Eötvös Loránd University

Yunus Anıl Yılmaz

NETWORKING FREUD:
The Intellectual Roots of Psychoanalytical Theory

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Doctoral School of Sociology

Supervisor
Dr. Eszter Pál
Habil. Associate Professor, ELTE

Ph.D. Dissertation, 2022
Yunus Anıl Yılmaz

NETWORKING FREUD:
The Intellectual Roots of Psychoanalytical Theory

Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem
Társadalomtudományi Kar
Szociológia Doktori Iskola
Szociológia Doktori Program

Témavezetők
Dr. Eszter Pál
habilitált egyetemi docens, ELTE

Doktori (PhD) értekezés, 2022
Statement

I hereby state that this dissertation contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions. The dissertation also does not contain any materials previously written or published by any other person, except where appropriate acknowledgement is made in the form of bibliographical reference.

Yunus Anıl Yılmaz

Budapest,

May 18, 2022
Table of Content

1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
3. Theoretical Background: The Theory of Randall Collins
   3.1. The Methodological Tools of Randall Collins
      3.1.1. Interaction Ritual Chains
      3.1.2. Cultural Capital
      3.1.3. Emotional Energy
      3.1.4. Network and Creativity
      3.1.5. Attention Space and Law of Small Numbers
   3.2. Critical Remarks on the Methodology of Randall Collins
      3.2.1. What does creativity mean?
      3.2.2. Is the Sociology of Philosophy an Anti-philosophy or Philosophy?
      3.2.3. Challenges of Micro-sociological Explanations
      3.2.4. How should the sociology of philosophy operate?
4. Results: Early Network of Freud
   4.1. Carl Claus
      4.1.1. Freud as a Darwinian Researcher
      4.1.2. Freud’s Usage of the Theory of Instinct
      4.1.3. The Recapitulation Theory
      4.1.4. Lamarckian Theory
      4.1.5. Conclusion
   4.2. Ernst Brücke
      4.2.1. Freud as a Neurologist
      4.2.2. Brücke and the School of Helmholtz
      4.2.3. Project for a Scientific Psychology
      4.2.4. Influence of Neurology in Freud’s Later Studies
      4.2.5. Conclusion
   4.3. Franz Brentano
4.3.1. Freud as an Auditor of Brentano
4.3.2. Tangential Dialogue
4.3.3. Conclusion
4.4. Charcot, Bernheim, and Breuer
   4.4.1. Path to Paris
   4.4.2. Charcot
   4.4.3. Bernheim
   4.4.4. Breuer
      4.4.4.1. Common Grounds
      4.4.4.2. Disagreements
   4.4.5. Afterward
   4.4.6. Conclusion
5. Further Questions
   5.1. Science of Fiction
   5.2. The Objective Science of Subjectivity
   5.3. Socializing the Mind
   5.4. Freud’s Hard Problem
6. Conclusion
1. INTRODUCTION

Sigmund Freud died in 1939. It is hard to remember that he died at some point. His “open” works (Eco, 1989, p. 3) make it harder to understand where Freud ends, and today’s psychoanalysis starts. Today, critics of psychoanalysis still put Freud at the center of their critique. Psychoanalysis has survived, changed, and still changing independently of Freud. For example, it would have been absurd to criticize evolutionary biology today only by taking Darwin’s works into account. Therefore, the best thing to do is find the border between the creator’s creation and its effects. To understand Freud’s theory, ideas, and perception, we should remember that Freud died in 1939.

The lines between Freud and his followers are blurry today, and the situation is not much different when it comes to Freud and his masters. When did Freud’s masters' or contemporaries' ideas end, and Freud’s start? This is another problem in the Freud literature. Again, when some critics of Freud find a resemblance of Freud’s ideas to someone before him, they declare that Freud is not original. It is not much different for Freudians. When they show how sensational Freud’s thoughts were in a conservative society, they declare that he was a hero that had suffered to bring us fire. Both approaches have their intention to place Freud where they wanted. Their works on the social settings of Freud are predetermined. They know the conclusion before even their studies start. In this way, studies on social dynamics fail to become sociological since they violate the basic rule of a methodological approach: impartiality (Bloor, 1991, p. 7).

This study aims to conduct an impartial sociological study on Freud to understand his theory better. This approach brings us three essential questions to begin with:

(1) Is it possible to conduct an impartial sociological study on Freud?

This question has an affirmative answer without a doubt. Any study can evaluate Freudian theories, methods, and worldview without assessing their truth-value, scientific-value, or rationality. Analytical research can causally explain how Freud’s ideas formed in the

---

1 Some Freudians do not agree with this approach since they believe it misrepresents what Freudian concepts mean (Gook & Žižek, 2020, p. 361).
light of his interactions. Additionally, a study can symmetrically expound refuted or supported claims of Freudian theories from the same perspective. Therefore, we can safely say that an impartial sociological study on Freud can be conducted despite mainstream social explanations. That would bring us the second question.

(2) Why do we need a sociological study on Freud?²

There are two aspects to this question. Why a sociological study? Moreover, why is it about Freud? Studying Freud is the easiest part of this question to be answered. Despite all the controversies about his name and work, Sigmund Freud is still one of the most influential figures in social sciences. His books, books on him, Freudian scholars who use his methods, anti-Freudian scholars who use Freud’s works to discredit him are still mainstream to create a specific gravity for Freud. Even discredited Freudian terms can come back under the cloak of substitute words with the same meaning (Otgaar, et al., 2019, p. 1078). It is hard for psychoanalytic terms to disappear even if they are discredited. Eric Kandel declared twenty years ago that “psychoanalysis still represents the most coherent and intellectually satisfying view of the mind” (Kandel, 1999, p. 505).

Meyer goes further than Freud’s status in social sciences. He says: “…[T]he language, concepts, and categories of psychoanalysis are not just attributes of our everyday contemporary cultural experience but are internal to such experience itself” (Meyer, 2001, p. 247). Accordingly, Freud’s ideas surpassed the limits of scientific fields and became inherent to our everyday thinking. Freud is with us when a friend says “mother” instead of “butter.” He is there to help us understand the conflicts of our favorite characters in movies; he is there to guide us to guess the unconscious motivations of our coworkers toward us. If the Freudian worldview is inherent to everyday experience, we must re-evaluate our tools of judgment to know ourselves better. Studying Freud has a self-critical value as much as its scientific and philosophical value. The necessity of studying Freud is merely a question.

² There might be various answers for his. The contemporary sociological approach tends to understand the sociology of ideas as an end in itself (Camic & Gross, 2004, pp. 243-244). Therefore, the answer could have been the sociological value of Freud’s unique interactions and their instructiveness for the social acquisition of knowledge. Our narrow-minded approach would have a hard time grasping the value of a sociological study for proving the importance of sociology. Re-affirming the value of sociology through well-established studies that widen the horizon of our understanding of the world might be a roundabout way. However, it would remind us why we need sociology as a method to strengthen our understanding instead of reminding us how good it is to have sociology as an institution.
(3) Why study Freud from a sociological perspective?

In 1979, Schorske pointed out a lack in the Freud literature and said: “The sociology of Freud’s friendships and associations has yet to be worked out in detail” (Schorske, 1979, p. 204). Why was there a need to study the sociology of Freud’s networks? For us, the answer is simple: to understand him better.

The names such as Machiavelli, Darwin, Marx, and Freud bear many pre-conceptions. Anyone who has taught these names to bachelor’s degree students would know the difficulties of making them forget what they had learned about them before (Anderegg, 2004, pp. 214-215). The problem comes from the connotations of these names in lay terminology. A helpful tool is placing these intellectuals in their time and place. It is a simple strategy to state that Marx died a little bit earlier than Stalin’s reign, or when Freud prescribed cocaine for his friends or himself, cocaine was not understood as we understand it today. In Freud’s days, one did not have to be a rock star to use it. Even simple reminders of where and when Freud lived can arouse interest in understanding him from a new perspective.

This study aims at the same strategy that has been used by many professors in their classrooms before, only in more detail. By the details, we mean to scrutinize the intellectual networks of Freud to understand his knowledge sources. Freud’s knowledge sources will help us better understand his theoretical stance. Although the concept of network differs in various schools, we should clarify our understanding of the term.

Randall Collins focused on networks in his theory of intellectual change since he believes the networks are “the social links among those thinkers whose ideas have been passed along in later generations” (Collins, 1998, p. xviii). Intellectual networks are social groups where the transmission and transformation of knowledge occurs. As in any social group, these groups have economic motivations, sacred objects, emotional attachments, etc. Therefore, Collins’s sociology of intellectuals does not differ from classical sociology. He chooses networks as his actors to understand ideas and their changes. Collins applies classical sociology to the intellectual field, and he uses the network as sociology uses society or group. We repeat the same process with slight differences when we say “networking Freud” in this study. Instead of analyzing a specific network as our main subject, we will study an individual and his interactions in his group. In this way, we hope to capture the group’s influence over Freud and Freud’s receptions and reactions towards his network.
However, this approach has its disadvantages if it would not be used with the principle of impartiality. The contemporary sociology of ideas perceives itself as an end in itself. Nevertheless, the earlier versions of the sociology of ideas had been applied to understand the motivations of the given intellectual (Camic & Gross, 2004, pp. 237-238). Finding authors' motivations can be helpful sociologically, but it can be used to discredit the authors. We know how mouth-watering to find “hypocrisy” by comparing authors’ life and works. For instance, Jean-Jacques Rousseau —the author of Emile, or On Education—also sent his five children to a foundling home (Mendham, 2015, pp. 131-132). However, if Rousseau’s ideas on education are accurate, they should be so without his intentions, mistakes, or wrongdoings. The opposite is also true. Does his quality as a father or his benevolence for children really matter if his theories are wrong? Our approach is akin to Marx’s approach in the face of a capitalist: “You may be a model Citizen, perhaps a member of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and in the odour of sanctity to boot; but the thing that you represent face to face with me has no heart in its breast” (Marx, 1906, pp. 258-259). Therefore, we aim to find what really functions and matters. What matters when it comes to philosophical and scientific production, then?

A method is the kernel of any theory. If we use sociology to understand “something more” than the authors have offered it, we should use it to understand the methodology. The methodology is the actual working force of any scientific and philosophical endeavor that has surpassed the intentions or biases of its creator. The methodology gives us something to replicate and test the validity of theories. This is true for philosophy as much as it is true for science. The result of any methodology is meaningful organization of the given subject, and it offers a better or different perspective about the relevant topic. That is the theory. The object of sociological analysis should be a better understanding of the given subject. When the subject is science or philosophy, the aim of sociology should be a better understanding of the methodology and theory of a given scientific or philosophical school. The sociological methodology offers a perspective to analyze the knowledge sources of the knowledge creator.

This study aims for a better understanding of Freud. Therefore, we want to understand the methodology and theory of Freud’s psychoanalysis. For instance, Freud employed the free

---

3 There are two different understandings of theory. First is the theory as belief before investigating the relevant subject matter and theory as an end-product after investigating it (Martin, 2015, p. 4). We are using the latter definition.
association method in his psychotherapies. The method demands patients to utter whatever occurs to their minds without excluding anything. The method is simple, and Freud already explained it. Then, why should we bother to examine it again? Freud’s method is an end-product of years of practical experiences and the adjusted version of his masters’ similar psychotherapeutic methods. The examination of the development of Freud’s clinical method gives an insight for a justification of his method. It raises the question of how different Freud’s methodological tool is, in its essence (Borch-Jacobsen & Brick, 2006, pp. 63-64).

To better understand Freud’s ideas, we have chosen the primary sources of his theories. We will study the six masters of Freud that he encountered before the birth of psychoanalysis. We believe these six men directly impacted Freud’s life, and most of them influenced the formation of psychoanalysis. Sociological analyses are sometimes conducted in the light of vague terms like zeitgeist. This so-called “broad context” of sociological understanding mainly attributes today’s historical conception of an earlier age in the light of available historical documents and questionable knowledge of everyday life experiences to the subjects of that age. A fine line between the interactionist approach and the vulgar historicization is the former’s focus on the subject's interactions. Therefore, we can ensure that our subject was aware of or influenced by the suggested historical events.

While preventing ourselves from the trap of zeitgeist, we should avoid an accompanying problem of this approach. Historical sociology often suffers from focusing on the similarities. For example, a sociological analysis of Freud can picture the productive capacity of the Vienna Medical School at the time. The remarkable history of this school with the breakthrough in the second half of the nineteenth century could have justified the discoveries of Sigmund Freud. However, why Freud founded psychoanalysis instead of hundreds of other students would be unanswered.

To answer why Freud was the product of his encounters and what made Freud different from his contemporaries, we will concentrate on his early network. We will focus on Freud’s early encounters with influential figures in his intellectual development, such as Carl Claus, Ernst Brücke, Franz Brentano, Jean-Martin Charcot, Hippolyte Bernheim, and Josef Breuer. Through Freud’s relationships with these men, we will try to understand the reasons for his professional choices and theoretical development.

The first chapter of this part will focus on Freud’s encounter with Carl Claus. Freud’s biology teacher was also his supervisor in his first scientific research (Freud S., 1986b, p.
Claus helped Freud enter the field of science and taught the fundamentals of evolutionary biology. Evolutionary biology was one of the essential components of Freud’s psychoanalysis from beginning to end (Freud S., 1986f, p. 60). We will demonstrate how Claus’s teaching shaped Freud’s understanding of biology and his usage of it in his theories.

The next chapter will focus on Ernst Brücke and how he shaped Freud’s urge for physiological explanations in his psychoanalysis (Langbaum, 1981, p. 120). Freud started to work in the physiology laboratory of Ernst Brücke while he was still a medical student. He met with influential figures of his life in this lab such as Josef Breuer, Sigmund Exner, and Ernst von Fleischl-Marxow (Ellenberger H. F., 1994, p. 431). He conducted neurological studies and learned the niceties of being a scientist under Brücke. We will argue in this chapter how Brücke’s influence shaped Freud’s ontological and epistemological choices while he was developing psychoanalysis.

In the next chapter, we will discuss Brentano, a controversial figure regarding his influence on Freud. Franz Brentano was Freud’s philosophy teacher, and we know from Freud’s letters; Freud admired the personality of Brentano (Boehlich, 1990, pp. 70-71). Some scholars have interpreted Freud’s admiration from his youth as an indicator of the philosophical roots of psychoanalysis. By using Collins’s method, we will argue that Brentano’s influence on Freud had not been carried to the psychoanalytical writings of Freud. Additionally, this chapter will help us to clear some of the misidentifications of Freud’s theory. Freud had a philosophical system, but his philosophy has not been necessarily induced by any canonical philosophical system (Jung, 1959).

The next chapter will deal with Freud’s relationship with Jean-Martin Charcot, Hippolyte Bernheim, and Josef Breuer. All these men were influential on Freud’s life and theories, all of which deserve separate consideration. We will evaluate all of them in their own right, yet the interaction of their ideas seems to suggest a more profound impact on Freud’s oscillations before founding psychoanalysis.

Freud visited Paris in 1885 for the first time to work under Jean-Martin Charcot. Personal impression of Charcot on Freud was great (Freud, E. L., 1975, pp. 184-185). Even in a short amount of time, Charcot’s ideas converted Freud into an adherent. Freud started to see himself as a pupil of Charcot, and upon his return to Vienna (Freud S., 1986e, p. 325), he fought against the Viennese medical establishment for Charcot’s ideas (Makari, 2008, pp. 28-29). Charcot’s studies upon hysteria and hypnosis aroused Freud’s interest in a whole new
world. Freud did not follow Charcot’s footsteps, eventually. However, even Freud’s refusal of Charcotian ideas is in debt to Charcot’s charisma that has attracted Freud to the field of neuroanatomy. We will discuss this broadly in the chapter.

There was one essential deficiency in Charcot’s teaching for the practical purposes of Freud. Charcot’s usage of hypnosis was not therapeutic (Thornton, 1986, pp. 106-107), and Freud wanted to employ hypnosis to his private patients in his clinic. In 1889, Freud visited Nancy for perfecting his hypnotic technique under the tutelage of Hippolyte Bernheim (Freud S., 1991a, p. 17). Freud quickly realized that hypnosis was not the most suitable method for his educated and middle-class patients (Newton, 1995, pp. 136-137). Nevertheless, Freud has learned something else in Nancy that he did not expect. At Nancy, he saw the unconscious from a psychological point of view as he conceptualized in his psychoanalysis. He explained his impression as follows: “I was a spectator of Bernheim’s astonishing experiments upon his hospital patients, and I received the profoundest impression of the possibility that there could be powerful mental processes which nevertheless remained hidden from the consciousness of men.” (Freud S., 1991a, p. 17).

Moreover, Bernheim had a psychologically oriented theory of hysteria and hypnosis. Freud learned that psychology without any physiological justification is possible for the first time. Freud did not follow this route, yet, the Charcot-Bernheim quarrel taught him the weaknesses of both approaches. Freud realized that he had to surpass all the deficiencies of his masters and find a new way.

Freud returned to his old friend Josef Breuer for surpassing his newly acquired problems. At the time, Breuer had already completed his treatment of Anna O., and he had told everything about it to Freud. After Freud’s interest was aroused in the subject by Charcot, Freud wanted to learn more about Breuer’s cathartic method, and soon after, he started to use it in his patients. The cathartic method was a powerful tool to examine the aetiology of hysteria while treating the patient. It helped Freud a great deal in completing his transition to psychoanalysis. Freud’s collaboration with Breuer was very fruitful for his intellectual growth, yet their friendship deteriorated after the publication of Studies on Hysteria (Freud S., 1991a, p. 19). We will analyze their relationship’s personal and professional aspects to better understand Freud’s theoretical and methodological developments during the 1890s.

We have shortly described what is to be found in the following pages. We are expecting to gain a better understanding of the theories of Freud after this endeavor. The
dissection of Freud’s writing to its methodological and theoretical components with the evaluation of his concerns and his omission, we will have a clearer picture of what was Freud’s psychoanalysis as he designed.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The Freud literature is immense. At this point, no one can read, assess, or even access the whole body of literature. However, it is possible to narrow the scope according to the researcher's interest. Our study is interested in the literature that undertook Freud’s works from a social perspective. This criterion does not necessarily smooth the way for handling the literature. Most of the studies on Freud use some social aspects to explain Freud’s personality or his ideas, at least partially. Even if a study says that Freud was raised in Vienna, this simple fact has many implications. At the time, Vienna was known for its intellectual boom, liberal elites, anti-Semitic movements, lifestyle, etc. Therefore, even the studies with little sentences such as where Freud was born or raised can be in our scope. However, that would be too large of literature to handle. Instead, we will systematically focus on the literature investigating Freudian ideas from a social perspective. In this way, we can work on the current literature on Freud’s social roots.

Social epistemology has been abused to credit or discredit authors throughout intellectual history. The Freud literature is no exception. Unfortunately, the Freud scholarship has plenty of examples from both sides of misusages of social epistemology:

“Two competing myths about Freud have gradually developed. The first myth, that of official psychoanalysis, depicts Freud as a lonely genius, isolated and ostracized by his colleagues, fashioning psychoanalysis singlehandedly and in perpetual struggle with the world at large. The history of psychoanalysis under the sway of this myth has become the story of Freud as triumphant revolutionary. The second, opposing myth pictures Freud as getting all of his ideas from someone else—usually Wilhelm Fliess, although the names of Jean Martin Charcot, Havelock Ellis, and Albert Moll, among many others, are also mentioned frequently—and taking credit for what were in fact no more than minor modifications in previously developed theories. This is the myth of the career discontents, and the history of psychoanalysis dominated by it has become the story of Freud as demagogue, usurper, and megalomaniac.” (Davidson A., 1987, pp. 256-257).

Our goal in this study is to overcome both myths to understand Freud’s ideas better. Some impartial studies pave the way in the literature, and they deserve to be mentioned. However, some studies that misused or abused social epistemology are essential for literature
to avoid altogether. Therefore, we will explore the literature of each side. We will classify these studies as Freidians, anti-Freidians, and impartial studies. Freidian studies are the ones that use social epistemology for hero-making. Anti-Freidian studies are the hero-bashing ones. Finally, we will use David Bloor’s criteria to differentiate the impartial studies. Bloor’s criteria are also the guiding principles for our study; therefore, they are apt to evaluate the literature.

Bloor sets out four tenets for conducting a sociological study on science. Here, we will follow the first three tenets of Bloor to distinguish the sociological studies on Freud. Bloor claims that a sociological study on science should bear the following qualities:

“1 It would be causal, that is, concerned with the conditions which bring about belief or states of knowledge. Naturally there will be other types of causes apart from social ones which will cooperate in bringing about belief.

2 It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity, rationality or irrationality, success or failure. Both sides of these dichotomies will require explanation.

3 It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same types of cause would explain, say, true and false beliefs.” (Bloor, 1991, p. 7).

It is important to note that we will evaluate the studies, not the authors. Sometimes, vehement supporters of psychoanalysis gave impartial studies on Freud, or non-Freudian scholars wrote Freidian studies. We will solely focus on their studies according to Bloor’s criteria. Additionally, we will use the thematical approach instead of a chronological one. A chronological exploration of sociological studies on Freud could say very little about this literature since Freidian and anti-Freudian authors do not engage with each other most of the time. They usually make their case towards a wider audience. For instance, an anti-Freudian scholar can say that Freud was not the inventor of the unconscious. Nevertheless, none of the Freidian historians ever claimed that. An anti-Freudian can show inconsistencies in Freud’s historical accounts on certain matters, yet Freidian scholars can act as if nothing happened. Since it is hard to find a good discussion between two different approaches, it is apt to explore both kinds of literature in their own right, thematically.

**Freudian Studies**
There are plenty of Freudian studies in the literature. Some cliches of Freud’s hardship, his struggle with anti-Semitism, his fight for his revolutionary ideas, and so on, can be found in many studies. However, these are just passing remarks in most studies, and they only serve rhetorical purposes. These studies are not our concerns. Some other Freudian studies take more of a philosophical approach and defend Freudian ideas from a scientific, philosophical, and intellectual point of view without using social epistemology. Again, these studies are not in our scope. We will present the systematic studies on Freud and his social context.

The most famous Freudian study is Ernest Jones’s *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud* (1953). This book is the official biography of Freud. Although it is mainly dedicated to the story of Freud’s life with every aspect of it, this book includes many comments by its author. Ernest Jones was an important part of the psychoanalytical movement and a friend of Freud; therefore, this aspect is inescapable. This book contains some critiques of Freud’s ideas, yet, it is mainly dedicated to praising the man. There are important chapters that explore Freud’s relationships with different fields in a causative style, yet they are far from an impartial perspective.

*Sigmund Freud: His Personality, His Teaching, and His School* (1924) by Fritz Wittels is another biography of Freud written while Freud was still alive. There is a tradition in the Freud literature to accuse Freudians of creating a myth after Freud. This book received that accusation from Freud himself (Wittels, 2014, p. 12). This book undertakes many influences over Freud as a biography, yet it is far from an impartial study.

Ernst L. Freud, Lucie Freud, Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, and K. R. Eissler edited and wrote the book called *Sigmund Freud: His Life in Pictures and Words* (1978). This book, due to its nature, does not go further than the general statements such as: “If Freud had been born fifty years earlier, it is certain that he would not have been able to develop into the founder of psychoanalysis” (Eissler K. R., 1985, p. 35). It only depicts Freud as a genius that has been influenced by his time. It is neither impartial nor analytical. It is just reiterating the general statements in Freud’s case.

Max Schur’s *Freud: Living and Dying* (1972) has more than one quality. It is a biography, a memoir, a monograph, an internal and external reading of psychoanalysis. It bears valuable features for the Freud literature without a doubt. However, it carries the stamp of the author’s emotional relationship with his subject matter. Some even questioned the
accuracy of his medical diagnosis due to his adoration towards Freud (Abram, 1973, p. 138). Despite Schur’s intention (Schur, 1972, pp. 2-3), it is not an impartial study.

Mannoni’s biography *Freud* (1971) takes a different approach than the mainstream approach to biography. It is topical; therefore, it takes psychoanalytical concepts and discusses their emergence by their social settings. It means it only discusses the social context if they had served to Freudian ideas. Mannoni is a Freudian without a doubt, yet his work bears some qualities of a sociological study: “*He is a believer and advocate, but not a fanatic*” (Hampshire, 1971). Nevertheless, this work suffers from overlooking some important figures that had contributed to psychoanalysis, and this approach depicts psychoanalysis one-dimensional instead of an eclectic enterprise.

Didier Anzieu’s *Freud's Self-Analysis* (1975/1986) is a psychobiography written from a psychoanalytical point of view. However, it does contain every social aspect, especially the intellectual networks of Freud in its analysis. With the help of social and psychological determinants, Anzieu explains the origins of psychoanalysis in a brilliant social-psychological fashion. Even though he uses psychoanalytical terms to explain Freud himself, it is hard to describe this book as a fanatically Freudian. His analysis depends on historical documents and explains his subject symmetrically and causatively in some parts of the book. Alongside his psychological assessments, this study bears most of the qualities of sociological work. However, this book contains occasional high praises and adoration to its subject matter. Therefore, it would not be possible to call this study impartial in the final analysis.

K. R. Eissler contributed significantly to the history of psychoanalysis, mainly because of his efforts to preserve the archival material. He also wrote about the history of psychoanalysis (Eissler K. R., 1992; 1978; 1971; 1965). His works are mainly concerned with defending Freud, and they are predetermined by proving his point about Freud’s genius, originality, and overall greatness. However, by doing this, he put some good arguments with the support of historical documents, and he is a keen observer of any inaccurate interpretation that has been made by anti-Freudian literature. Eissler’s studies cannot be taken as impartial, stand-alone studies to learn Freud without bias, yet he can be helpful to assess accusatory studies. For instance, no one put better counterarguments to Ellenberger than Eissler (1971, pp. 342-380).

Peter Gay’s studies on Freud, especially his biography called *Freud: A Life for Our Time* (1988), benefit from a historian's perspective and sometimes suffers from the
perspective of a psychoanalyst. While Gay historically situated Freud to the world he was born into, he suffers from situating Freud to the world he lived in. Freud’s identities and ideas are represented in the climate of Vienna and European thought, yet Freud is favored in all the quarrels of his life. Gay gives us great insights and interpretations. Nevertheless, he cannot distance himself from his subject matter: sometimes critically yet mainly as a defender. Therefore, we have good historical biography on the one hand and a Freudian book that tries to convince us of the righteousness of Freud on the other.

In *Cassandra's Daughter: A History of Psychoanalysis* (1999), Joseph Schwartz takes the history of psychoanalysis as his subject matter, not Freud. However, inevitably half of his book is about Freud. Schwartz’s study is a scholarly one, and it is excellent in its exposition and prose style. However, he designed his study to prove that psychoanalysis is a science, and the orthodox view of science is flawed, not psychoanalysis. Therefore, this study does not aim to be an impartial one. It only makes its case through social explanations.

Ilse Grubrich-Simitis is an eminent scholar, and she has made significant contributions to the Freud literature. In her *Early Freud and Late Freud: Reading Anew Studies on Hysteria and Moses and Monotheism* (1997), she gives an internal reading alongside with comprehensive network approach to Freud’s books. Nonetheless, she is placing her endeavor to the opposite of what she called “Freud-bashing” (Grubrich-Simitis, 1997, p. 1).

**Anti-Freudian Studies**

There is vast literature on anti-Freudian themes. Some only focus on internal reading; some solely focus on Freud’s life. We will only include the anti-Freudian studies in our scope if they systematically associated Freudian literature with social context. When we narrow our scope in this way, only a few studies deserve to be mentioned. They hold important places in Freud’s literature. All of them created their own gravity.

In his *Freud's Unfinished Journey: Conventional and Critical Perspectives in Psychoanalytic Theory* (1981), Louis Breger places Freud in his social milieu, yet his study takes the social context as an inhibition from a better understanding of psychology. He uses his day’s psychological theories to refute some of the Freudian ideas, and he only uses social determinants when he explains Freud's “failed” theories. Therefore, he is neither symmetrical nor impartial in his study. Later, in *A Dream of Undying Fame: How Freud Betrayed His*
Mentor and Invented Psychoanalysis (2009), Breger revisits Freud and the origins of psychoanalysis. This book is a psychological study, even though it draws parallels between events and theories. What makes this book different from other psychological assessments of Freud—and why we include this book in this literature review—is its claim on the science of psychology. According to Breger, theories in natural science do not bear any resemblance to their creator’s character, but psychology cannot be as objective as the natural sciences. Therefore, a sociological study of psychology should investigate psychologists as well. Again, this study is neither impartial nor symmetrical, even though Breger is insightful and appealing to read.

Helen Walker Puner brings together social and psychological explanations of Freudian theories that she sees as outdated in Freud: His Life and Mind (1947/2019). Therefore, she mainly explains why Freud failed and cannot maintain an impartial study. As Gay rightly describes it, this book is “fairly hostile and neither very scholarly nor very reliable” (Gay, 1988, p. 744).

The Discovery of the Unconscious: The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry (1970) is one of the most outstanding examples of the history of science studies. Ellenberger has chapters on Janet, Freud, Jung, and Adler in his book, and he has a prominent place in the Freud literature due to these chapters. Ellenberger places these names into the history of dynamic psychiatry, and he evaluates them by their contribution to the field instead of their evaluating them in their own right. Especially when it comes to Freud, he depicts an unoriginal thinker and a self-made myth. Ellenberger’s study is one of the examples of myth-busting in the Freud literature, yet his endeavor is scholarly instead of hostile. He supports most of his claims with rich historical materials. His accuracy in his analysis could be disputable, but his methodological precision is not. Nonetheless, the question of impartiality and symmetry remains problematic. Ellenberger uses social influences while explaining Freud’s success, but he explains failures by personality traits. Therefore, for Ellenberger, Freud is successful when he repeats the ideas of others, and his failures are the result of his neurosis or his personality.

A notorious study by Masson is one of the most famous studies in the debate between Freudians and anti-Freudians: The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory (1984). While Masson dives into historical debates to situate Freud’s position regarding the seduction theory, he does not explain Freud’s acquisition and abandonment of
the seduction theory from the same perspective. Instead, Masson decides that the seduction theory was the truth, and he explains the reasons for abandonment from a social perspective. Therefore, this study is neither symmetrical nor impartial.

Thornton’s *The Freudian Fallacy: Freud and Cocaine* (1983) is one of the extreme examples of Anti-Freudian books. In the end, the author claims that the originator of Freud’s theories is his cocaine addiction. As a medical historian, Thornton knows the medical context of the time very well. However, if her knowledge of medical history contributes to her conclusion is an open question.

Before talking about the impartial studies, we should mention some studies with an ambivalent attitude. They are hard to place in our schema, yet they must be mentioned.

Paul Roazen’s *Freud and His Followers* (1975) is an excellent example of ambivalent studies. Roazen’s investigation is a significant endeavor, methodologically. Through interviewing Freud’s pupils and analysands, he constructed a new biography of Freud. While his study is unique, it mainly focuses on the psychological aspects of the emergence of psychoanalysis, and it lacks the causal analysis between ideas and their emergence. When Roazen establishes the causal connections, he tends to explain failures with psychological aspects as he admits (Roazen, 1975, p. 7). Therefore, he is not symmetrical in his psychological explanations. The question of impartiality is a major issue in the studies of Roazen. On the one hand, he praises Freud for his creativity and genius; on the other hand, he depicts Freud as a terrible human being.

The last book to mention in this genre is again an ambivalent one. In this literature review, *Freud, Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend* (1979), is the most challenging book to place in our scale. Is this study a Freudian one or anti-Freudian, or simply impartial? Unfortunately, the answer is all of them at the same time. Sulloway carefully analyzes all the possible biological influences on Freud. He sometimes redundantly mentions a good deal of work, which is very ambiguous why he mentions them. He probably tries to capture the biological paradigm of Freud’s time without considering any influence of these studies on Freud. The chapters on Fliess are maybe the best in the whole Freud literature and impartial, causative, and symmetrical in its exploration. However, Sulloway perceives himself as a myth-buster and attacks many Freudian scholars for misrepresenting Freud as a hero, genius, or loner. Then, he wants to create another Freud, a biologist of mind. He agrees with
his biologically oriented Freud. Therefore, he has impartial chapters alongside with anti-
Freudian concerns, and he is a Freudian, all at the same time.

Impartial Studies

The final group is the impartial studies on Freud. These studies have a kinship with
our study, and they were inspirational for us. Their exposition aims to explore the studies that
have widened our understanding of Freud and demonstrate our study's added value to this
literature. There are two things to remember about this part. Firstly, impartiality is not the trait
of authors but studies. Secondly, not every impartial study is a sociological study. A
sociological study should be causative and symmetrical, alongside being impartial.

There are impartial studies on Freud without being causative. Clark’s *Freud: The Man
and the Cause* (1980) includes Freud’s life and encounters on the one hand and Freud’s ideas
on the other. Nonetheless, it does not bring these two elements together, except occasional
remarks. As Forrester put it: “For Clark manages to omit almost entirely the question of the
relation of Freud's thought to his life.” (Forrester, 1982, p. 81). Therefore, Clark’s biography
is neutral, or indifferent, to the influence of the social environment of Freud on his ideas. We
will omit this and similar studies in this review.

Furthermore, there is a vast feminist literature on Freud. Some are Freudian, some are
anti-Freudian, and some are neither. Although, as to our best knowledge of this literature,
none of them is genuinely impartial. Their main concern is expanding the feminist literature
and criticizing or understanding the representation of women in Freudian literature. Therefore,
they do not claim to be impartial in the face of truth or falsity of a theory. One such example
is Roith’s *The Riddle of Freud: Jewish Influences on his Theory of Female Sexuality* (1987).
She wants to explore the roots of the false representation of women in Freudian thought. Even
though her subject matter is Freud and his context, without being Freudian or anti-Freudian,
we cannot place her under the category of impartial sociological studies on Freud. Therefore,
we have to exclude the feminist literature on Freud from this literature review.

There are classical influence studies where the author points out similarities with
literature and the given intellectual and draw causal explanation without even restoring the
bridge between giving fields. This genre generally assumes that “zeitgeist” would be
sufficient to explain parallels or similarities between two fields. Gunnar Brandell’s *Freud: A
Man of His Century (1979) takes a different turn in his explanation, and he shows the reciprocal relationship between literature and medicine. Therefore, he claims that Freud was influenced by the literature of his time, but the literature of the time was influenced by medical sources as well. This theoretical difference places Brandell’s study on a different ground than similar studies. His deductions depend on actual events instead of imagined causal relations. His observations or his usage of historical documents are far from perfect, but his methodological approach is sufficient to place him amongst the impartial studies on Freud’s social settings.

There are two similar studies by a master and a pupil: Schorske’s Politics and Patricide in Freud’s Interpretation of Dreams (1973) and McGrath’s Freud’s Discovery of Psychoanalysis: The Politics of Hysteria (1986). McGrath’s study follows the footsteps of his master Schorske’s article on Freud. Each study is completed by historians who do not have horses in the race of Freudians vs. anti-Freudians. Therefore, both studies present a balanced and detailed account of Freud’s life and social influences. They perceive Freudian theories as a result of social events and a broad context. McGrath has a whole book for his subject matter; therefore, he uses more documents and events to interpret Freudian thought than Schorske’s article. McGrath emphasizes the intellectual influences of Freud, also. However, when it comes to finding the causes of the theoretical decisions of Freud, they are more Freudian than some psychoanalysts. They are impartial and symmetrical since they use the same type of explanations for Freud’s decisions, and they explain both success and failure in the same style. Nevertheless, their broad contextualization is sometimes too vague to draw causative explanations. Even so, their observations and rich materials enriched the Freudian scholarship greatly.

The Unconscious Before Freud (1960) by Lancelot Law Whyte is not about Freud but deserves to be mentioned. As indicated in the title, Whyte investigates the different ideas about the unconscious in different fields such as philosophy, psychiatry, physiology. It is a good study in history of ideas, yet, finding the relationship between Freudian thought and earlier versions of the unconscious as a concept is left to readers.

Johnston’s The Austrian Mind: An Intellectual and Social History, 1848-1938 (1972) includes chapters on Freud where he situates him to his time by analyzing his encounters. Although sometimes he lacks precision since Freud is not his primary subject matter, Johnston’s study is one of the good examples of sociological studies on Freud.
Another study about a more extensive subject investigating Freud as a chapter is Mark S. Micale’s *Hysterical Men: The Hidden History of Male Nervous Illness* (2008). Even though Micale’s study is not solely on Freud, he touches on one of the central topics in the history of psychoanalysis. Additionally, he investigates the role of both Charcot and Freud in separate chapters. Therefore, he presents an excellent historical account of male hysteria and psychoanalysis.

Rieff’s *Freud: The Mind of the Moralist* (1959/1965) is a good and insightful study. Nonetheless, sometimes it is regarded as a sociological study. Since Rieff was a sociologist, this interpretation might be plausible at first sight. Also, Rieff mentions some of the social influences of Freud’s theory from time to time. However, this study is a fine example of an internal reading of a scholarly study. Rieff’s main aim is to find what holds Freud’s studies together, finding a motive. Wollheim, for instance, believes Freud’s body of work does not make sense as it is. According to him, a way to understand it is by putting it in chronological order and seeing the changes through the lens of social context (Wollheim, 1987, pp. 9-10). However, Rieff makes sense of Freud by understanding his whole body of work by reading them as if they carry an intention toward a general theory. Therefore, this study is a philosophical inner reading rather than a sociological work.

The anthology *Freud and the Twentieth Century* (1957) was edited by Benjamin Nelson, a sociologist and historian. Moreover, the title is promising. However, sociological assessments that one would expect are simply on the surface. Some chapters contain excellent sociological insights, nonetheless, not very methodically. Merlan’s articles (Merlan, 1945; 1949) are similar in this respect —yet relatively brief—. His contribution to the history of psychoanalysis is important by the documents he found, but his conclusions are very hasty and too general.

Some studies are solely based on Freud’s library, such as: (Trosman & Simmons, 1973; Bogousslavsky, 2011b; Harms, 1971). These studies deduct the influences on Freud by studying his library. In addition, they include broad perspectives from the sheer volume of different fields to Freud’s remarks on his copies in their analysis. Although their causative explanatory power is scarce, as their authors pointed out, all of them are very illuminative and impartial studies.

Siegfried Bernfeld was the first author interested in Freud’s intellectual roots. He published several articles (Bernfeld S., 1944; 1973; 1953; 1946) on Freud’s early years as a
scientist, and he drew parallels with his psychoanalytical conceptions. In addition, he had keen observations that are still important to understand Freud today. These studies are historically significant, well-documented, very original for his time, and still very valuable today. Although he was a devoted psychoanalyst, his historical investigations are impartial, symmetrical, and causative.

Richard Wollheim’s biography (1973) is an excellent example of a sociological study on Freud. Wollheim follows Freud’s ideas in chronological order and exposes his theories and possible intellectual sources. This study is impartial, symmetrical, and causal. This study differs from ours in its style. Wollheim put Freud’s theories in chronological order and explained them and their social roots. We take Freud’s early network as our subject and demonstrate their results in Freud’s theory. While Wollheim presents the Freudian theory in its totality, we have fragments of Freud’s theory. However, Wollheim’s study does not have some advantages of our approach. Wollheim almost entirely overlooks the influence of biology and Bernheim’s ideas over psychoanalysis.

Sander L. Gilman has conducted a few studies (Gilman, 2020; 2010; 2006) on the social roots of Freudian ideas from different aspects such as the usage of electrotherapy at the time, Freud’s Jewish identity, his readings, and Anti-Semitism. Gilman's all studies carry the merits of good historical and sociological studies. Brunner (1995) investigates Freud textually and contextually better understand Freud’s political stances and political climate that shaped Freud’s ideas. As a result, he provides creative new perspectives on Freud through an impartial, symmetrical, and causative analysis.

Decker contributed to the history of psychoanalysis through serious historical documentation (Decker, 1977; 1982). From a sociological point of view, she is a keen observer of the social milieu of Freud’s time, and she impartially analyzes some aspects of Freud’s claims. Therefore, she provides an excellent sociological perspective on the origins of psychoanalysis.

Freud, the Fusion of Science and Humanism: The Intellectual History of Psychoanalysis (1976) is edited by John E. Gedo and George H. Pollock, and it contains valuable sociological studies on Freud and his intellectual roots. Even though it offers some internal readings between Freud and earlier intellectuals, this study carefully analyzes Freud’s intellectual encounters and their results in psychoanalysis. Unfortunately, the book is not balanced since while it devotes a big part to Breuer and Charcot, it does not focus on many
important influences of psychoanalysis. The most significant omission is Ernst Brücke and his contribution to Freud’s ideas. Nonetheless, this book is a good sociological study about Freud despite its narrow scope.

Lucille B. Ritvo’s *Darwin’s Influence on Freud: A Tale of Two Sciences* (1990) is about Freud’s relationship with the field of biology, and it is a sociological study *par excellence* on Freudian thought. She analyzes Freud’s interactions, emotional attachments, and she perceives his theory as a result of these encounters. Her work is causative, impartial, and symmetrical in its application and unmatched in its scholarly precision.

