuntary per se – while the
level of determinism may be interpreted variously. However, if one presumes that we as
humans are not entirely completely rational beings who carefully calculate every pro
and contra of their actions, then the modern theories of legal liability (including
criminal liability) may be ill-founded.
As the main topic of my research is criminal liability and the mens rea, I have
decided that the above issues need to be explored in greater detail than the usual scope
of doctrinal research. To summarize my findings, many of those who have examined
this topic believe that we are not truly indeterministic, however, this does not mean that
the current idea of legal (criminal) liability is up for change. Our system may be flawed,
but it is flawed for everyone, and we also have to keep in mind that criminal law shall
not devolve into a pure administrative-preemptive part of our legal environment.
Finally, I have included a part which explores the connection between human
thinking and another modern field of legal research, the liability of artificial
intelligence. As we differentiate between „soft” and „hard” AI, I consider if an androidlike
level of intelligence needs to be the same as a human, and what it means for the
various further researches on its criminal liability