*Freud’s Neurological Education and Its Influence on Psychoanalytic Theory* (1965) is another excellent example of a sociological study. Peter Amacher assesses Freud’s relationship with his masters and colleagues, and draws conclusions upon their influence on Freudian thought. His ideas on Freud’s relationship with Meynert place him in a different position from the other scholars. Meynert is a controversial figure in the history of psychoanalysis due to his quarrel with Freud. Nevertheless, Amacher manages to distance himself from the usual discussions and investigates possible intellectual interactions. Consequently, he manages to conduct an impartial sociological study on Freud and his network.

Carlo Bonomi is an exceptional author. He discusses the social settings and Freud’s encounters that have not been investigated before and draws conclusions about the influences of these settings on Freud’s ideas. His studies on pediatric influences on Freud (Bonomi, 1994) and the place of sexuality in medical practice in the time of Freud (Bonomi, 2015) are unmatched. Even though Bonomi is a practicing psychoanalyst, his studies carry the merits of first-class sociological inquiries.

Levin’s studies (1974; 1978) on the emergence of psychoanalysis are good examples of sociological studies on Freud. Levin exposes the then-current scientific discussions and problems very vividly and causally explains Freud’s indebtedness to them. Then, after capturing the essence of lively discussions of the time, Levin successfully situates Freud’s theories to his time.

Slavet takes *Moses and Monotheism* in her focus and tackles the question of Jewishness, Freud’s Jewish identity, and Freud’s understanding of Jewishness and race. While this study, *Racial Fever: Freud and the Jewish Question* (2009), contains internal readings, it
aptly uses social and political context to understand Freud’s position and defense of Lamarckism. Finally, through the help of sociological tools, she situates Freud’s final book into its historical place.

There are great sociological articles on Freud’s social roots. These articles usually focus on one or two aspects of Freudian thought, and they explain their subject matters through social epistemology. For example, Stewart’s (1976) brief article undertakes the non-scientific factors in Freud’s refutation of Charcotian hereditary aetiology. It is a fine impartial sociological study of one aspect of Freud’s theory. Paul F. Cranefield (1957; 1966) depicts an adequate picture of the School of Helmholtz, or the Biophysics Movement of 1847, and deduces their influence on Freud. Besides some widely discussed aspects in the literature, Cranefield shows how the movement might have influenced Freud’s understanding of art and the demarcation between art and science.

George Rosen is a medical historian interested in the social aspects of medical concepts, schools, and institutions. *Freud and medicine in Vienna: Some scientific and medical sources of his thought* (1972) follows the sources of Freudian ideas in Vienna. For a short study like this, Rosen captures the essence of both Freudian thought and its Viennese characteristics very well by including almost every medical encounter of Freud. Therefore, he presents a brief and illuminating sociological study on Freud’s origins. Another excellent example of a short but comprehensive study on Freud is Fullinwider’s *Darwin Faces Kant: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Physiology* (1991). First, Fullinwider analyzes German physiological thought and its theoretical changes and challenges in this brief paper. Then he shows the influences of nineteenth-century debates on Freud by using an impartial, causative, and symmetrical approach to his subject matter.

Davidson’s study (1987) places itself beyond Freudian and anti-Freudian concerns and tries to place Freud in his time. While he finds both approaches mythical, he claims that we should follow the argumentation for placing Freud to the history, not mere usages of concepts. As a result, he presents an illuminating sociological study on the aspects of Freud’s creativity in his *How to Do the History of Psychoanalysis: A Reading of Freud's "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality"*.

Carter’s (1980; 1983) and Makari’s (1994) studies are other good examples of sociological studies on Freud’s theoretical influences that have widened our understanding of Freudian thought. These studies focus on small-scale subject matters and thoroughly explore
them using social epistemology. Borch-Jacobsen (and his collaborators) contributed to the history of psychoanalysis with a few different studies (Borch-Jacobsen & Shamdasani, 2012; Borch-Jacobsen, 1989; Borch-Jacobsen & Brick, 1996; 2006; 1990). He aims to explore the roots of psychoanalytical ideas in their scientific context, and as a result, he presents illuminating results on the origins of Freudian thought.

Without a doubt, the sociological literature on Freud is extensive enough to be covered in full justice. However, we tried to explain which discussions, sides, and methods took place for a century. Freud’s writings are scrutinized mainly by psychological approaches. We encounter sociological understanding of Freud very rarely. When we find a sociological study, they are sometimes predetermined and not very scholarly. Then we find scholarly and sociological studies on Freud, and there are excellent studies amongst these endeavors. However, these studies either focus on Freud’s relationship with one field or trace the origins of one specific concept.

None of the above-mentioned studies undertook Freud’s early encounters together as a network. Forming the intellectual network of Freud before he founded psychoanalysis can give us the chance to capture Freud’s cognitive map. Thus, we can start to understand how he formed his ideas, which problems he encountered and how he solved them. If we prioritize the intellectual network of Freud, we can find what the kernel of psychoanalysis is. For finding out what made psychoanalysis, we will use the sociological theory of Randall Collins and try to contribute to the Freud literature.
3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND:
The Theory of Randall Collins

In this chapter, we will discuss the theoretical gaze of Randall Collins. Since our methodological toolkit is derivative and needs interventions to operationalize it, most of this chapter will be devoted to this endeavor. This chapter is inevitable since it defines both the scope of our data and the application of our method. After constructing our theoretical stance, we will expose our data more empirically. This data will consist of Freud’s writings, his correspondences, and the writings of his masters and rivals.

3.1. The Methodological Tools of Randall Collins

The features that we associate with the fields that require creativity revolve around certain behaviors that transcend the human experience. We love the narrative of geniuses that cannot be understood in their lifetime. We know that art creates aesthetic end-products and stimulates our emotions. Therefore, we think artistic creation must result from miraculous, metaphysical moments. When Gabriel Garcia Marquez found the idea for *One Hundred Years of Solitude* while driving his car, he almost had an accident because he almost blacked out and forgot the reality. That is a powerful image. However, he went home and spent eighteen months completing the book after his miraculous moment. Moreover, he was a writer for all his life. For maintaining that lifestyle, he woke up very early every day, sat down in front of his typewriter, and could not write anything most of the days.

In science and philosophy, things can get even more demanding than that. Sometimes apples fell down a tree. Apples did fall very often in the history of humanity, as a matter of fact. To grasp the importance of that fall, one may need to spend the whole of his life. If Newton’s apple story is true, it was Newton who realized what is important about that fall.

---

4 The myth of unappreciated talent is too powerful to avoid. When he was still young (at the age of 39), Robert Schumann complained about this myth, and he could not defend himself from it. In his letter to Franz Bendel, he wrote: “I really have no idea what is meant by that so-called misunderstanding from which I am supposed to be suffering. Your journal frequently proves that I enjoy the opposite quite often... As I said, I am quite content with the ever growing recognition I have been receiving.” (Lenneberg, 1980, p. 219).
through years of education and tireless study. Creative works are fascinating. Creative processes are long and mostly dull. Studies of creative processes can help us distinguish the difference and help us to understand what really is creative.

Great scholars from various fields try to remove the metaphysical genius image from our minds. The sociology of philosophy is one discipline that fights against that image. It aims to change our judgments on intellectuals and creativity. Maybe Jacques-Louis David’s image of Socrates is too powerful to visualize another image when one thinks about Socrates. However, It is possible for us to know that Socrates could not look like a very muscly Hollywood star at the age of seventy as David portrayed. The ambitious attempt of Randall Collins⁵ that covers the whole history of intellectual movements is a good place to start to know about intellectual life and how it operates.

Starting with 1987, Collins published several articles, and he completed his attempt in 1998 with his major book called *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change*. This book substantially impacted the sociologists who wanted to research philosophical knowledge or the philosophers themselves. The importance of this book does not lie in its investigation of the history of philosophy. It is vital since it aimed to produce theoretical tools for the later works, and Collins himself encouraged sociologists to work on this field (Collins, 1988, pp. 669-670). After publishing *The Sociology of Philosophies*, he did not invest much time in the field. He published only a few articles⁶ related to the sociology of philosophy and continued to encourage new researchers⁷.

At the beginning of the book, Randall Collins opposed four main approaches in the history of ideas. Those were; “1. Ideas beget ideas. . . . 2. Individuals beget ideas. . . . 3. Culture begets ideas. . . . 4. Everything is fluid; it is impossible to fix any contours or sharpen any explanatory concepts.” (Collins, 1998, pp. 1-10). According to Collins, these are the

---

⁵ Randall Collins is one of the most important sociologists today. In a 1994 research, Collins was ranked as the 8th most important theorist of today among American sociologists (Lord & Sanderson, 1999, p. 52). That was even before the publications of his very popular books like *Interaction Ritual Chains*, *Violence: A Micro-sociological Theory*, *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change*, and his presidency of the American Sociological Association from 2010 to 2011. The importance of Collins for this research lies in his attempt to impose sociological interpretation onto the history of philosophy.

⁶ See: (Collins, 2000a; 2000b; 2002; 2011).

⁷ It is not a coincidence to see the name of Randall Collins in the “Acknowledgment” chapters of the studies from the field. See: (Fabiani, 2013, s. vii; Gross, 2008, p. xix).
mainstream ways of thinking about the history of ideas that the sociology of philosophy should overcome. Hence, he explains why these approaches cannot be sufficient for explaining the history of ideas. He describes historical examples that these approaches cannot explain. In a nutshell, the message is that the sociological approach that claims ideas are rooted in social settings is hard to accept since it overthrows the ruling epistemological assumption. The assumption is that the ideas that have been affected by social circumstances cannot be the truth (Collins, 1998, pp. 7-8).

As opposed to all the approaches he introduced, he defines his sociological task as “to see through intellectual history to the network of links and energies that shaped its emergence in time.” (Collins, 1998, p. 15). Before he starts to apply his approach, he introduces his tools and justifies their usage. To better understand his method and use it in our research, we should explain his concepts rigorously. Additionally, we will discuss why we chose to use the sociology of philosophy while studying Freud since he was not a philosopher.

The book uses a few central concepts to explore the cases or derive from the cases. These are interaction ritual (IR) chains, cultural capital (CC), emotional energy (EE), creativity, network, attention space, and the law of small numbers. These concepts’ exposition will make Collins’s theory accessible to the readers and our methodology apprehensible.

### 3.1.1. Interaction Ritual Chains

Interaction ritual chains are the theory of situations. It chooses situations as its subject matter and explains individuals, communities, and any macro-level events or institutions through the analysis of situations. According to Collins, situations, interactions, rituals⁸ (as they concealed the situations) make individuals: “It is games that make sports heroes, politics that makes politicians into charismatic leaders” (Collins, 2004, p. 5). Situations are the observable particles of macro-level events and structures; therefore, it is easy to study. The analysis of situations can open the possibility of macro-level conclusions, but it must start with where real people act and react.

---

⁸ Collins describes ritual as “... a mechanism of mutually focused emotion and attention producing a momentarily shared reality, which thereby generates solidarity and symbols of group membership” (Collins, 2004, p. 7).
The starting point for interaction ritual analysis is “here and now” as symbolic interactionism or ethnomethodology. As opposed to symbolic interactionism or ethnomethodology, the interaction ritual chains approach includes previous encounters in its analysis. When people encounter each other with their consciousness and emotions, they encounter with what they have accumulated until that moment (Collins, 2004, p. 3). In other words, analysis of local situations takes “there and then” into consideration for a better grasp of here and now (Collins, 1998, p. 21). In this manner, the macro-level of society would not be disregarded. The macro-level would not take place vertically above the micro-level, either. Collins explains the macro-level in interaction ritual chains as “the unfurling of the scroll of micro-situations” (Collins, 1998, p. 21).\(^9\)

There are six ingredients of interaction rituals, according to Collins:

\(^1\) a group of at least two people is physically assembled;
\(^2\) they focus attention on the same object or action, and each becomes aware that the other is maintaining this focus;
\(^3\) they share a common mood or emotion . . . .
\(^4\) The mutual focus of attention and the shared mood cumulatively intensify . . . .
\(^5\) As a result, the participants feel they are members of a group, with moral obligations to one another . . .
\(^6\) Individuals who participate in IRs are filled with emotional energy, in proportion to the intensity of the interaction.” (Collins, 1998, pp. 22-23).

Even though intellectuals are part of social groups, their group has distinct characteristics that require tailoring the usual methods. Contrary to the other social groups, intellectuals make abstract and universalistic claims in their very activity. They are more reflexive, self-analytical, and perceive their role in society or history. Consequently, the events which bring intellectuals together are neither practical nor socializing but gathering for serving a higher goal, namely, for the sake of truth (Collins, 1998, p. 25). In addition, written

---

\(^9\) According to Collins, the macro-level explanations should not use vague concepts as “zeitgeist.” A good theory should amalgamate several layers of causality (Collins, 1987, p. 49).
materials are the main pieces for intellectuals to share their thoughts, especially after the printing revolution. Then, how will we apply the method that focuses on interactions? According to Collins, intellectual communities did not change in their very structure for two millennia (Collins, 1998, p. 25). The whole study of Collins is devoted to proving this point, and we will expose this structure. Before that, we can add that what held a whole intellectual tradition together for two thousand years was “the consciousness of the group’s continuity itself as an activity of discourse, rather than the particular contents of its discussions.” (Collins, 1998, p. 28). This formula ascertains the intellectual community's survival—a community based on conflicts and only be creative when their conflicts are sustainable (Collins, 1992, p. 77). In addition to that, the focus of the sociology of philosophy is not the non-intellectual motives of intellectuals. On the contrary, intellectual motives are socially rooted, not individual traits (Collins, 2000b, p. 158).

3.1.2. Cultural Capital

If there is a central concept for the sociology of philosophy, that is cultural capital. There is a huge convention to use cultural capital as a methodological tool among leading studies in the field. Cultural capital is a concept coined by Pierre Bourdieu when he needed to explain the difference in success between children from different social classes (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 243). According to Bourdieu:

“Cultural capital can exist in three forms: in the embodied state, i.e., in the form of long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body; in the objectified state, in the form of cultural goods (pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.), which are the trace or realization of theories or critiques of these theories, problematics, etc.; and in the institutionalized state, a form of objectification which must be set apart because, as will be seen in the case of educational qualifications, it confers entirely original properties on the cultural capital which it is presumed to guarantee.” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 243).

In other sociological studies, cultural capital is a hard concept to investigate (Lamont & Lareau, 1988, p. 157). However, it is easier in the intellectual communities since the intellectuals willingly demonstrate their intellectual predecessors.

Collins introduced the term from his earlier article on the subject as “the stock of ideas and concepts acquired from previous encounters” (Collins, 1987, p. 47). Similar to the function of Bourdieu’s concept, cultural capital in the methodology of Collins preconditions the success of the intellectuals. Intellectuals brought their cultural capital from their educations, masters, families\textsuperscript{12}, etc. The cultural capital of intellectuals is not the same as cultural capital in the usual sense. Family plays a role in intellectuals’ cultural capital only if they pass the intellectual legacy to their children. It means providing a better education is not what we call cultural capital in the case of intellectuals. Collins’s cultural capital is akin to Bourdieu’s embodied state of cultural capital. The ultimate goal is getting into the center of attention in his field, and drawing attention is only possible by producing creative works. Creativity simply means new ideas, and at the same time, there are no new ideas in the sense that ideas build themselves on something no one has ever heard of. Cultural capital should provide an intellectual with a comprehensive knowledge of his field and an insight into the problems and needs of the field (Collins, 1998, p. 31). Cultural capital has an essential social effect on the philosopher who tries to hold a prominent position in his field. In Kuhnian terms, the philosophers must own a paradigm and transcend it to achieve a prominent position in their field\textsuperscript{13}.

### 3.1.3. Emotional Energy

Despite its reputation in the self-help book jargon, emotional energy results from interaction rituals in sociology (Collins, 1998, p. 23). According to Collins, every sociological tradition has an approach that includes emotions to explain what holds society together. What Collins does is to improve Durkheimian solidarity, which produces mechanisms as structures. The structures focus, intensify, and transform emotions (Collins, 2004, p. 102). Consequently,\textsuperscript{12} For a perfect example of it, see: (Gross, 2008). Richard Rorty had very political parents, and their thinking style impacted him. Even one of his articles was written to answer his father’s questions towards philosophy (Gross, 2008, p. 162). Only in these kinds of situations a family could be part of the analysis.\textsuperscript{13} Thomas Kuhn was very well aware of this difference between scientists and philosophers: “Scientists have not generally needed or wanted to be philosophers. Indeed, normal science usually holds creative philosophy at arm’s length, and probably for good reasons.” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 88).
the last-longing emotions that society produces are described as emotional energy (Collins, 2004, p. 106). To conclude, he demarcates the importance of emotional energy in sociological analysis.

The emotional energy of intellectuals is also central to the sociology of philosophy due to its reciprocal relationship with creativity. Emotional energy is not a personal trait but the effect of community on the individual (Heidegren & Lundberg, 2010, p. 8). When a philosopher attaches himself to the sacred objects of the field, his emotional energy (along with his creativity) increases (Collins, 1998, p. 36). One great exemplification of this is as follows:

“In the summer of 1912, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s sister Hermine visited her 23-year-old brother in Cambridge. On one occasion, Bertrand Russell said to her in Wittgenstein’s presence: ‘We expect the next great step in philosophy will be taken by your brother’ (Fredriksson, 1993: 54–5). Note the use of ‘we’. There was an entire group of eminent philosophers and intellectuals who charged the young Wittgenstein with EE.” (Heidegren & Lundberg, 2010, p. 9)

Also, note that the most important thing is that this conversation took place in front of Wittgenstein. It means the actual target audience of Russell’s praise was no one but Ludwig Wittgenstein. Even though emotional energy does not necessarily appear directly as here (or not every little moment documented as this one), intellectuals need to maximize their emotional energy to find the strength to continue and increase their creativity. In the last analysis, intellectuals are EE-seekers like every human being (Collins, 2004, p. 181).

### 3.1.4. Network and Creativity

Networks are the actors of Collins’s investigation (Collins, 1998, p. xviii). We can track the interaction rituals through the network, and IR chains give us the necessary ingredients for micro-sociological explanations (Collins, 1998, p. xviii). The inner structure of

---

14 The name can be misleading since the approach of Bruno Latour is also called Actor-Network-Theory. A brief criticism of Collins’s approach by Latour can be found in (Latour, 2005, p. 51).
the intellectual networks shapes the ideas through IR chains since the networks are the places where cultural capital and emotional energy pass to the members (Collins, 1998, p. 2). Networks work in both vertical and horizontal ways. The analysis of vertical ties goes backward to predecessors and associates, and it goes forward to pupils. The horizontal analysis focuses on the link between contemporaries (Collins, 1998, p. 65). For instance, vertical analysis can demonstrate Sigmund Freud’s relationship with his master Ernst Brücke, and it can lead us to find where the cultural capital of Freud came from (Schimmel, 2014, p. 15). Horizontal analysis can be about alliances and oppositions since both influence creativity.

Intellectual creativity was defined at the earlier stage of Collins’s theory and remained the same. Intellectual creativity had three aspects: cultural capital, emotional energy, and market opportunities (Collins, 1987, p. 47). The most crucial aspect is cultural capital since, without cultural capital, the others would not work in intellectual networks. Market opportunities can be suitable for a particular kind of EE or CC in every field, and those qualifications would not guarantee any spot in other intellectual fields (Collins, 1998, pp. 34-35). Market opportunities are defined as the needs of the market. Either philosopher would prepare for the market’s needs or not find a spot in the center of intellectuals’ attention.

As part of the horizontal analysis, rivalry is also a powerful element of creativity (Collins, 1998, p. 6). Even though CC and EE are important in creative work, they are insufficient. Furthermore, they can create side effects without rival positions. Under the roof

---

15 The opposite of creativity is stagnation, and it is investigated by Collins also. There are three types of intellectual stagnation: (a) loss of cultural capital, (b) dominance of classics, and (c) technical refinement. Through the analysis of stagnation, Collins aims to demonstrate that stagnation and creativity depend on the same social factors (Collins, 1992, pp. 73-76). Here, the style of Randall Collins’s analysis is symmetrical, in the sense that it treats success and failure in the same respect as the strong programme would do (Bloor, 1991, p. 7). He demarcates the importance of analytical symmetry somewhere else — without calling the approach symmetrical (Collins, 2000b, p. 200).

16 Neil Gross explains Rorty’s move from Wellesley to Princeton from this perspective (Gross, 2008, p. 13).

17 This negative situation best exemplified by Lamont as follows: “In contrast, Jacques Bouveresse, one of the few French analytic philosophers, writes, in his ‘Why I Am So Very UnFrench’: ‘I have been told that my own works were practically unreadable by the French philosophical public because they were concerned essentially with ‘logic’ (which meant in addition that they were not in any event worth reading, inasmuch as they contained nothing that was properly philosophical’)” (Lamont, 1987, p. 591).

18 Other than a few exceptions, creativity depends on rival positions, and this phenomenon could be observed universally (Collins, 1989, p. 116).
of any community, individuals tend to lose their differences and become more and more like each other. This outcome is not what the intellectual community would desire. Thus, rival positions are needed. The rivalries provoke creativity with opposed ideas and create more space for all the parties participating in the discussion. Nonetheless, the content of the discussion can be very determinant on the emergence of rivalries. For instance, throughout history, ethical philosophy did not cause significant conflicts (Collins, 2000a, pp. 176-177) as epistemological or ontological discussions did.

3.1.5. Attention Space and Law of Small Numbers

The rival positions provoke creativity and attract more audiences to the discussion. More audience will bring the discussion to the attention of intellectuals. This would create more interest in the topic; thus, more rival positions will appear. When the discussion becomes loud enough, it will enter the attention space where all the field members recognize the main components and their arguments (Collins, 1998, p. 38). However, there are limited positions in the attention space since it is hard to follow for the audience when too many equally important parties are included in the discussion. There is a lower limit, also, since creativity requires conflict. As a result, the best condition for creativity occurs “when there is a fine balance between a few rival centres of intellectual life, tied together into a single network” (Collins, 1992, p. 94). This fine balance could be observed throughout the historical cases as three to six rival positions exist simultaneously. This balance maintains itself as follow:

“The principle is dynamic over time. Positions appear and disappear, grow stronger and weaker in adherents. The law of small numbers holds sway amid the flux. Strong

---

19 The image of introverted intellectuals is not totally wrong and even necessary. Straightforward logic works here. Even though creativity emerges from social circumstances, the intellectual should create the product in isolation. Its creation process is based on a lot of time devoted to reading. Nevertheless, even when the creative intellectual is alone, “The group is present in consciousness” (Collins, 1998, p. 7). Besides this very brief emphasis on personality, Collins is not using personality traits in his analysis (Heidegren & Lundberg, 2010, p. 8).

20 Rivalries produce creativity only when all the parties have autonomy (Collins, 2000b, p. 170).
positions (those which have dominant external support), subdivide in subsequent generations into as many as four or five factions. On the other side, weak positions (those that have a poor or declining external base) disappear, or amalgamate into others by syncretisms or syntheses. We may add a corollary: a second reason why positions become weak is that the entire attention space becomes overcrowded, violating the upper limits of the law of small numbers. This too is an incentive to reduce the number of positions by synthesis.” (Collins, 1998, p. 81)\(^{21}\)

We should note that a high level of creativity is rare, and hard shoes always hold top positions to fill. When every aspect mentioned above goes well, creative moments in philosophy emerge. Intellectual networks have a stratified structure that is formed as a narrowing pyramid. While the intellectual stars are getting most of the attention/citation, \(75\%\) of the community never publish at all (Collins, 1998, p. 43).\(^{22}\) Thus Randall Collins introduced the attention space. According to him, Bourdieuan “field” or his “network” have limited explanatory power. For instance, Wilhelm Wundt had approximately 700 students, yet only five or six of them received recognition (Collins, 2017, pp. 10-11). The attention space helps to explain this stratified structure of the intellectual field.\(^{23}\)

### 3.2. Critical Remarks on the Methodology of Randall Collins

It would be fair to note that the methodology of Randall Collins aims to discover a global theory of intellectual change, as is indicated in the title of his book. We aim to use his methodological tools in our case study and ultimately find out a sociological perspective for understanding the works of Sigmund Freud. The accuracy of Collins’s theory is not the concern of our study. Therefore, when we use the phrase “critical remarks,” we do not aim to understand Collins’s work better. On the contrary, we are trying to demonstrate how we will use his methodology in our research.

\(^{21}\) One of the most famous examples of a philosopher who gets renowned by creating a theory by synthesizing the existing positions of his day is Aristotle. He reduced the number of overcrowded attention spaces through his synthesis and got the attention for himself. (Collins, 1998, p. 101).

\(^{22}\) When the domination of stars or classics could not be overturned for a long time, the period of stagnation starts (Collins, 1992, p. 75).

\(^{23}\) For an empirical demonstration of attention space with a table see: (Collins, 1998, pp. 76-77).
Before getting into remarks, one question is hanging in the air as the sword of Damocles: Is psychoanalysis a philosophy? Why are we using the sociology of philosophy to investigate psychoanalysis?

The International Psychoanalytical Association describes psychoanalysis as follows:

“1) as a theory of how the mind works
2) as a treatment method for psychic problems
3) as a method of research, and
4) as a way of viewing cultural and social phenomena like literature, art, movies, performances, politics and groups.” (Schmidt-Hellerau, Szőnyi, & Hartke, n.d.)

Today's psychoanalysis is more than what Freud conceived; however, these four articles are apt for Freud’s psychoanalysis as well. Still, it is hard to decide if psychoanalysis is philosophical or scientific. “A theory of how the mind works” can be explored by a scientific and philosophical investigation. “A treatment method” and “a method of research” imply a science more than a philosophy. “A way of viewing” can be perceived as more of a philosophical perspective than a scientific methodology.

Additionally, Freud was always dedicated to establishing a scientific discipline, not a philosophical system. Nonetheless, the end-product does not have to satisfy the intent. Therefore, we cannot put intent over the product in our investigation.

As a result of these confusing explanations of psychoanalysis, we might go into details of debates over the status of psychoanalysis. However, Randall Collins’s sociology of philosophy is not only applicable to philosophical studies. His methodological tools are useful for investigating various intellectual fields. Despite the status of psychoanalysis as a science or a philosophy, it is agreeable to say that psychoanalysis is an intellectual product. Therefore, using Collins’s methodology for investigating Freud’s psychoanalysis is appropriate. Due to the nature of Freud’s psychoanalytical work, it is easier to study him by the method of Randall Collins instead of any other theory in the sociology of science. Nonetheless, it requires some necessary adjustments.
3.2.1. What does creativity mean?

One of the central concepts of Randall Collins’s work is creativity. He uses creativity to decide who are the major intellectuals and who are not. The periods of creativity and stagnation are essential aspects of his study since intellectual activity's ultimate goal is to be creative. Only creative intellectuals can find a place for themselves in the attention space.\textsuperscript{24}

However, Collins does not give a concrete definition of creativity. We can find two types of creativity in his study. The first one is the creativity that builds up in the network by developing CC (Collins, 1998, p. 31) and increasing EE on an individual (Collins, 1998, p. 37). The second definition of creativity is a long-term reputation. If a philosopher's ideas are transmitted across generations and become canonical, we can regard that philosopher as creative (Collins, 1998, p. 58). There is a contradiction here. Major philosophers, whose works are regarded as canonical today, were not always in strong networks. Therefore, concepts like CC or EE cannot be applied to them.

Randall Collins confronts this problem in the case of Immanuel Kant. In his earlier article, he mentions that Kant started Idealism while isolated from any network (Collins, 1987, p. 53; 58). However, the issue was only pointed out by him and remained unsolved. Later on, in The Sociology of Philosophies, he claimed Fichte made Kant (Collins, 1998, p. 4). This means the reputation of Kant was created by the next generation of Idealism in a network structure. If we decide whether Kant was creative or not through the later Idealist network (since Kant was not a part of any network), why do we claim the concepts like CC, EE, and network are the components of creativity? Does creativity depend on interaction rituals that the person physically be a part of, or the decision about one’s creativity is made by later generations? When Collins focuses on a network, he uses the IR definition of creativity. On the other hand, in his canonical analysis, where he determines how many major or minor philosophers lived and died throughout history, he uses the long-term reputation definition.

In this research, we are interested in situating the works of Sigmund Freud. Therefore, his cultural capital, emotional energy, and networks gain importance. These concepts of

\textsuperscript{24} This does not mean that every creative intellectual finds a place in the attention space. This structure of the attention space is demonstrated conspicuously by Collins: “Intellectual competition in this period was as intense as at any time in history, and many creative thinkers were squeezed out of attention. That is why this generation accounts for so many of the famous cases of neurotic breakdowns and misanthropic withdrawals.” (Collins, 1998, p. 636).
Randall Collins are beneficial for explaining the content of the work of any given philosopher. Consequently, we will use the IR definition of creativity and ignore the long-term reputation definition.

### 3.2.2. Is the Sociology of Philosophy an Anti-philosophy or Philosophy?

The methodology of Randall Collins is usually portrayed as anti-philosophical.\(^{25}\) However, Collins himself tried to change this image. He even left a comment at the end of McLaughlin’s book review and explained his position\(^ {26}\) as it follows:

> “Intellectuals are not necessarily, or even primarily, calculating and egotistical. It is rather that the social structure of the attention space allows room for only a small number of positions, and gives attention to those who negate (or sometimes, after a long period of negations that proliferates positions beyond the upper limits of the ‘law of small numbers,’ synthesize) others’ positions. If we assume intellectuals are motivated by a disinterested love of truth, the social structure remains the same: They still must work through the networks and the struggles of the attention space if they want their truth to be known.” (McLaughlin, 2000, p. 174)

Even though the portrayal of the intellectual movements’ structure did not necessarily imply the selfish intentions of philosophers in his book, it is still understood in this way. There could be several reasons for this perception. First of all, Randall Collins was never very clear about this point in his book. Secondly, anti-philosophical ideas were already had a considerable impact on social theory.\(^ {27}\) In other words, the readers were mentally ready to interpret the ideas of Collins as a struggle against the conceptualization of philosophy as a “disinterested search for truth” (McLaughlin, 2000, p. 171). Even if we accept that Collins did not imply (despite it is hard to say that he never implied his method is anti-

\(^{25}\) See: (Fuller, 2000, p. 247; Nichols, 2016, p. 171; McLaughlin, 2000, p. 171; Heidegren & Lundberg, 2010, p. 6).

\(^{26}\) He explained his position in The Sociology of Philosophies; however, it did not work since his explanation was too vague and it came towards the end of the book and only as a brainstorming, not as a decent argumentation in his book (Collins, 1998, pp. 858-862).

\(^{27}\) A remarkable version of the dispute on the matter between two eminent philosophers of the 20\(^{th}\) century, Foucault and Derrida, and more can be found in: (Žižek, 2015, pp. 327-358).
philosophical\textsuperscript{28}), still, it would have been hard to convince the readers — especially from social sciences and philosophy — due to the ruling paradigm in the academical sphere at the moment.\textsuperscript{29}

Lastly, the sociology of philosophy functions in a way that \textit{ad hominem} does — a logical fallacy. \textit{Argumentum ad hominem} means “argument against the person,” meaning drawing attention to a person from a person’s argument to discredit the argument (Tindale, 2007, p. 82)\textsuperscript{30}. Even though the sociology of philosophy does not aim to discredit the ideas, ultimately, it is about shifting the focus from the philosopher's argument to his network, life, interests, etc. Thus, this method is always at the periphery of a fallacy. This position is inevitable, especially when a sociologist investigates a topic that would raise a conflict of interest, as Martin Kusch pointed out from his experience (Kusch, 1995a, pp. 267-268).

Furthermore, it is possible to claim that even conducting sociological research on philosophy is for the benefit of sociologists. Randall Collins himself drew the attention of his fellow sociologists to the sociology of philosophy in the first place, simply because there was a growing interest in social explanations by philosophers (Collins, 1988, p. 669). More than that, he had an interest as a sociologist in changing the poor image of sociologists in the intellectual field (Collins, 1988, p. 669). His method was a chance to strengthen his status as a sociologist amongst intellectuals, and he invited his colleagues to benefit from this historical opportunity (Collins, 1988, p. 670).

Here, we aim to stay out of this controversy. Our research on Sigmund Freud aims to understand the emergence and development of his theory. The sociology of philosophy should be aware that social analysis of philosophy can imply accusation or admiration. Pierre

\textsuperscript{28} He says at the beginning of his book that he chose “\textit{philosophers because theirs is the archetypal intellectual role}” (Collins, 1998, p. xviii). Albeit he did not intend to focus on contemporary philosophy. On the contrary, he proposed a marriage between philosophy and sociology on an anti-positivistic ground (Collins, 1988, p. 670). It is easy to assume that he had the intention to “disenchant” the believers of an archetypical philosopher, yet, only as a part of the contemporary philosophical discourse.

\textsuperscript{29} For a comparison between the old paradigm that sees intellectual as an objective social category and intellectual who struggles for an intellectual position see: (Camic & Gross, 2004, pp. 241-242; 248-249).

\textsuperscript{30} Tindale remarks that even the understanding of \textit{ad hominem} changed over time (Tindale, 2007, pp. 81-82).
Bourdieu and Martin Kusch demarcated this point more strongly than Randall Collins.\textsuperscript{31} In his investigation of Martin Heidegger’s discourse, Bourdieu insists that his work is not an accusation but a scientific analysis (Bourdieu, 1991, p. vii). However, these words are not magical. Bourdieu claims that the philosophical discourse of Heidegger was just a sublime version of his contemporaries’ conservative revolutionary ideas (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 53-54) despite Heidegger’s own refusal (Žižek, 1999, p. 14). This conflict is inevitable. Even so, the perspective of Martin Kusch could be more effective.

Martin Kusch raises a question: where the history of philosophy stands? Are the questions that the history of philosophy (and the sociology of philosophy) asks philosophical or non-philosophical? Martin Kusch demonstrates the questions of the history of philosophy and why they are philosophical become apparent:

“They claim that the history of philosophy is not essential to philosophy proper rules out consideration of a number of issues that, I believe, undeniably are genuine systematic philosophical questions. For instance: how does philosophical knowledge develop over time? Is there progress in the history of philosophy? Why do philosophers disagree? What is the dynamic of theory change in philosophy? What are the conditions on which philosophical theories are accepted or rejected? How do social factors influence the development of philosophical knowledge? What is the relation between philosophy and social institutions or classes? If these questions are philosophical ones, then at least with respect to them the history of philosophy is essential to philosophy.” (Kusch, 1995a, p. 20).

As Martin Kusch indicated, both the history of philosophy and the sociology of philosophy have questions that themselves are philosophical. Therefore, the sociology of philosophy is not a meta-philosophical position. Some philosophers raised their concerns about reducing philosophical ideas by sociological explanations and were not totally wrong in their concerns. For this reason, Kusch proposes a sociological approach that does not reduce but situates the philosophical arguments (Kusch, 1995a, p. 21). The stance of this study is the

\textsuperscript{31} The possible reason for Randall Collins’s disinterestedness in strongly demarcating this point could be found in his method. Most of the time, his approach does not concern with the content but the producers of the content (Kusch, 1995b). We should note that an earlier version of his project was interested in the content, also. His interpretation of Immanuel Kant’s works is an excellent example of the efficiency of his method on the content (Collins, 1987, p. 62).
same as Martin Kusch’s. We should be more precise than the works of Bourdieu and Collins. The aim of this study is a better understanding of the ideas of Sigmund Freud without placing ourselves in any superior position.

For reiterating the position of Kusch, we should reiterate his guiding principles as well. Kusch is a follower of the strong programme, and he applies the tenets of Bloor’s as we should do. Therefore, in our investigation, we will use Bloor’s four tenets, which we have already mentioned. We will aim to be causative, impartial, symmetrical, and reflexive in our analysis. We have not mentioned the last tenet, reflexivity, earlier since it was not right in that context. According to Bloor, sociology of scientific knowledge should not demand any meta-position for itself:

“It would be reflexive. In principle its patterns of explanation would have to be applicable to sociology itself. Like the requirement of symmetry this is a response to the need to seek for general explanations. It is an obvious requirement of principle because otherwise sociology would be a standing refutation of its own theories.” (Bloor, 1991, p. 7).

In the last analysis, we will apply the methodology of Randall Collins with the central doctrines of the strong programme.

3.2.3. Challenges of Micro-sociological Explanations

The documents, which are to be investigated during research, are inclined to give micro-sociological explanations rather than macro-sociological explanations. Intellectuals do not infer conclusions about themselves from macro events. They usually focus on personal interactions in their letters or autobiographies. As a result of the abstract analysis, we can say macro events impacted a particular intellectual or a group. Therefore, micro-sociological explanations seem more valid from Collins’s perspective.
Additionally, the chosen sources of the sociology of philosophy overlook the power of macro events on the individual and are inclined to underestimate the power of weak ties\(^{32}\). For instance, we do not know if Sigmund Freud found a job at the laboratory of Ernst Wilhelm von Brücke by his acquaintance or if some favorite student of Brücke recommended Freud? We know Freud sent a letter to Charcot to translate his work to German (Freud S., 1991a, p. 12). However, we do not know who assured Charcot that Freud was a good choice for introducing his work to the German-speaking world. These details are understandably missing in historical documents. We should be aware that our documents are far from perfect during the analysis. We are only working on the documents that other people have already found important enough to record.

### 3.2.4. How should the sociology of philosophy operate?

There is a difference between the intention of Randall Collins and the reception of his theory. For the sake of clarity, we should delineate our intention. This research aims to avoid interpreting Sigmund Freud's intentions from his activities unless his intentions were clearly stated. As we have seen earlier, when an intellectual makes any move to get a place into attention space, and the sociologist points out this fact, there is a tendency to interpret this fact as unmasking the impure intentions of intellectuals. If the readers perceive the sociology of philosophy as a verdict on intellectual activity, we recommend keeping the presumption of innocence in mind.

When the philosophers are interested in being in the attention space or want to get a higher position, it does not diminish the value of their theory. There can be several reasons for their intention to get a higher position, and the sociology of philosophy should not assume those intentions if they are not overtly declared. The important thing is, as Collins stated, the structure of attention space operates in the same way whether the intention of the intellectual pure or not (McLaughlin, 2000, pp. 174-175).

One possible reason for their desire to be in higher positions is their passion for their theory to be recognized. The structure itself pushes intellectuals to demand a higher position

\(^{32}\) As Granovetter demonstrated, members of different groups are linked through weak ties (Granovetter, 1973, p. 1376).
since only in this way can they get a respectable place for their theories, or simply, what they believe.\textsuperscript{33} There is a tendency to criticize the incompatibility between theory and act of philosopher (ultimately, the hypocrisy of philosopher), and it is not the invention of the sociology of philosophy. It is old as philosophy itself.\textsuperscript{34} The sociology of philosophy should be aware and keep itself at a distance from this type of interpretation. Again, this study aims to provide a better understanding of the theory of Sigmund Freud by situating his theory without any deviation.

\textsuperscript{33} Michèle Lamont draws attention to Derrida’s rejection to complete his dissertation may cause a decline in his popularity (Lamont, 1987, p. 604).

\textsuperscript{34} Diogenes was very well aware of this criticism. He took it very seriously and lived in total harmony with his theory. He even accused his master Antisthenes of hypocrisy (Luck, 2011, p. 105). As a result, he was accused of living like a dog, as his master (Desmond, 2008, pp. 16-17). Long story short, the expectation of the totality of philosophers’ actions and theory is not a very sincere criticism, either.
4. RESULTS:

Early Network of Freud

4.1. Carl Claus

Just before taking a university exam, Sigmund Freud heard an essay on nature by G. C. Tobler from Carl Brühl—he thought the essay had been written by Goethe—and subsequently decided to enter medical school (Freud S., 1991a, pp. 8-9). He signed up for zoology classes given by Carl Claus (Ritvo, 1990, p. 19). Freud’s interest in Darwin’s theories (Freud S., 1991a, p. 8) led him to a research topic that provided him with a scholarship to see the world of evolution through a microscope (Triarhou, 2009, p. 3). The decision was taken by a pair of ears, which became sore for eyes while he started to dissect 400 eels during his stay in Trieste (Taschwer, 2017, p. 45). For Freud, it took three years to look away from the streets and beauties of a small Mediterranean town since it was “not allowed to dissect human beings” (Boehlich, 1990, p. 146) from an enthusiastic Gymnast who enjoyed literature and admired nature.

Freud’s interest in biology—specifically, evolutionary biology, and even more specifically, the “Darwinian line of thought” (Freud S., 1991g, p. 303)—started very early in his life. As a devoted bookworm from an early age (Bernays, 1940, p. 336), Freud could not overlook a scientist who rattled the narcissism of humanity (Freud S., 1986a, p. 285) and shattered all religious views. It is easy to follow his desire to become a “conquistador” (Masson, 1985, p. 398). When he entered medical school and signed up for zoology classes, he did not know of the difficulties of becoming a scientist who spends most of his time behind a microscope and rarely makes any discoveries. It took Freud more than 20 years to leave his monotonous laboratory duties behind and return to the essence of biology that had captivated him in his youth (Sulloway, 1979, pp. 275-276). During this period, he invented his method to understand the human mind by psychologizing biology to suit his interests (Wallace E. R., 2008, p. 729).

In his psychoanalytic writings, Freud based his psychological analysis on the biological theories of Darwin and other biologists as a presupposition—some theories, such as
instincts and small hordes, were directly acquired from these biologists’ work. From there, psychological analysis was conceived. Recapitulation theory and Lamarckism are used to apply his psychoanalytical observations to a larger scale, such as culture, religion, early primitive societies. Sometimes as a presupposition and sometimes as a justification for Freud’s theories, biology was one of the most critical components of psychoanalysis.

To understand psychoanalysis comprehensively, one should dive into the biological paradigm at the time and, more importantly, Freud’s understanding of said paradigm. “Caput Nili” (Masson, 1985, p. 184) for this inquiry is observing Freud’s university years, where he took an active part in evolutionary biology.

There are three substantially influential biologists for the psychoanalytical writings of Freud: Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829), Charles Darwin (1809-1882), and Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919). Before discussing their influence on Freud, we can shortly mention the essential aspects of their theories. Lamarck was the first biologist who used “biology” in the modern sense (Coleman, 1977, pp. 1-2). He is mainly remembered for his theory of inheritance of acquired characteristics. This theory, also called Lamarckism, claims that animals evolve to complex versions of themselves through generations by their volition (Ritvo, 1990, p. 194).

The most famous example of Lamarckism is the giraffes. According to Lamarckism, giraffes have long necks because their ancestors wished to reach higher trees to feed themselves (Cook, 2018, s. 14). Also, they lost certain features of themselves by the disuse of these organs (Jones E., 1957, pp. 310-311). This is the use and disuse principle of evolution that serves animals to adapt to their environment. Charles Darwin proposed that all living species descended from a common ancestor, and they all evolved from there to their later form through adaptation (Darwin, 1859, p. 125). Unlike Lamarckian ideas, this adaptation took

35 Freud used German “Trieb” to distinguish human instincts and animal instincts (or German “Instinkt”). Some researchers suggested “drive” for the equivalent of “Trieb.” However, we will use Strachey’s translation, instinct, to be in harmony with Standard Edition's language.

36 However, we should keep in mind that Freud was neither a biologist nor familiar with every biological discussion at the time. Freud was a student of medicine, and the source of his biological knowledge was mainly dependent on his biology teacher Carl Claus and the books of Darwin and some others that he had at the time (Ritvo, 1990, pp. 114-115). Therefore, to understand biology as Freud did, we should narrow our scope to his sources. Additionally, a few numbers of Freud's sources for biology are excluded from this chapter, such as his histology studies as a student under Brücke, his early acquaintances such as Max Kassowitz, Wilhelm Fliess, and Josef Breuer and his pupil Sándor Ferenczi. We focus solely on the result of his interaction with Carl Claus since it would give us a unique perspective in his line of thought.
place by natural selection or survival of the fittest (Darwin, 1859, p. 6). In other words, the most suitable form survived, and the volition of the animal did not involve in the process. In addition to this, most of the behaviors of animals are shaped by the necessities of life (Richards R. J., 2018, pp. 2-3). Ernst Haeckel is known as the popularizer of Darwin’s theories (Marcaggi & Guénolé, 2018, p. 5). He is also known for his famous but today invalid recapitulation theory. The recapitulation theory suggests that individual development heavily relies on the development of the species. All evolutionary history of one species would be recapitulated in the development of every member of that species. According to Haeckel, ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny (Sulloway, 1979, p. 199).

4.1.1. Freud as a Darwinian Researcher

After hearing a lecture on nature by Carl Brühl, Freud’s choice of profession shifted from law to medicine (Freud S., 1986v, p. 193). His curriculum and his late graduation from medical school indicate that he was not into medicine, and he did not even feel ready to practice it when he was graduated (Vogel, 1994, p. 94). From the second semester on, he took the classes required for medical students with the addition of philosophy under Brentano and a course on Biology and Darwinism under Claus (Jones E., 1964, p. 59). Until the fourth semester, he continued to take supplementary courses (different zoology classes under Claus from then on):

“In his fourth semester, in the summer of 1875, we find Freud striking out on a more independent line. He attended the lectures on zoology proper (fifteen hours a week), not those on ‘zoology for medical students’. He took two physics classes, one more than was required in the medical curriculum. He continued with the seminars on philosophy and added another course of Brentano’s, on Aristotle’s logic. Eleven hours a week were given to Brücke’s physiology lectures.

This leaning to biology became more pronounced in the following summer semester, when he spent ten hours a week on practical zoology in Claus’s laboratory. Anatomy and physiology took up the rest of his time, but he still attended Brentano’s seminar once a week.” (Jones E., 1964, p. 60).

His interest lay in being a researcher of nature. This is why he spent most of his time in laboratories as a student. After his graduation, he never stopped his studies behind the
microscope, even though he had to work as a physician for economic reasons (Rosen, 1972, p. 336). He even considered having a Ph.D. in zoology and philosophy (Boehlich, 1990, p. 95). Even later in life, he admitted his medical knowledge was insufficient (Masson, 1985, p. 23).

Carl Claus was Freud’s first teacher who was influential to him. At first, he must have been attracted to the Darwinian syllabuses of Claus, and Claus must have been attracted by the performance of young Freud in his class (Bernfeld S., 1973, p. 166). We can surmise this from Claus’s researcher of choice. When he needed to send young researchers to Trieste for testing the latest discoveries in zoology, one of his choices was Freud for the duty (Gay, 1988, p. 31). In his long career, this research was Freud’s first scientific study (Bernfeld S., 1973, p. 165).

In March 1876, Freud took a trip to Trieste to test the discovery where the question was the reproduction of eels (Bernfeld S., 1973, p. 166). The question puzzled Aristotle himself, and Freud wrote to his friend Silberstein: “even Aristotle did not know where they obtained their males and hence argued that eels sprang from the mud” (Boehlich, 1990, p. 149). Polish zoologist Syrski claimed that he found a lobed organ which he described as the testicles of eel (Schwartz, 2003, p. 27). This study was the signifier of the end of an era. Believing that eels were hermaphrodites was a long tradition among zoologists, including Claus (Cornejo, 2018, p. 7). When Claus assigned Freud to test the claims of Syrski, the 20 years old Freud traveled to the Zoological Experimental Station in Trieste to practice “the beast-killing science” (Boehlich, 1990, p. 142) for the first time. After two trips and dissecting 400 eels in this small town, Freud returned to Vienna and left zoology behind. This research caused him great dissatisfaction, and he felt like he failed. Freud took his supervisor Claus partly responsible for this failure (Eissler K. R., 1992, p. 118). However, from the lectures of Claus, he filled his inquisitive mind with the biological discussions of the time, which clung to him for the rest of his life. Here, we observe acquiring cultural capital of biology, yet, decreasing emotional energy toward the field.

The study's conclusion was published under the name Observations on the configuration and finer structure of the lobed organs in eels described as testes (1877), and it is a topic of debate amongst Freud historians. Some say it was successful and paved the way for later discussion, which at the end led to the actual discovery of testes of eels (Bernfeld, 37 This paper was presented in front of the Vienna Royal Academy of Science by Claus on March 15, 1877.
1973, p. 225; Jones E., 1964, p. 61; Laible, 1991, pp. 255-256). Some say it was satisfactory for Carl Claus, and only Freud’s high hopes of great discovery made him feel upset about the conclusion (Jones E., 1964, p. 61). Some say the study was only successful at teaching Freud how scientific studies work. He learned the diligence required by a scientist (Jones R. A., 2005, p. 238). Some just took the word of Freud and accepted it as a failure (Schweid, 2009, p. 29). One thing is sure, Freud was not satisfied by the attitude of Claus toward his study. Claus was negligent, according to Freud (Eissler K. R., 1992, p. 118), and this negligence caused an absolute silence on Claus from Freud’s side. Freud never uttered his name other than two times. Since Freud named his children after loved ones, this muteness says a lot. Once, he had to mention Claus’s name while he summarized his studies up to the date for his application for Professor Extraordinarius (Freud S., 1986b, p. 227). Next time, he mentioned Claus (which he called the study under him “foolish”) when he was commenting on the study of Brun, who studied Freud’s pre-psychoanalytical works while Freud was still alive (Eissler K. R., 1992, p. 118). That is all.

Freud did not only learn a great deal from Claus, but his education also affected his style and thinking when it came to topics of biology. When we talk about their relationship, we see a significant contribution to Freud’s cultural capital, yet very little to his emotional energy towards the discipline of biology. Until 1915, Freud never mentioned the Lamarckian theory or the inheritance of acquired characteristics; since Claus only started to accept some aspects of Lamarck’s theory after 1888 (Ritvo, 1990, p. 146), not when Freud studied under him. Until 1915, Freud used Haeckel’s recapitulation theory for his social theories, and on rare occasions, for his psychoanalytical ontogeny. During Freud’s years as a student, Claus accepted the recapitulation theory (Wilson, 1941, p. 26) but rejected the gastraea theory and probably used these discussions in his lectures (Ritvo, 1990, pp. 126-127). However, Freud did not simply believe and copied what Claus believed. Haeckel and Claus were two different ends of the same stick in some ways, which can be named as the lumpers and the splitters. “The lumpers emphasize the commonalities of the facts of life, the splitters the uniqueness.” (Schwartz, 2003, p. 46) Haeckel was keen on generalizing and making quick connections and deductions from insufficient data. Churchill called Haeckel and Weismann (the two opponents of Claus) “innovative generalizer[s]” (Churchill, 2015, p.144). Claus believed in slow scientific processes just as Darwin did (Ritvo, 1990, p. 125). Their differences peaked over Haeckel’s gastraea theory. Claus was attacking Haeckel for being over-hasty while Haeckel found Claus’s attitude too conservative, which led him to call Claus “anti-Darwinist”
Freud got familiar with these discussions during his studies, not just merely the opinions of his master. Cultural capital is acquiring the paradigm, not the exact ideas of a master. In a relationship like Claus and Freud, where emotional energy is missing, it is harder for the student to align with the master. Therefore, as a conquistador-wannabe student, he favored Haeckel’s ideas over Claus’s.

Freud was a lumper. The only exception to his longing to be a great scientist was the time he had spent in Brücke’s laboratory. Freud’s admiration for Brücke and the environment which Brücke provided tamed Freud to be a diligent scientist, a splitter, for a while. Even there, he had the urge to be the first discoverer of any given topic (Schimmel, 2014, p. 18). Freud’s attitude changed again after working under Charcot. Freud returned to be a lumper and sought an outstanding scientific achievement, and his inclination to generalizations brought his relationship with Breuer to an end (Masson, 1985, p. 175). He favored the ideas of the lumper of the debate between Haeckel and Claus and took the side of Haeckel as we can track in his later writing, most overtly in *Totem and Taboo* (1912). This is still a result of his interaction with Carl Claus. His aversion toward Claus may have influenced this decision. As a young researcher in a city far away from his master, Freud felt very much alone. He found himself unsuccessful, and there was no one to stand beside him to teach about the other side of science. Being unsuccessful or sometimes working in vain for a very long time is part of science. Freud did not receive any support at this moment. Instead, he felt he would achieve a great discovery (Jones E., 1964, p. 61). When he failed, he was alone. All these feelings of being left alone are reflected in Claus by Freud. As a result of this study and being a pupil of Claus for a few years, Freud was left with excellent knowledge of biology and very little aspiration toward being a biologist. This combination of significant cultural capital with low emotional energy led Freud to be a psychologist (instead of a biologist) with a great deal of influence from biology. Besides, he was in favor of Haeckel instead of Claus. It still does not change the fact that he had learned about this debate and many more from Claus.

### 4.1.2. Freud’s Usage of the Theory of Instinct

The theory of instinct in Freud’s psychoanalytic writings could be found from the very beginning, and it developed through the end. For Anna Freud: “*Psychoanalysis is above all a drive psychology*” (Ritvo, 1990, p. 2). Even though today we remember the Freudian theory of instinct as rivalry or struggle between life and death instincts, death instincts did not arrive
in the picture until 1920. Therefore, most of the psychoanalytic writings of Freud were dominated by self-preservation and sexual instinct.\(^{38}\) For his usage of the instinct theory, Freud once quoted Friedrich Schiller’s “hunger and love are what moves the world” (Freud S., 1986h, p. 117). He did it since we did not wait for a seafarer to see different tortoises and shout “Eureka!” to understand that we had to eat, drink, and love.\(^{39}\) However, we needed that seafarer and many others to understand that maybe love is just one way of expressing the simple desire that can also be seen in animals. Only that point of view that broke the pride of humanity by lowering their status from God’s favorite children to cousins of apes could have given Freud the impetus to go forward. He did not, after all, start his investigations from love, a culturally organized form of the sexual instinct, but he started from the instinct itself as a physical reaction in the body. It was meaningless and, therefore, open to different meanings. He psychologized the instinct theory, after all.

Freud’s usage of instinct theory (before death instinct) could be found throughout his writings. However, two of his texts strictly depended on the theory: *Three Essays on Theory of Sexuality* (1905) and *Instincts and their Vicissitudes* (1915). The beginning of the former text deserves to be quoted in its entirety since its power of demonstration of Freud’s relationship with the instinct theory:

“The fact of the existence of sexual needs in human beings and animals is expressed in biology by the assumption of a ‘sexual instinct’, on the analogy of the instinct of nutrition, that is of hunger. Everyday language possesses no counterpart to the word ‘hunger’, but science makes use of the word ‘libido’ for that purpose. Popular opinion has quite definite ideas about the nature and characteristics of this sexual instinct. It is generally understood to be absent in childhood, to set in at the time of puberty in connection with the process of coming to maturity and to be revealed in the manifestations of an irresistible attraction exercised by one sex upon the other; while its aim is presumed to be sexual union, or at all events actions leading in that direction. We have every reason to believe, however, that these views give a very false picture of the true situation. If we look into them more closely we shall find that they contain a number of errors, inaccuracies and hasty conclusions.

I shall at this point introduce two technical terms. Let us call the person from whom sexual attraction proceeds the sexual object and the act towards which the instinct

\(^{38}\) We can trace the first adequate description and usage of the instinct theory in a letter to Fliess early as 1894 (Freud S., 1991b, p. 192).

\(^{39}\) We did not wait for Schiller, either. Various forms of the instinct theory have been around since Aristotle or Hippocrates (Richards R. J., 2018).
tends the sexual aim. Scientifically sifted observation, then, shows that numerous deviations occur in respect of both of these—the sexual object and the sexual aim. The relation between these deviations and what is assumed to be normal requires thorough investigation.” (Freud S., 1986aa, pp. 135-136).

The first paragraph is the assertion of Freud, which gives full recognition of the biological fact. He does not linger on this point. The second paragraph is on various disciplines’ conceptualization of the biological fact, but there are good reasons to believe that Freud had his medical colleagues in his mind. As it had been pointed out by Burnham (1974, p. 193), this dual nature of instinct theory had already been accepted by the medical establishment and what Freud called “hasty conclusions” (Freud S., 1986aa, p. 135) also posited by his contemporaries such as Krafft-Ebing and Moll. The third paragraph is his way of building on the instinct theory or his psychologization of it.

Later on, Freud made two additions to the first theory concerning the sexual object and the sexual aim: source and pressure (Freud S., 1986m, p. 122). The source is again a biological postulate for Freud:

“By the source [Quelle] of an instinct is meant the somatic process which occurs in an organ or part of the body and whose stimulus is represented in mental life by an instinct. We do not know whether this process is invariably of a chemical nature or whether it may also correspond to the release of other, e.g. mechanical, forces. The study of the sources of instincts lies outside the scope of psychology. Although instincts are wholly determined by their origin in a somatic source, in mental life we know them only by their aims. An exact knowledge of the sources of an instinct is not invariably necessary for purposes of psychological investigation; sometimes its source may be inferred from its aim.” (Freud S., 1986m, p. 123).

The pressure of an instinct is similar to the source by not being a psychological component of an instinct. Freud describes pressure as: “By the pressure [Drang] of an instinct we understand its motor factor, the amount of force or the measure of the demand for work which it represents.” (Freud S., 1986m, p. 122). Biologically speaking, instincts exist; they emerge from a source and apply pressure. From then on, psychology took place “an instinct is a stimulus applied to the mind” (Freud S., 1986m, p. 118). By this formulation, Freud concluded that the human mind gives meaning to this internal pressure consciously or mainly unconsciously. Also, the aim of every instinct is to be satisfied (Freud S., 1986m, pp. 118-
according to Fechner’s rule called “principle of constancy” or Freud’s rule called “pleasure principle”. According to Fechner, the quantity of excitation must be held at a constant level, or at least at a low level. Every stimulation seeks discharge to keep the excitation at a low level (Sulloway, 1979, pp. 62-63). Freud used this idea from Studies on Hysteria onward with the addition of his pleasure principle, which means human beings tend to obtain pleasure and avoid unpleasure (Freud S., 1986f, pp. 9-10). Therefore, the aim of an instinct may seem solely physiological. However, through psychoanalytical observation, Freud discovered that aim-inhibited love exists for family or friends (Freud S., 1986h, pp. 102-103). According to Freud, since there is no other source in a biological organism to provide love, the source of all versions of love is sexual instinct. Thus, following Darwin, Freud claimed that the abhorrence of incest does not exist as an innate category (Ritvo, 1990, pp. 106-107). However, with reaching puberty, youngsters can learn (by the demand of society and through the superego) to inhibit the aim of sexual instinct (Freud S., 1986aa, pp. 225-227). Therefore, the aim of the instinct can be repressed, which means it can be controlled or inferred by the psychological establishment. The only thing left is the object of an instinct that solely depends on psychological factors.

The category itself, the object of instinct, shaped the views of Freud against other sexologists. Object-choice is usually understood from the lens of biological categorization of normal and abnormal. Normal is defined as a reproductive heterosexual relationship. As Darwin pointed out, the survival of the fittest was only one aspect of evolution. For any species to survive, they had to reproduce (Sulloway, 1979, p. 252). Therefore, from a biological point of view, normal was directing sexual instinct to heterosexual relationships for reproductive purposes. Even though Freud did not renounce this categorization once and for all, he questioned the very basis of these categories (Smith, 1999a, pp. 56-57). He asserted that the true source of object-choice is what we learn through conventions (Freud S., 1986aa, p. 151). Since the only biological aim of the instinct is to be discharged (solely quantitative), the object of that discharge was irrelevant (qualitative) for our bodies (Freud S., 1986aa, p. 162).

Breuer made the first reference to Fechner’s idea, but he referred to the acceptance of this idea to Freud (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 197). In another place, Freud also referred to Darwin’s “principle of the overflow of excitation,” which can be read in parallel to Fechner’s idea, and it would still show Freud’s indebtedness to the biological paradigm but especially to Darwin (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 91). For a comprehensive evaluation of Fechner’s influence on Freud, see: (Micale & Dubor, 1993).

Although, he chose to refer to it as “regarded as normal” when he needed to mention it (Freud S., 1986aa, p. 162).
Therefore, all the factors that lead us to certain object-choices were determined by psychological factors such as conventions, disgust, and shame (Freud S., 1986aa, p. 159). In addition to this, Freud discovered that infants have sexual instincts. However, it differs from the sexuality that appears after puberty.

Only driven forces at this age are seeking discharge or seeking pleasure. After obtaining the pleasure of breast-sucking, the infant would like to repeat the pleasure, and when the mother is away, his object-choice would be his thumb, and thumb-sucking would be the sexual activity (Freud S., 1986aa, pp. 181-182). Before getting to the age of five, infants use anal and phallic zones for the same kind of pleasure-seeking activity. These stages are characterized by the leading erotogenic zones that can be categorized under the name of autoerotism. Only through development would they be taught which object-choices are acceptable. Acceptable objects would be internalized through the Oedipus complex and identifying with the father. From then on, an adult can develop an aversion to particular objects, or even disgust, concerning the idea of those objects.

Freud divided the instinct theory into four categories and accepted two of these as solid biological facts. The categories of aim and object were reserved for psychological purposes. These two categories and their connotations could be identified as the difference between human and animal instincts. Freud’s treatment of sexual instincts is usually understood as his reductionism or appetite to explain everything with sexuality (Freud S., 1986aa, p. 134). However, it could be understood as his significant discovery that explains what it means to be human. What makes human beings, just another animal species, different from the others. His interference with the biological paradigm not only weakened the moral and medical meaning of abnormality (Gay, 1978, p. 73) and opened the possibility to the acceptance of non-heterosexual categories of sexuality, but it also paved the way for preventing different kinds of neurosis from emerging at all. Some psychological disturbances such as hysteria emerge solely from unacceptable forms of sexual object-choices, even with

---

42 This idea could be more intelligible when we explore the effects of the so-called Helmholtz School on Freud. However, this is a task for the next chapter.  
43 From this point of view, physiologically, none of the objects would be out of the table as long as they discharge the quantity of excitation. However, when Freud came to the question of licking excrement or necrophilia and other forms of perversion, he retreated from his hypothesis for the sake of reserving the perversion category for these groups of people. Nevertheless, he warned his medical colleagues that these behaviors do not necessarily lead to neurosis (Freud S., 1986aa, p. 161).
the patients consciously being at peace with their object-choice as we saw from the case history of Miss Lucy R. (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 117).

We have covered the essence of Freud’s usage of the instinct theory with partial exclusions of various vicissitudes until 1920. After that point, he came up with a new category in his Beyond Pleasure Principle: death instinct. In 1915, Freud said there could be a possibility in the future for a new formula of categorizing primal instincts. However, he was only able to distinguish two of them at the moment, self-preserving or ego and sexual instincts (Freud S., 1986m, pp. 123-124). Freud proposed a formulation only five years later when he introduced the death instinct as speculation. Three years later, he said he had no doubts about the existence of the death instinct. He stated that the main antagonism of human beings was the struggle between life (sexual) and the death instinct.

The most vital impulse must have come from World War I concerning death instinct. During WWI, there were many cases where soldiers showed serious dysfunctions such as tremors and paralysis, which at first sight looked like disturbances to motor skills. However, the psychical characters of these disturbances were unmistakable (Freud S., 1991e, pp. 212-213). These dysfunctions are called war neuroses in Freud’s writings. Freud’s pleasure principle could not explain these soldiers’ behaviors when they had been exposed to these traumatic events. The actuality of the day and the pressing issues of his field helped Freud to question his cultural capital's limits. He was assigned to examine the treatments of shell-shocked soldiers (Jones E., 1964, p. 493). Ernst Simmel, independently of any psychoanalytical movement at the time, applied Freud’s method and obtained positive results on traumatized soldiers (Freud S., 1991e, pp. 214-215). These developments led Freud to recognize another pattern in the human mind: the compulsion to repeat. Until 1920, Freud believed that pleasure-seeking and avoiding unpleasure were the main thrusts of the human mind. After, he recognized that human beings tend to repeat unpleasurable acts or thoughts from a very early age. He explained this tendency as the ego’s wish to acquire a mastery or “instinct for mastery” over things that the ego has no control over (Freud S., 1986f, p. 16). Also, the repetition of unpleasant acts and thoughts is still one of the therapeutic processes in treating phobia and trauma (Foa, 2011, p. 1043). Therefore, this wish to gain mastery over uncontrollable external events sometimes overrides the pleasure principle (Freud S., 1986f, p. 22). That is what exists beyond the pleasure principle.
Freud concluded that we have a tendency toward earlier stages of things (Freud S., 1986f, p. 36). We want to go back to the earlier stages of our personal history or our species’ history. In this sense, instincts are conservative (Freud S., 1986f, pp. 37-38). They would like to return back. Going back to the inanimate stage is an ultimate return since all animate life sprung from an inanimate one (Freud S., 1986f, p. 38). Therefore, the ultimate compulsion to repeat is, being inanimate, otherwise known as death. This force cannot be categorized with any other instinct; thus, the death instinct deserves to be a primal category amongst instincts. Consequently, sexual instinct and self-preservative instinct merged into the category of life instinct in opposition to death instinct (Freud S., 1986f, pp. 52-53).

The change in Freud’s thinking becomes apparent when we follow his exploration style. Earlier, when he used the instinct theory, he directly took the biological paradigm's suggestion. He only psychologized when chemical forces of the body exceeded the barrier of its quantitative laws and got meaning by the mind (Freud S., 1986f, pp. 8-9). However, here he proposes a new category to biology from the observations of psychoanalysis with the assistance of philosophers and poets (Freud S., 1986f, p. 50; 58). It is not the first time Freud showed his indebtedness to poets and philosophers, yet this was the first time he attempted to change the categories of biology and admitted it in the following way: “Psycho-analysis, which could not escape making some assumption about the instincts, kept at first to the popular division of instincts typified in the phrase ‘hunger and love’.” (Freud S., 1986f, p. 51). After the justification of compulsion to repeat and the death instinct, Freud started to explore the biological theories of his day to see if he could find a claim to disprove his claims. Unsurprisingly, he fails to do so (Freud S., 1986f, p. 49).

This is a significant change in Freud’s approach to biology. He always considered biology “the underlying bedrock” of psychoanalysis (Freud S., 1986d, p. 252). He accepted the laws of biology then built a psychological theory from his observations. Hence, he had a psychological theory supported by biology. In this instance, psychoanalysis is in the position to teach biology. Biology as an “underlying bedrock” is replaced with biology as a “land of unlimited possibilities,” which Freud took his part in as an inventor (Freud S., 1986f, p. 60). He added that he was only speculating this new duality of instincts. Freud was sure of his observations on the compulsion to repeat while also admitting that he was not quite sure of his death instinct (Freud S., 1986f, p. 59). That uncertainty took a few years, and he came to a

---

44 The latter will be discussed under the recapitulation theory.
point where he could not think any other way (Freud S., 1986h, p. 119). Many of his followers did not accept the new theory of instincts (Jones E., 1964, p. 505).

Later, the same discontent by his followers appeared against his usage of Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics. The death instinct and Freud’s usage of Lamarckian theory help us to date his changing attitude towards biology. Until 1915, his usage of instinct and recapitulation theories was solely based on his biological knowledge from years as a student when he collected most of his books written by Darwin. Until that point, his ignorance towards Lamarckian theory can be traced back to Claus’s undermining of Lamarck. Since Freud could not be acquainted with Lamarckian ideas in his student years, he discovered them independently. The same applies to the death instinct. Until the beginning of WWI, Freud was very pleased with biology as he knew. However, the beginning of war required new perspectives. Freud’s attitude towards the theory of instincts was his answer to the destruction he had witnessed and, more specifically, the damage that the war caused to people. Therefore, we can say that war brought the paradigm shift in Freud’s attitude towards the biological paradigm. This paradigm shift results from his lack of emotional energy towards biology. Freud was never in any network of biological field, and when he was faced with the first real problem, his cultural capital was shattered. Since he had high emotional energy toward his invention, psychoanalysis, he found the strength to question his biological cultural capital. The next shift in his biological paradigm would take place when Nazis would be on the rise. We will discuss his first and later applications of Lamarckian theory later.

4.1.3. The Recapitulation Theory

Freud’s usage of biology can be found in all his psychoanalytic writing. Evolutionary biology, per se, is used in the service of his social psychology. His knowledge of evolutionary biology, which he carried from his early student years, was on the decline until he moved to Brücke’s laboratory. After his graduation, his studies took a different turn until his psychological studies started. When he started dealing with neurosis, biology was inescapable, providing fruitful conclusions. Besides the instinct theory, Freud made good use of the recapitulation theory. When he decided to apply his clinical experience to social theory, the recapitulation theory was his most effective tool, which peaked in *Totem and Taboo*. This theory had immense success in spreading the method of psychoanalysis to other scientific fields. From that point on, psychoanalysis was used by Freud and his followers to explain
social matters.\textsuperscript{45} When psychoanalysts needed to explain the behaviors of primitive people in comparison with children and neurotics, they found the treasure of Haeckelian theory.

Haeckel, known as the popularizer of Darwinian theories in the German language (Marcaggi & Guénolé, 2018, p. 5), was not just a vigorous advocate of evolution. He was also a contributor to the theory of evolution. Even though his theories sometimes puzzled Darwin himself (Gould, 1977, p. 79), some regarded him as more influential than Darwin (Nordenskiöld, 1929, p. 77). Some of the words he invented are still in use today in everyday language and biology, such as ecology, ontogeny, and phylogeny (Kutschera, 2016, p. 2). One of the most influential theories he set forth was the recapitulation theory, also known as biogenetic law, which found its use in psychology, education, criminal anthropology, and so on (Gould, 1977, pp. 115-166). The essence of the idea was his description of ontogeny (individual development) as a short and rapid recapitulation of phylogeny (evolutionary development of species as a whole) (Sulloway, 1979, p. 199). He believed that ontogeny did not have an independent status. It can only mechanically repeat the phylogeny (Gould, 1977, p. 78). Therefore, Haeckel gave a determinate power to the evolution of species over the members of the species. This theory can be seen as a chapter in the long tradition opposite the Cartesian understanding of the world where the mind is described as an undetermined force of humans and knows no limitation. According to Haeckel, that limitation was the body itself, as determined in evolutionary history.

It was not hard to adapt this biogenetic law to psychoanalysis since Freud chose his side in that discussion when he gave a determined status to the unconscious over ego. The recapitulation theory gave a chance to construct adult life independent of the evolutionary framework. Freud converges to Kantian Enlightenment which described Enlightenment as “mankind’s exit from its self-incurred immaturity” (Kant, 1996, p. 58).\textsuperscript{46} Freud used Haeckel’s theory as an equalizer between savages and children or neurotics, which was already

\textsuperscript{45} As early as 1920, Wheeler observed the relationship between psychology and biology, and he was disappointed by psychologists for not even considering biology as a part of human psychology. The only exception to this was psychoanalysts who he even found courageous: “In nothing is the courage of the psychoanalysts better seen than in their use of the biogenetic law. They certainly employ that great biological slogan of the nineteenth century with a fearlessness that makes the timid twentieth century biologist gasp.” (Wheeler, 1920-1921, p. 317).

\textsuperscript{46} Apart from the Neo-Kantian scientific paradigm that had influenced Freud’s teachers and colleagues, Kant is the most cited philosopher in Freud’s writings (Brook, 2003, p. 20; 36).
embedded in the theory. However, he exempted adulthood as a potential differentiation from savages. According to Freud's theory, there is no need to say humanity failed to become an adult in the Kantian sense.

Freud used the recapitulation theory as a presupposition. He directly put it forward and did not question it. Afterward, he invented psychological extensions based on the recapitulation theory. The parallels between religious acts and obsessional neuroses were not new to Freud (Freud S., 1975a). However, in *Totem and Taboo*, mere analogies took the causal form of explanation with the help of the recapitulation theory.

According to Haeckel, ontogeny was the mechanical repetition of phylogeny (Gould, 1977, p. 78). Haeckel’s primary studies focused on morphology and embryology. His biogenetic law resulted from his studies on embryology, and he did not attach any predictive value to his formulation (Marcaggi & Guénolé, 2018, p. 5). Freud’s usage of the idea somewhat differed from Haeckelian embryology. In Freud’s time, the biogenetic law was prevalent and gave an impetus for numerous studies in biology (Richards R. J., 2008, pp. xvii-xviii). The idea could be found in embryology textbooks (Ritvo, 1990, pp. 89-90). Thus, Freud’s conception of Haeckelian law might have been influenced by a loose version of the idea. Therefore, we cannot deem Freud as a pupil of Haeckel but as a distant admirer. That distance must have resulted from his interaction with Claus and Claus’s depiction of Haeckel.

Freud was able to learn from phylogeny and reconstruct his ontogenetic research. However, he knew psychological ontogeny better than phylogeny. Furthermore, through the end of *Totem and Taboo*, he invented a phylogenetic origin story that he needed to justify his ontogeny. He did not hide his intention of using anthropology to social psychological inferences (Freud S., 1986ab, p. 22). Therefore, he was using his clinical observations to

---

47 This sentence may explain better what exactly Haeckel meant by ontogeny and why Freud’s approach to theory was already embedded in it: “The story of the development of the individual until it reaches maturity was then called ontogeny (on = being), which coincides generally with embryology (though it may also include the growth of the child).” (Bölsche, 1906, p. 231)

48 Although, in his letter to Einstein, he seems to expect us to be rebellious against the war (and to some degree, we are already, according to him) due to the progress of civilization (Freud S., 1986ad, pp. 214-215).

49 Freud’s approach to the psychological character of religious acts can be traced back to 1897 in his letters to Fliess. (Masson, 1985, p. 286).

50 One of the most popular zoology textbooks of the time was written by Carl Claus (Nyhart, 2012, p. 256).
construct a psychological phylogeny, and with this mediation, he was constructing the social psychology of his day.

Taboo is the sum total of restrictions and prohibitions against certain acts which found its source in the prohibition against the instincts, most overtly, against the sexual instinct (Freud S., 1986ab, pp. 18-22). It shows itself mainly in the incest taboo as primitive societies took shape based around this taboo (Freud S., 1986ab, pp. 11-12). Also, the strength of incest taboo could be seen in a civilization that Freud explored later in a more detailed manner. A primitive version of taboo and its effects on men (touching phobia) could be traced in anthropological findings (Freud S., 1986ab, p. 27). The parallels of these prohibitions could be found in children whose first object-choice in the family was prohibited. These prohibitions cause actual fear against the father (who prohibited incest with the child’s mother and his sisters), and even this fear can be transferred to something else, such as animals, and can also create animal phobia (Freud S., 1986ab, p. 127). Since the father is not only the object of hatred but also an object of love and this twofold relationship towards the father causes what Bleuler called “ambivalence” (Freud S., 1986ab, p. 29). In addition, the prohibition would not abolish instinct. It only helps to repress the instinct to the unconscious. As shown in savages —with the help of anthropological evidence— and children —with psychoanalytical observation— both suffer from repression. Then, they carry the repressed instinct in their unconsciousness (Freud S., 1986ab, p. 29). Savages may acquire repression by the actual parricide. Freud thought that children are sure to experience the Oedipus complex and learn to repress their instincts. However, even when children would not experience every step of the Oedipus complex from their own experience, they carry the burden from their ancestral experience since ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny.  

Footnote 51: Freud always defended to find psychological findings through clinical psychoanalytic work. Thus, he used the biogenetic law rarely in his ontogeny. However, there are exceptions to this rule. After using every possible means of psychoanalysis, he explained individual psychology from a phylogenetic point of view. Examples of this could be found in his various writings. See: (Freud, 1986w, p. 547; 1986y, p. 48; 1986aa, p. 131; 1986m, p. 120; 1991f, pp. 119-200; 1986a, pp. 370-371; 411; 1991c, pp. 86-87; 119-120; 1986k, p. 143; 1986u, pp. 34-37; 1986p, pp. 86-87; 1986o, pp. 99-100; 1986c, pp. 188-189). Sulloway points out the theory of neurosis is heavily influenced by phylogeny, or the gaps are filled by phylogeny (Sulloway, 1979, pp. 369-374). This is only partially true. While he found his social theories by applying ontogeny to phylogeny, he applied phylogeny to ontogeny in the theory of neurosis only above-cited a few times after exhausting other means of psychoanalysis (Freud S., 1991c, p. 97; Garcia, 1992, p. 150). We can still say that his assumption of ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny saved both sides of the theory. With this assumption, he claimed the universality of his theories,
cannot overcome the so-called Oedipus complex, which means he cannot find a substitute object instead of what is prohibited for the discharge of the instinct, he would develop neurosis and show parallels with savages such as the omnipotence of thought, touching phobia and so on.

One part deserves to be quoted in its totality since it contains everything we need to understand about Freud’s understanding of social psychology:

“In the first place, then, it must be said that there is no sense in asking savages to tell us the real reason for their prohibitions— the origin of taboo. It follows from our postulates that they cannot answer, since their real reason must be ‘unconscious’. We can, however, reconstruct the history of taboo as follows on the model of obsessional prohibitions. Taboos, we must suppose, are prohibitions of primaeval antiquity which were at some time externally imposed upon a generation of primitive men; they must, that is to say, no doubt have been impressed on them violently by the previous generation. These prohibitions must have concerned activities towards which there was a strong inclination. They must then have persisted from generation to generation, perhaps merely as a result of tradition transmitted through parental and social authority. Possibly, however, in later generations they may have become ‘organized’ as an inherited psychical endowment. Who can decide whether such things as ‘innate ideas’ exist, or whether in the present instance they have operated, either alone or in conjunction with education, to bring about the permanent fixing of taboos? But one thing would certainly follow from the persistence of the taboo, namely that the original desire to do the prohibited thing must also still persist among the tribes concerned. They must therefore have an ambivalent attitude towards their taboos. In their unconscious there is nothing they would like more than to violate them, but they are afraid to do so; they are afraid precisely because they would like to, and the fear is stronger than the desire. The desire is unconscious, however, in every individual member of the tribe just as it is in neurotics.

The most ancient and important taboo prohibitions are the two basic laws of totemism: not to kill the totem animal and to avoid sexual intercourse with members of the totem clan of the opposite sex.

These, then, must be the oldest and most powerful of human desires.” (Freud S., 1986ab, pp. 31-32).

such as the Oedipal complex. Also, his distaste for Claus's research project can be explained from this point of view. He needed a biological paradigm as a general assumption. Still, he did not want to become a part of small components of the theory, such as his master Claus did in his zoological studies.
According to this passage, even though some savages experienced the primal act which caused the prohibition, most of them were just unconsciously under the spell of prohibition as we do. From today’s knowledge of obsessional neuroses, we can reconstruct history. Ontogeny was a mechanical repetition of phylogeny; therefore, the knowledge of ontogeny could allow us to reconstruct phylogeny. For Freud, this was just a logical inference of the biogenetic law. What we learn from incestuous prohibition and every renunciation of our instincts would be reassured by parental or social authorities and eventually took the organized form as an “inherited psychical endowment” (Freud S., 1986ab, p. 31). Whether innate (Freud was in favor of his claim) or learned through education, taboos get fixed and constitute the most potent human desires with staying unconscious. They are the most powerful because they are the oldest.

Consequently, history gave power to psychoanalytical inference just because they were old enough. It is how most theories work. In social theory, we can see history as a justification for today’s situation. Theories of the state of nature are supposed to justify how we live our lives today; the communal societies are supposed to justify the fight for a communist world, and how primitive societies lived their lives is supposed to give meaning to how we perceive the world around us. Besides, this is not just true for Freud but today’s evolutionary psychology, also.

In the last chapter of *Totem and Taboo*, Freud gave his ultimate historical construction: the primal parricide. Freud depended on Darwin’s theory of small hordes (Sulloway, 1979, p. 372). According to this theory, primitive men, like apes, lived in small hordes under the powerful male who took the wives and daughters as his property. He deprived his sons and the rest of the clan of his property, hence, demanded them to renounce their sexual instincts towards his property. The only way to take the father's place was the father's death, and that position was reserved for the strongest son. Afterward, that son would take the father's place, continuing the same conditions. The young males would be expelled when they grow up with the hope of finding a partner from a different clan that had not been prohibited from them. When they settled, they would build their hordes to which they applied the same rules as their fathers (Freud S., 1986ab, p. 125).

Freud based his discussion on how this cycle broke with the help of Frazer’s explanation of totem. According to Frazer, totem animals are regarded as ancestors of the hordes (Freud S., 1986ab, p. 131), and this belief is handed down to the next generations.
Thus, both exogamy and totem were ancestral in their origin. Totem animals could not be killed or even touched. Freud drew a parallel between this inhibition against a totem animal and children’s animal phobia. Both case histories of Little Hans and Árpád helped Freud realize that the animal was the father's substitute (Freud S., 1986ab, pp. 129-130). Then, the origin of the totem and the Oedipus complex must have been the same. From this parallel, Freud put forward his primal parricide hypothesis. His sons must have killed and devoured the father of small hordes. However, this act must have given rise to a horrible sense of guilt. Sons who banded up against their father, who was loved and hated at the same time, must have replaced the father with a totem animal to compensate for their sin. In the body of totem animals, they could show respect for the late father. This view of Freud was justified with a festival so-called totem meal\(^{52}\) where all the clan members got together, killed the totem animal, and ate it. In this way, they took responsibility for their crime and discharged their sense of guilt from the parricide. This construction was the historical justification of the Oedipus complex and his psychological analysis of social organizations such as religion and culture, and so on.

This ultimate construction was Freud’s excellent usage of biology in the justification of psychoanalysis. Without the opportunity that the recapitulation theory provided, Freud could draw many parallels between savages and neurotics, ceremonies and religions, and civilized men and primitive men. However, the recapitulation theory turned every possible analogy into a causal explanation as Haeckel envisaged it (Gould, 1977, p. 78). Today the recapitulation theory has lost its status as a valid scientific theory (Ritvo, 1990, p. 88). This can mean all of Freud’s causal links turned into analogies, again, or some other causal links can be maintained by psychoanalysts between primitive societies and neurotics or children.\(^{53}\) However, one thing is for sure. Freud was a student of biology, and he did not hesitate to push respectable biological theories of his days to extreme conclusions. His imagination was fully justified by the scientific theories available to him, and he was the master of psychologization of the teachings of various disciplines.

### 4.1.4. Lamarckian Theory

\(^{52}\) This idea belongs to Robertson Smith, and Freud acknowledges his readers about the origin of this idea (Freud S., 1986ab, pp. 132-133).

\(^{53}\) An attempt of this kind could be found in: (Solms, 2021).
After WWI, Freud’s interest overtly shifted to social matters, which he had an enthusiasm for from the beginning (Freud S., 1991a, p. 72). As we have seen, he was not entirely detached from them, yet, his main interest was psychological studies before the war. During the war, he started to find much free time by reducing the number of patients. They were not the best definition of free time since it was wartime. His sons were in the front, and everyone suffered many shortages. Freud was luckier than the general public to acquire even some luxuries, although he still had to write his letters and texts with shaking hands because he could not afford the heating (Jones E., 1964, pp. 439-440). These were not the ideal free times, yet, they were filled with a new set of writings by Freud: *The Metapsychological Papers*.

In 1915, he wrote twelve texts which explored the basic psychoanalytic concepts. According to Freud, none of the sciences start with a clearly defined set of concepts and dwells upon them. On the contrary, every concept possibly changes during the development of science, and they can end up with new meanings and implications based on the observations made along the path. Consequently, psychoanalytical concepts needed a new exploration to summarize the new meanings they had acquired through the years (Freud S., 1986m, p. 117). He wrote twelve papers with this purpose, yet, only five were published during his lifetime. The other seven could not survive and were thought to have never been written or destroyed by Freud. However, this consensus changed (Ritvo, 1990, p. 28) with the discovery of one of these papers in 1983 by Ilse Grubrich-Simitis: *The Phylogenetic Phantasy: Overview of the Transference Neuroses*.

This paper has a different character than the other five published papers. All the other papers are based on the theories that had already existed in psychoanalytic literature. However, this paper uses a theory that Freud had never used before (Ritvo, 1990, p. 35), namely, the inheritance of acquired characteristics (Freud S., 1987, p. 10). The theory was asserted by French biologist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744 – 1829), one of the earliest supporters of evolutionary ideas in modern biology. He predated Charles Darwin (1809 – 1882) with this support to evolutionary ideas; however, he was not defending the ideas from the same theoretical stance as Darwin. Even though Darwin accepted his use and disuse theory, later on, he found Lamarckian theories nonsense (Ritvo, 1990, p. 33). Today, also they are perceived as two different sides of the evolutionary theory, yet, it was not always like this (Ritvo, 1990, p. 31). Besides Darwin’s early aversion to Lamarck, Haeckel listed him, alongside Goethe and Darwin, one of the founders of evolutionary ideas (Haeckel, 2018, pp.
Lamarck did not receive a warm welcome in his days; nonetheless, with Darwin’s introduction of evolution, his ideas gained interest, also (Ritvo, 1990, p. 146). Freud was unaware of this increased interest concerning Lamarck until 1915. He did not mention Lamarckism until 1915, which could have helped him in Totem and Taboo. The main reason for Freud’s ignorance about Lamarck is probably rooted in his education under Carl Claus. It seems like Claus did not mention Lamarckian ideas until 1888 (Ritvo, 1990, p. 146), which is much later than Freud’s graduation. Unlike Darwin and Haeckel, Lamarck stayed a treasure that Freud had to find himself very late in life.

Freud’s only published reference to the inheritance of acquired characteristics appeared in Moses and Monotheism as late as 1939 (Freud S., 1986o, pp. 99-100). The idea took a turn from early usage in 1915. Around 1915, Freud did not only use Lamarck in his metapsychological paper. He was also planning to write a co-authored book with Sandor Ferenczi based on Lamarckian theory (Young A., 2006, pp. 181-182). His application of Lamarckism at that time seemed like dwelling on Haeckelian recapitulation theory. The advantage of the Lamarckian theory is its usage of unconscious ideas in itself, at least for Freud; thus, he did not have to psychologize it more. The theory came with that element in itself.

The book called Zoological Philosophy, which Freud used when he studied Lamarck, describe Lamarckism as it follows:

54 Earlier, he cited Lamarck’s study on cocaine (Freud S., 1974, p. 53), but the specific idea called Lamarckism or the inheritance of acquired characteristics did not appear in his books or letters until 1915.
55 Freud openly defended Lamarckism by this reference for the first time (Bowdler, 1996, pp. 432-433). However, he used Lamarckism in his other writings by referring to it as archaic inheritance or archaic heritage. These usages are in line with ideas that he developed in A Phylogenetic Fantasy to explain psychoneuroses or symbolism in dream formation. Freud’s attempts to explain ontogeny by phylogeny were already juxtaposed in an earlier footnote. After 1914 (including the later editions of his earlier books), Freud’s references to phylogeny for explaining ontogeny included Lamarckism or archaic inheritance. Nevertheless, the degree of importance he attached to Lamarckism gradually increased over time. The phylogeny was used to demonstrate innate dispositions by Freud. Over time, he claimed that not only was the structure transmitted, but also the content of memory was transmitted. In Moses and Monotheism, Freud used Lamarckism in its most radical form, and we will discuss this book in length. For more information on Freud’s changing usage of Lamarckism, see: (Jones E., 1957, pp. 308-314).
“FIRST LAW.
In every animal which has not passed the limit of its development, a more frequent and continuous use of any organ gradually strengthens, develops and enlarges that organ, and gives it a power proportional to the length of time it has been so used; while the permanent disuse of any organ imperceptibly weakens and deteriorates it, and progressively diminishes its functional capacity, until it finally disappears.

SECOND LAW.
All the acquisitions or losses wrought by nature on individuals, through the influence of the environment in which their race has long been placed, and hence through the influence of the predominant use or permanent disuse of any organ; all these are preserved by reproduction to the new individuals which arise, provided that the acquired modifications are common to both sexes, or at least to the individuals which produce the young.” (Lamarck, 1963, p. 113).

The first law indicates the use and disuse, and the second law is about the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Lamarck was purporting that the volition of an animal had a role in the process of evolution. According to Darwin, the fittest among the animals was favored by natural selection. Lamarck thought that animals were adapting to their environment. They were using and disusing certain organs to adapt to their environment, and this new complex form of the animal (reached by the animal’s volition) was passed down to later generations. From Lamarck’s understanding, it was evident that what was inherited was not the volition itself but the result of the volition. Freud immediately recognized this volition as the unconscious in a letter to Karl Abraham. That was the minor adjustment that Freud has made.

“Have I really not told you anything about the Lamarck idea? It arose between Ferenczi and me, but neither of us has the time or spirit to tackle it at present. The idea is to put Lamarck entirely on our ground and to show that the 'necessity' that according to him creates and transforms organs is nothing but the power of unconscious ideas over one's own body, of which we see remnants in hysteria, in short the 'omnipotence of thoughts'. This would actually supply a psycho-analytic explanation of adaptation; it would put the coping stone on psycho-analysis. There would be two linked principles of progressive change, adaptation of one's own body

57 In Freud’s adjustment, psycho-Lamarckism of August Pauly might have played a role (Marcaggi & Guénolé, 2018, p. 5)

This was a great discovery for Freud. He was using the recapitulation theory, yet he was aware of its deficiencies for psychoanalytic purposes. Before he discovered Lamarck, he explained the collective mind from a Haeckelian point of view. That was the best available theory for him. However, near the end of Totem and Taboo, he expressed his discontent toward his theoretical material. He said that without presupposing the existence of a collective mind, his social psychology would be impossible. Finally, Freud came to a point where he described what he meant, and that passage almost sounds like he is describing the Lamarckian theory (or better, his understanding of the Lamarckian theory) without knowing it:

“No one can have failed to observe, in the first place, that I have taken as the basis of my whole position the existence of a collective mind, in which mental processes occur just as they do in the mind of an individual. In particular, I have supposed that the sense of guilt for an action has persisted for many thousands of years and has remained operative in generations which can have had no knowledge of that action. I have supposed that an emotional process, such as might have developed in generations of sons who were ill-treated by their father, has extended to new generations which were exempt from such treatment for the very reason that their father had been eliminated. It must be admitted that these are grave difficulties; and any explanation that could avoid presumptions of such a kind would seem to be preferable.

Further reflection, however, will show that I am not alone in the responsibility for this bold procedure. Without the assumption of a collective mind, which makes it possible to neglect the interruptions of mental acts caused by the extinction of the individual, social psychology in general cannot exist. Unless psychical processes were continued from one generation to another, if each generation were obliged to acquire its attitude to life anew, there would be no progress in this field and next to no development. This gives rise to two further questions: how much can we attribute to psychical continuity in the sequence of generations? and what are the ways and means employed by one generation in order to hand on its mental states to the next one? I shall not pretend that these problems are sufficiently explained or that direct communication and tradition—which are the first things that occur to one—are enough to account for the process. Social psychology shows very little interest, on the whole, in the manner in which the required continuity in the mental life of successive generations is established. A part of the problem seems to be met by the inheritance of psychical dispositions which, however, need to be given some sort of impetus in the life of the
individual before they can be roused into actual operation.”

His clear need for a causal link between individual psychology and social psychology indicates Freud’s biological disposition. When he found the Lamarckian theory and combined it with the recapitulation theory, he solved the mystery for ontogeny. Freud never used phylogenetic explanations before exhausting all the possible ontogenetic explorations (Freud S., 1991c, p. 97). Although, ontogenetic observations were insufficient when he needed to explain the whole story. In A Phylogenetic Phantasy, he got the chance to give meaning to all neuroses from a phylogenetic point of view. The Lamarckian theory explained Freud’s understanding of the origins of neuroses. He put all the known history of human beings in front of him and equated them with the ontogenetic stages of psychoneuroses.

According to this (Freud S., 1987, pp. 13-17), first, there was a “primeval paradise” where human hordes lived in a rich milieu where they could satisfy their needs. Then, the ice age arrived, which was the most challenging time in human history. The exigencies of life pressured human beings to choose between their self-preservative needs and their desire to procreate. Since they could not afford a crowded population, human beings gave in to their self-preservative needs and withdrew from their sexual desires. This very act, the renunciation of the sexual instinct in favor of self-preservative instinct, is also the real impetus in the development of civilization. This very result of experiencing the ice age also gave birth to three psychoneuroses: “anxiety hysteria, conversion hysteria, and obsessional neuroses” (Freud S., 1987, p. 13). Anxiety hysteria resulted from the need for self-preservation, which was seriously threatened by the ice age's natural conditions. The renunciation of the sexual instinct caused the conversion hysteria. The disposition to conversion hysteria is more significant in women since the birth of a child was the primary concern of women more so than for men.

Consequently, women renounced their sexual instinct to preserve a future child's life. This renunciation also gave rise to obsessional neuroses in men. The man, who had to learn to economize his libido, invested his energy into his intellect to understand the hostile world. He

\footnote{At the end of the passage, he quoted Goethe for supporting his claim. That is not new for Freud, yet, it also shows his need to find support for his understanding (Freud S., 1986ab, p. 158).}
wanted to gain mastery over the world. He created the language and perceived it as magic. This magical discovery led to the omnipotence of thought and an animistic worldview. In the end, he succeeded over nature and produced the necessary tools for living. He was also able to secure the lives of the helpless. As a reward, he gained control over the women and decided to protect his status as an alpha male. This stage of phylogenetic history gave rise to obsessional neuroses:

“Now obsessional neurosis recapitulates the characteristics of this phase of mankind, some in a negative way, because neurosis does after all [in the form of its] reaction formations, correspond to the struggle against this return. The overemphasis on thinking, the enormous energy that returns in the compulsion, the omnipotence of thoughts, the inclination to inviolable laws are unchanged features. But against the brutal impulses that want to replace love life, there arises the resistance of later developments, which from the libidinal conflict finally saps the life energy of the individual and leaves standing, leaves [over] as compulsion, only the impulses that have been displaced to trivialities. So this human type, so valuable for the development of civilization, perishes in its return from the demands of love life, just as the grandiose type of the primal father himself, who later returned as godhead, has perished in reality from the familial relationships he created for himself.” (Freud S., 1987, p. 16).

This series was followed by dementia praecox (neuroses of sons who were prohibited from sexual relationships within the family), paranoia (neuroses of sons who were banded together and built strong ties with each other through homosexuality and entered the spell of imagined persecutor), and melancholia-mania (which Freud could not date precisely but approximated it to maturity) (Freud S., 1987, pp. 17-20). Through the help of these phylogenetic phantasies, Freud succeeded in dating every psychoneurosis to a certain age. In another way of saying it, Freud causally explained why a particular neurosis appears at a certain age (Freud S., 1987, p. 12) and sometimes why they occur more in one gender than the other. Final specific dates of the aforementioned neuroses are:

“Then anxiety hysteria, almost without precondition, is the earliest [neurosis], closely followed by conversion hysteria (from about the fourth year); somewhat later in prepuberty (9-10) obsessional neurosis appears in children. The narcissistic neuroses are absent in childhood. Of these, dementia praecox in classic form is [an] illness of the puberty years, paranoia approaches the mature years, and melancholia-mania the same time period, otherwise not specifiable.” (Freud S., 1987, p. 12).
This was the first psychological usage of Lamarckism by Freud. Lamarckism and the recapitulation theory were intertwined in this paper. However, he never published this text since he was not satisfied with the result. When he sent it to Ferenczi, Freud gave him the right to keep it or throw it into the trash (Falzeder & Brabant, 1996, p. 73). Ferenczi decided to keep it, and luckily in 1983, Ilse Grubrich-Simitis discovered it. Therefore, we cannot treat this paper as completed work or the final form of Freud’s thoughts. It can only guide us to see the dispositions in Freud’s thinking. He did not arrive anywhere with this paper; however, the need for causal justification for his social psychology is unmistakable.

In 1956, Ernst Kris said, “Freud's Lamarckian propensities were much regretted by many of us” (Sulloway, 1979, p. 439). He did not mean this paper. Kris did not even know this paper had survived. He had Moses and Monotheism in mind, where Freud openly defended Lamarckism. After 1915, Freud wrote more about social matters, and it is very hard to track any need for causal explanation. He just presupposed that there is a link between individual and social psychology. He did not feel the need to fill this gap. Possibly, he could have done that in Moses and Monotheism, also. However, he chose to bring Lamarckism back.59

When Freud used Lamarckism again in Moses and Monotheism, he adjusted the theory in a way that did not exist in Lamarck’s work. He applied the inheritance of acquired characteristics to racial characteristics, namely Jewishness. According to Freud, Moses was killed by Jews (Freud S., 1986o, pp. 60-61). The idea shows an obvious parallel with the primal parricide described in Totem and Taboo. This Jewish parricide caused a sense of guilt, transmitted to successive generations, and created Jewish characteristics. Freud admits that tradition plays a role in this transmission, not just biological elements.60 One way or another,

59 Freud’s usage of Lamarckism as late as the 1930s is a controversial issue. We will only focus on its theoretical implications for his theory; however, Freud’s instance of using Lamarck might have political reasons. See: (Slavet, 2008).

60 We should add that whenever Freud came close to accepting the importance of tradition, he constantly reminded us that tradition is a way to hide or transform what was happened initially. For instance, tradition helps in transforming parricide’s memory to worship of Yahweh (Freud S., 1986o, pp. 71-72). Tradition led people to repress (not extinguish) what was originally occurred. The phylogenetic component of our mind is the only reliable source for observing unconscious memory traces (Freud S., 1986o, p. 94).
this parricide created Jewish characteristics. Freud does not explain how a biological theory about humankind can explain a specific race, yet he puts it into action.

Ernest Jones says he tried to convince Freud to eliminate this Lamarckian element in his theory. Lamarckism was already outdated, and Jones warned Freud that “no responsible biologist regarded it as tenable any longer” (Jones E., 1957, p. 313). Freud did not only keep the Lamarckian idea, but he added a passage to defend it and blamed biologists for overlooking the idea:

“On further reflection I must admit that I have behaved for a long time as though the inheritance of memory-traces of the experience of our ancestors, independently of direct communication and of the influence of education by the setting of an example, were established beyond question. When I spoke of the survival of a tradition among a people or of the formation of a people’s character, I had mostly in mind an inherited tradition of this kind and not one transmitted by communication. Or at least I made no distinction between the two and was not clearly aware of my audacity in neglecting to do so. My position, no doubt, is made more difficult by the present attitude of biological science, which refuses to hear of the inheritance of acquired characters by succeeding generations. I must, however, in all modesty confess that nevertheless I cannot do without this factor in biological evolution. The same thing is not in question, indeed, in the two cases: in the one it is a matter of acquired characters which are hard to grasp, in the other of memory-traces of external events—something tangible, as it were. But it may well be that at bottom we cannot imagine one without the other.” (Freud S., 1986o, pp. 99-100).

Even though he could have continued by merely asserting that tradition causes the transmission through generations, he did not follow that path. He did not deny its role, yet he was not convinced by it as a sufficient explanation. He had a deeply rooted belief in biology, and as he had repeated so many times that only biology could causally explain how social psychology would be possible when it needed to reflect from the knowledge attained by individual psychology. In Moses and Monotheism, he went far enough to blame contemporary biologists for his favored biological presupposition. He was, once again, going further than what biology offers and declaring a biological category of his own: transmission of unconscious motives through biological inheritance.

4.1.5. Conclusion
We do not know why Freud did not like Carl Claus, eventually. We do not know why he did not utter his name while extremely respectful towards his other masters. We only have glimpses of truth. Some argue Claus was only twenty-one years older than Freud, and he was not a great father figure compared to Brücke (Bernfeld S., 1973, pp. 226-227). Some say Claus was deeply pessimistic, and this was not an ideal character trait for Freud to feel committed (Eissler K. R., 1978, pp. 481-482). Some say Freud left Claus because staying under his tutoring was not the best career option, and Brücke’s laboratory was more interesting than tedious zoological tasks (Clark, 1980, p. 42). Maybe simply Freud’s interest shifted to “reduce or wipe out some of the ills that afflict our body” (Boehlich, 1990, p. 127), as he reported to his friend Silberstein.

We think that Freud was a lumper and Claus was a splitter. Therefore, Freud favored Haeckelian theory over Carl Claus’s slow-growing scientific rigorism. We know that Claus was negligent, and he was not the ideal supervisor to work with (Eissler K. R., 1992, p. 118). These two elements seem plausible for explaining lower emotional energy toward being a biologist and the eventual breakaway from Claus. On the one hand, even after spending many years under him, the muteness about Claus cannot be explained sufficiently in the light of existing evidence. On the other hand, his scientific indebtedness to Claus is out of the question. His usage of Darwin and Haeckel and unawareness of Lamarck until 1915 match with the education he gained from Claus. Therefore, not just the biological interests that took place in Freud’s writings, but the form of his biological knowledge, his cultural capital, could be explained by the influence of Carl Claus.

The sociological approach to historical data and Freud’s theories help us distinguish what is psychological and biological in his theories. Freud was an eclectic thinker who used biology, physiology, philosophy, and many more disciplines to form his ideas. Despite the advantages of eclecticism, one aspect of it is challenging. How should we evaluate a theory when one of its components is invalidated? For instance, there is the danger of Freud’s social psychology being disregarded after Haeckel’s biogenetic law is invalidated. We have demonstrated that Freud’s observations and the connections he established are still valid as analogies, yet not as causation as Freud intended.

61 Although, Eissler satisfactorily shows Freud could have had a great career by staying under the supervision of Claus (Eissler K. R., 1978, pp. 479-480). After all, he started his research career in a facility that hosted the most influential biologists of the time (Schefbeck, 1996, p. 8; Casellato, 2008, p. 201).
The sociological approach helped us dissect Freud’s theories from their unity and rethink their implications. Finally, this method should be applied to the other fields that Freud used in his theory through his interactions by evaluating the historical data for having the big picture. We will evaluate Freud’s relationship with his other masters in the following chapters to complete the task.

4.2. Ernst Brücke

In his autobiography, Freud wrote that he dragged himself to science that his talent could not give him the success he strived for (Freud S., 1991a, p. 9). Most probably, he had the laboratory of Carl Claus in his mind. Freud ended up in Brücke’s laboratory where he found satisfaction and, more importantly, “and men, too, whom I could respect and take as my models” (Freud S., 1991a, p. 9). Brücke certainly contributed to the scientific knowledge of Freud, yet, on a larger scale, he influenced Freud with his understanding of science as a whole. Brücke’s personality convinced Freud to be a splitter for a while. Freud’s admiration for Brücke and the environment which Brücke provided tamed Freud to be a diligent scientist. When he wrote Studies on Hysteria with Breuer, he was apologetic in his style. He was not comfortable that his scientific study seemed like “short stories” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 160). He ended up writing psychology from a “scientific” point of view only right after the publication of Studies, which would have satisfied his late master: A psychology solely based on physical and chemical forces in organisms. He failed, or at least he was not satisfied with it. However, he never lost his fate that his psychoanalysis would be confirmed one day from a neurological point of view (Freud S., 1986c, p. 182).

Freud’s early interest in physiological studies must have been awakened by the lectures that he took from Brücke. As a medical student, he had to attend Brücke’s one lecture and his laboratory courses. He even took an additional course from Brücke, which was not required by the medical school curriculum before working in his laboratory (Jones E., 1964, p. 60). When we consider the other student’s discontent about Brücke’s lectures (Mahony, 1989, p. 9; Wiest & Baloh, 2006, pp. 570-571), we can truly appreciate Brücke’s influence on Freud. Alongside the classes of Claus and Brentano, Brücke’s classes were the most occupying ones for Freud. He was a medical student with a vivid interest in biology,
philosophy, and physiology. His interest in these topics was the probable cause of his late graduation (Freud S., 1991a, p. 10). He had never fully dedicated himself to medicine⁶² and had spent most of his time in laboratories. He had never pictured himself as a physician. His idol Brücke was just like him, who had graduated from medicine but never practiced it (Bernfeld S., 1944, p. 355). From the moment of hearing “Fragment fiber die Natur” as a high school student up until one year after his graduation, he never planned his future in clinics. Although he heard another speech in 1882 from Brücke where he stated that Freud could not be promoted in his laboratory and for starting a family, Freud should practice medicine (Freud, E. L., 1975, pp. 31-32).

4.2.1. Freud as a Neurologist

Freud spent six years in Brücke’s laboratory as a researcher from 1876 to 1882 (Rosen, 1972, pp. 332-333). He conducted important studies in physiology, especially in histology. As a young researcher, he contributed to evolutionary theory and neurology of this time (Solms, 2002, pp. 19-20). He even recognized the neurons as the main particles of the nervous system (Triarhou & Cerro, 1985, p. 284) before neuron doctrine was put forward by Santiago Ramón y Cajal (Jones E., 1964, pp. 68-69). Nevertheless, the most crucial gain of these years for Freud was his scientific development. He was always disposed to a materialistic worldview (Toews, 1991, pp. 540-541). In Brücke’s laboratory, he devoted himself to materialism. He never abandoned these ideas. We can easily deduct his materialism all through his writings. We can safely say that the scientific perspective he developed in these years became the kernel of his cultural capital. A complementary parallel to his cultural capital was his emotional energy, which was raised immensely by the men he could respect and take as his models, such as Ernst Brücke and his two assistants, Sigmund Exner and Ernst Fleischl von Marxow (Freud S., 1991a, p. 9). Brücke’s laboratory was not the only place to learn and practice materialism. He could also have gained his cultural capital from other professors and laboratories. However, this workplace was where he enjoyed the happiest hours of his student life (Freud S., 1986v, p. 206).

---

⁶² He never prepared himself to be a physician. He said he passed his final exam with the help of his photographic memory, and he admitted his lack of knowledge in the field of medicine a few times in his letters to Fliess (Masson, 1985, p. 107).
Freud published five papers while still working under Brücke (Freud S., 1986b, pp. 228-230). One of these papers concerned the technique for the microscopic study of the nervous system. The others were the results of his various research. Brücke allowed his researchers to choose the problem that they wanted to explore. Also, he was ready to find a problem for the ones who needed a starting point (Jones E., 1964, p. 66). Freud’s first research in his laboratory falls into the second category. Brücke set Freud behind the microscope to explore the difference between the structure of the nerve cells of the lower and higher animals. His specimen was Petromyzon. Freud was able to show that those of lower and higher animals do not differ in their histological structure. This result suggested an evolutionary continuity (Solms, 2002, pp. 19-20). In his second research, again, he worked with Petromyzon. For a long time, the spinal ganglion cells of fish were thought to be bipolar and differed from the higher animals’ spinal ganglion cells, which were thought to be unipolar. Freud was able to show that transition between bipolarity and unipolarity can be seen in the spinal ganglia of Petromyzon (Jones E., 1964, p. 67), and again, it was a notable contribution to the evolutionary theory (Scharbert, 2009, p. 299).

In a later study, he observed the nerve cells of the crayfish. He proved that the axis cylinders of nerve fibers are fibrillary. He was the first researcher who proved this point (Jones E., 1964, p. 67). His studies were successful in their own right. Besides, these early studies contributed to the development of his thought and placed him as a Darwinian and materialistic scientist. The evolutionary continuity and proving this continuity only with observable particles demonstrate what type of scientist Sigmund Freud was and wanted to be. We have already covered the Darwinian side of Freud and the importance of the evolutionary paradigm in his later writings. In light of this new training under Brücke, we can explore what it meant to work under Brücke through Brücke’s intellectual roots.

4.2.2. Brücke and the School of Helmholtz

63 Siegfried Bernfeld coined the name for this group as the School of Helmholtz. Bernfeld was the first scholar who demonstrated the link between Freud and this school (Izenberg, 1976, pp. 36-37). Consequently, his choice of name is widely used in psychoanalytical writings, and we will follow this tradition. However, it would be appropriate to remind the readers of Cranefield’s criticism against this name. Paul Cranefield said that Helmholtz was a member
Ernst Wilhelm Ritter von Brücke was born in 1819 as a child of an artist. His aunt and uncle raised him in an intellectual atmosphere (Lohff, 2001, p. 1). As a result of this setting, his interest in different fields was aroused very early (Eissler K. R., 1978, p. 482). He graduated from the University of Berlin. Like Freud, he studied medicine. Also, like Freud, he attended non-medical lectures throughout his education, such as philosophy, philology, literature. Particular interest in languages was apparent during his university years. He signed up for English and Italian classes, and eventually, he spoke six languages. Alongside this wide range of interests, he was a painter like his father. His skills provided him an assistantship in Johannes Müller’s physiology laboratory, where he met his life-long friend and theoretical partner Emil du Bois-Reymond (Seebacher, 2006, pp. 2-3).

The friendship between du Bois-Reymond and Brücke turned into a very fruitful scientific project. Their master Müller was a supporter of vitalism. Vitalism is a belief that living organism differs substantially from non-living ones. What gives the status of a living organism must be some force that lacks in non-living objects, and that force must be the determining factor in governing principles of these two categories (Schimmel, 2014, p. 17). Brücke and du Bois-Reymond rejected their master’s beliefs for the sake of their materialistic scientific ideas. They founded Physikalische Gesellschaft (Physical Society) in 1845 and soon to be joined by two eminent scientists: Hermann von Helmholtz and Carl Friedrich Wilhelm Ludwig (Kichigina, 2009, p. 44). The program can be explained by a letter of du Bois-Reymond to Eduard Hallmann three years before the foundation of the group:

“Brücke and I pledged a solemn oath to put in power this truth: No other forces than the common physical chemical ones are active within the organism. In those cases which cannot at the time be explained by these forces one has either to find the specific way or form of their action by means of the physical mathematical method, or to assume new forces equal in dignity to the chemical physical forces inherent in matter, reducible to the force of attraction and repulsion” (Bernfeld S., 1944, p. 348).

This stance was the glue that kept the group together. All the members remained faithful to this point of view. Emil du Bois-Reymond, Hermann Helmholtz, and Ernst Brücke were the pupils of Johannes Müller, and their rejection can be understood as an oedipal revolt of the group, but not a leader in any sense. He preferred to call them “the 1847 group” (Cranefield, 1957, p. 407).
towards their intellectual father. The group saved the belief of unity of science as their master; however, they saw this link in the laws of mechanics, unlike their master and Naturphilosophie (Ritvo, 1990, p. 25). Cranefield implies that this intervention to Naturphilosophie is similar to Marx’s intervention to Hegelian dialectic: it places the idea on a materialistic basis (Cranefield, 1966, p. 1). Physiology was the science of organisms. There was something that differentiated living entities from non-living ones as a presupposition. In the eyes of the School of Helmholtz, this difference could only be explained by chemical-physical forces. Whatever takes place in the realm of organisms was belonged to the physical world, as in the case of non-living entities. Here, for elevating the group's point of view, Helmholtz entered the stage.

In 1847, at the meeting of the Physical Society, Helmholtz read a paper on the principle of conservation of energy (Ritvo, 1990, p. 165). This principle was about to ground the new physiology they were seeking on Newtonian thermodynamics. Helmholtz’s direct influence on this new physiology was the first law of thermodynamics (Churchill, 2015, p. 211). Helmholtz reduced the organisms to observable and measurable entities. From then on, every activity in organisms could have been explained by external and internal forces. Soon after the principle of conservation of energy, Helmholtz developed his theory, known as Young-Helmholtz theory64, which could exemplify the new physiology at work.

Before Thomas Young, it had been accepted that the eye had receptors for every possible color range between red and violet, and the color ranges were mixing of rays of three fundamental colors. Young showed that the eye has only red, violet, and green receptors. Interference of color took place in the organism. If one eye is exposed to red and the other to green, the subject would perceive gold. Older theories of mixing the color rays could not explain this phenomenon. Also, there were no receptors for gold; therefore, the job was completed in the physiological mechanism (Fullinwider, 1991, pp. 29-30). Helmholtz developed the theory further by including the effects of wavelengths on receptors. There were three distinct sets of nervous fibers, which he classified as red-sensitive fibers (stimulated

64 This is the same theory that Freud used against Charcot. While Charcot was conducting his lecture, Freud objected to one of Charcot’s claims by saying, “But this contradicts to Young-Helmholtz theory” (Freud S., 1986g, p. 13). The answer he received was something he never forgot and helped him to develop a distinct approach while he was developing psychoanalysis: “So much the worse for the theory, clinical facts come first” (Freud S., 1986g, p. 13).
most by the longest wavelength), green-sensitive fibers (stimulated by middle-range wavelength), and violet-sensitive fibers (stimulated by the shortest wavelength) (Finger, 1994, p. 100). Therefore, colors that we perceive are not entirely the work of external mechanisms. The Young-Helmholtz theory demonstrated that our receptors are inadequate to perceive every possible range of color. However, the receptors were able to differentiate the different quantities of wavelengths. After the different quantities were stroked to the retina, the brain was entitled to interpret them and convert them into visible colors. This job was the unconscious inference of the brain, according to Helmholtz (Makari, 1994, pp. 574-575).

Brücke developed this further. According to Helmholtz, these unconscious inferences worked as a principle or law that works as “a priori principle of causation” (Askay & Farquhar, 2006, p. 195). The wavelength, for instance, has a determining power over the unconscious inference of the brain. Brücke, on the other hand, was intrigued by the work of the brain itself — the visual illusions as Helmholtz described them (Makari, 1994, p. 575). Something was occurring in the brain which clearly was not represented in reality. Fullinwider explains Brücke’s interest in the psychological side of the physiological occurrences in the following way:

“Brücke described experiments of his own and of Helmholtz wherein colours were made to seem other than they were, and experiments in which the same degree of brightness was at different times judged bright and dark. He pointed out deceptions involving judgments of time and space and motion. In his hands the distinction between valid and invalid perception dissolved. Valid or invalid, the experienced sensation was to be seen as a construct of the cognitive constitution. ‘The brain’, he wrote in an anticipation of Gestalt psychology, ‘undertakes to complete the inadequacy of the immediate sense perception’.” (Fullinwider, 1991, p. 30).

After all, it does not seem strange how the School of Helmholtz gave cultural capital to modern psychology. Not just Freud was a pupil of Brücke and an admirer of Helmholtz65. Wilhelm Wundt was a pupil of Helmholtz (Laird, 2008, p. 34), and Ivan Pavlov was a pupil of Ludwig (Amacher, 1965, p. 9). Also, there is no wonder in Brücke’s two pupils’ attempts to

65 Freud wrote to his wife that he was taking Helmholtz as an idol (Gay, 1987, p. 18). Also, his close friend Fliess sent him a copy of Helmholtz’s book one Christmas, proving Freud’s admiration of Helmholtz and sharing his feelings toward Helmholtz with his friends (Gay, 1987, p. 61).
explain psychological phenomenon purely in the language of exact sciences: Sigmund Exner in his *Entwurf zu einer physiologischen Erklärung der psychischen Erscheinungen* (Draft for a physiological explanation of mental phenomena) and Sigmund Freud in his *Project for a Scientific Psychology*.

The dual-aspect monism approach affected Freud’s later theories. As indicated in the name, dual-aspect monism is a monistic idea that refuses the duality between mind and body. Body and mind are one and the same thing. There is no room here for any kind of idealism over materialism. There is no room for the mind to escape from its soma.

Nevertheless, if mind and body are two different realms of the same unity, there is an epistemological advantage in this point of view. It means one can investigate an individual from both of these realms (Makari, 1994, p. 556). One can observe perception, the velocity of nerves, brain, hormones, etc. Then, these measurable substrates of the individual can be associated with the subjective side of the whole. Also, the subjective or psychological side of the individual can be observed and accepted as a presupposition that whatever is found in the psychological realm, there will be a simultaneous activity in the soma. As the name suggests, an individual is an indivisible unit (Lothane, 1998, p. 44). It is a whole. As an ontological postulate, the School of Helmholtz believed in this monistic character. Epistemologically, they believed in two realms to explore this one and the same whole. However, they put most of their effort into exploring the soma. Theoretically, they believed in research in the domain of psychology and reaching a conclusion about an individual from this domain. However, in practice, they did not find the appropriate method to do the job, most of the time. Also, they did not effectively try to find a method, or they were not simply interested in finding a psychological method. They did not perceive themselves as psychologists. They were only open to the idea theoretically. Above mentioned letter of du Bois-Reymond clearly leaves an opportunity for later studies if a specific way could be found or “to assume new forces equal in dignity to the chemical-physical forces inherent in matter, reducible to the force of attraction and repulsion” (Bernfeld S., 1944, p. 348). This new research area was left open as a possibility, which their pupils gladly explored.

When Freud left the laboratory of Brücke and became a clinician, the pathway for him to explore the mind from this perspective opened; however, he did not realize it until his Paris trip. When Freud visited Salpêtrière and met with Charcot, he became aware of the
advantages of the clinical method. Every day, Freud was practicing in clinics. His clinical observations could have been his ticket to be a scientist. He did not need a lab and a microscope for being a scientific conquistador. His clinical habitat was more than enough. He found the strength and little push to practice what he learned under Brücke. He could have studied the psyche from the point of view of dual-aspect monism. Eventually, he did. However, finding a method to stay in the scientific paradigm yet, expanding it to its limits was not the most straightforward pathway. It included other friends, self-analysis, migraine, neurotic symptoms, and more or less twenty years.

4.2.3. Project for a Scientific Psychology

After returning from Salpêtrière, Freud dedicated himself more and more to psychology. He published articles in French and German, gave presentations in front of his Viennese colleagues on hysteria, neuroses, etc., and translated books on hypnosis by Charcot and Bernheim (Schwartz, 2003, p. 38; 45). Freud, the scientist, was very much into the classification, description, and aetiology of psychological ailments, and Freud, the physician, was interested in curing them.

One of the cornerstone[s] of his efforts in psychology gave its fruit in his collaborated work with Breuer called Studies on Hysteria. This work consisted of both authors' case histories, and theoretical chapters were separately written on their views on hysteria. The details of their collaboration will be discussed later. Nevertheless, their words could exemplify a significant difference in their style. Breuer approached the topic as a mere psychological topic, and he was not concerned with the book's scientific status. In other words, he did not escape to the safe waters of exact sciences. He believed psychology is a field in its own right and it should be treated in that way:

“In what follows little mention will be made of the brain and none whatever of molecules. Psychical processes will be dealt with in the language of psychology; and, indeed, it cannot possibly be otherwise. If instead of 'idea' we chose to speak of

66 The influence of Charcot will be discussed in the relevant chapter.
67 Freud wrote his last neurological work in 1897 (Freud S., 1986b, p. 256). However, up until that date, the number of neurological papers had decreased gradually.
‘excitation of the cortex’, the latter term would only have any meaning for us in so far as we recognized an old friend under that cloak and tacitly reinstated the ‘idea’. For while ideas are constant objects of our experience and are familiar to us in all their shades of meaning, ‘cortical excitations’ are on the contrary rather in the nature of a postulate, objects which we hope to be able to identify in the future. The substitution of one term for another would seem to be no more than a pointless disguise. Accordingly, I may perhaps be forgiven if I make almost exclusive use of psychological terms.” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 185)

How much Breuer kept his promise is another question (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 24). However, he clearly indicated that he was not overwhelmed by exposing psychology as a science. He did not feel the urge to reduce psychological phenomena to measurable, quantitative particles. He even claimed that these attempts are only “a pointless disguise” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 185). We cannot claim that he was against these attempts if an appropriate method was employed. Nonetheless, he was aware that his data collecting method was not already in the physiological area. Therefore, he believed that there was no sense in translating them at the end. However, Freud was not comfortable enough with their method. He was still under the sway of his own education. He was almost apologetic with their method:

“I have not always been a psychotherapist. Like other neuropathologists, I was trained to employ local diagnoses and electro-prognosis, and it still strikes me myself as strange that the case histories I write should read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious stamp of science. I must console myself with the reflection that the nature of the subject is evidently responsible for this, rather than any preference of my own. The fact is that local diagnosis and electrical reactions lead nowhere in the study of hysteria, whereas a detailed description of mental processes such as we are accustomed to find in the works of imaginative writers enables me, with the use of a few psychological formulas, to obtain at least some kind of insight into the course of that affection. Case histories of this kind are intended to be judged like psychiatric ones; they have, however, one advantage over the latter, namely an intimate connection between the story of the patient’s sufferings and the symptoms of his illness—a connection for which we still search in vain in the biographies of other psychoses.” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, pp. 160-161)

He was defending their method in a way, yet, clearly, he was not entirely comfortable with it. As he admitted, this method did not coincide with how he was trained. This feeling of not having the serious stamp of science led him to write a more serious book from a
neurological point of view. After publishing *Studies on Hysteria*, Freud met with his closest friend and confidant Wilhelm Fliess. He must have been encouraged by Fliess to write his book on neurology since he started to write his book on the train while he was returning home from the meeting with Fliess (Masson, 1985, p. 139). In one of his letters to Fliess, Freud referred to the book as “*The Psychology for Neurologists*” (Masson, 1985, p. 127). The book was his attempt to translate everything he learned from his psychological studies to his mother tongue: neurology. There were two reasons to do this. First, he wanted to draw the attention of the medical circle of Vienna with the scientific language that they were accustomed to. Therefore, this is a classic case of aiming to be in the attention space. Freud knew that he was on the edge of discovery. Their cathartic method was something new that could provide them the fame. However, they had already published this method. Now, it was time to explain the psychological mechanisms that they discovered. The best method to do this was speaking in the language of their network. Freud was very well aware of this need. The refusal of purely clinical studies and the demand of the theories based on the language of exact sciences was also uttered by Meynert when Freud presented his paper on male hysteria as early as 1886 (Schwartz, 2003, pp. 40-41). All attempts from Freud’s side, the translations, and presentations could be understood as preparing Vienna for the clinical method of France. The sales of *Studies on Hysteria* indeed proved that medical networks were not interested in the book as Freud and Breuer expected.

The second reason was more personal for Freud. He was eager to translate what he discovered in clinical studies to the language he was accustomed to. The inner struggle or urge of his cultural capital convinced him that he needed the concepts of exact science. Freud’s cultural capital, emotional energy, and the market opportunities were all at play in Freud’s mind, and these aspects led him to a neurological study.

These needs urged Freud to write his *Project for a Scientific Psychology*. This book, or manuscript, is consisted of three chapters. The first chapter focuses on defining the nervous system in a new and abstract way and associates them with psychological mechanisms such as

---

68 The first edition of *Studies on Hysteria* was printed as 800 copies, and it took fifteen years for the reprinting (Grubrich-Simitis, 1997, p. 15). We can assume that the book attracted the readers only after Freud’s later success.

69 Years later, covertly, Freud admitted his attempt was not successful: “But every attempt to go on from there to discover a localization of mental processes, every endeavour to think of ideas as stored up in nerve-cells and of excitations as travelling along nerve-fibres, has miscarried completely.” (Freud S., 1986z, p. 174).
conscion, memory, experience, satisfaction, pain, etc. The second chapter is about psychopathology, and with the assistance of the second chapter, the third chapter attempts to represent normal psychology.

Freud’s Vienna, over the years, specialized in a method of diagnosis called localization. Localization or cerebral localization is “a dominant and multifaceted approach to nineteenth-century brain research, held that either simple sensory-motor or more complex mental and affective processes could be situated within discrete anatomical areas in the brain.” (Bassiri, 2013, p. 95). Correspondingly, this was a method that pathologies were explained by the degenerations in the brain or nerve cells. Wilhelm Griesinger’s famous motto of “Mind diseases are brain diseases” summarizes the approach of the Medical School of Vienna and the impact of neuroscience on psychiatry (Smith, 1999a, p. 12). This school had the chance to use autopsy effectively for decades, and their knowledge of human anatomy was immense. However, their monistic materialism was not leaving so much room for the clinical-descriptive method that Freud became acquainted with in Paris. The shift from the German anatomical-explanatory method to the French clinical-descriptive method itself led Freud to find his new method, psychoanalysis (Solms, 2002, p. 28). Therefore, pure psychological diseases, such as hysteria that do not leave any trace in the anatomy, were treated as malingering or ignored by physicians (Schwartz, 2003, p. 44). As a parallel to this paradigm, hypnosis was considered as a method of charlatans (Gay, 1988, p. 49). Therefore, Studies on Hysteria, with its subject and cure method, did not have much chance to survive in Vienna. Not to mention openly discussing women's sexuality without retreating to the safe distance of Latin (Sulloway, 1979, pp. 456-457) as Krafft-Ebing did.

---

70 In 1753, the autopsy was declared mandatory by the state for every patient who died in the Vienna General Hospital (Batt, 2011, p. 14). Rokitansky, the cofounder of the Second Viennese Medical School, himself performed more than thirty thousand autopsies (Batt, 2011, p. 23). The Second Viennese Medical School was also one of the pioneers of laboratory studies in medicine (Gilman, 2006, p. 381).

71 Richard Freiherr von Krafft-Ebing was a famous and very influential sexologist whose theories affected many leading sexologists at the time (Sulloway, 1979, p. 295). His Psychopathia Sexualis (1886) is one of the first books on sexual pathology. He was also acquainted with Freud. In 1986, he famously said that Freud’s seduction theory is “a scientific fairy tale” (Masson, 1985, p. 184). Also, he requested from the assembly of professors with Nothnagel to propose Freud for the position of Extraordinary Professor (Ellenberger H. F., 1994, p. 453).
Freud chose to work on neuron doctrine and developed his ideas from there. The neuron doctrine as a fresh discovery seemed like a perfect match for him. The doctrine assigned neurons as observable individual cells that perform the transmission in the nervous system. Santiago Ramón y Cajal proposed the doctrine in 1888, and Heinrich Wilhelm Gottfried von Waldeyer-Hartz elucidated it in 1891. Waldeyer also gave the name neuron for these individual cells, and he popularized the doctrine in the German-speaking world (Thornton, 1986, p. 224). This doctrine provided a dynamic structure for anatomical explanations more than brain anatomy (Geroulanos, 2011, pp. 229-231).  

Freud was also disposed to the doctrine before it was discovered. According to Jones (1964, pp. 68-69), Freud even came close to discovering the doctrine himself, yet he was not clear or maybe brave enough to assert it more openly. With the assistance of the neuron doctrine, he was ready to constitute the scientific psychology that he craved for. He started Project with the following paragraph:

“The intention is to furnish a psychology that shall be a natural science: that is, to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determinate states of specifiable material particles, thus making those processes perspicuous and free from contradiction. Two principal ideas are involved: [1] What distinguishes activity from rest is to be regarded as $Q$, subject to the general laws of motion. (2) The neurones are to be taken as the material particles.” (Freud S., 1991g, p. 295).

Freud used some general principles of physiology and some of his own discoveries or abstractions. For instance, he put the neuron doctrine, the principle of inertia, and the principle of conservation of energy on his psychological system. However, he classified neurons as physical, psychological, and perceptual as his own interpretation. The ultimate goal of the organism was sustaining the state of inertia (Freud S., 1991g, pp. 295-296). Inertia could secure the peaceful living of the organism. This is called the principle of inertia, and it is very hard to sustain since the organism is not a self-sufficient system. The organism has its needs. It needs food, water, air, and so on. These are the endogenous requirements that must be fulfilled. Also, they are observable and measurable quantities. For instance, the required

---

72 Freud himself made the neuron doctrine more dynamic since he did not try to localize any of the neurons; instead, he focused on their functions (Kandel, 2012, p. 55). Freud learned this dynamic approach from Charcot. We will discuss the influence of Charcot later.
energy for the body to sustain itself could be calculated. Endogenous stimuli rise when these needs occur (Freud S., 1991g, pp. 296-297). The deprivation of food occurs as hunger. Hunger causes unpleasure since it disturbs the principle of inertia. In the state of hunger, the individuals seek to satisfy the need and get rid of the unpleasure to return to the inertia (Freud S., 1991g, p. 312).

After describing the first principle, Freud attempted to use the neuron doctrine to explain the same procedure with his own adjustments. When the exigencies of life rise in the body, they are transmitted as stimulation through neurons. The neuron which carries this message is a cathected neuron, and the same neuron continues to be empty until the associated need is satisfied (Freud S., 1991g, p. 298). When the neuron is filled with cathexis, the neuron’s main aim becomes to discharge the energy as soon as possible to get back to the inertia state. Also, before a neuron receives cathexis, it can resist being filled with it. However, resistance can be established during the contact between neurons. It means neurons cannot resist themselves, but the pathway could be resistant against being loaded by cathexis. Therefore, Freud introduced contact-barriers. The contact-barriers may serve as a protective shield against unwanted cathexis, yet, it also recognizes the inescapable needs. In addition to this, the contact-barriers are responsible for the learning processes. When any type of transmission is completed, the conductive capacity for that action would be easier next time.

---

73 The term’s original German name is Besetzung. It is translated as cathexis. Strachey’s footnote might be helpful here: “The German word is one in ordinary use, and, among many other senses, might have some such meaning as ‘occupation’ or ‘filling’. Freud, who disliked unnecessary technical terms, was unhappy when in 1922 the present editor, in the supposed interests of clarity, introduced the invented word ‘cathexis’ (from the Greek κατέχειν, cathchein, to occupy) as a translation. He may perhaps have become reconciled to it in the end, since it is to be found in his original manuscript of his Encyclopaedia Britannica article” (Freud S., 1986x, p. 63). The original use of cathexis that we come across in Project is only physiological or quantitative, converges to Helmholtz’s transformation of the word “energy” (Solms & Saling, 1990, p. 104). Later on, Freud repudiated this usage: “It is only when I speak of the ‘cathexis of psychical paths’ that I seem to depart from the analogies commonly used by Lipps. My experiences of the displaceability of psychical energy along certain paths of association, and of the almost indestructible persistence of the traces of psychical processes, have in fact suggested to me an attempt at picturing the unknown in some such way. To avoid misunderstanding, I must add that I am making no attempt to proclaim that the cells and nerve fibres, or the systems of neurones which are taking their place to-day, are these psychical paths, even though it would have to be possible in some manner which cannot yet be indicated to represent such paths by organic elements of the nervous system.” (Freud S., 1986n, pp. 147-148).

74 The contact barriers are synapses as we know them today. The synapses were only named eleven years after this manuscript (Sacks, 1998, p. 231).
The neurons start to adapt themselves for certain types of activity, and they develop a memory (Freud S., 1991g, pp. 298-300). Here Freud found two types of fundamental functions for neurons. They must be loaded by cathexis for surviving since they cannot ignore the exigencies of life. However, they want to resist cathexis for keeping the inertia as much as possible. This is a contradictory situation for neurons. Therefore, Freud concluded that there must be two types of neurons.

The first group is permeable neurons that allow the transmission without resistance and tries to discharge afterward. They act like they do not have any contact-barriers, and after the discharge, they return to their original state, unchanged. This group of neurons deserves the name permeable neurons or, in Freud’s symbolization: \( \phi \). The second group is impermeable neurons that show resistance to any excitation through their contact-barriers, and they only receive cathexis partially. Nevertheless, when they receive any excitation, they are transformed by it permanently. Thus, they represent the memory (Centonze, Siracusano, Calabresi, & Bernardi, 2004, p. 313). Freud presents these impermeable neurons as \( \psi \) (Freud S., 1991g, pp. 299-300). Consequently, \( \phi \) and \( \psi \) neurons represent the physical and psychological activity in the level of neurons. Freud made these inferences, according to his studies and readings on physiology and psychology. The explanation of the learning process by neurons leads to explaining what memory is from a neurological perspective, also. When the passage of excitation finds its way through \( \psi \) neurons, this pathway facilitates further transmissions. Therefore, memory is facilitation between \( \psi \) neurons (Freud S., 1991g, p. 300).

Freud’s system, up until that point, tried to subjugate psychology to quantities. However, he was aware that consciousness (which knows only qualities) knows nothing about the quantitative processes (Freud S., 1991g, p. 309). Neither endogenous nor exogenous quantities could say anything about how we know qualities, the things that we know, or perceive consciously. Also, he wanted to convert these qualitative representations to quantities. Here he introduced his third system of neurons, perceptual neurons, or \( \omega \) neurons. These neurons are responsible for outside knowledge, transmitting them to the neural system (Freud S., 1991g, pp. 309-310). However, the addition of \( \omega \) neurons caused more problems to Freud than they could explain. He went on for pages to fit this third system of neurons to the first scheme (Geroulanos, 2011, pp. 229-231).
After establishing his so-called $\phi\psi\omega$ system, Freud tried to explain the psychological states such as the experience of satisfaction and pain, ego, cognition, remembering, dream, and so on by his newly established system. All these states are explained or treated as known subjects, then translated to the language of neurology or Freud’s new neurology. The known parts of all these psychical states were known by psychological investigation. Freud was speaking of excitation of the cortex instead of naming it as an idea, in Breuer’s terminology, “a pointless disguise” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 185).

*Project* is a failure, as many authors have pointed out. It is a failure, mainly because even if everything Freud pointed out would be true, he still did not show how to use all these new quantities to understand psychology. He translated qualities to quantities, yet, the questions of how to observe, predict and know the psychological sphere based on these neurological terms are left unexplained. As an attempt to create scientific psychology, *Project* indicates two important sociological traits in Freud’s life. The first one is the influence of cultural capital and emotional energy on his work. He learned and sincerely believed the science and the specific way of science. Materialistic and reductionist science, primarily about quantitative, measurable entities, was the only reliable way to conduct science. All the other ways of science or sources of knowledge were dubious. Freud was trained to be this kind of scientist. He received tremendous support from Brücke in all his scientific endeavors, including finding a bursary to go to Paris (Laible, 1991, p. 256). For a long time, the paradigm that Brücke believed and taught was the one that Freud felt at home.

The second reason for writing *Project* was the need for recognition by his medical colleagues (Solms, 2005, p. 536). Obviously, Freud had a hard time introducing his new subjects. As an ailment that does not leave any trace in the nervous system (Kanzer, 1983, pp. 845-846), or in other words, unlocalizable disorder, hysteria had been overlooked. Hysteric patients were treated as malingerers by the Viennese medical establishment (Schwartz, 2003, p. 44). Hypnosis was the tool of charlatans (Dalzell, 2011, pp. 70-71). Despite recognition of hypnosis by medical circles in France, mainly by Charcot and Bernheim, Vienna was not

---

One example of the School of Helmholtz’s discontent about science without an appropriate method is how they treated Goethe. Both Hermann Helmholtz and Emil Du Bois-Reymond gave lectures on Goethe’s scientific status since Goethe was still perceived as a scientist in the second part of the nineteenth century. Both members of the school of Helmholtz criticized Goethe for his lack of method and artistic concerns over scientific truth. They only regarded some of his claims as artistic intuition, but nothing more (Nicholls, 2010, pp. 98-99; 101-102).
ready to recognize it. Neither as a cure as Bernheim suggested nor as a method of clinical study as Charcot did. Psychology or psychiatry could have received better recognition, yet, Freud was not using the methods of Viennese medical circles. *Project* was an attempt to keep the pace of his colleagues to the new discoveries. The ones that he did and the ones that he was about to discover. After describing his aim of establishing a psychology that can be a natural science at the beginning of *Project*, Freud wrote that “*Similar experiments are now frequent*” (Freud S., 1991g, p. 295). He must have been thinking about the book of Sigmund Exner that had been published a year before. Therefore, he was also trying to get a place in the attention space before it got too crowded. However, these endeavors could not create the attention that they were seeking.

After suffering a lot to solve the puzzle he created, Freud decided to put these ideas in a drawer (Masson, 1985, p. 150). They created more questions than they could solve. Also, they were keeping Freud away from what he was really about to discover. His ties were never entirely cut from the medical circle of Vienna. Nevertheless, he felt himself more and more isolated (Freud S., 1991a, p. 48). He could not get the attention that he believed he deserved. Every paper he wrote until 1899 was either ill-received or did not affect. It is controversial whether he was isolated from medical circles or isolated himself from them. However, one thing is certain. He felt almost entirely alone in his scientific journey. He only had Fliess as his confidant and supporter of his new ideas. He lost his father in 1897 and failed in his *Project*. As a result, he started his self-analysis (Chung, 2003, p. 4). He had much pain due to his neurosis and migraine. These events led him to publish his magnum opus in 1899: *Die Traumdeutung* [*The Interpretation of Dreams*].

---

76 Freud’s former master and famous psychiatrist Meynert openly attacked Freud because of his usage of hypnosis and implied that Freud was not a physician anymore since he was practicing hypnosis, something that can be practiced even by a shepherd or most likely by unmedical charlatans (Eissler K. R., 1971, pp. 354-355). We can add that the acceptance of hypnosis in France resulted from the powerful influence of Charcot (Hillman, 1965, p. 164). Therefore, we can say that Freud’s reputation was not strong enough to convince his colleagues.

77 Freud attended Exner’s lectures while he was a student (Coen, 2007, p. 100), and he was familiar with Exner’s earlier works (Wallesch & Bartels, 1996, s. 118).

78 According to Ellenberger, there is no proof of isolation from the medical circle (Ellenberger H. F., 1994, p. 448). This isolation might be what Freud felt, despite how the medical circle felt about him.
Even the name *Die Traumdeutung* suggests that he was not trying to build a bridge between his new field of study and the medical society of his city. *Die Traumdeutung* was a name that could have been found on the cover of metaphysical dream books that suggest divine interpretations for everything that appeared in a dream (Ellenberger H. F., 1994, p. 452). From *Project* to *Die Traumdeutung*, Freud lost his will to be recognized in his community. However, his first reason to write *Project* stood still. He believed in science, and he believed in being a serious scientist. He kept his belief in dual-aspect monism. He reinforced the idea of monism in his writings. Also, he understood what dual-aspect really means. Thus, he gave up restoring psychology from the physiological aspect. On the contrary, he proposed that psychoanalysis is an aspect in equal dignity to physical and chemical explanations. He claimed that he found the missing element in du Bois-Reymond's letter (Bernfeld S., 1944, p. 348).

### 4.2.4. Influence of Neurology in Freud’s Later Studies

*Project* has failed, yet, some of the ideas from the manuscript have survived (Sulloway, 1979, p. 419). The failure was transforming the mental states to nervous activities, a qualitative phenomenon to a quantitative one. However, there was no problem with saving the psychological processes that have been described in the manuscript. They had not been discovered by any neurological experiments (Geroulanos, 2011, pp. 233-234). They were known from either clinical experience or other research. Therefore, the only need was to explain them in a new way. Freud did it so. Especially in the seventh chapter of *The Interpretation of Dreams*, he reiterated most of the psychological mechanisms he wrote in *Project* (Thornton, 1986, p. 226). These mechanisms do not deserve to be mentioned as the residues of neurology in Freud’s later writings. Both their method of discovery and their realm solely belong to psychology.

There were still some basic ideas that Freud learned from neurology, and he kept them in his writings and in his way of thinking. Dual-aspect monism could allow psychological methods on organisms, yet it would not allow overlooking the physiological facts. If

---

79 We can add that he did not have the technological means to pursue experimentally what he theoretically put forward (Centonze, Siracusano, Calabresi, & Bernardi, 2004, p. 312; Cieri & Esposito, 2019, p. 1; Triarhou, 2011, p. 14).
something had been proven physiologically, it had to be recognized by a psychologist. Freud, as we have seen, used this principle wholeheartedly.

Before getting into later studies, one earlier study deserves mention. *Studies on Hysteria*, published in the same year that Freud wrote *Project*, has its debt to Brücke’s laboratory. Both Freud and Breuer worked in this laboratory back in Freud’s student years (Freud S., 1954, p. 22). Both were familiar with the teachings of Brücke and the big names in the field of neurology. In their case studies, their way of recognizing sexual aetiology came from the stories of their patients, without a doubt. However, there was one more theoretical element. As well-trained scientists, they knew the principles that govern the body. The body had its needs. These needs gave rise to stimulus, and their psychological equivalents were instincts. If the subject overlooks the body's needs, its own instincts, the body could not maintain itself, and it would fall ill. Freud and Breuer’s patients came from wealthy families. Their bodily needs such as rest, food, air, or water could have easily been provided for them (Amacher, 1974, p. 221). With the help of deduction from the body's physiological needs, Breuer and Freud understood that only the sexual needs of the body were not fully satisfied (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, pp. 199-200). This straightforward reasoning was inescapable for these two medical men. The hard part was unveiling their biases about sexual matters, which they gained as Viennese medical men.

Brücke’s influence was remarkable before *Project*, and it had not ceased afterward, either. The principle of inertia was one of the neurological principles which Freud continued to use effectively. According to that principle, when the stimulations rise due to exogenous or endogenous activities, the body faces the threat of losing the state of inertia (Freud S., 1991g, pp. 295-296). This very activity causes unpleasure. The body's main aim is to save itself from this unpleasant situation. When the body finds a way to discharge the overloaded energy, it finds pleasure in returning to the state of inertia (Freud S., 1991g, p. 312). This principle was known through the electrical recordings of the nerve tracts (Pribram, 1962, p. 445).

---

80 Greenberg and Mitchell aptly observe: “In the *Studies on Hysteria* (Breuer and Freud, 1895) and the *Project for a Scientific Psychology* (Freud, 1895a), despite their vastly different theoretical perspectives, human behavior is understood to be regulated by the constancy principle. Without it, none of the formulations in the *Studies on Hysteria* make sense” (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 26).

81 In a letter to Auguste Forel, Breuer admitted that “this immersion in the sexual in theory and practice is not to my taste” (Grubrich-Simitis, 1997, p. 36).
What Freud effectively did was, find the equivalent of this principle in his patients' stories and cure what has gone wrong. As he explained in *Project*, and as he reiterated later on, displacement was one of the problems to discharge this energy (Quinodoz, 2018, p. 12).82 What the body need is always the same, discharge. However, subjects have different opinions on how to discharge the overload. Libido, the equivalent of hunger in sexuality (Freud S., 1986aa, p. 135), could be ceased by masturbation or sex. This was physiologically true; therefore, it had to be true psychologically. However, as patients and society demonstrated, it was not that simple for them. There were tons of rules when it came to sex. Avoiding incestuous sexual relations was only one of them (Freud S., 1986ab, pp. 1-2).

Physiologically, having sex with a family member cannot be different from having sex with anyone else.83 Psychologically, it can ruin one’s life. As Freud learned from clinical experience, even seeing or hearing one’s own parents having sex (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 127) or falling in love with the “wrong” person can cause hysteria (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 157). Moreover, what is hysteria? Hysteria is, in a nutshell, just a wrong way of discharging energy (Freud S., 1991d, p. 57). When a person cannot discharge the energy due to the repression of “unthinkable thought,” the same energy finds its way in some other way. That other way is a somatic manifestation of the perfectly natural first stimulus. This fundamental principle of keeping the body’s energy level low, or as he later directly attributed to Fechner and called it the principle of constancy (Freud S., 1986f, p. 9), is just a psychological equivalent of physiological principle. It is easy to identify in Freud’s later writings.

When Freud discovered his second topographical model, he assured that the duty of psychoanalysis is strengthening the ego over the id and the superego (Smith, 1999a, pp. 90-91). This process proved fruitful for Freud because obviously, what the superego does is block the ways of discharge by enforcing a sense of guilt in subjects (Freud S., 1986h, pp. 135-137). When the superego gets more robust, as he realized in *Totem and Taboo*, it can

---

82 Even before *Project*, he wrote that even though we cannot measure it, displacement and discharge can be used in psychological studies (Freud S., 1986x, p. 60).
83 Freud believed in the “constitutional bisexuality of each individual” (Freud S., 1986u, p. 31). This idea found its foundation in the same physiological reasoning. Discharge is discharge. It does not matter if the tension is discharged in a heterosexual or homosexual way; therefore, everyone was born bisexual. Freud’s ideas on bisexuality are usually attributed to the influence of Fliess (Freud S., 1986aa, p. 127), and it is true. Yet, his physiological and biological cultural capital already made him prone to accept this idea (Hudson & Jacot, 1991, pp. 6-7).
pave the way for fatal consequences through the omnipotence of thought and be a self-destruction machine simply by inhibiting the discharge of the energy from the body or discharging the energy through displacement (Freud S., 1986ab, p. 30). In the tribes that he studied, Freud saw that the members of some tribes could have died just because they had misconduct with taboo, and they believed that they were going to die (Freud S., 1986ab, pp. 42-43).

The psychological interpretation of a subject or a society could lead to total negligence of physiological needs. The duty of psychoanalysis was to find the actual cause of the needed discharge and let it discharge as it should. Freud’s belief in these true causes solely depends on his neurological knowledge. Even when he wrote Beyond the Pleasure Principle, he did not completely retreat from the pleasure principle. Furthermore, in situations where seemingly the pleasure principle is not ruling, he asserted the need for the ego to master traumatic situations for the sake of survival (Freud S., 1986f, p. 16). He only changed his deeply believed neurological principle in favor of biology, which was science in equal dignity with neurology in Freud's eyes. Beyond the Pleasure Principle is filled with biological justifications since neurology's scientific ground could only be deserted if replaced with another scientific base.

The beginnings of psychoanalytical writings such as Studies on Hysteria, The Interpretation of Dreams, The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, and Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious unmistakably carry the sign of Freud’s physiological deductions. Even though subjects experience dreams, parapraxes, and psychopathologies in their subjective ways, their underlying mechanism was the same and could be followed to the physiological needs. The problem was, for analytical purposes, even though it was possible to find the underlying physiological problem, physiological methods could not solve it. This was the reason why Project failed.

However, the physiological traces of Project did not disappear principally from Freud’s writings or thinking. It can be assumed that he withdrew himself from Project because of its use-value. However, when theorizing his patients’ stories outside the therapy room, Freud believed in a parallel between the mind and the nervous system. Therefore, his philosophy was heavily influenced by physiology. He learned by the words of patients, theorized, and found the general rules of the psychological realm with the help of physiology and biology, and treated his patients with words again. For Freud, even what separates
pathology from normal is gradation (Davidson A., 1987, pp. 264-265). This was a physiological deduction. In *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, Freud questioned the very basis of his day’s common distinction between normal and abnormal through various individual examples. The road that led him there could be found in Project:

“The term ‘excessively intense’ points to quantitative characteristics. It is plausible to suppose that repression has the quantitative meaning of being denuded of Q, and that the sum of the two [of the compulsion and the repression] is equal to the normal. If so, only the distribution has changed.” (Freud S., 1991g, p. 350)

This idea directly results from the principle of conservation of energy (Bernfeld S., 1973, pp. 229-230; Hall, 1954, p. 12). Where the total energy remains constant, one can only assume that if the energy could not be discharged normally, it transforms itself to find another neural pathway to discharge. Therefore, the pathology is caused by the same energy that causes the normal. Normal and abnormal are only a matter of quantitative displacement of the same energy. Nothing abnormal should lead to social stigma since there is nothing innately wrong with someone with a pathology. Also, there is nothing profoundly great about being normal. This materialistic root of Freud was the reason for his fight against social stigma towards hysterical women and any abnormal condition.

4.2.5. Conclusion

The influence of physiology and neurology could be found everywhere in psychoanalysis. *Instincts and their Vicissitudes* (1915) is the most significant paper for more evidence from Freud about the physiological roots of his theory. The most important thing to understand is the ruling paradigm of dual-aspect monism. Without this philosophical background, psychoanalysis would not be possible. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, without dual-aspect monism, Freud would not be confident enough to leave the physiological sides of his research. He firmly believed that whatever he finds in the realm of psychology, there would be direct equivalents in physiology. He believed he lived when neurology was not advanced enough to confirm his theories, yet, he continued to believe that this field would develop enough to reach his conclusions (Mannoni, 1971, p. 15). The second reason was that without fixing points provided by neurology, he would not be able to give meaning to the psychological phenomenon he gave. The power of the principle of constancy and the pleasure principle became his pole star. He believed there was a working principle of organisms, and
the psychological layer could not operate far from that. These principles were valid for studying society as much as individuals.

The discharge was discharge in the final analysis. The subjective stories were a way to find a cure. However, the cure was the same cure. The eventual aim was to satisfy the needs and give the body what it needs. The subjects did not know what they needed. The biggest part of the mind was unconscious, and the body’s needs could easily be in the realm of the unconscious. This aspect of the unconscious, staying outside of the subject’s awareness, including the very processes of the subjects’ own body, was assigned by Helmholtz (Ellenberger H. F., 1994, pp. 312-313). Therefore, Freud’s cultural capital from Brücke had a major influence on his theoretical perspective.

Freud’s cultural capital was coupled with high emotional energy. As Freud also showed in his dream analyses, Brücke was an influential figure for him. He was a scientific father and a great role model. Brücke’s words and beliefs found a solid resonance in Freud’s mind. Name-giving was important for Freud, more important than most people might think. At least, he was very conscious about what many people already do when it comes to name-giving:

“From here my thoughts went on to the subject of the names of my own children. I had insisted on their names being chosen, not according to the fashion of the moment, but in memory of people I have been fond of. Their names made the children into revenants. And after all, I reflected, was not having children our only path to immortality?” (Freud S., 1986w, pp. 486-487).

In this respect, Ernst Brücke returned to life as Freud’s third son (Weineck, 2007, pp. 98-99). Brücke was not the father figure that Freud wanted to revolt against. He was the one

---

84 For the dream and its analysis see: (Freud S., 1986w, pp. 452-455). Newton’s analysis of this dream is more interesting than Freud’s analysis itself: “Perhaps the dream also meant that the Brücke inside was ordering him to get on with real science, yet doing so in his mentor’s way disabled him. It was not yet clear to Freud how to use his scientific training in pursuit of his new psychological interests.” (Newton, 1995, pp. 14-15)

85 The returning to life by name-giving was occurred by Jean-Martin Charcot’s name, and it had been described similarly by Martin Freud himself: “It is known how deeply my father was influenced by his work in Paris under the famous Jean Martin Charcot and how strongly this master’s personality captivated him. In a sense, this influence is alive today. My father
that Freud always wanted around. By giving the name for his son and keeping what he learned from Brücke in the very heart of his theories, Freud lived with the revenant of Ernst Brücke. Their relationship was ideal for showing how cultural capital travels through generations and how emotional energy that the master has raised would make pupils fanatics of a scientific field.\textsuperscript{86} Freud’s everlasting thirst for science after leaving Brücke’s laboratory and his final attempt to stay in the discipline by writing \textit{Project} were the results of the strong influence of Brücke to a large extent.

\section*{4.3. Franz Brentano}

Until this point, we used the name of “Freud” interchangeably with “Freud’s psychoanalytical writings” now and then. However, our concern is Freud’s psychoanalytical studies, not the man himself. Freud might be a stubborn or easy-going, depressive or cheerful, good or bad father or husband, yet, Freud’s psychoanalytical writings may not bear any influence of these qualities.\textsuperscript{87} Using “Freud” instead of “Freud’s psychoanalytical writings” could have been totally harmless in any other chapter. This chapter is not one of them. Freud, as a young student, was influenced by Franz Brentano. He was captivated by Brentano’s intellect and his personality. However, the influence of Brentano on Freud’s psychoanalytical writings is very scarce.

Franz Brentano (1838 - 1917) was a philosopher whose work influenced numerous intellectuals and movements such as Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Movement, Carl Stumpf and the Berlin School of Gestalt Psychology, Alexius Meinong and the Graz School of Object Theory, Franz Hillebrand, Anton Marty, and Kasimir Twardowski (Dewalque, 2017, p. 235). He was born into a very intellectual atmosphere in his family. He was the son of writer Christian Brentano, and his brother was a famous economist Lujo Brentano. His uncle Clemens Brentano was a famous poet and novelist, and his aunt was novelist Bettina von Arnim (Ellenberger H. F., 1994, p. 541). First, he studied philosophy and admired Charcot so much that he decided to call his eldest son after him—Jean Martin: a name quite unusual in Austria and one that now misleads the authorities in England. They often address me as ‘Dear Madam’” (Freud M., 1958, p. 21). Sigmund Freud employed the same name-giving tradition to Martin Freud’s first son (Freud S., 2007, p. 434).

\textsuperscript{86} This was true for the generation of scientists studied under the School of Helmholtz (Decker, 1971, p. 477).

\textsuperscript{87} Also, any influence on Freud’s pre-psychoanalytical writings is outside our scope.
theology and became a Catholic priest (Bernfeld S., 1973, p. 245). Between 1870 and 1873, he openly argued against papal infallibility, and he ended up renouncing his priesthood and his position in Würzburg University (Newton, 1995, p. 67). He moved to Vienna in 1874, one year after Freud started his studies, and he tried to gather pupils around him (Albertazzi, 2006, p. 25). His magnum opus was *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. In this study, he devoted his energy to classifying mental activities and establishing psychology as an independent branch of science.

At first glance, Brentano’s influence on Freud’s psychoanalytical writings is indisputable. Brentano was a psychologist who had discussed various topics in psychology in his lectures even before Freud had thought he had any interest in this discipline. He was arguing against speculative philosophies (Boehlich, 1990, pp. 102-104) (Freud always shared this contempt against philosophers), and he was an ardent supporter of the methodology of natural sciences in philosophy (Tauber, 2010, p. 42). Even though Brentano was a theist, his fight against the dogma of papal infallibility must have attracted Freud, also. Even if Brentano did not influence Freud’s psychoanalytical writings by any of his ideas, he must have been the reason for his early interest in the discussions such as the existence of unconsciousness, differences between the physiological and psychological methodology of researching mental life, and discussions on the existence of God and functions of religion.88

However, Freudian ideas and Brentanian ones are not going hand in hand. Brentano was opposed to the idea of the existence of unconsciousness, which is one of the pillars of psychoanalysis. For Brentano, the existence of God was a logical principle, and without the acceptance of this existence, science was not possible (Newton, 1995, p. 69). It is clear that the Godless Jew of Vienna did not share these convictions in his psychoanalytical writing. One of the essential things for Brentano (in a very Cartesian fashion) was separating psychology from physiology and philosophy and creating what he called descriptive psychology, which depends on inner perception and empiricism (Brentano, 1995a, pp. 3-10). As he pointed out, Freud saw psychoanalysis as an eclectic way of thinking as opposed to Brentano’s hostility against eclecticism (Brentano, 1995b, p. xxv). Freud’s psychology heavily relied upon biology and physiology, and he often used other disciplines such as

---

88 Freud became familiar with the writings of Feuerbach, who interpreted Christianity as a result of human desires through Brentano. Parallels between his ideas and Freud’s could be found in many of Freud’s writings, especially in *The Future of an Illusion* and *Totem and Taboo* (Muckenhoupt, 1997, pp. 22-23).
sociology, archeology, literature, and ethnography to understand the human mind better. While Brentano was interested in psychology for psychology’s sake, Freud was interested in the human mind, and every methodological help was welcomed.

The relationship between Freudian ideas and Brentanian ones could easily suggest both interpretations. There are obvious similarities and apparent contradictions. We will follow six ingredients of interaction rituals as depicted by Collins (1998, pp. 22-23) for our purposes. Only by these criteria can we decide if there is any influence of Brentano in Freud’s psychoanalytical writings. For this purpose, we need to start from their interactions.

4.3.1. Freud as an Auditor of Brentano

Philosophy was not a compulsory course for medical students, yet, Freud enrolled in five different philosophy courses between 1874 and 1876 during his student years (Merlan, 1949, p. 451). We do not know what attracted Freud in the first place. It could be philosophy or Franz Brentano himself. However, we can be sure that what made Freud enroll for more courses in the following semesters was Brentano’s teachings and personality.

The best source for following young Freud’s attraction towards Brentano is his letters to Silberstein. We saw the first mention of Brentano’s name from Freud is in a letter written on 22-23 October 1974. That mention contains only a neutral language, almost like a report about his classes to his friend (Boehlich, 1990, p. 66). Only two weeks later, Freud is cheerful as a child and even pities his friend for not having philosophy courses:

“I should be sorry, for instance, if you, the lawyer, were to neglect philosophy altogether, while I, the godless medical man and empiricist, am attending two courses in philosophy and reading Feuerbach in Paneth’s company. One of the courses—listen and marvel!—deals with the existence of God, and Prof. Brentano, who gives the lectures, is a splendid man, a scholar and philosopher, even though he deems it necessary to support this airy existence of God with his own expositions. I shall let you know just as soon as one of his arguments gets to the point (we have not yet progressed beyond the preliminary problems), lest your path to salvation in the faith be cut off.” (Boehlich, 1990, pp. 70-71).
Joseph Paneth (1857 - 1890) was one of the closest friends of Freud during his student years. Paneth was an excellent company for Freud since both shared a passion for physiology and philosophy in these years (Askay & Farquhar, 2006, p. 91). Paneth was a pupil of Brücke, as well (Laible, 1991, p. 263). Paneth also appeared in one of Freud’s dreams, and he was mentioned as “my friend P.” (Freud S., 1986w, p. 423). Just a month after the above-mentioned letter, Freud reported the second issue of their journal, where he and Paneth contributed by their philosophical critique (Boehlich, 1990, p. 73). The attraction and influence of Brentano in these years were striking Freud like lightning. The next time he mentioned Brentano, he gave an account of a closer connection. Paneth and Freud wrote a letter of objection to Brentano about the points he has defended during his courses (Boehlich, 1990, pp. 94-95). Freud does not mention the content of their objections, yet God's existence or any topic concerning materialism and empiricism seems plausible. Brentano invited two medical students to his home to discuss their letter and refuted their objection. They prepared a second letter, and Brentano invited them to his home again (Boehlich, 1990, p. 95). Brentano’s interest in them was obviously a delightful event for these students. It was the general attitude of Brentano, also. Brentano’s main aim when he arrived in Vienna was gathering pupils and creating networks around him. He obviously knew how to increase students’ attachment to himself and the topics he was discussing. As a result of these home visits, or better, taken seriously by a famous philosopher as an amateur philosophy reader, Freud ended up describing Brentano as follow:

“When you and I meet, I shall tell you more about this remarkable man (a believer, a teleologist (!) and a Darwinian and a damned clever fellow, a genius in fact), who is, in many respects, an ideal human being. For now, just the news that under Brentano's fruitful influence I have arrived at the decision to take my Ph.D. in philosophy and zoology; further negotiations about my admission to the philosophical faculty either next term or next year are in progress.” (Boehlich, 1990, p. 95).

Brentano’s fast and intense influence on young Freud is a great example of emotional energy. With his personality and attitude towards Freud, Brentano convinced him to study philosophy just after a few months. Freud could not follow his plans to take his Ph.D. in philosophy (Boehlich, 1990, p. 95) because of the regulations of his university. However, he continued to attend Brentano’s classes. Just a week after the above-quoted letter, Freud gives an interesting remark: “Of my relationship with Brentano, which you may be imagining as
closer than it really is” (Boehlich, 1990, p. 102). A day after, on the 15th of March, he gives a
detailed account of his relationship with Brentano. We realize that Freud’s feelings toward
him became ambivalent in this long letter. At one point, Freud says the only tolerable aspect
of Brentano’s philosophy is his claim that philosophy should follow the scientific method
(Boehlich, 1990, p. 102). He let Brentano know that Paneth and he were materialists, so they
were not fully surrendered. When Brentano spoke ill of idealist philosophers such as
Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel; Freud was filled with joy since he thought that Brentano was
getting closer to materialism (Boehlich, 1990, pp. 103-104). After reporting the meeting with
Brentano, Freud confessed his feeling to his friend, which demonstrates that Freud’s
knowledge in philosophy was very scarce at that moment, and Brentano’s influence was at its
peak:

“So far, so good, and you might flatter yourself on having a friend thought worthy of
the company of so excellent a man, were it not that thousands of others have been
invited to his home or to converse with him, which greatly detracts from our
distinction. He came here to found a school and to gain disciples, and hence proffers
his friendship and time to all who need it. For all that, I have not escaped from his
influence—I am not capable of refuting a simple theistic argument that constitutes the
crown of his deliberations. His great distinction is that he abhors all glib phrases, all
emotionality, and all intolerance of other views. He demonstrates the existence of God
with as little bias and as much precision as another might argue the advantage of the
wave over the emission theory.

Needless to say, I am only a theist by necessity, and am honest enough to confess my
helplessness in the face of his argument; however, I have no intention of surrendering
so quickly or completely. Over the next few semesters, I intend to make a thorough
study of his philosophy, and meanwhile reserve judgment and the choice between
theism and materialism. For the time being, I have ceased to be a materialist and am
not yet a theist. Though he upholds man’s descent from the animals, he opposes
Darwinism and has shattered my own belief in it, not so much with his own arguments
as with the report that the computations of Thomson in London have demonstrated
that the organic history of the earth could not be put at more than one hundred million
years; but even if Darwinism stands up, as I hope it does, it does not conflict with his
teleology or with his God.” (Boehlich, 1990, pp. 104-105).
The discussion of unconsciousness was probably included in this meeting since both Zimmerman and Herbart\textsuperscript{89} were pronounced (Smith, 1999b, p. 11). Also, only one year before, in 1874, Brentano published his \textit{Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint} and refuted every argument in favor of unconsciousness. Therefore, not just in this meeting but in his courses throughout these years, he must have discussed this matter. Even though Freud had his moments of ups and downs towards Brentano’s ideas, he seems to get familiarized with the concept of the unconscious very early on. He does not mention his position regarding this point in his letters. Most probably, the foundation of his thinking concerning materialism and atheism was shattered, and these were more important for him than the philosophical epistemology concerning consciousness and unconsciousness. He was under the influence of Brentano and very helpless in front of his arguments, yet, he continued to keep his beliefs until improving his knowledge of philosophy (Boehlich, 1990, pp. 107; 109-110). Also, he was very much aware of his ambivalence and reported to Silberstein: \textit{"We are completely powerless in the face of attacks from that quarter. But let us cut our philosophical deliberations short. I cannot promise that I shall still be holding these views next week."} (Boehlich, 1990, p. 111).

We can say that Freud’s diagnosis for his situation was not different from ours. He continuously reported his admiration to Brentano, and under his influence, Freud’s interest in philosophy was significantly increased. Brentano’s character and some of his ideas were very favorable to Freud, such as his scientific inclinations, logical and unbiased argumentation, his fight against the Church, and most importantly, his attitude towards Freud and Paneth. These were clear indications of the emotional energy that has been raised by Brentano. He continuously encouraged the young students to come into close contact with his discipline and his views.

On the other hand, Freud realized by Brentano’s challenging arguments that he was not competent enough to defend his own ideas. He always demarcated his lack of knowledge, and instead of being subjugated by Brentano’s world views, he wanted to increase his knowledge to defeat him for keeping his beliefs. In this respect, Brentano could have been the real thrust behind strengthening Freud's cultural capital. Freud eventually did not agree with Brentano on any controversial topic. Besides, he did not follow the path Brentano suggested.

\textsuperscript{89} Freud’s affinity with Herbart’s philosophy goes back to his gymnasium days (Landerer, 2010, p. 74; Sullivan, 1964, p. 96).
Brentano constantly gave Freud reading lists to increase his knowledge, yet Freud followed the path of science and scientific readings instead of Brentano’s philosophical readings. Thus, Freud found his argument against philosophy outside of philosophy under the influence of Brücke. We agree with Gay (1988, p. 31), who says Brentano’s influence fell into the background after Brücke. Freud overcame Brentano by staying outside of his philosophical readings. Almost 50 years later, Freud said that philosophers could not understand his psychoanalytic ideas because they were exactly trained for not understanding him (Freud S., 1986u, p. 13). Brentano definitely created an interest in philosophy in young Freud, yet he could not turn him into a pupil because Freud refused to acquire the cultural capital suggested by philosophy.

During his military service in 1879, Freud translated four essays of John Stuart Mill's *Collected Works* into German (Cohen, 2002, p. 60). The biographer of Theodor Gomperz (who edited Mill’s *Collected Works*) was his son Heinrich Gomperz, and he was surprised by his father’s choice of Freud as a translator while he was preparing the biography of his father. Freud was only a student and far from any fame at that moment. When he asked Freud with a letter why he was chosen for the duty, Freud said as he knew Franz Brentano suggested him for the duty (Merlan, 1945, p. 375). Brentano taught Mill to Freud in one of his courses (Boehlich, 1990, p. 66) and probably knew Freud’s ability of languages. An interesting point in this letter is Freud’s description of his relationship with Brentano. He demarcated that he was not a pupil of Brentano but his auditor (*Hörer*) (Bernfeld S., 1973, p. 245). Their relationship became closer between 1874 and 1876, as the Silberstein letters suggest. Nevertheless, there is a truth in Freud’s description of himself as an auditor. Even though Freud felt totally weak in front of Brentano from time to time, he never completely agreed with him. He always postponed his final decision about Brentano’s claims to the future when he would be more capable of discussing the philosophical matters. The future brought the experience of being the pupil of Brücke, and Freud finally found peace from challenges that Brentano expressed. He eventually kept his beliefs about materialism and atheism. Therefore, Freud was right to describe himself as an auditor instead of a pupil while evaluating their relationship in retrospection. He never followed Brentano’s ideas, and mainly he created psychoanalysis in the exact opposition in many essential points.

4.3.2. Tangential Dialogue
Freud’s psychoanalytical writings carry similar discussion points with Brentano’s descriptive psychology. It also carries a lot of similar topics or sometimes similar points of view with many different thinkers. It is very yielding to conduct a parallel reading between two schools or thinkers, yet, this does not necessarily indicate an influence. It seems like the relationship between Brentano’s psychology and Freud’s psychoanalytical writings is one of those cases where many similarities could be found, but it is tough to indicate an influence. The dialogue between the two intellectuals lies in their shared topic, psychology, despite their early personal relationship. This relationship is interesting, where a very high emotional energy level failed to produce substantial cultural capital.

The main difference between Brentano and Freud is their ontological perspective. Brentano was a dualist (McGrath, 1986, p. 114). He believed that mind and body are different realms and do not possess sovereignty over each other. The mind-body dualism is an old discussion for philosophy, and Brentano clearly took the side of Descartes in this matter (Wakefield, 1992, p. 4). Descartes was the philosopher who founded modern philosophy by clearly establishing the mind-body dualism (Smith, 2002, p. 155). According to Descartes, the mind was the realm where ideas emerge, and ideas have the possibility of reflecting on themselves where they can establish themselves free from all the prejudices (Descartes, 2003, p. 14). Descartes was dogmatic and claimed that knowledge is possible. Despite skeptics, Descartes thought that ideas have the potential of being knowledge as long as we accept that they are limited in themselves, yet, they are our only way to know. Therefore, Descartes introduced the mind as the only epistemological tool of human beings, even if it is dreaming or tricked by a malicious demon (Derrida, 2005, s. 60-62). The modern mind was flawed, yet, better than every other knowledge source. Following the philosophical discussion of knowledge, Brentano took the side of Descartes, yet, he left all the idealist tradition in favor of empiricism (Boehlich, 1990, pp. 103-104). Therefore, Brentano accepted that ontologically mind and body were different realms and must be explored by different means (Brentano, 1995b, pp. 3-4). Epistemologically, he believed that philosophy should apply scientific methods (Stepansky, 2014, p. xvi). He did not believe in following logical consequences of a priori knowledge or inventing transcendental beings to justify philosophers’ convictions. He overruled Hegel, Fichte and Schelling as swindlers in this spirit (Boehlich, 1990, p. 104). He thought that the realm of the body could be investigated by physiology, yet physiology could not explain mental activity (Brentano, 1995b, p. 48). Mind (or soul as he called it) is a totally independent realm, and it should be investigated by psychology (Brentano, 1995b, pp. 2-3).
His main aim was to create psychology independent of physiology and philosophy since the mind was independent of other realms (Boehlich, 1990, p. 102). His epistemological dualism was the logical consequence of his ontological dualism. For Brentano, the scientific method meant the best possible means for the related field, and the field of mind was the collection of experiences that were only open to its subject (Brentano, 1995a, p. 8). He thought that the realm of thing in itself was not something we can know as it is. We could only know the things as they are represented to us (Shmidt G., 2017, p. 13). We can know things within the limits of our minds. The limit of mind is how it perceives any object. Thus, mind knows the things as they were represented, and this is the only source of knowledge in the realm of mind. This is called intentionality, and any object can be known in its intentional inexistence by the subject (Crane, 2017, p. 44). Intention does not mean purpose as in the daily language. Intentio is Latin for representation (Pataki, 2015, pp. 37-38). If we cannot know the things in themselves and only know the thing as they are represented, it means the best possible mean for knowledge of mind is inner perception (Wakefield, 2018, p. 170). Brentano, with this reasoning, clearly differentiate the content and method of his psychology:

“So it appears that just as the natural sciences study the properties and laws of physical bodies, which are the objects of our external perception, psychology is the science which studies the properties and laws of the soul, which we discover within ourselves directly by means of inner perception, and which we infer, by analogy, to exist in others.” (Brentano, 1995b, p. 4).

It is not hard to demonstrate how Freud’s psychoanalytical writings differ from Brentano’s point of view. As demonstrated in the earlier chapter, Freud was epistemologically dualist yet ontologically monist. This might suggest that Freud and Brentano could be perceived as similar despite their ontological difference because of their epistemological stances. Freud believed that mind and body are one and the same thing. Consequently, inquiring the subject from the psychological or physiological point of view does not differ. It meant that any finding of psychology or physiology should be applicable from the other realm. Therefore, we cannot say the epistemological stance of Brentanian psychology and Freudian psychoanalysis converges. Brentano was very strict about leaving physiology out of psychology, and Freud, on the contrary, was very keen to bring two disciplines together.
Brentano’s reference to natural sciences or empiricism when he addressed the apt method of philosophy should not be confused with our present references to these words:

“For him, there would be no other valid scientific method but the positivist method. However, his use of the term ‘empirical’ is very different from the present one: Brentano emphasized that all our knowledge should be based on direct experience, not in the form of a theory described in third person, but in a form of introspection: psychology from an empirical point of view means, for him, to describe what one experiences directly in the inner perception, in a theory described in first person” (Shmidt G. R., 2017, p. 8).

Even though their differences are apparent, the matter is not showing the differences between Freud and Brentano. A pupil can establish his own ideas differently from his master. Nonetheless, the influence could be evident, as in the case of Husserl and Brentano (Welsh, 2002, p. 168). The most crucial matter in Freud and Brentano is that their differences were not rooted in the same discussion. Moreover, if this is true, we cannot talk about an influence as Collins indicated. The rules of Collins to deduce an influence are as follows:

1. a group of at least two people is physically assembled;
2. they focus attention on the same object or action, and each becomes aware that the other is maintaining this focus;
3. they share a common mood or emotion . . . .
4. The mutual focus of attention and the shared mood cumulatively intensify . . . .
5. As a result, the participants feel they are members of a group, with moral obligations to one another. . . .
6. Individuals who participate in IRs are filled with emotional energy, in proportion to the intensity of the interaction.” (Collins, 1998, pp. 22-23).

The review of these rules would show that only the first rule is fulfilled in the relationship between Freud and Brentano. They were so far away from each other’s mood or

---

90 Brentano criticized Husserl for transforming his philosophy to a priori idealism (Husserl, 1965, p. 190).
focus. One of the most significant differences of Brentano and the other masters of Freud was his date of death. Brentano died in 1917 and worked actively in the field for most of the part. Freud published a very substantial amount of work up until the death of Brentano, and both of them seemed totally unaware of each other’s works. This also suggests that they were not sharing the same focus or obligation to one another. We can see that Brentano was commenting on his pupils’ works. Freud described himself as an auditor of Brentano instead of a pupil. Seemingly, this description resonated with Brentano also.

Freud did not choose monism over dualism through a philosophical discussion. There is no evidence suggesting that Freud’s choice was philosophical, as if he was thinking in the canonical philosophical debates and deciding between opponents. He made his philosophical (ontological and epistemological) choices outside of orthodox philosophical debates. He made his decision under the influence of physiology and Brücke. Thus, in this debate, his stance was a consequence of the dialogue between the field of philosophy and physiology. For instance, a discussion on God’s existence could be made by many disciplines such as theology, philosophy, biology, and so on. If a biologist becomes an atheist by following the arguments of evolutionary biology, we cannot think that this biologist is also opposed to the arguments of Descartes in favor of God. He might not have heard of that line of argument at all. This was the possible case of young Freud in the face of Brentano’s reasoning in favor of God. Freud had never thought of philosophical debates on the existence of God. He knew the gods of Jews and Christians and found them untenable against the idea of evolution. Brentano’s arguments stroke him and shook his beliefs as an atheist. As in our example, Freud had not considered any arguments of philosophers on existence or knowledge when he was developing his ontological and epistemological ideas. He was a Darwinian scientist and a follower of the school of Helmholtz, and his side in a mainstream philosophical discussion simply did not exist.

Freud was not in the realm of philosophical paradigm while developing his ideas. Thus, we cannot assign any of his ideas as a result of the influence of Brentano. If there is any possible overlapping between Freudian and Brentanian ideas, they result from their sharing field. Their opposition should be understood as a result of the interaction between science and philosophy, not between them. Clark Glymour’s (1991, p. 47) comparison between Brücke

---

91 Other than giving one of the riddles Brentano produced, Freud did not mention any of Brentano’s work in his writings (Freud S., 1986n, p. 32).
and Brentano’s influence on Freud is illuminating. Glymour says that the ideas of Brücke and Brentano are similar in some respect and different in others. Whenever the ideas differ, Freud chose the side of neurology, not Brentano. These similarities could be confusing when deciding whose influence was more prevalent, yet, the differences should be the guiding principle. Moreover, we doubt if Freud even considered the ideas of Brentano in his evaluation of opposite ideas.

The differences between Freud and Brentano in their ontology and epistemology are the key to understanding every difference between them. They were not speaking inside of the same paradigm. Every attempt to show Brentano’s influence on Freud fails since similarities could explain a certain degree of truth, yet, the whole story lies in differences. Their differences in ontology and epistemology suggest that they were not speaking the same language. Therefore, every dialogue between them only touches upon the same points from different angles.

One of the main topics when we want to discuss the influence of Brentano on Freud’s psychoanalytical writings, is how they were approaching unconsciousness. At first sight, it seems evident that Brentano is the first master who introduced Freud to the topic. Therefore, we ought to conclude that Brentano influenced Freud’s psychoanalytical writings (Wallwork, 1991, p. 32). Freud indeed learned about the unconscious from Brentano; nonetheless, this does not suggest a direct influence. For an influence, we should be able to detect arguments from Freud’s side that are concerned to prove the existence of unconsciousness against philosophical arguments. However, Freud’s writings do not show any sign of will to convince philosophers to his arguments.

On the contrary, he thought that the medical establishment should understand what he meant by the unconscious, and philosophers cannot even understand what he meant because of their education (Freud S., 1986u, p. 13). Freud was aware of Brentano’s reasoning, and he did not even feel the pressure or the moral obligation to refute any of his arguments. He thought his theory of the unconscious was something that the medical establishment could appreciate since he borrowed the term from physiology and developed over it (Makari, 1994, p. 567). As a process that we cannot be aware of but be influenced by, the unconscious was first attributed to physiological processes by physiologists. Freud learned this usage of the

---

92 Freud did not feel the pressure of any philosophical argument (Pataki, 2015, p. 42).
unconscious from the School of Helmholtz. Consequently, he rightly assigned his theory of the unconscious to the paradigm that he shared with his medical colleagues, not the philosophers who believed that mind and body are separate realms.

Freud’s indebtedness to Brentano is usually defended from Brentano’s disagreement with empiricists who refuted the unconscious as a logical fallacy (Wakefield, 2018, pp. 192-193). Despite the assertion of the British empirical school, Brentano believed that the unconscious consciousness was not a logical fallacy. He believed there is a possibility of unconsciousness if the theories of unconsciousness meet the criteria he set out:

“There are four different ways in which one might proceed here with some hope of success. First, we could try to prove that certain facts given in experience demand the hypothesis of an unconscious mental phenomenon as their cause.

Secondly, we could attempt to prove that a fact given in experience must bring about an unconscious mental phenomenon as its effect, even though none appears in consciousness.

Thirdly, we could try to show that in the case of conscious mental phenomena the strength of the concomitant consciousness is a function of their own strength, and that, because of this relationship, in certain cases in which the latter is a positive magnitude, the former must lack a positive value.

Finally, we could attempt to prove that the hypothesis that each mental phenomenon is an object of a mental phenomenon leads to an infinite complexity of mental states, which is both intrinsically impossible and contrary to experience.” (Brentano, 1995b, p. 81).

All the criteria that Brentano set out are impossible to prove the existence of unconsciousness because all of them depend on Brentano’s epistemology, where the method could be inner perception. Inner perception is different from introspection since the former takes place simultaneously with the mental activity, where the latter focuses on the mental activity only after the actual experience took place (Brentano, 1995b, pp. 22-23). Freud used introspection in his self-analysis, and he expected his patients to use the same method (Freud S., 1986a, pp. 284-285). This was not a tenable method for Brentano since introspection opens to the possibility for infinite regress (Brentano, 1995b, p. 99). Introspection was observing one’s own mind as a third person, and it was clearly contradictory with the first rule of Cartesian epistemology. “Cogito ergo sum,” or “I think, therefore I am” (Descartes, 2003,
is the starting point for dualism that clearly assigns all the knowledge or the possibility of knowledge to “I.” This rule does not equate thinking with existence, as Hegel indicated. Only through the thinking of “I” can the existence of “I” be known. For Brentano, only “I” could have known the experience of “I” simultaneously with the mental activity. Since the unconscious activity cannot be known simultaneously with the mental activity and only an introspection could have revealed an unconscious motivation, Brentano eliminated the possibility of unconsciousness due to his epistemology (Brentano, 1995b, p. 106). Since Freud did not concern with this discussion between skeptics and dogmatists (since he did not acquire a cultural capital from Brentano), he did not even care to establish the unconscious from a Brentanian point of view. He did not linger on a question of “Can we know anything?” as a well-trained philosopher would do.

Two attempts to prove Brentano’s influence on Freud are interesting for our purpose. The first one ends as follows: “It is to Freud’s detriment that he was not more philosophically minded” (Boag, 2015, p. 264). This conclusion is the result of searching for something that is not there. Freud’s body of work is not part of the history of philosophy in the usual sense. As it has been explored countless times, psychoanalysis is a philosophy, and it has great philosophical implications. However, that does not mean that it voluntarily placed itself into the philosophical canon. Freud’s philosophy is a philosophy as Darwin’s work or any scientific endeavor. Not intentional, yet, inescapable for the canon of philosophy.

The other comment that tries to show the influence of Brentano on Freud belongs to Uriah Kriegel. Kriegel also believes that Freudian unconscious cannot meet the criteria that Brentano put forward, yet he purported a fifth criterion:

“The argument is extremely carefully prosecuted, but it ignores a fifth basis for positing unconscious mental states, which basis has been in fact most operative, in both psychological and literary contexts. This is the idea that we must posit unconscious mental states to causally explain, not conscious states, but certain behaviors. The idea recurs in Freudian deep psychology, folk psychology, and experimental psychology.”

One of Hegel's objections to Kant is that the statement “I think, therefore I am” is not inferred. There is no third that mediates these two, and there is no premise here such as “Everyone who thinks does exist.” Thinking and being are different things but still identical. At the same time, it is not the content of being identical to the cogito, but the being itself is identical to the cogito regardless of its content (Hegel, 1997, p. 139).
Its clearest application is in the Freudian case. Suppose a person has no awareness of anger toward her father, but consistently behaves toward him in a variety of inappropriately aggressive, petty, or defensive ways. Because these behaviors would be both explained and rendered intelligible by assuming the person harbors an unconscious anger toward her father, we are inclined – quite justifiably, it seems to me – to make this assumption. In doing so, we adopt none of Brentano’s (a)–(d)⁹⁴. Instead, we make an inference to the best explanation from behavioral explananda to unconscious explanantia.” (Kriegel, 2018, p. 44)

However, clearly what Kriegel describes is introspection. Evaluating the behavior or emotion after the actual event took place cannot be known by Brentano’s standards. Therefore, this method of proving that the existence of the unconscious cannot be the fifth criterion of Brentano. If one cannot know something simultaneously, one cannot know. Two scholars who tried to prove the influence of Brentano on Freud found two ways. One of them invented a criterion for Brentano; thus, Freud could fit in, and the other pitied Freud for not being philosophically minded. Both attempts prove that the dialogue between Freud and Brentano was only tangential and cannot suggest any influence of Brentano over Freud.

Epistemological dualism and the discussion of the unconscious are not the only similarities between Freud’s psychoanalytical writings and Brentano. When reading Brentano, one might think his explanation of mental as intentional (every mental activity is of or about something or mental has its content) has equivalent in Freud. Freud’s theory on object relations also indicates an instinct with its object (Wakefield, 2018, p. 171). However, these are two fundamentally different views. Brentano did not claim that mental activity has its object. He said only something toward an object or something about an object could be classified as mental. Mental activity with or about an object is not even an invention. It is an immanent knowledge to think that some mental activities occur with relating itself to an object. Brentano asserted an argument or set criteria for accepting something as mental and, therefore, the subject of psychology (Ierna, 2014, p. 547).

Freud’s objects are always random and totally meaningless for the primary function of mental activity from a metapsychological point of view. Objects are important in clinical use, for the analysis, and for the cure. If Freud had followed the Brentanian rules, there would be no displacement or repression. For instance, the smell of a burnt pudding caused hysterical

⁹⁴ Kriegel assigns letters to Brentano’s criteria of proving unconsciousness.
symptoms for Miss Lucy R (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 107). For Brentano, the smell is smelled, and the mind gets activated by the smell; therefore, burnt pudding smell exists as a representation (Brentano, 1995b, p. 68). This is the end of the story. If some other subject smells the same burning pudding and feels hungry, that burning pudding is a representation, and this mental activity causes the hunger. These mental activities do not say anything about the object itself, and what is true for the subject, sparing the rule that noumena cannot be known, could be accepted as truth. This is nowhere near the thinking style of Freud, and he has no concern with truth value in this sense, either. For Freud, the object is almost an excuse for the mental activity to be performed, which he founded its roots in physiology and biology. As known by physiology and biology, every human being has their needs and should satisfy those needs. An object is not the cause of the need, but it is a way of satisfying it or discharging the tension. As a direct opposite of Brentano’s view, if someone becomes fixated on an object, he will develop a pathology. Psychoanalysis emphasizes the awareness of the process and explains the insignificance of the object that has been fixated. Therefore, there is no common ground between intentionality and Freud’s theory on object relations, as Wallace (2008, p. 732) and Wakefield (2018, p. 171) have suggested.

Despite all the fundamental differences between Freud and Brentano, the possible influence of Brentano’s one idea from Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint could be found in Freud’s psychoanalytical writings. Brentano mentions other sources to gain knowledge about individual psychology, and Freud devoted his effort to those sources for understanding individual psychology better. According to Brentano, “we can gain some insight into the states of a conscious life simpler than our own,” such as “children” and “adults in primitive societies” (Brentano, 1995b, p. 30). In addition to them, we can gain insight from “diseased mental states,” “fixed ideas,” “biographies of men who have distinguished themselves as artists, scientists, or for outstanding character,” “an eminent work of art, a remarkable discovery or a great deed or crime” (Brentano, 1995b, p. 31). Furthermore, we can “understand society and its development on the basis of what has been discovered about individuals than to proceed the other way around and to try to shed light on the problems of individual psychology by means of the observation of society” (Brentano, 1995b, p. 32). Freud explored almost all these phenomena to gain insight into individual

95 Lacan’s theory of desire grasped this aspect and developed further. According to Lacan, ultimately, we do not desire because of an object, but we desire for desiring itself (Sheikh, 2017, p. 9).
psychology. It is hard to assign this method of psychology to Brentano. As Brentano pointed out, these were not his original ideas (Brentano, 1995b, pp. 30-31). However, if we would like to find any similarity between Freud’s psychoanalytical writings and Brentano without the distortion of other masters’ influences, this might be the only adequate one.

4.3.3. Conclusion

The relationship between Freud and Brentano is an interesting one. Young Freud was very captivated by the charm of Brentano, and his convictions tested in the face of Brentano’s clever argumentations. Brentano’s influence on young Freud is unmistakable. Also, the shared topics of both intellectuals seem to suggest a substantial influence. However, sociological analysis demonstrates that the influence of Brentano on Freud’s psychoanalytical writings does not appear as it would have been thought at first sight. We gained an impression of high emotional energy from his letters, yet Freud always explained his weakness in front of Brentano due to his insufficient knowledge in philosophy (Boehlich, 1990, p. 107). He wanted to learn more about philosophy to stand against Brentano. His high emotional energy was about to increase his cultural capital in the field of philosophy.

Nonetheless, before deepening his philosophical knowledge, he found himself a better place to settle down: Ernst Brücke’s laboratory. From that moment on, Freud’s emotional energy raised towards physiology, and as Gay indicated, the teachings of Brentano faded into the background (Gay, 1988, p. 31). Freud never learned philosophy in a proper sense. Therefore, Jung is correct to say that Freud did not have any philosopher that he used as a pillar in his psychoanalytical writings (Jung, 1959), not even the one who was closest to him.

Does any of Brentano’s teaching leave a reminiscence in Freud’s mind? This is an open question. We know Henry Maudsley’s ideas had similarities with Freud's, and Maudsley was one of the opponents that Brentano chose to himself while refuting the arguments of physiological psychology (Askay & Farquhar, 2006, p. 162). Brentano discussed the existence of unconsciousness, and Freud must have been familiar with the names who support the idea of unconsciousness. Also, Brentano’s suggestions for comparative psychology might have been hidden somewhere in Freud’s mind. However, as we discussed, none of the overlappings in their interest seems to find their source from the same field. Therefore, it is just to think that Freud’s psychoanalysis does not bear any stamp of Brentano’s philosophy.
4.4. Charcot, Bernheim, and Breuer

In *Immortality*, Milan Kundera depicts Hemingway and Goethe in a chat after death. Hemingway complains about all the rumors on the details of his life and people’s disinterestedness in his books. He thinks his books are all that matters, not his love towards his wives or how many wounds he got during wars. Goethe explains to Hemingway that this is immortality and adds: “Immortality means eternal trial” (Kundera, 1999, p. 81). Freud’s afterlife is undoubtedly one of the great examples of an eternal trial. He even expected this inevitable end and burned almost all his letters to make biographers’ jobs harder (Gay, 1988, p. xv). Despite Goethe’s very late advice to Hemingway of being more careful while he was still alive, we know from Freud’s example that being careful is not a way out from the eternal trail.

Freud has been judged for a good number of matters from hiding sexual assault of children to be recognized by his peers (Masson, 2003, pp. xx-xxi) to being unfaithful to his wife with various women that he knew of, including his sister-in-law (Gay, 1988, p. xviii). Most of the controversies revolve around the period of the birth of psychoanalysis. Any Freud scholar would feel themselves reading detective stories when they dive into the period between 1885 to 1899. It is the period that anyone can lose focus from theory immediately and find themselves into various discussions on the validity of historical accounts, Freud’s trustfulness, how his famous speech “On Male Hysteria” took place, and so on. It is even hard to find a study that shows the influence of Charcot, Bernheim, and Breuer on the psychoanalytical writings of Freud as a whole.

We will also go through the historical account since it is inescapable. However, we aim to focus on the influences on Freud for a better understanding of Freud’s theory, not the man. Until this chapter, we focused on Freud’s years as a student and the very basis of his thinking. However, everything became clear for Freud with the influence of these three men and the discussions that they have raised. Hysteria and hypnosis gave Freud the direction to follow and opened the gates of psychology. In the end, Freud did not become a faithful follower of any of these men, but the interaction between their arguments inspired Freud to discover his own path: psychoanalysis.
4.4.1. Path to Paris

Jean-Martin Charcot was one of Freud’s most influential masters. He was also one of the most influential neurologists of all time. He was known as “Napoleon of Neuroses” (Ellenberger H. F., 1994, p. 95) in his days. Freud spent around five months in Paris, starting from October of 1885 until February of 1886 (Freud S., 1991i, pp. 9-10). Despite the short length of this visit, the impact of Charcot’s personality and theory captivated Freud. Only in five months Freud’s whole career has changed. Charcot's impact in this short time indicates intense emotional energy that has no equal in Freud’s career. This chapter will explore how Freud ended up in Paris and how this sojourn paved the way for psychoanalysis.

After graduating from medical school, Freud spent one more year in Brücke’s laboratory. After meeting with Martha Bernays and dreaming about marrying her, he realized that he had to fill his pockets for his future. Freud took Brücke’s advice and left the laboratory (Jones E., 1964, p. 75) and wandered around various clinics of the Vienna General Hospital:

“[T]hree months in Billroth’s Department of Surgery; six months in Nothnagel’s Clinic for Internal Medicine; five months (at the elevated rank of Sekundararzt) in Meynert’s Psychiatric Clinic; three months in Zeissl’s Department of Dermatology; fourteen months in Scholz’s Department of Nervous Diseases; and finally, beginning in March 1885, three months in the Department of Ophthalmology” (Sulloway, 1979, pp. 23-24).

These years were not formative per se; however, they show Freud’s conception of science, career plans, and final decision to study under Charcot. Initially, Freud actively continued his scientific studies. However, he contributed to science in his free hours (Freud, E. L., 1975, p. 52). This suggests that in Freud’s mind, science was belonged to laboratories, not to clinics. His gold chloride method of staining nervous tissue and cocaine studies are the products of these years, and clearly, they took place in his free time (Thornton, 1986, pp. 39-40). His idols, such as Brücke and Helmholtz, were also physicians, yet, they never practiced their profession (Bernfeld S., 1944, p. 355). Therefore, for Freud, medicine was the field to earn money. He did not think of medical practice as a place to contribute to science. This idea was changed after he visited Paris — under the influence of Charcot (Levin K., 1974, p. 390).
The second important thing about these years is Freud’s experience with psychiatry. Even though Freudian ideas find a place to themselves in psychiatry today, psychoanalysis was not the result of it (Pérez-Rincón, 2011, p. 115). On the contrary, psychoanalysis was influenced by neurology more than psychiatry. The dichotomy between neurology and psychiatry may not be so distinct today, yet, they were two different ends in Freud’s days (Baker, Kale, & Menken, 2002, p. 1468). Especially, Viennese psychiatry and Parisian neuropathology were very distinct from each other. Freud’s experience in Meynert’s Psychiatric Clinic must have been contributed to his understanding of the field of nervous diseases. Even before meeting with Charcot, Freud was dissatisfied with psychiatry. Meynert at the time even suggested to him to stay with as his pupil and offered to hand down his teaching duties, yet, Freud passed the offer (Dalzell, 2011, p. 70). Freud had great respect for Meynert in the field of brain anatomy, yet, not as a psychiatrist (Jones E., 1964, p. 79). If Freud gained anything from working with Meynert that influenced his theory, that must be his critical attitude towards heredity as a cause of illness (Dalzell, 2011, p. 70). When Freud criticized his esteemed teacher Charcot on his theory of heredity, he did not mention Meynert as an influence, but he used the Fournier-Erb model (Barker, 2015, p. 11). He was indeed influenced by this model more than Meynert’s model, yet, a critical attitude towards heredity was planted by Meynert early on. We will mention this topic more extensively later. Freud’s relationship with Meynert indicates a questionable transfer of cultural capital, low emotional energy, and an opponent after he returned from Paris (Theweleit & Peck, 2007, p. 342). Only the last quality of Meynert may have helped Freud get into attention space for a short amount of time.

The most important encounter of Freud from these years was Breuer. Freud met with Breuer in Brücke’s institute for the first time, probably around 1876 (Schur, 1972, p. 28). Their friendship grew in subsequent years into a point where they started to share intimate details of their lives (Freud, E. L., 1975, p. 41). In 1882, Breuer mentioned Anna O. for the first time to Freud (Jones E., 1964, p. 204). This case must have been interesting to Freud since we know he mentioned the case to Charcot while he was in Paris (Freud S., 1991a, pp.

---

96 Freud’s discontent towards the psychiatry of Meynert and his sympathy towards the neurology of Charcot could have been influenced by their institutes’ attitude towards their patients. Where Meynert’s psychiatry tried to find the causes of madness under the microscope and ignored the suffering of their patients, Salpêtrière offered a humane treatment to its patients (Casement, 2017, pp. 98-99). Additionally, Charcot’s lecture hall had a painting of Pinel where he took off the chains of madmen (Freud S., 1986g, p. 18).
Through the agency of Breuer’s case, Freud was familiar with hypnosis and hysteria when he arrived in Paris. Nevertheless, before studying under Charcot, he did not consider these phenomena a career choice. We will return to the relationship between Freud and Breuer later.

Through his histological and clinical papers, Freud became Privatdozent in Neuropathology in 1885 (Thornton, 1986, p. 40). Before this assignment, he realized he was not competent enough in neuroses, and he needed to improve himself. He explains in his autobiography why he needed to go to Paris:

“The fame of my diagnoses and of their post-mortem confirmation brought me an influx of American physicians, to whom I lectured upon the patients in my department in a sort of pidgin-English. About the neuroses I understood nothing. On one occasion I introduced to my audience a neurotic suffering from a persistent headache as a case of chronic localized meningitis; they all quite rightly rose in revolt and deserted me, and my premature activities as a teacher came to an end. By way of excuse I may add that this happened at a time when greater authorities than myself in Vienna were in the habit of diagnosing neurasthenia as cerebral tumour.” (Freud S., 1991a, p. 12).

Freud, from afar, sensed that Charcot could have offered him something new. In his motivation letter for his application for a travel grant, he praised his Viennese teachers, such as Meynert and Nothnagel. Since he had studied under them already, he said there was nothing new to be learned in German Universities (Freud S., 1991i, p. 5). This was Freud’s way of indicating that Vienna is superior to German Universities in the field of neuroanatomy for creating sympathy for himself in his application. In this way, he justified that he could not learn neuroanatomy better anywhere else, but neuropathology in Paris could have contributed to his knowledge. We cannot know how much his flattering words contributed to the final decision, yet, he obtained the scholarship and moved to Paris soon after. When he returned to Vienna, his ideas were far from flattering for his old masters, especially for Meynert.

4.4.2. Charcot

In October of 1885, Freud arrived in Paris. According to his account, he struggled to fit into the medical community due to his inadequate French and introverted character (Freud,
Soon after, Freud met with Charcot. Then, he learned that Charcot was looking for a German translator for his *Leçons sur les maladies du système nerveux* [Lectures on the Diseases of the Nervous System], and Freud offered himself to the role (Freud S., 1991a, p. 12). Charcot gladly accepted the offer, which became the turning point in Freud’s life in Paris. He had been invited to parties in Charcot’s house, and after Charcot started to enjoy Freud’s company, he encouraged his colleagues to get along with him as well (Freud, E. L., 1975, pp. 198-199). More importantly, with the duty of translation, Freud started to learn the ideas of Charcot line by line, and he sharpened his knowledge of neuropathology, hysteria, and hypnosis.

Jean-Martin Charcot was born in 1825 in Paris. He was graduated in Medicine from the University of Paris in 1853, and he worked in Salpêtrière Hospital for thirty-three years (Kumar, Aslinia, Yale, & Mazza, 2011, p. 46). Charcot became Professor of Pathological Anatomy in 1872 and Professor of Neurology in 1882 at the University of Paris (Waraich & Shah, 2018, p. 48). He achieved an international reputation through his clinical studies and classification of many diseases, including amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, tabes dorsalis, Charcot-Marie-Tooth disease, and multiple sclerosis, before studying hysteria and hypnosis (Erwin, 2002, p. 75; Markel, 2011, p. 121). Around the 1880s, he started to use hypnosis as a clinical technique, but not therapeutically (Brown E. M., 2008, p. 525). His interest in hypnosis, hysteria, and nervous diseases was significant not only for neurology but also for government policies. Charcot was an anti-clerical man as the government and his studies on hysteria were the scientific explanation of old religious practices on so-called demonic possession (Davidson A. I., 2004, p. 25). He believed demonic possession and related applications such as exorcism or witch-hunting were cruel practices over a material neurological disease (Goldstein, 1987, pp. 369-370). It is not hard to see how captivating Charcot’s personality was for Freud. The government supported Charcot’s endeavor, and the chair in the diseases of the nervous system was created for him in this regard (Goldstein, 1987, pp. 368-369).

Charcot’s main contribution to Freud’s cultural capital comes from his studies on nervous diseases and especially from his studies on hysteria. His usage of hypnosis and his understanding of clinical observation are our main focus to demonstrate their relationship. When Freud arrived in Paris, Charcot was famous for his almost theatrical lectures demonstrating his hysterical patients (Ferguson, 1996, pp. 35-36). These lectures were open to the public, and many important figures visited them, including international students,
physicians, and artists (Ellenberger H. F., 1994, p. 94). In these lectures, Charcot presented a case to his audience. He usually summarized the symptoms and gave the details about their family trees to show a possible hereditary cause of the disease. Then, he hypnotized the patient and suggested the symptoms to the patient under hypnosis. Patients animated the symptoms under hypnosis, then Charcot annihilated those symptoms (Robertson, 1892, p. 506). According to him, only hysterical patients were open to suggestions (Decker, 1977, p. 116), and what happens under hypnosis was only a demonstration of what really happened to these patients earlier. These lectures were so captivating for Freud that he compared their effect on him to the effect of Notre Dame (Freud, E. L., 1975, pp. 184-185).

One of the essential features of these lectures for Freud was their emphasis on clinical facts. On a very famous occasion, Freud objected to Charcot by saying, “It contradicts the Young-Helmholtz Theory” (Freud S., 1986g, p. 13). Charcot’s answer resonated with Freud, and he loved to repeat whenever he could (Sachs, 1945, p. 45): “Theory is good; but it doesn’t prevent things from existing” (Freud S., 1986g, p. 13). This occasion was very decisive for Freud to choose between the famous dichotomy: clinical-descriptive medicine versus anatomical-explanatory medicine (Solms, 2002, pp. 31-32). Freud was trained to be in the latter paradigm where the natural working area of medicine was not the subject but the objective part of any subject: soma. The objective way to study the subject was to understand its soma by anatomical methods. Hysteria represented a crisis of this paradigm since it did not leave any changes in the soma (Freud S., 1991k, p. 169). Even though there were clear clinical signs of hysteria, anatomical studies of these patients did not show any sign of brain lesion in post-mortem examinations (Micale M. S., 1990, p. 382). Both paradigms used anatomy and clinical methods, yet, they emphasized one over another. Charcot and the Paris School stressed clinical material (Faber, 1923, p. 28). Charcot was practicing nosography. Faber describes nosography as follows: “The object of clinical science is the study of morbid phenomena as displayed by patients, and, within this domain, nosography -that is, the description of diseases- forms a special discipline” (Faber, 1923, p. v). For explaining the practice of Charcot, Freud used the myth of Adam where he put every animal in front of him and gave them their names (Freud S., 1986g, p. 13). Charcot collected every possible clinical data and classified them by underlying their differences. He was a visual man (Freud S., 1986g, p. 12). Even in his daily practice, he saw patients, and without uttering a word, he watched them for a very long time before deciding on their diagnosis (de Marneffe, 1991, p. 113).
Salpêtrière was famous for its photography usage, where physicians took photographs of every stage of their patients’ diseases (de Marneffe, 1991, pp. 78-79).

It was a long journey for Freud to “hear” his patients after learning to “see” under Charcot. This was one of their dissimilarities when they approached the same pathology. Freud had a long way to go to hear the patients instead of seeing them, especially with the influence of Breuer. However, it is vital to realize that Freud’s real transition is his move to the clinical-descriptive paradigm (neuropathology) from the anatomical-explanatory paradigm of Vienna (neuroanatomy) (Solms, 2002, p. 28; Levin K., 1974, p. 390). Charcot indeed removed Freud’s bias against the clinics. Before arriving in Paris, Freud was practicing in clinics, yet, he was spending his free time in laboratories since he could conduct his scientific studies. Charcot convinced him that clinics could be a place for science. Charcot redefined what science and scientist meant for Freud. (Phillips, 2014, p. 87). This was a very substantial cultural capital that had paved the way for psychoanalysis.

Charcot stated a significant difference between clinic and nosography. He wanted to see in clinics as open-mindedly as possible. He did not see the physician as a technician whose job is to apply theory to the practice. He wanted to see in the clinic and gather all he could collect for his nosography (Lepoutre & Villa, 2015, p. 9). Charcot chose the most typical cases through observation of any given pathology. After excluding coincidental personal symptoms, he described the type as the representative of the pathology in his clinical work (Lepoutre & Villa, 2015, pp. 9-10). This method of classification profoundly influenced Freud. Freud’s studies during the 1890s mainly used this method, and he focused his energy on classifying different types of neuroses in conjunction with their aetiology. Freud greatly differentiated himself from Charcot when he decided to explain what is normal in relation to the pathologies, including the psychopathologies of everyday life. Although, their underlying attitude to the scientific inquiry remained similar: “a rationalistic approach to the irrational, neither denying it nor glorifying it, but attempting to explain it and bring it under the control of reason” (Mindess, 1988, p. 56).

Moving scientific studies to clinics from laboratories is Charcot’s influence in the broader sense. More importantly, Charcot introduced the dynamic approach to Freud. As it is

---

97 Freud acknowledges his changing approach in the case of Dora (Freud S., 1986ae, p. 24).
98 Eissler’s description of Charcot as an ego ideal of Freud is apt in this sense (Eissler K. R., 1965, p. 393).
well known, Freud’s approach is called psychodynamic today. It appears as it is long forgotten what dynamic really means. Here again, Freud’s dual-aspect monism played a role with the help of Charcot. The anatomical-explanatory approach of the Vienna School is also known as localization or cerebral localization (Thornton, 1986, p. 62). This approach has its own history that we will not discuss here.

Nevertheless, we can briefly say that localization closed doors to any metaphysical approach to medicine (Thornton, 1986, pp. 70-71). According to this approach, if researchers could show the cause of clinical manifestations through local diagnosis, they could have dismissed every speculation. The localization approach helped to establish medical science to a thoroughly materialistic ground. Even though localization was a great success in its own right, it was not explaining every disease since every disease did not leave a trace behind. Especially, hysteria was the turning point for Freud. Freud explained his paradigm shift as follows:

“The special characteristics of cortical paralysis are determined by the peculiarities of cerebral structure, and allow us to infer back to the anatomy of the brain. Hysterical paralysis on the contrary behaves as though there were no such thing as cerebral anatomy. Hysteria knows nothing of the anatomy of the brain. The alteration which underlies hysterical paralysis can have no resemblance to organic lesions but must be looked for in the conditions governing the accessibility of some particular circle of ideas.” (Freud S., 1986b, p. 248).

In this respect, dynamic means functional. One cannot localize every anatomical change. However, if a pathology could be shown through clinical observation, it can be assumed that there must be some changes in anatomy (Micale M. S., 1990, pp. 382-383). The dynamic approach opened the door to speculations that the localization method had already closed. It is essential to understand that the fundamental challenge to the Vienna Medical School is coming from theorization upon solely clinical material. The usage of hypnosis or male hysteria is only of secondary importance in this respect. Freud’s quarrel with the Viennese medical establishment is commonly attributed to his usage of hypnosis and male hysteria after he returned from Paris, and they undoubtedly played a part. However, it is crucial to remember that Freud opened the door that charlatans had used before (Pace, 1968, s. 79). Hence, his strict materialism and anti-religious attitude did not save him from the backlash of the Viennese medical establishment.
Freud’s newly learned dynamic approach was carried to Viennese turf by his “On Male Hysteria” speech. On 15 October 1886, Freud read a paper in front of the Vienna Society of Medicine (Jones E., 1964, p. 206). The polemic on Viennese conservative attitude toward male hysteria versus psychoanalytic myth-creation of lonely genius revolves around this long-lost paper. While one side defends that Freud received hostile reactions upon his paper, the other side says Freud did not present anything new since male hysteria was well-known in Vienna.\(^99\) Therefore, the reaction against Freud was the reaction against his underestimation of his colleagues’ expertise on the topic. We do not possess the original paper; therefore, every account must be flawed regarding historical accuracy. However, we know the reports about the occasion, and more importantly, we know what Freud learned in Paris. Therefore, it is not impossible to reconstruct the scene. Levin’s construction of the speech seems accurate, and it demonstrates how the reactions against Freud have missed the points of Freud:

“The text of the paper delivered by Freud before the Medical Society has not survived, but there are several reviews of it in the medical journals. All concur that Freud emphasized three points made by Charcot: that hysteria is a well-defined disease with predictable symptoms, that simulation plays no significant role, and that hysteria in males has the same clinical manifestations as in females. None of the reviews suggests that either Freud or Charcot was presenting male hysteria as a new concept. The paper appears to have been mostly concerned with establishing the standard clinical picture of hysteria, with considerably less space devoted to the third point, that male hysteria presents the same picture as female hysteria. That Freud, through his title, chose to emphasize this last point, can be attributed to his sharing Charcot’s belief that cases of male hysteria provided some of the strongest support for the argument that hysteria is a clinically uniform disease.” (Levin K., 1974, p. 390).

Hysteria in men was not unknown to Vienna. However, Freud’s emphasis was not on the actuality of the phenomenon. What Charcot demonstrated in his lecture was the features of male hysteria. For a long time, hysteria (the word comes from the uterus (Gilman, 2020, p. 42)) was a female disease. Nevertheless, some man was diagnosed as hysterical in modern times. The male hysteria was always characterized by some female behavior in men. For instance, male hysterics were either homosexual or emotionally weak as women (Micale M. S., 1990, p. 376). In the lectures of Charcot, we often see an emphasis upon male behavior in men.

\(^{99}\) Both sides of the discussion are listed by Sulloway (1979, p. 489).
characteristics of male hysterics. Charcot often described his patients as emotionally strong, working-class, or being a father. These are male features of hysterical male patients against usual misconceptions. All we need to know about the controversy concealed in one paragraph by Charcot:

“Hence we may conclude that male hysteria is far from being a rare disease. Well then, gentlemen, if I may judge from what I daily see around me, these cases are often unrecognised, even by very distinguished physicians. One can conceive that it may be possible for a young effeminate man, after excesses, disappointments, profound emotions, to present hysterical phenomena, but that a vigorous artisan, well built, not enervated by high culture, the stoker of an engine for example, not previously emotional, at least to all appearance, should, after an accident to the train, by a collision or running off the rails, become hysterical for the same reason as a woman, is what surpasses our imagination.” (Charcot, 2014, p. 222).

As Charcot explained, the main ideas over male hysteria revolved around three points: patients’ male characteristics, commonality of phenomena, and trauma as the primary cause. Only one point is not mentioned in this paragraph which is hereditary. We will mention that later. These three topics might have been the central issues of Freud’s paper since he was just returned from Paris, and this paper was served as a report more than an original study. We should understand why these topics were so important in the paradigm shift of Freud.

Charcot was very exact when it came to the demarcation of the borders of neurology (Gelfand, 2000, p. 217). He tried to prove that nervous diseases were the topic of neurology, not psychiatry or gynecology (Ellenberger H. F., 1994, p. 143). He was keen to underline the relationship of hysteria with the nervous system (Marshall J., 2003, pp. 5-6). This is why focusing on psychological characteristics of hysteria later explained by Janet and Freud, instead of Charcot (Ellenberger H. F., 1994, p. 102). Charcot accepted the psychological features of hysteria and even pointed out this direction to his students (Bailey, 1956, p. 87), yet he did not focus on them. For Charcot, the most important aspect was the neurological aspect of hysteria. The nervous system was not different in men and women. Therefore, there was no significant difference in susceptibility to becoming hysterical. Hysteria before Charcot was known as the result of a wandering womb since its symptoms were not following an exact pattern (Thornton, 1986, pp. 73-74). One day it could have caused tremors, and the other day it could have paralyzed the arm (Schwartz, 2003, pp. 35-36). Charcot rejected the
womb as a cause (Micale M. S., 1990, p. 402) and associated characteristics with being a woman due to his neurological understanding. Everyone with a nervous system, thus everyone, was susceptible to hysteria (Micale M. S., 1990, p. 373). This was a great disagreement between the Vienna Medical School and the Parisian medical establishment. Charcot could not demonstrate any anatomical basis for his theory since there was no difference between hysterical and normal nervous systems.

Charcot thought that if there is no difference in the nervous system of hysterics from the nervous system of healthy people, then the difference must be in their existence. Since he could not demonstrate any lesion in the body, he thought that hysterics must have been born in this way. Therefore, he put hereditary as the main cause of hysteria (de Marneffe, 1991, p. 75). According to Charcot, people are born with a disposition to hysteria. The difference was not in gender but in family history (Brown E. M., 2008, p. 525). He put great weight on family trees in his lectures (Gelfand, 1988, p. 574). If some family members are hysterics or suffering from some nervous disease and other members are perfectly normal, which is always the case, then there must be some additional causes to become hysterical. Charcot called these causes agents provocateurs (triggering factors) (Libbrecht, 2002, p. 137). There were various agents provocateurs such as alcoholism, infectious diseases, and all sort of physical illnesses (Gelfand, 1989, p. 300). Amongst these factors, one was the most visible in the cases of male hysteria: physical trauma (Levin K., 1974, p. 381).

At the time, a diagnosis called railway spine was popular. In 1866, John Eric Erichsen published a study where he described post-traumatic effects of train accidents where “concussions to the brain and spinal cord during railway accidents caused organic lesions responsible for a variety of symptoms, many of which occurred long after the actual accident” (Charcot, 2014, p. xxvii). His study and increasing numbers of these cases created a lively debate. Charcot recognized the clinical picture as hysteria. The aftereffects of trauma could have explained the cases he presented. Even though traumatic events did not leave any visible trace in anatomy, clinical manifestations were similar to the other trauma cases. Therefore, physical trauma as one of the agents provocateurs proved his points: men were susceptible to hysteria as much as women (Charcot, 2014, p. xxxii), hysteria had nothing to do with womb or female characteristics, and male hysteria was not rare as it was thought. In any case, Charcot could also trace nervous diseases in the family history; therefore, the sole cause of hysteria was heredity (Freud S., 1986l, p. 143).
Charcot’s insistence on the nervous system as a unifying aspect of humanity surpassed the usual gender-based biases of the medical world (Micale M. S., 2008, p. 251). A similar attitude of Freud could be found in his various psychoanalytical works, but one of them is the most striking: *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905). Freud, however, replaced Charcot’s hereditary aetiology with childhood experience where we are influenced by but long-forgotten.

The medical world's shared understanding of healthy individuals did not differ for men and women. The difference was most discernible in their pathology. It was understandable when women suffered from hysteria since they tend to be emotionally weak. Men could have been hysterical, also, as long as they were carrying female weaknesses. Charcot’s claim that men had no difference from women in their susceptibility to hysteria damaged the stereotypical conception of the healthy male. How much Charcot was aware of the implication of his study is a question.

Nonetheless, Freud did not fail to recognize this aspect and explored it more in his later studies. First, in his trilogy (*The Interpretation of Dreams*, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, and *Jokes and Their Relationship to the Unconscious*), he demonstrated the deviances of normal and healthy individuals to grasp the picture of what really is normal. Then, in *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, Freud showed that normal and abnormal were only a matter of gradation and everyone was susceptible to various abnormalities (Davidson A., 1987, pp. 264-265). This aspect of psychoanalysis was one of the most shocking and even repelling elements (Quinodoz, 2005, p. 57), and Charcot profoundly influenced Freud while he constituted this element of his theory.

We do not possess the original document of “On Male Hysteria.” How many elements that Freud learned from Charcot was in this paper cannot be known entirely. Freud’s account in his autobiography seems misleading. He pictures his senior colleagues as totally ignorant about the existence of male hysteria.100 This is wrong without a doubt. Rosenthal and Bamberger accepted the existence of male hysteria, yet, they were against the commonality and traumatic aetiology of it (Ellenberger H. F., 1994, p. 440). Leidesdorf dismissed the

---

100 Freud chose his words very carefully. He did not say Bamberger or Meynert was against the idea of male hysteria. He put that word to the mouth of some old physician after the event. Yet, this paragraph gives the impression that the Viennese medical community was entirely unaware of male hysteria (Freud S., 1991a, pp. 15-16).
classification of male hysteria to the presented cases (Jones E., 1964, p. 207), and Meynert challenged Freud to present a male hysteria with the symptomology as Charcot described (Freud S., 1991a, p. 15). They also misunderstood some points of Freud. Bamberger objected by presenting the differences he observed in his male patients with railway spine and dismissed the category of hysteria for these cases (Bernfeld & Bernfeld, 1973, p. 257). However, this is a misunderstanding of Charcot’s type where the incidental differences were excluded from the common characteristics (Lepoutre & Villa, 2015, pp. 9-10). In Charcot’s understanding, male hysteria was not solely dependent on railway spine (Libbrecht & Quackelbeen, 1995, p. 372). Additionally, post-traumatic cases of male hysteria were the example of undetected cases, not the sole cause. This aspect was misunderstood by his colleagues, also.

In addition to disagreements upon some aspects of male hysteria, national biases might have played a role in this event. While applying for the bursary, Freud justified the Paris visit by praising his Viennese colleagues’ superiority over German universities (Freud S., 1991i, p. 5). However, he presented French science as more remarkable than the Viennese one after his arrival. This must have been offensive, especially to Meynert, who was ready to leave his teaching duties to Freud very recently (Dalzell, 2011, p. 70). Meynert attacked Freud soon after in his book by saying, “Freud is now active in Vienna as a trained practitioner in hypnosis” (Eissler K.R., 1971, p. 354). According to Meynert, Freud pursued suggestion therapy “despite his excellent Viennese training” (Levin K., 1974, p. 394). Thus, contempt against Freud was not an invention of Freud’s imagination despite his misleading account in his autobiography. Freud was aware of national biases at play, and he used the allegiances of Krafft-Ebing and Obersteiner to hypnosis in his review of Forel’s article, and he blamed Meynert for using his authority without conducting a severe criticism against hypnosis. Freud added the following sentences to the reader whom the nonscientific dimension of the discussion may seduce:

“It will be seen that these names can satisfy, too, those who are so lacking in judgement that their confidence requires of a scientific authority that it shall fulfil certain conditions as to nationality, race and geographical latitude, and whose faith comes to a stop at the frontier-posts of their fatherland.” (Freud S., 1991j, p. 95).
The mutual misunderstandings seem to suggest something more profound. When Freud arrived in Vienna, he was no longer in the Viennese paradigm. He perceived himself as a pupil of Charcot (Freud S., 1986e, p. 325), and he was thinking in clinical-descriptive propensities. Freud’s paper and subsequent discussions seem to indicate more than interpersonal communication. This event suggests a dialogue between two paradigms that cannot understand each other at that moment. It is a case of Kuhn’s “incommensurability of competing paradigms” (Kuhn, 1996, p. 150). Charcot’s nervous system was not the same static anatomical entity as Viennese men understood for a long time. The nervous system was a dynamic current in itself that surpasses known distinctions. Charcot’s science was the biology of morbid state in opposition to Viennese anatomy of post-mortem soma. The Viennese lens was the microscope that could exhibit the pieces, whereas Charcot’s lens was the photography machine that could capture the whole in motion. Therefore, 15 October 1886 was the day that miscommunication was inescapable because of the incommensurability of two different paradigms. Even their basic concepts did not bear the same meaning for the participants. ¹⁰¹

Even if we accept that Freud was mistaken entirely to interpret the reactions against himself, still he interpreted them as hostile. His understanding determined how he reacted back. Freud perceived himself as lonely and most probably as a genius who could not be understood in his own time. He saw this meeting and his later quarrels as a challenge, and he wanted to go further. He sharpened his theory, and when he wrote *Three Essays on the Theory*

¹⁰¹ Incommensurability of competing paradigms is a controversial idea in science studies (Sankey, 1993; Franklin, 1984; Jackson & Carter, 1991; Donaldson, 1998). The idea suggests an inescapable miscommunication between the adherents of different paradigms and depicts the miscommunication as unsurpassable. We agree with Kuhn in his observation, nonetheless, not his theorization. Miscommunications occur between different paradigms due to semantic problems, yet they do not necessarily persist. Additionally, we do not think that the only way to surpass the miscommunication is to obtain the new paradigm. Therefore, incommensurability may occur between two paradigms due to their semantic differences in an event such as Freud’s speech. This occurrence does not necessarily persist. For instance, when Sándor Ferenczi first came across *The Interpretation of Dreams*, he could not make any sense out of it. A few years later, he reread the book and was fascinated this time and became a follower of Freud (Jones E., 1964, p. 330). Additionally, incommensurability could be designed by the new paradigm. A new paradigm can demarcate its limits by excluding the old paradigm and its adherents. According to Biagioli, Galileo represented his opponent as “an unrealistically simpleminded and dogmatic straw-man” (Biagioli, 1990, p. 186) to gain the sympathy of his readers. Therefore, Galileo wanted to create cohesion in his group rather than establishing a rational dialogue. This strategy was very well known to Freud.
of Sexuality, he was still in the same battle in his mind. He perceived his colleagues as either ignorant or conservative. Historical accuracy is inescapable to be fair to all parts of the event. However, misinterpretations or biases of that historical event could also say a lot to us. Therefore, Freud’s account of these events should not be overlooked since it shows us an epistemological break.

In a debate that took place in Charcot’s house, he reacted to Giles de la Tourette’s prediction of war by saying: “I am a Jew, adhering neither to Germany nor Austria” (Freud, E. L., 1975, p. 203). That was true for his scientific approach, also. He was neither German nor Austrian scientist at that moment. He was a Jew, and his Jewish identity may have even helped him distance himself from Charcot later.102 We will discuss his epistemological break from Charcot through Bernheim and Breuer.

Additionally, we should remember that national biases are not one-way streets. As much as Viennese scientists did not want to credit Charcot for his theories, French scientists wanted that credit for their nation. They perceived Charcot’s achievements as a part of French superiority (Charcot, 2014, p. xviii). As an outsider in his own land, Freud did not share the nationalist urge against this French man (Brunner, 1995, p. 96). However, he felt discontent against his fellow Viennese men. As Bourdieu indicated, importing an idea cannot be explained by intellectual concerns only (Bourdieu, 2000, pp. 223-224). Freud’s love for scientific truth without any national characteristic cannot be his only motivation, either. He wanted to fight against his countrymen, and Charcot’s ideas played a role in his fight against the Viennese establishment. Although, national biases are not strict as they could be in other fields. It is only one of the components of evaluation of any scientific idea (Collins, H.M., 1985, p. 87).

4.4.3. Bernheim

Freud had his epistemological break from the Viennese medical paradigm, yet, he was not fully integrated into the new paradigm. Charcot provided him insight into a new scientific view, yet Freud soon realized that Charcot’s approach was not the most suitable approach for

102 Although there is no convincing evidence if his Jewish identity influenced his criticism of Charcot’s hereditary aetiology (Brunner, 1995, pp. 22-23).
him. Again, cultural capital worked as acquiring all the problems of a paradigm alongside a new worldview. Charcot’s theory was not psychological enough in the sense that it took psychological disturbances as *agents provocateurs* (Wollheim, 1987, pp. 23-24), and Charcot’s approach was not enough for Freud to work with a private patient. For Charcot, hypnosis was only a method of clinical demonstration, not a therapeutic tool. Finally, Charcot put heredity as the sole cause of hysteria. According to him, Jews were more disposed to hysteria than any other race (Brunner, 1995, pp. 10-11). Even though Freud accepted heredity initially and applied the explanation to himself (Freud, E. L., 1975, p. 210), he had minimized the role of heredity as a cause of hysteria soon after. As a Jew, Freud may have felt a distaste for Charcot’s heredity, yet more importantly, he could not confirm Charcot’s thesis in his clinical experience.³⁰³

Charcot’s influence on Freud should be understood as a transformative experience. When Freud returned to Vienna, he was almost shouting “Eureka!”. He was excited, yet, his feelings toward his newly acquired paradigm did not resonate with his colleagues. Still, when he first arrived at Vienna, he presented himself as a pupil of Charcot. Even after finding problems with Charcot’s theory, it was hard to turn away from the new identity he acquired. His strong emotional energy delayed his break from Charcot. He chose to externalize his devotion to Charcot by name-giving to his son and acquiring a Charcot lithograph to hang onto his wall.³⁰⁴ Thus, he started to penetrate more into Bernheim’s theories. He commented on the matter in 1930 —retrospectively— that he started to side against Charcot without fully accepting Bernheim’s ideas (Freud, E. L., 1975, p. 394). The most significant influence for his theory was not Charcot or Bernheim eventually, but the interaction between two schools and Breuer’s method.

---

³⁰³ Freud’s Jewish identity may have played a role in his refutation of Charcot’s aetiology of hysteria. Yet, this is not certain since Freud accepted the hereditary theory and its application to Jews when he was first acquainted with this theory (Brunner, 1995, pp. 22-23).

³⁰⁴ In psychoanalysis, internalization is usually understood as accepting social norms through the superego. Conversely, the objectivity of belief reflects society what one believes or how one wants to be perceived (Žižek, 1989, pp. 31-32). For instance, attending a funeral wearing black would help people show how sorry or depressed they are without a necessary internalization of sorrow. Freud’s objectification of his adherence to Charcot might have resulted from his growing divergence from Charcot’s ideas while withholding strong emotional energy. For another approach to Freud’s acquisition of a Charcot lithograph, see: (Morgan, 1989).
As an act of following the footsteps of Charcot, Freud opened his clinic on Easter Sunday, April 25, 1886 (McGrath, 1986, pp. 159-160). It was the day when every office was closed in Catholic Vienna. Freud’s choice of the day indicates that he was not only bringing the clinical style of Charcot but his anti-clerical attitude, also (Charcot, 2014, p. xx). In his clinic, Freud worked on cerebral paralysis of children, his aphasia studies, and hysteria (Gay, 1988, p. 48). He continued to work on his translation of Charcot’s lectures, published in July. Before visiting Nancy in 1889, Freud came across some crucial cases in his clinic. Frau Emmy von N. and Cäcilie M. were important hysterical patients, and their stories were told in *Studies on Hysteria*.

After opening his clinic, Freud used various treatment methods such as electrotherapy, hydrotherapy, and Weir Mitchell’s rest cure (Rosen, 1972, p. 342). In December 1887, eighteen months later than opening his clinic, he wrote to Fliess that he started to use hypnosis as a treatment method (Masson, 1985, p. 17). Freud was already working side by side with Breuer at the time. He was using hypnotic suggestion and cathartic methods from time to time. The exact starting date of his usage of the cathartic method is hard to guess. He must have started to use hypnotic suggestion in December 1887 and the cathartic method in May 1889 (Aron, 2013, pp. 103-105). Nevertheless, in his autobiography, Freud says: “…*from the very first I made use of hypnosis in another manner, apart from hypnotic suggestion*” (Freud S., 1991a, p. 19). According to his explanation, the “another manner” was the cathartic method. Therefore, the apparent use of the cathartic method in the case of Emmy von N. may not be the beginning. Moreover, Breuer’s principal case, Anna O.’s treatment, was completed in 1882, and Freud knew all about the case by the time.

Since Charcot did not use hypnosis as a therapeutic tool, Freud had to learn the hypnotic technique by himself. This was the reason for the delay in his usage of hypnosis. For his luck, he started to translate Bernheim’s book on suggestion around December 1887. Freud stated in a letter that he did not take the task willingly (Masson, 1985, p. 17). Nonetheless, working on translation brought new opportunities for him. In the summer of 1889, Freud visited the Nancy School and Hippolyte Bernheim to improve his skills in hypnosis (Gay, 1988, p. 61).

The Nancy School was the result of the studies of Ambroise Auguste Liébeault. Liébeault was a general physician who discovered long disreputed hypnosis around the 1860s and started to practice it (Fancher & Rutherford, 2017, p. 371). He started to use hypnosis
alongside classical medicine. His experiments with hypnosis started with his offer to his patients. He said if they wanted classical therapy, he would have provided it as usual, but he would have treated them free of charge if they wanted hypnosis. Most of his patients chose the free option, and he earned himself a reputation at the time as Good Father Liébeault (Fancher & Rutherford, 2017, pp. 371-372). He advocated the therapeutic advantages of hypnosis in both organic and functional diseases. His book on the subject either went unnoticed or rejected (Chertok, 1968, pp. 97-98). After more than twenty years of practicing without recognition, he met Hippolyte Bernheim. In 1881, Bernheim visited Liébeault for the first time. Bernheim was initially suspicious, yet, after observing Liébeault’s experiments in 1882, he became a follower (Chertok, 1968, p. 98). Bernheim published his first book De la Suggestion dans l'État Hypnotique et dans l'État de Veille in 1884. That book was followed by De la Suggestion et de son Application à la Thérapeutique. Bernheim’s influence helped the formation of the Nancy School, and he started to gain followers (Micale & Dubor, 1993, p. 21). His ideas contrasted with Charcot’s, and their controversy attracted professionals as much as the wider audience (Smith, 1999a, p. 15). Two schools created the attention space, and it attracted Freud. Freud’s studies until the 1900s aimed to be a part of these discussions.

What were the differences between Bernheim and Charcot, or more correctly, between the Nancy School and the Paris School? The most fundamental of their differences was their understanding of hypnosis. Charcot perceived hypnosis as a special form of neurosis. What happened under hypnosis was purely physiological changes of the nervous system (Andriopoulos, 2011, p. 90). The Paris School described three stages of hypnosis: lethargic, cataleptic, or somnambulistic stages (Robertson, 1892, pp. 495-496). Accordingly, hypnosis followed certain laws in its occurrence. After the criticism by the Nancy School, they decided to name their procedure “grand hypnotisme” [major hypnotism], and they divided it from “petit hypnotisme” of ordinary people (Piechowski-Jozwiak & Bogousslavsky, 2014, p. 61). According to the Paris School, only the patients with nervous diseases could have been hypnotized. This was in accordance with Charcot’s hereditary aetiology. Charcot believed that only people with hereditary dispositions could have developed nervous diseases. Hypnotism, thus, as a form of neurosis, was only applicable to people with disposition. Charcot was inclined to keep his theory within the boundaries of neurology, and he developed his theory of hypnosis in the boundaries of his field (Gelfand, 2000, p. 217). In Salpêtrière, the usual ways of treatment included fattening foods and isolation as a way of moral treatment or as a
physiological mode of living (Robertson, 1892, p. 506). Hypnosis could not have been a standard therapy method since it was the form of nervous disease itself.105

The Nancy School had a psychology-oriented theory of hypnosis. They saw hypnosis as a form of suggestion. They had a straightforward method to hypnotize the subject and suggest that their symptoms would disappear when they are awake (Fancher & Rutherford, 2017, p. 372). Hypnosis was akin to natural sleep with a slight difference. In contrast to sleep, hypnosis was induced sleep, and the patient was conscious during the procedure without “reason, attention and judgment” (Bernheim, 1890, p. x). Hypnosis was helping the physician to penetrate consciousness where there is no inhibition exist. Thus, patients were accepting suggestions as if they were their own will. Bernheim explains this as follows: “The patient remains asleep according to the operator's will, becoming a perfect automaton, obedient to all his commands” (Bernheim, 1890, p. 8). There was nothing akin to nervous diseases in this process, and everyone was susceptible to hypnosis. According to Bernheim, the Paris School’s stages were the product of suggestion since the Parisian physicians discussed these stages in front of the patients all the time. Therefore, patients were demonstrating what was expected of them. In another way of saying it, they were following the suggestions of physicians (Bernheim, 1890, pp. 90-91). Bernheim stressed that he could observe these stages neither in his patients nor in other hospitals he had visited (Bernheim, 1890, p. 90). He produced the same results with the Paris School on one patient only, and that patient was a former resident of Salpêtrière. He concluded that even the physiological theory of the Paris School was the result of suggestion or, as he called it: “suggestive hypnotic neurosis” (Bernheim, 1890, p. 91). Then, hypnosis was the result of suggestion.

Since hypnosis was psychological in its origin, one of the most important components was the rapport between patient and physician. Bernheim describes hypnotized patients as “automaton, directed by a foreign will” (Bernheim, 1890, p. 60) without losing individuality. This control over the patient is not the same as a patient under narcosis, where his body is under the surgeon's control without any consent needed. Patients must trust and believe the physician to follow his suggestions such as “Relax!”, “Now you will sleep,” and so on even

105 Charcot suggested hypnosis only in a very limited way as a therapeutic tool. He believed hypnosis might trigger hysteria in ordinary people (Charcot, 2014, p. xlii). Therefore, while describing hysteria as a result of hereditary taint, Charcot presented hysteria as irremediable. On the contrary, he believed in improvement in health; thus, he promoted the hospitalization of hysterics with humanistic concerns (Kerr, 1993, p. 29).
before being hypnotized. The patient and physician had to establish a positive relationship for obtaining the first consent. The Nancy School’s free treatments probably created gratitude towards their physicians from the patients. However, their hypnotic suggestions were not the most successful for the educated or private patients (Newton, 1995, pp. 136-137).

The Nancy School and the Paris School had other quarrels, especially their ideas over medico-legal issues. The Nancy School demonstrated by experiments that it is possible to suggest someone under hypnosis to commit a crime (Walusinski & Bogousslavsky, 2020, p. 5). The hypnotized subject would totally forget that they were suggested to commit a crime due to post-hypnotic amnesia. This kind of suggestion could have been induced even months before the actual crime’s occurrence. The Paris School rejected this idea altogether since the experiments were not real-life crimes, and the hypnotized subject would have realized that they were carrying a real gun in the actual event if they were suggested to commit a real crime. Charcot called these experiments “crimes of the laboratory” (Robertson, 1892, p. 518). Thus, experiments with fake guns could not have predicted actual events. This conflict between the two schools was due to both schools’ rejection of each other’s results by finding flaws in each other’s methods. Therefore, there were no grounds for them to come to an agreement. As usual, the non-scientific factors resolve these conflicts (Collins, H.M., 1985, p. 87). Charcot’s fame brought acceptance toward the Paris School at the beginning. However, the growing allegiances with the Nancy School by some eminent names such as Obersteiner, Krafft-Ebing, and Forel and the report by Joseph Delboeuf ultimately favored the Nancy School (Fancher & Rutherford, 2017, pp. 376-377).

In addition to medico-legal issues, one particular case history of Bernheim is crucial. Bernheim reported a case history of his patient Marie G. in 1884. He demonstrated that he could seed a false memory into the patient’s mind during hypnosis. Bernheim gave a fictional account of a rape scene that Marie supposedly witnessed. Three days later, a lawyer friend of Bernheim questioned her; she told the story with details and said that she was ready to tell this story in court (Bernheim, 1890, p. 165). This story is also important when we take autosuggestion into account. The psychical origins of hysteria that the Nancy School had purported explained the acquisition of hysterical symptoms as a result of autosuggestion.106

106 The Nancy School was eager to explain everything with some form of suggestion, and this was the subject of the criticism of the Paris School and Freud (Borch-Jacobsen & Brick, 2006, pp. 50-51).
Therefore, if false memories could be planted by suggestion, they would be planted by autosuggestion, as well. This must have been an important lesson for Freud since he dealt with the same issue while abandoning his seduction theory. We will come to that later.

Freud learned two crucial lessons at Nancy. Firstly, he was convinced of the psychological origin of hysteria. He even converted Charcot’s theory of physical trauma to the psychological theory of trauma with Breuer. Also, Freud was familiar with the term unconscious, yet, he only came across the physiological and philosophical usages of the concept. At Nancy, he saw the unconscious from a psychological point of view as he conceptualized in his psychoanalysis: “I was a spectator of Bernheim’s astonishing experiments upon his hospital patients, and I received the profoundest impression of the possibility that there could be powerful mental processes which nevertheless remained hidden from the consciousness of men.” (Freud S., 1991a, p. 17).

The second lesson was that hypnosis was not working, especially in his patients. There were two fundamental reasons for hypnosis not to work. The first reason was that it was hard to create a rapport between the physician and patient when they were middle class or educated. Free will was an important merit of educated people, and they did not want to leave it in someone’s hands, even to a trusted doctor (Mayer, 2001, p. 185).107 Freud experienced this firsthand at Nancy. He brought his patient Frau Cäcilie M. to Nancy with him, yet, Bernheim could not hypnotize her even after several attempts (Schlessinger, et al., 1967, p. 418).108

Freud went to Nancy for perfecting his hypnotic technique; instead, he found out that even though hypnosis was successful in some respects, it was not solving his problems. Freud completely abandoned hypnosis in 1896, but his usage of hypnosis decreased over time.109

---

107 Early therapeutic methods of psychoanalysis required the opposite type of patients according to Freud: “Psycho-analytic therapy is not at present applicable to all cases. It has, to my knowledge, the following limitations. It demands a certain degree of maturity and understanding in the patient and is therefore not suited for the young or for adults who are feeble-minded or uneducated.” (Freud S., 1986s, p. 282).

108 Before visiting Nancy with Frau Cäcilie M., Freud also sent this patient to Charcot (Gay, 1988, p. 70).

109 Bernheim and Delboeuf abandoned hypnosis even before Freud, and they have used the suggestion in an awakened state of their patients (Borch-Jacobsen & Brick, 2006, p. 64). Borch-Jacobsen and Brick evaluated Freud’s abandonment of hypnosis as “jumping on Bernheim's bandwagon” (Borch-Jacobsen & Brick, 2006, p. 65) since they were moving...
Instead, he started to spend more time with Breuer and learn more about the cathartic method, which was more useful in theoretical and therapeutic use. However, this short trip to Nancy helped Freud find a new perspective in his newly acquired French paradigm. Charcot raised his emotional energy, yet, the cultural capital he provided was not enough for Freud. The competing ideas of Bernheim help Freud to grasp the conflict points and weaknesses of both sides of the argument. Now, Freud was more than just a captivated pupil of Charcot. He was a researcher who could participate in the debates around hysteria as an independent party. The acquisition of cultural capital is the only way to surpass the existing paradigm, and Freud completed his understanding of French science with his visit to Nancy. Now it was time to surpass it with the collaboration of Breuer.

4.4.4. Breuer

Josef Breuer was in Freud’s life before Freud’s psychological studies started, and he was there to collaborate in Freud’s first major psychological study. Breuer was fourteen years senior of Freud, yet, they developed a close friendship until the birth of psychoanalysis did them apart. Freud recalled the event: “The development of psycho-analysis afterwards cost me his friendship” (Freud S., 1991a, p. 19). This part will discuss how their relationship started and ended briefly and focus on Breuer’s influence on Freud. However, this is a challenging task that was tried by Forel before. When Auguste Forel inquired Breuer by a letter in 1907, Breuer said it was hard to decide who had the priority over which idea (Schwartz, 2003, p. 44). Despite that, some of their differences could be instructive for us.

Josef Breuer was born in Vienna in 1842 and studied medicine at the University of Vienna. He had worked as an assistant for Johann Oppolzer (Pollock, 1968, p. 720). His neurophysiologic study on respiration with Ewald Hering in 1868 brought him fame, and their joint discovery is still known by their name: Hering–Breuer reflex (Smith, 1999a, p. 10). Starting from 1873, he published papers on how the sense of equilibrium functions (Hawkins & Schacht, 2005, pp. 186-187). Despite his outstanding scientific achievements, Breuer devoted most of his professional career to his main occupation of practicing medicine. He was towards the same direction. However, it is hard to decide if Freud was aware of Bernheim’s abandonment of hypnosis or if Bernheim’s decision influenced him or not.
a family physician for great medical men and their families (Freud S., 1991a, p. 19). He came across his famous patient Anna O. while practicing as a family physician.

Between 1880 and 1882, Breuer put a lot of afford into his patient, famously known as Anna O. As Breuer later complained, her treatment was a time and energy-consuming activity, and Breuer did not want to apply the same treatment ever again (Grubrich-Simitis, 1997, p. 22). Breuer discussed the details of the case and the treatment process in his chapter in Studies. We will not recapitulate the case history since it is not directly related to our concern. We will focus on Breuer’s theoretical chapter. However, we can briefly describe Anna O. and what her complaints were.

Anna O.’s real name was Bertha Pappenheim and she was born in 1859. She was the daughter of a rich, strictly orthodox Jewish family (Kimball, 2000, p. 20). In November 1880, Breuer was called for treatment due to her deteriorated health. She had experienced psychosis, paraphasia, disturbances of vision, paralysis, and so on (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 22) during her illness between 1880 and 1882. A critical component of these symptoms was the time of their occurrences. Anna O.’s father fell ill in July 1880, and she started to nurse her father. From the beginning of sick nursing to November of 1880 was the incubation period, according to Breuer (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 22). Then, Anna O.’s disturbances became visible by her tussis nervosa (nervous cough) (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 23). She had developed all the other symptoms over the course of two years.

Breuer tried a hypnotic treatment for his young patient. Hypnosis was not the most favorable treatment method on that date, especially in Vienna. Breuer’s choice of treatment is somewhat puzzling. We do not know the reason for his choice. Breuer’s hypnotic treatment did not repeat the techniques tried before him. During the treatment, he started to use the cathartic method that he invented with the help of Anna O.

110 Although he had seven more different hysteria cases that he treated with the cathartic method, six of them were after Anna O. (Muller, 1992, p. 133).
111 The experiments with hypnotism usually faced challenges due to the nature of hypnosis. Therefore, hypnotic treatments consisted of individual trials instead of an established method of treatment (Ellenberger H. F., 1994, p. 171).
112 Catharsis is an Ancient Greek word that Aristotle employed in Poetics to describe the purgation or purification of emotions through an artwork (Merriam-Webster's Encyclopedia of Literature, 1995, p. 217). Before Poetics, he used the word in medical meaning to describe evacuation of the menstrual fluid (Belfiore, 1992, p. 292). Breuer’s usage refers to metaphorical usage that was employed in Poetics.
Breuer observed mood changes in Anna O. as a result of her talking (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 30). When she described her hallucinations to him, she became cheerful and relieved. After realizing the therapeutic effect of these story-telling sessions, they became permanent. Anna O. called these sessions “talking cure” and “chimney-sweeping” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 30) and Breuer called them abreaction (Breuer & Freud, 1991a, p. 8).

The justification of cathartic treatment was not different from the pleasure principle discussed earlier. The nervous system’s ultimate goal is to keep its energy level low or constant (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 197). For this reason, every tension should be discharged. However, one psychological problem occurs in this process. According to Breuer, some ideas that are arisen from the body are “inadmissible to consciousness” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 225) because of their content. This idea or memory could result from psychological trauma (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 235). These ideas are not properly discharged because their content would stay outside of the realm of consciousness. The ideas that cannot enter consciousness, thus the unconscious ideas, still need to be discharged, and they find their discharge in the soma instead of the mind. Therefore, unconscious ideas that caused the tension would show themselves in the bodily symptoms. Hysterical somatic problems result from this broken link between the association of ideas (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 201).

During the treatment of Anna O., Breuer realized that the restoration of this broken link was the cure itself. The physicians such as Bernheim or Liébeault would have tried to get rid of symptoms, and their treatments could not be sustained in the long term. Breuer realized that when the unconscious thoughts were recovered or brought to the conscious level, they would re-establish their link with the patient’s current situation, and the symptoms would disappear. For instance, during the treatment of Anna O., she developed a symptom where she could not drink water anymore, and it persisted for six weeks. The Nancy School would have suggested that she drink water, and they would have insisted until she followed the suggestion.

On the other hand, Breuer put her into hypnosis and inquired why she could not drink. It turned out that she saw her companion let a dog drink water out of a glass. Anna O. was

\textsuperscript{113} Freud was in total agreement with Breuer: “There seems to be a necessity for bringing psychical phenomena of which one becomes conscious into causal connection with other conscious material” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 67).
disgusted by her companion’s attitude of letting the dog, yet, she did not show her anger out of politeness. Under hypnosis, she finally found the reason for her avoidance and expressed her anger. After this, she drank water again without trouble (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, pp. 34-35). From the psychoanalytical point of view, what Bernheim did was, repressing another expression of original tension. Breuer discovered that tension should be discharged in a proper way. Therefore, the aetiology of hysteria was bound to its cure.

After spending many hours with Anna O., Breuer realized that the missing link of ideas was missed because of the traumatic experiences (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 42). Thus, the solution would be to return to the first traumatic event and remember it. Once the traumatic memory is restored, all the links between current problems and their causes would be reassociated. This would permit a proper discharge, and first real tension would disappear as a result. Breuer’s approach encapsulated the cure and the aetiology of hysteria simultaneously.

The Paris School believed in hereditary as an aetiology, and obviously, their cure focused on improving the health, not curing the underlying cause (Gelfand, 2000, pp. 224-225; Gottlieb, 2003, pp. 866-867). The Nancy School, on the other hand, believed in suggestion (by environment) or autosuggestion as an aetiology (Barker, 2015, p. 11), yet, they did not have an explanation of why and how some people suggest themselves the pathological ideas while some do not. Additionally, their treatment focused on annihilating the symptoms instead of finding the underlying causes. Breuer went beyond both schools in his exposition. If Breuer’s method was accurate, it meant that his method could cure hysteria since it aimed at the first attainment of the disease.

Breuer and Freud met in the physiology laboratory of Ernst Brücke, possibly in 1876. This occurrence is a signifier of their theoretical background and how they came to a point where they wrote a collaborative study on hysteria. Freud and Breuer wrote separate chapters of their theoretical explanation of hysteria in Studies. Two different chapters on theory suggest differences of opinions without a doubt. However, their ideas carry many similarities that are sometimes overlooked.

Two separate chapters also indicate two separate aims of the authors, even more than their understanding of hysteria. While Breuer solely focused on the aetiology and classification of hysteria, Freud’s main concern was psychotherapy (Grubrich-Simitis, 1997, pp. 32-33). For Breuer, hysteria was an old case history that he never wanted to go back.
According to Breuer’s own account, his scientific achievement was the realization of the instructive value of the case of Anna O. (Schwartz, 2003, p. 48). His scientific contribution in Studies, thus, was the re-thinking hysteria in the light of this case. In reality, he did not even want to publish the case study. If he had had the enthusiasm to pursue this case, he could have owned his school like Bernheim and Charcot. Only with Freud’s insistence, Breuer agreed to publish Studies. Later, Freud wrote to Fliess, “I believe he will never forgive that in the Studies I dragged him along” (Masson, 1985, p. 175). Two different objectives of the authors suggest that they were not sharing the same mood toward an objective. In the relationship between Breuer and Freud, we can talk about the transmission of knowledge, yet, low intensity on emotional energy. If there was an increase in emotional energy, it took place on Breuer’s side. Freud brought him to the field where Breuer did not want to be. Therefore, we have a collaboration on the one hand and a separation on the other. Breuer and Freud had an intimate relationship, and their separation became stormy, also.

We should remind that the treatment of Anna O. took place between 1880 and 1882. Freud and Breuer published Preliminary Communication in 1893, and Studies on Hysteria was published in 1895. Therefore, the case history was written by Breuer only after a few years of discussions with Freud. This is the challenging side of reviewing this book. The differences of opinions are easy to be identified. However, the mutually agreed ideas by authors are hard to be distinguished. On some occasions, Breuer put Freud's name in parentheses. For instance, when Breuer used the concept of conversion for the first time, he referred to Freud as an inventor (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 206). However, Freud said that he only came up with the name. The idea came to them “simultaneously and together” (Freud S. , 1986q, p. 9). Therefore, it is hard to decide who had the priority over which idea, where the authors cannot do the job. Instead, we will demarcate the similarities and differences and try to understand how two authors came together in a collaborative study and why they could not study together afterward.

4.4.4.1. Common Grounds

Why Freud and Breuer published a study on hysteria together? Breuer had his case history and theoretical chapter as well as Freud. This study could have been published separately by both authors. After the separation of Breuer and Freud, understanding their differences attracted the researchers more than their similarities. Obviously, they had a lot in
common. Again, their common grounds should not be searched in two different chapters. Instead, both of their beliefs are concealed in both chapters since this book resulted from years of collaborative study and hours of discussions of its authors. First, we should focus on their commonalities to appreciate the reason for publishing a joint study.

a) pleasure principle

Breuer and Freud agreed on an important assumption: the pleasure principle. According to both authors, the human body works as if the first rule of thermodynamics is at work (Makari, 2008, p. 71). We have discussed Freud’s alignment with the conservation of energy for psychology in the *Ernst Brücke* chapter. Since Breuer was a pupil of the same school, agreeing on the pleasure principle was probably the easiest starting point for both authors. In *Studies*, we see that this principle is mainly explained in Breuer’s theoretical chapter, and we can assume from the whole career of Freud that he had no objection against the idea.

Breuer and Freud explained how this principle works on hysterical patients. We have already explained how the pleasure principle works, according to the authors. In this book, they discuss the mechanism of hysteria through this model. Accordingly, the tensions originated by the body are discharged, and that is the proper working model of the body. Problems occur when the body is not able to discharge its tension. Proper discharge is discharging the energy through its associated tension. For instance, sexual tension should be discharged in sexual means. However, it is not the only way. As talking cure suggests, sexual tension can be discharged by the conscious understanding of the original tension. In this way, given tension might be relieved. Therefore, the authors did not suggest a sexual discharge to every sexual tension. A conscious understanding of “unacceptable” tensions could also discharge the tension (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 67).

Hysterics were not able to get rid of their tensions in this way. The main reason for being unable to discharge some tensions is that some ideas (related to original tension) are not “admissible to consciousness” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 225). This means that a person who experiences tension is unaware of the problem. Nevertheless, the principle of conservation of energy still needs to work in the physiological realm. Thus, given tension must be discharged whether the person understands it or not. When the tension is inadmissible to consciousness, it

---

114 Ewald Hering also influenced Breuer to adopt Fechner’s law (Makari, 2008, p. 67).
stays unconscious but still seeks discharge. When the psyche cannot respond to its tension, energy directs itself to soma. Therefore, the tension is converted to somatic disturbances. This is the mechanism of hysteria. Hysteric could not discharge their tension properly since their consciousness inhibits some ideas to its realm. Hysteric did not even have a chance to deal with their problem with awareness. Since the somatic disturbances have lost their connection to the original idea, the bodily symptoms could persist until the conscious connection is reestablished (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, pp. 225-226).

**b) the psychological character of hysteria**

Why are some thoughts inadmissible to the conscious? Here, the psychological characteristics play a role, and hysteria's psychological nature is another common ground for Breuer and Freud. As Charcot purported, the origin of tension does not have to be physiological in its origin. What originates the tension might be totally a psychological one. In the case of hysterics, it is almost always the psychological event that triggers the tension (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 209).

Breuer and Freud converted the physical trauma theory of Charcot to a psychological theory of it. The question was why some thoughts were inadmissible to consciousness. These thoughts must have been unpleasant even though they were intense enough to be conscious. Therefore, they had the potential to create unpleasure (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, pp. 223-224). According to Freud, one of the duties of consciousness is keeping unpleasure out of mind by inhibition (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, pp. 263-264). However, this defense mechanism only has relative success since the physical laws will still govern. Breuer thought there were two levels of mind (conscious and unconscious) that could not interact with each other (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 225). We will discuss their difference of opinion on this subject later.

Breuer and Freud agreed that when the quantity of tension was high enough, the body would still look for a discharge and discharge its energy through the body. Hysteric with paralysis, paraphasia, or aphasia were only discharging their tension without the involvement

---

115 Even though Charcot mentioned some psychical concomitants to physical injuries, his focus was physical traumas even when those physical injuries were not significant in their magnitude (Micale M. S., 1990, pp. 386-387).

of their consciousness. For instance, when Anna O. experienced a hallucination, she could not find words to pray. She could only remember children’s verses in English. After the incident, she could not speak German again and only spoke English. Her mind inhibited German and allowed only English because she found pleasure in English during the event. Only after the recollection of the event was she able to speak German again (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, pp. 38-39).

c) solving Charcot-Bernheim conflict with dual-aspect monism

The psychological origin of hysteria was the outcome of the authors’ belief in dual-aspect monism. Mind and body were one and the same thing. They were open to the interactions with the outside world as much as to the interactions with each other (Makari, 1994, pp. 556-557). The somatic changes had psychological equivalents as much as the mental changes had physiological equivalents. However, this equation only became plausible with the assumption of unconscious activities of the mind. Breuer and Freud were already acquainted with unconsciousness by the experiments of the Helmholtz School (Ellenberger H. F., 1994, p. 313). Mental activities were more than conscious ones for them. Therefore, psychopathologies could have been developed without the awareness of the patient as in any physical pathologies. The only difference was the patient's potential to bring the unconscious cause of pathology to the consciousness.

After equating mind and soma’s activities to each other, it was easier to assign meaning to their seemingly autonomous activities. They could have examined the changes in the soma to assign a psychological meaning to it and vice versa. Here Breuer’s categories of free and bound energy helped a great deal in transforming the Helmholtz School’s ontology to the realm of psychology.117 Freud assigned significant meaning to this discovery:

“This circumstance caused Breuer to assume the existence of two different states of cathectic energy in mental life: one in which the energy is tonically 'bound' and the other in which it is freely mobile and presses towards discharge. In my opinion this distinction represents the deepest insight we have gained up to the present into the

117 In the Ernst Brücke chapter, Freud’s understanding of free and bound energy in his terminology was discussed. Freud’s permeable and impermeable neurons are his version of Breuer’s free and bound energy. For further exploration of these concepts of Freud, see: (Radford, 2014).
nature of nervous energy, and I do not see how we can avoid making it.” (Freud S., 1986z, p. 188).

For Freud, returning to working with Breuer after visiting Paris and Nancy was more than just acquiring the cathartic method. As Studies suggests, it is a return to Vienna with the help of a fellow researcher from Brücke’s lab. After oscillating between Charcot and Bernheim, Freud returned to basics. His Viennese dual-aspect monism paved the way for his aufhebung from the dichotomy between Charcotian neuropathology and Bernheim’s psychology. However, this was not merely a return to the basics but going beyond the Paris-Nancy dichotomy. His return to the Viennese paradigm indicated a resolve to an issue in the Charcot-Bernheim conflict by creating an ontological reference point. Therefore, the new theory of hysteria was not the repetition of the old paradigm but its application to a new problem. The pleasure principle was used as a beginning point in this new theory. It helped Freud overcome the pitfalls of Bernheim’s psychology that generalized everything to a suggestion and gave an absolute autonomy to subjective reasoning (as idealism would do).118 At the same time, Freud avoided the Charcotian pathology where the distinction between normal and abnormal was innate; thus, psychotherapy was not even considered.

d) hysteria as an acquired disease (germ theory)

Freud and Breuer’s understanding of mind and body came together with Breuer’s momentous case study. By the case of Anna O. and with the discovery of the cathartic method, Breuer gained great insight into how hysteria develops. The cathartic method was a method of treatment, but it was an experimental tool for inquiring about the aetiology of the disease at the same time. It gave a great advantage from a clinical and theoretical point of view. While applying the method as a physician, he could have observed the starting point of disease as a scientist. If a symptom was abolished by remembering an event, the given event was the cause of the symptom. If all the symptoms could be abolished and the patient could gain health, the actual reason for the disease would be found.

This method helped them describe hysteria as an acquired disease (Breuer & Freud, 1991a, p. 17). In contrast to Charcot, Breuer and Freud defended that so-called agents

118 In this regard, Freud was a follower of the Vienna Medical School. This school was the flagship of liberal elites’ attachment to the natural sciences and materialism (Luft, 2003, p. 24).
provocateurs were the actual cause of hysteria. The germ theory most probably influenced their discovery (Carter, 1980, p. 273). According to the Paris School, when hereditary disposition to hysteria is triggered by one of the factors, the innate weakness of the nervous system is activated (Freud S., 1986i, p. 21). Freud and Breuer reversed this relationship. When the patients were exposed to Charcot’s agents provocateurs, they stayed in mind as a memory. If the memory of trauma persisted, hysteria would continue to exist. They explained this as follows:

“But the causal relation between the determining psychical trauma and the hysterical phenomenon is not of a kind implying that the trauma merely acts like an agent provocateur in releasing the symptom, which thereafter leads an independent existence. We must presume rather that the psychical trauma—or more precisely the memory of the trauma—acts like a foreign body which long after its entry must continue to be regarded as an agent that is still at work; and we find the evidence for this in a highly remarkable phenomenon which at the same time lends an important practical interest to our findings.

For we found, to our great surprise at first, that each individual hysterical symptom immediately and permanently disappeared when we had succeeded in bringing clearly to light the memory of the event by which it was provoked and in arousing its accompanying affect, and when the patient had described that event in the greatest possible detail and had put the affect into words.” (Breuer & Freud, 1991a, p. 6).

They described hysteria here as if a germ enters the body. As long as the germ stays in the body, the concomitant symptoms will persist. The solution is getting rid of the germ or, in this particular context, bringing it to consciousness for re-associating the pathogen ideas to seemingly meaningless symptoms.

In the second half of the 19th century, pathogen microbes were identified as the sole cause of some infectious diseases. The seminal works of Pasteur and Koch were gaining more ground (Castiglioni, 1947, p. 809), and eventually, their model found a place in psychiatry and neurology. The studies of Adolph Strümpell and Paul Julius Möbius were seeking similar

---

119 Freud criticized the usage of the foreign body as a metaphor later and suggested infiltration as a replacement (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 290). However, it is not hard to realize the metaphor itself sounds like Bernheim’s “foreign will” (Bernheim, 1890, p. 60); therefore, it has been used against Charcot for demarcating the “spatial unlocatability” (Rottenberg, 2014, p. 353) of aetiology of hysteria.
grounds for the aetiology of nervous diseases as Breuer and Freud (Carter, 1980, p. 273). However, the Fournier-Erb model was more influential for Freud since he put their model instead of Charcot’s hereditary explanation (Freud S., 1986a, p. 144). According to the Fournier-Erb model, syphilis was the cause of tabes dorsalis (slow degeneration of nerves cells and fibers) (Gelfand, 1989, pp. 299-300). This model opened the way for seeing everyone as susceptible to degeneration in their nervous system. In the model of Breuer and Freud, psychological traumas were entering the body and staying there unconsciously until their discharge. As in germ theory, innate disposition or autosuggestion was not necessary to acquire diseases.

In his journey, Freud first understood the nervous system as a dynamic structure after working under Charcot. Later, under the influence of Bernheim, Freud started to think of hypnosis as a result of suggestion and applicable to everyone. This psychological view widened his understanding of the human mind, and it helped him move beyond Charcot’s innate differentiation between healthy and pathological characteristics. Together with Breuer, they entered a new phase where psychopathology became a category that might happen to anyone. After his separation from Breuer, Freud moved beyond, where psychopathologies existed in healthy individuals, only by a minor degree. Therefore, Freud’s creative process can be seen in his understanding of psychopathological categories as universal traits. Everyone already had a disposition to psychopathological diseases, and they were experiencing these categories to a smaller degree in their everyday life. The germ models of his age undoubtedly contributed to Freud’s paradigm shift to his invention, psychoanalysis.

e) the sexual aetiology

What is the germ of hysteria, then? Psychological traumas and their reminiscences. What is the nature of psychological traumas? Here, the two authors had their similarities and differences at the same time. The answer for Freud was sexuality, in every nervous disease. Breuer’s answer was also sexuality, most of the time in hysteria. Here, we are in the old debate of lumpers vs. splitters. Freud, again, was inclined to generalizations where Breuer was cautious (Schwartz, 2003, pp. 46-47). In his theoretical chapter, Breuer defended the sexual aetiology:

120 Freud was already aware of these universal characteristics in Studies (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, pp. 268-269). Yet, he presented a clearer picture of this aspect of his theory after his self-analysis.
“We so often find adolescents who had previously been healthy, though excitable, falling ill of hysteria during pubertal development, that we must ask ourselves whether that process may not create the disposition to hysteria where it was not present innately. And in any case we must attribute more to it than a simple raising of the quantity of excitation. Sexual maturation impinges on the whole nervous system, increasing excitability and reducing resistances everywhere. We are taught this from the observation of adolescents who are not hysterical and we are thus justified in believing that sexual maturation also establishes the hysterical disposition in so far as it consists precisely in this characteristic of the nervous system. In saying this we are already recognizing sexuality as one of the major components of hysteria. We shall see that the part it plays in it is very much greater still and that it contributes in the most various ways to the constitution of the illness.” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 244).

This passage from Studies shows Breuer’s usage of sexual aetiology of hysteria. Sexual aetiology was one of the common grounds between Freud and Breuer in their published accounts. However, there is much controversy over this topic. Both Freud’s account and Ernest Jones's biography portrayed Breuer as if he rejected the sexual aetiology due to his personal disinclination and his fright against Anna O.’s hysterical childbirth (Jones E., 1964, p. 203). Breuer’s alignment with sexual aetiology needs no more proof than his contribution to Studies. Nonetheless, Freud’s retrospective interpretations create confusion. Again, this story has two aspects. The first one is historical accuracy, and the second is Freud’s misconception and its possible meaning.

Breuer did not deny the sexual aetiology. He even said: “I do not think I am exaggerating when I assert that the great majority of severe neuroses in women have their origin in the marriage bed” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 246). Additionally, from Freud’s letter to Fliess, we know that Breuer also publicly supported the sexual aetiology in front of a medical audience and described himself as “a converted adherent to the sexual etiology” (Masson, 1985, p. 151). When Freud approached him to thank, he said to Freud: “But all the same, I don’t believe it” (Masson, 1985, p. 151).

Breuer’s attitude towards the topic is confusing, yet, his letter to Forel made his ambivalence plausible: “I confess that the plunging into sexuality in theory and practice is not to my taste. But what have my taste and my feeling about what is seemly and what is unseemly to do with the question of what is true?” (Sulloway, 1979, p. 80). He only said the matter was not his taste. Then, in his public appearances and writings, he defended sexual aetiology. In
private, he did not. This attitude of Breuer suggests his honesty in front of the fact, or better, his own discovery. Then, the difference between Freud and Breuer does not lie in their understanding of sexual aetiology but their emphasis on it. Breuer acknowledged that different results could have been obtained in different patients. He always demarcated the special status of their private patients (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 232). Therefore, Breuer was against the generalizations, not to the sexual aetiology. At the beginning of his theoretical chapter, he said:

“In our ‘Preliminary Communication’ we discussed the psychical mechanism of ‘hysterical phenomena’, not of ‘hysteria’, because we did not wish to claim that this psychical mechanism or the psychical theory of hysterical symptoms in general has unlimited validity” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 186).

Breuer also ended his chapter by encouraging an eclectic understanding for future studies (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 250). Thus, he was against the generalizations of Janet, Binet, Charcot, and others as much as the generalizations of Freud. That brought us again the lumper vs. splitter debate between Breuer and Freud that was recognized by Schwartz. Breuer wrote to Forel that: “Freud is a man of absolute and exclusive formulations; that is a psychic need which drives him in my opinion to huge generalizations” (Schwartz, 2003, p. 46). Therefore, their differences were not only overt but also grasped by Breuer, one of the participants of the quarrel.

In all fairness to Freud, he had an intimate personal relationship with Breuer. Breuer’s regress from their joint work must have been painful for him (Masson, 1985, p. 172). After their relationship ceased, Freud also believed Breuer actively ran a campaign against Freud to Fliess's family (Masson, 1985, pp. 196-197). Freud’s misinterpretation of Breuer’s attitude towards the sexual aetiology resulted from their personal communications and the hostile feelings that have grown later in their lives. However, this aspect of their relationship cannot justify Freud’s later claim on the transference in Breuer’s treatment of Anna O. Here is the Jones’ account of the matter:

“Freud has related to me a fuller account than he described in his writings of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the end of this novel treatment. It would seem that
Breuer had developed what we should nowadays call a strong counter-transference to his interesting patient. At all events he was so engrossed that his wife became bored at listening to no other topic, and before long she became jealous. She did not display this openly, but became unhappy and morose. It was a long time before Breuer, with his thoughts elsewhere, divined the meaning of her state of mind. It provoked a violent reaction in him, perhaps compounded of love and guilt, and he decided to bring the treatment to an end. He announced this to Anna O., who was by now much better, and bade her good-bye. But that evening he was fetched back to find her in a greatly excited state, apparently as ill as ever. The patient, who according to him had appeared to be an asexual being and had never made any allusion to such a forbidden topic throughout the treatment, was now in the throes of an hysterical childbirth (pseudocyesis), the local termination of a phantom pregnancy that had been invisibly developing in response to Breuer’s ministrations. Though profoundly shocked, he managed to calm her down by hypnotizing her, and then fled the house in a cold sweat. The next day he and his wife left for Venice to spend a second honeymoon, which resulted in the conception of a daughter; the girl born in these curious circumstances was nearly sixty years later to commit suicide in New York.” (Jones E., 1964, p. 203).

There are factual mistakes in Freud’s story. Breuer’s daughter Dora was born on 11th March 1882 (Decker, 1982, p. 114). According to Freud’s story, Dora must have been conceived three months after her actual birthday. Breuer did not go to Venice but Gmunden. Lastly, the termination of Anna O.’s treatment and her admission to Bellevue Sanatorium was already planned (Muller, 1992, p. 134). Therefore, there was no reason for Breuer to depart in shock. However, this last point does not necessarily contradict Freud’s account. Freud’s side of the story carries factual mistakes without a doubt, yet, this does not mean his ideas on transference and countertransference in the treatment were utterly baseless. He depended on his conversations with Breuer or his interpretation of Breuer’s words about the event. Freud said Breuer never told him this story by exact words, but he hinted some parts of it (Freud S., 1986q, p. 12). For instance, Breuer’s wife’s jealousy of Anna O. was already written to Martha by Freud in 1883 (Forrester, 1990, p. 19). Even though there might be a grain of truth in Freud’s account, his factual mistakes make it hard to believe in him. Nevertheless, even if he misinterpreted the reminiscences in his memory, there must be reasons for him to misinterpret.

Two reasons may have played a role in Freud’s reconstruction. In his lectures that he gave in the United States, Freud underlined the importance of Breuer in the emergence of psychoanalysis. Some of his pupils even warned him about his over-emphasis on Breuer’s importance (Freud S., 1986q, p. 8). Then, he retreated from his claim in *On the History of the*
Psycho- Analytic Movement. The ongoing priority debate with Janet was already bothersome for Freud (Ellenberger H. F., 1994, pp. 448-449). He probably did not want to add more to his problems by giving too much credit to Breuer. If Breuer was the inventor of psychoanalysis, as Freud almost claimed in 1910, what was the creativity Freud brought into the field? Obviously, some aspects of psychoanalysis were the creation of Breuer. Then, Freud had to answer this question: Why did Breuer run away or return his back to his own creation, and why was Freud the inventor of psychoanalysis? Freud’s new Breuer—who was incompetent to realize the sexual nature of transference, therefore, unable to continue his invention—helped Freud to create his myth:

“In his treatment of her case, Breuer was able to make use of a very intense suggestive rapport with the patient, which may serve us as a complete prototype of what we call ‘transference’ to-day. Now I have strong reasons for suspecting that after all her symptoms had been relieved Breuer must have discovered from further indications the sexual motivation of this transference, but that the universal nature of this unexpected phenomenon escaped him, with the result that, as though confronted by an ‘untoward event’, he broke off all further investigation. said this to me in so many words, but he told me enough at different times to justify this reconstruction of what happened.” (Freud S., 1986q, p. 12).

Psychoanalysis was a burden to carry. Psychoanalysis was a fire that burns whoever holds it. After 1914, Freud told the story of psychoanalysis as a truth claim instead of a mere psychological method. He depicted himself as an isolated warrior of truth during his invention, and he reinterpreted the reactions against psychoanalysis as the reactions of conservative scientists of the old world. We had already discussed how Freud used this schema when he retold the reactions against the “On Male Hysteria” speech. Was he right in his claims? Indeed, there were truths and mistakes or lies in Freud’s story. The rest is up to historians. Our study can tell only how Freud’s account contributed to his theory.

The reinterpretation of the Anna O. case by Freud was important because of its emphasis on the sexual nature of transference. The complete account of transference was the

---

121 The priority debate between Freud and Janet was a never-ending story. Freud’s account of the debate could be found in many of his writings from 1983 to 1926 (Freud S., 1991h, p. 263). Priority debates are widespread in science, or as Bloor puts it, “discoveries prompt priority disputes” (Bloor, 1991, p. 22).
most important aspect of psychotherapy which could even hold Breuer from inventing psychoanalysis. Despite his “very intense suggestive rapport” (Freud S., 1986q, p. 12), Breuer failed to recognize transference as a whole. Freud discovered transference in his famous Dora case. Freud’s choice of nickname for his patient and the similarities of Dora to Breuer’s daughter Dora Breuer (Decker, 1982, pp. 114-115) suggests that the transference connection with Anna O. case was not invented by Freud in 1914 (Freud S., 1986q, pp. 11-12). As we have already mentioned, it goes back to 1983. Thus, the kernel of the story is not a subtle lie that Freud carefully tailored. Freud’s decision to make his memory public — first in his writings and then, by the agency of Jones and Zweig — is the result of his priority claims and his demarcation of the importance of transference. Freud’s discovery of transference marks an essential shift in his views. His retraction from the seduction theory and the discovery of transference demonstrates his shift from Charcot to Bernheim. We will discuss this later.

In the final analysis, the sexual aetiology of hysteria was common for Breuer and Freud. Breuer understood sexual aetiology as the most common cause of hysteria (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 244; 246). Freud thought that the sexual aetiology could be found in every case of hysteria and neuroses (Freud S., 1986s, p. 263). Their difference was in their scientific style. Freud’s later reconstructions have nothing to do with Breuer’s ideas on sexual aetiology.

4.4.4.2. Disagreements

a) symbolism

As can be understood from separate theoretical chapters that Breuer and Freud wrote, they had their differences. According to Freud’s letter to Fliess, their communication was stopped even before the publication of Studies (Masson, 1985, p. 86). We will discuss these differences in their joint work and in general.

Anna O., famously called the psychotherapy session of Breuer the “talking cure” and “chimney-sweeping” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 30). It must be hard for even an amateur reader of psychoanalysis today to overlook possible sexual symbolism in “chimney-sweeping.” Anna O.’s words may not have any sexual meaning. Nevertheless, Freud would not have missed the chance of considering a possible symbolic meaning in this phrase.
Breuer, however, did not pay attention to it. This is one of the differences between Breuer and Freud. Symbolism was important for Freud. Even though Freud emphasized symbolism in his later works, starting from *The Interpretation of Dreams*, he was aware of symbols in *Studies*. Especially in the case of Frau Cäcilie M., Freud emphasized the importance of symbolization. According to Freud, when Cäcilie M. was describing an event by phrases such as “stab in the heart,” “slap in the face” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 181), or “a look so ‘piercing’” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 180), she was reliving the event as if it was happening, again.

Freud and Breuer’s understanding of symbolism lay in their understanding of the mechanism of human beings. Freud was shifting to psychology while Breuer was more physiological-minded —despite his claim in *Studies*—. Symptoms were a path to understanding the real illness for Breuer. Breuer saw symptoms as a meaningless or unimportant way of mere discharge. Even though he realized symbolization as a process (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, pp. 208-209), he did not attach any therapeutic importance to them. Freud also believed that symptoms are the by-products of discharge. However, he did not find them meaningless. Freud realized —most visible in his theory of dreams— psychological symptoms were subjective, and they bore meaning for that specific subject (Freud S., 1986v, pp. 96-97). In physical diseases, diagnosing the actual problem could have been enough to cure. In psychoanalysis, the formation of the patient’s symptoms would tell a lot about the treatment.

Freud’s and Breuer’s different understandings of symptoms were an important difference of theirs. Today, it might be hard to imagine Anna O.’s hallucination of snakes in front of her father’s deathbed was not interpreted with the Oedipus complex. In *Studies*, Freud was also not ready to interpret the symbols in this manner. Breuer, however, did not even pay attention. This is especially strange when we consider Breuer’s report on Anna O. that he prepared for Bellevue Sanatorium. In that report, Breuer mentions Anna O.’s “*truly passionate love for her father*” (Ellenberger H. F., 1972, p. 275), two weeks of aphasia due to

122 It should be remembered that *The Interpretation of Dreams* was written in City of Dreams, where people created a glittering bourgeois culture to escape their harsh realities (Janik & Toulmin, 1973, p. 34).

123 Freud believed his theory developed in this way, yet insights into this development could be found in *Studies* (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. xxxi).
being hurt by her father, and so on. Breuer was aware of her father’s role in symptom formation, yet, he chose to overlook it in Studies.

Breuer was a family physician. He confessed that after Anna O.’s treatment, he never wanted to go to the same procedure since this long treatment method was not suitable for him (Grubrich-Simitis, 1997, p. 22). Therefore, even though Breuer put a lot of time and effort into Anna O.’s treatment, he was trained to diagnose and cure in the fastest possible way. His usage of hypnosis also suggests his inclination to a rapid intervention. The circumstances of Anna O. pushed him to invent the cathartic method, yet, he has discovered something he was not expecting. Breuer did not even fully grasp the importance of his listening (Schwartz, 2003, p. 49).

b) talking cure vs. interpretative psychotherapy

There was another important difference between Freud and Breuer. Breuer invented the talking cure. According to this, the patient talked about her symptoms until she found the origin of her symptom (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 221). The physician’s role was listening to the patient and assisting her in remembering when the patient could not recover her memory. Breuer did not attach much importance to the role of the physician. He saw himself as an observer (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 232). If Freud was right about Breuer’s lack of the conception of transference, he was right because Breuer did not discuss his role or the importance of interaction between patient and physician. Breuer had no answer why the patient could not talk away her problems to any companion or family members. Why was the physician any different than someone else? Breuer came close to psychoanalytical conception when he compared his method with the confession practice of the Catholic Church (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 211). However, he did not formulate why the hearing was necessary as much as talking.124

As a pupil of Bernheim, Freud was aware of the importance of rapport between physician and patient. However, rapport in hypnosis does not precisely coincide with transference in psychoanalysis (Borch-Jacobsen, 1989, p. 96). The Nancy School’s rapport

---

124 Listening and hearing were the essential components of Breuer’s therapeutic method. He let his subject speak for herself (Schwartz, 2003, p. 54). Daphne de Marneffe recognized Breuer’s and Freud’s “listening” as a remarkable shift from Charcot’s “looking” (de Marneffe, 1991, p. 85). In this regard, it is strange that Breuer did not emphasize this aspect of his method.
helped physicians access the patient’s unconscious. The rapport provided “consent to hypnosis” (Borch-Jacobsen & Brick, 2006, p. 52). Freud’s method needed an adjustment. Freud needed a way to establish rapport during psychotherapy until reaching catharsis. Freud found his solution by inventing an interpretative method. Instead of hypnotizing his patients, Freud obliged them to tell him everything that has crossed their minds without censoring (Sulloway, 1979, pp. 94-95). This was the reverse version of hypnosis. Instead of entering the patient's unconscious, Freud let his patients bring their unconscious conflicts to intrude to the conscious (Sulloway, 1979, p. 95). His role was interpreting the “raw data” of free association and helping his patients to reassociate their ideas and solve their conflicts. Therefore, by synthesizing Breuer’s cathartic method with Bernheim’s rapport, Freud invented psychoanalysis as an interpretative method of psychotherapy.

In talking cure, the physician's role was hypnotizing the patients and leading them to catharsis. Therefore, his role was mainly a passive observer. Breuer said his scientific contribution was, realizing the importance of the Anna O. case (Schwartz, 2003, p. 48). He understood his role from this perspective, also. Freud assigned a conscious role to his patients and a more active and interpretative role to the psychoanalyst.

c) hypnoid hysteria vs. defense hysteria

One of the theoretical disagreements between Freud and Breuer in Studies was their conception of hysteria. This difference in their idea is also an indicator of Freud’s understanding of healthy and pathological on the same scale. According to Breuer, there were various mental states, and they had no interaction with each other (Freud S. , 1986q, p. 11). This state has been explained by the splitting of the mind (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 225). If the pathogenic ideas were received during a particular conscious state, those ideas would stay outside the ego’s boundaries (Freud S. , 1986ac, p. 237). This was the hypnoid state. Therefore, the hypnoid state was not part of the ego, and it was a special state of mind specific to hysteric.

Breuer’s theoretical exposition was akin to Charcot’s explanation of hypnosis (Miller, et al., 1969, p. 611). According to Charcot, hypnosis was a dissociated state of mind similar to hysteria. If hypnosis was a simulation of hysteria, being susceptible to hypnosis was depended on hereditary degeneration. Breuer did not repeat the hereditary aetiology and replaced hereditary with the acquisition (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 235). Therefore, everyone was susceptible to hysteria but only under a special psychic moment of life that he called hypnoid
state or “the tendency to auto-hypnosis” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 247). The hypnoid state was characterized by amnesia since the pathogenic ideas lost their possibility to become conscious (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 234).

On the other hand, Freud believed there was no special state for acquiring hysteria by following Bernheim’s understanding of hypnosis (Zanuso, 1986, p. 100). He believed hysteria resulted from the active agency of ego (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, pp. 285-286). When an idea arose that was not compatible with “the predominant trend of the subject’s mental life” (Freud S., 1986ac, p. 237), that idea would be repressed and converted to somatic discharge. Therefore, the resistance of the consciousness was the cause of hysteria (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 269). The defense and resistance helped Freud to eliminate “special states of mind” or “hereditary degeneration,” and he conceptualized hysteria and nervous diseases as pathologies that everyone was susceptible to (Freud S., 1986j, p. 253).

d) post-hypnotic amnesia

There was another difference between Breuer and Freud. While Breuer did not attempt to recover post-hypnotic amnesia, Freud tried to make his patients remember their memory that they recovered under hypnosis. Again, the phenomenon called post-hypnotic amnesia marks one of the differences between the Paris and the Nancy School. Since the Paris School understood pathologies as a result of the splitting of consciousness, they believed whatever occurred under hypnosis was, occurring on another conscious level (Borch-Jacobsen & Brick, 2006, pp. 59-60). They took post-hypnotic amnesia as proof of their thesis.

The Nancy School, on the other hand, believed that hypnosis was a conscious state and what happened under hypnosis could be remembered by the patients (Ehrenwald, 1956, p. 305). They proved their thesis by abolishing post-hypnotic amnesia. Bernheim developed a technique called the pressure technique (Druckprozedur) and concentration (Borch-Jacobsen & Brick, 2006, p. 59). Freud actively used this mild form of suggestion and insisted on his patients for recovering their unconscious memories (Borch-Jacobsen & Brick, 1996, pp. 31-32). He interpreted the success of the pressure technique as a counterargument of Breuer’s hypnoid state and the splitting of the mind. Even though Freud did not overtly dismiss the category of hypnoid hysteria, he said: “Strangely enough, I have never in my own experience met with a genuine hypnoid hysteria” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 286). Freud and Breuer’s ideas on post-hypnotic amnesia, thus, suggest a fundamental difference and a repetition in the

e) Freud’s psychotherapy vs. Breuer’s nosography

Finally, we can mention one more difference between Breuer and Freud. While Breuer focused on classifying hysteria in his theoretical chapter, Freud emphasized psychotherapy of it. This is not a major difference since Freud also published various articles on the classification and aetiology of nervous diseases before and after Studies. Additionally, Freud agreed on some points Breuer wrote; therefore, there was no need to repeat the same arguments. Nevertheless, Freud’s emphasis on psychotherapy shows what he wanted to promote.

Freud was concerned with practicality, where hysteria seldom occurs alone in real life (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, pp. 258-260). Therefore, their treatment could not be maintained by a single method (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 261). For instance, where physical and psychical disturbances co-occurred, one could solve the psychical disturbances by psychical means, yet, physical disturbances would persist (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 265). This would not indicate the failure of psychotherapy. It only meant one aspect of the patient’s disease was cured. Therefore, Freud —the clinician— demarcated what was aetiologically a “type” had a classificatory value but rarely had a practical value (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, pp. 258-265). Therefore, diagnosing a patient by a “type” only misses the reality of the actual diseases that always have more than one component than a single diagnosis can suggest. As a pupil of Charcot, Freud promoted seeing open-mindedly as possible in the clinic and perceived nosography as almost superficial, or better, always deficient. Therefore, when he talked about psychotherapy —even in a monograph on hysteria— he insisted on the impossibility of isolated cases in reality.

One of the most critical aspects of this book for Freud was showing the effectiveness of his method. He wanted to forestall possible practical failures. Breuer, however, decided to quit hysterical patients thirteen years before the publication of this book. Breuer shared an important case study with the medical community due to his scientific responsibility. Breuer has spoken and saved his soul. Freud, on the other hand, was only starting. This book was the retirement of Breuer from the field of psychology and Freud’s admission to it (Grubrich-Simitis, 1997, pp. 32-33).
Therefore, we can conclude that Breuer did not contribute to Freud’s admission to the study field of hysteria emotionally. Despite their personal intimacy, their intellectual collaboration did not receive support from Breuer when it came to publication. However, Freud’s emotional energy had already been raised by Charcot, and Freud’s commitment to the field has never ceased.

We are facing an interesting interaction here. Freud’s psychoanalysis bears more resemblance to the theories of Bernheim and Breuer than that of Charcot’s. How the cultural capital and emotional energy could be acquired from different sources? They do not. Let us recall what we have said about cultural capital: The cultural capital of an intellectual should provide him a comprehensive knowledge of his field and an insight into the problems and needs of the field (Collins, 1998, p. 31). The cultural capital is not a direct transmission of some information, which could be acquired from a textbook. It is a social and dynamic aspect of human relationships. Charcot did not only teach Freud, but he aroused an interest that has carried Freud to the field. This is why Anna O.’s story in 1883 was gossip material for Freud. When Freud met with Charcot, Anna O. became the seminal work of psychoanalysis. After working with Charcot, Freud’s years of oscillations resulted from the emotional energy that Charcot had raised. Freud learned a great deal from Bernheim and Breuer, yet, Jean-Martin Charcot provided emotional attachment required to be a part of any community.

**4.4.5. Afterward**

After the separation of Freud and Breuer, Freud wrote *Project* and then left his physiological justifications behind. He was convinced that his ontological point of view allowed him to study the realm of psychology alone. Freud worked from this perspective until WWI, when he realized the importance of Charcot and Breuer, again. One event shows that Freud completely retracted from the Charcotian point of view, and he was closer to Bernheim in this period.

In 1896, Freud gave a speech for *Society for Psychiatry* called “*The Aetiology of Hysteria*.” Krafft-Ebing famously labeled this speech a “*scientific fairy-tale*” (Masson, 1985, p. 184). According to Freud, the cause of hysteria was almost always the memory of a sexual experience of early age (Freud S., 1986t, p. 199). This speech is a topic of much controversy. We will side-step that land mine for our present concern. Short and official history was when
his patients talked about their sexual traumas during therapy sessions, Freud did not question their validity and published these stories to prove that hysteria’s real cause was sexual traumas. After a while, Freud decided that his patients did not lie to him, yet they did not tell the truth, either. In this way, Freud discovered the role of phantasy, infantile sexuality, and the Oedipus complex in psychoanalysis (Freud S., 1986aa, p. 128). According to Anna Freud, without the abandonment of the seduction theory, psychoanalysis would not exist, either (Masson, 2003, p. 113). Because, instead of employing sexual trauma to hysterics, Freud employed sexual phantasy as a universal concept.

What is intriguing in this story for our purpose is Freud’s later reevaluation of this theoretical change:

“On the way, a mistaken idea had to be overcome which might have been almost fatal to the young science. Influenced by Charcot’s view of the traumatic origin of hysteria, one was readily inclined to accept as true and aetiologically significant the statements made by patients in which they ascribed their symptoms to passive sexual experiences in the first years of childhood—to put it bluntly, to seduction. When this aetiology broke down under the weight of its own improbability and contradiction in definitely ascertainable circumstances, the result at first was helpless bewilderment. Analysis had led back to these infantile sexual traumas by the right path, and yet they were not true. The firm ground of reality was gone. At that time I would gladly have given up the whole work, just as my esteemed predecessor, Breuer, had done when he made his unwelcome discovery.” (Freud S., 1986q, p. 17).

Freud killed two birds with one stone. He found a universal trait called phantasy under the cloak of traumatic aetiology by dismissing Charcot’s physiological approach. Freud also indicated why the founder of psychoanalysis was him instead of Breuer. However, he omitted Bernheim in this paragraph as an inspiration. Maybe, he did not think that Bernheim influenced his discovery, yet Bernheim’s medico-legal experiments and auto-suggestion theory resemble Freud’s concept of phantasy. Bernheim’s experiment with Marie that we have summarized earlier could prove that false memories may occur in the patients’ minds (Bernheim, 1890, p. 165). Bernheim proved that suggestion could plant false memories. Since

---

125 Freud’s omission confused some Freudian scholars about his accusation of Charcot since Charcot did not mention anything to base the seduction theory at first sight (Kupfersmid, 1993, pp. 282-283). Charcot’s “blame” was overlook the influence of suggestion. Therefore, Bernheim must have a role in the abandonment of seduction theory.
everything was a form of suggestion for Bernheim, false memory could emerge by autosuggestion, also. Since Freud already shifted to the realm of psychology by the rebuttal of Charcot and Breuer, it is curious why he did not acknowledge the influence of Bernheim. Freud gave recognition to Bernheim’s thesis in Studies, and he interpreted Bernheim’s post-hypnotic suggestions in the medico-legal context as follows:

“The process was the same as that studied by Bernheim and others after him in persons who carry out in a post-hypnotic condition instructions given them during hypnosis. For instance, Bernheim (1886, 29) suggested to a patient that after he woke up he should put both his thumbs in his mouth. He did so, and excused his action by saying that his tongue had been giving him pain since the previous day when he had bitten it in an epileptiform attack. Again, in obedience to a suggestion, a girl made an attempt to murder a law-court officer who was totally unknown to her. When she was seized and questioned as to the motives of her act, she invented a story of a wrong done to her which called for revenge. There seems to be a necessity for bringing psychical phenomena of which one becomes conscious into causal connection with other conscious material. In cases in which the true causation evades conscious perception one does not hesitate to attempt to make another connection, which one believes, although it is false. It is clear that a split in the content of consciousness must greatly facilitate the occurrence of ‘false connections’ of this kind” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 67).

Freud had a clear example of the need for causal connections, and he acknowledged his readers by citing Bernheim. It is hard to think that when he abandoned the seduction theory, he was not aware of the influence of Bernheim in his theory of phantasy. Only two years before the abandonment, he published the above-cited paragraph. The possible reason for this omission might be Freud’s opposition to autosuggestion. However, if he was blaming the influence of Charcot for believing sexual assaults as real events, it is strange that he could not find any influence by Bernheim to retreat from the seduction theory. As speculation, we can also assume that Freud did not want to deal with the accusation that he suggested the sexual traumas to his patients by uttering Bernheim’s name. However, we do not possess any evidence for this.
Freud was closer to being in the Nancy camp, especially after 1897 if we need to place him in this quarrel. However, as we have discussed, he had detours and many more influences. His creative thinking, along with his clinical experience, cannot be dismissed, either. Nevertheless, he again started to give more credits to his old masters after WWI. First, he praised Breuer’s cathartic method:

“There are still a number of psychotherapists who have not gone beyond catharsis as Breuer understood it and who still speak in its favour. Its value as an abridged method of treatment was shown afresh by Simmel [1918] in his treatment of war neuroses in the German army during the Great War. The theory of catharsis had not much to say on the subject of sexuality.” (Freud S., 1991a, p. 22).

According to Freud, Breuer did not have much to say about sexuality, not the cathartic method. Still, even if he was right, the dismissal of the cathartic method did not survive after the war. Freud, after WWI, placed death instinct as an equal force as sexual instinct (Freud S., 1986f, pp. 49-50). The theory of catharsis could have been valid again in the new theoretical framework. The same was true for Charcot, also. Trauma as a cause of neurosis was never abandoned in psychoanalysis. However, after discovering phantasy as a universal trait, it has lost its place. During WWI, the cases of war neuroses were increased, which put the traumatic neurosis of Charcot back on the table (Ferenczi, 1921, p. 11). According to Bogousslavsky, Charcot’s theory had already contained this element in itself: “It is likely that the military events of the Commune and of the Siège de Paris, with hysteria cases in fighters, stimulated his interest” (Bogousslavsky, 2011a, p. 138).

We can conclude that the interactions between the theories of Charcot, Bernheim, and Breuer persist in the psychoanalytic theories, even after the emergence of the discipline. Their influences on Freud were more far-reaching than the earlier stages of psychoanalysis. They were all great helpers for Freud to form and reform his theories.

4.4.6. Conclusion

126 We can assume the transition to the Nancy camp occurred in the fall of 1897 with his self-analysis and the abandonment of the seduction theory (Masson, 1985, pp. 264-273).
We have covered most of the influences of Charcot, Bernheim, and Breuer. In a chronological reevaluation of Freud’s writings, we see one line of thought developed under the influence of his masters. Freud started to see pathology and normal on the same scale. As Storr asserted: “[P]sycho-analysis is a general psychology which applies to normal human beings as well as to neurotics. Since we all have some neurotic symptoms, the difference between neurotic and normal is one of degree, not of kind” (Storr, 1996, p. 115). First, Freud witnessed Charcot’s obliteration between genders in susceptibility to hysteria by the universality of the nervous system. Then, under Bernheim, he was convinced that hypnosis was applicable to everyone. Together with Breuer, they conceptualized hysteria as an acquired disease.

The therapeutical projections of these theoretical conceptions were like this: the Paris School observed the patient’s outlook and theorized what they had seen. The Nancy School demarcated the power of verbal communication, but the direction of this suggestion was from physician to patient. Then, Breuer rediscovered the importance of verbal communication from patient to physician. Freud, in the end, discovered the free association where the patient and the psychoanalyst work on the same problem actively and together.

With the guidance of his masters, Freud opened the borders of pathologies to everyone. However, his most successful and creative attempt was finding pathologies in normal life. It was the reversal of what he learned until that point. Therefore, other than everything we have already discussed, the interaction between the three masters taught Freud to understand pathology and health on the same scale. Almost as if he was discovering an old medical motto for psychology: “dosis sola facit venenum” [The dose makes the poison].
5. FURTHER QUESTIONS

In this study, we have explored Freud’s psychoanalytical writings in their relationship to Freud’s various encounters. By nature, this study is unchronological and fragmentary. This approach has its advantages as well as disadvantages. Some arguments can be hard to follow for a reader who does not have an acquaintance with Freud’s work. Therefore, we did not aim to be an introductory study. Instead, we relied on the familiarity of our readers with psychoanalysis. However, the advantage was scrutinizing Freud’s works and encounters in detail. The chapters on Freud’s masters serve this purpose. After completing these chapters, we can finally assess Freud’s work in light of these chapters to make more sense out of his psychoanalysis.

5.1. Science of Fiction

We can still attempt to make a whole out of our fragmentary study by asking a rather odd question: Why was Sigmund Freud not a novelist? If he was, he would have satisfied both Freudian hermeneuticians of philosophy and, obviously, a good deal of psychologists, psychiatrists, and scientists (Luft, 1990, p. 96). In the last century, numerous hermeneuticians had to deal with Freud’s commitment to natural sciences (Bowlby, 1989, p. 100), his so-called “scientific self-misunderstanding” (Habermas, 1971, p. 214). Even more scientists and philosophers of science had to deal with Freudians who wanted to carry Freudian “fairy-tales” to the field of science. Why did Sigmund Freud not stay in the field of literature where he could still be very influential without causing this many problems for everyone?

This question is not very far off from what could have happened. We know from the Silberstein letters that Freud wrote works of fiction (Boehlich, 1990, pp. 89-90). Even though he did not follow that path, he was awarded The Goethe Prize for his prose skills (Freud S., 1986ae, p. 207). He was praised for his writing skills by great novelists such as Thomas Mann, Stefan Zweig, Arnold Zweig. The literary critic Harold Bloom listed him in his major work, The Western Canon, as one of the most important names in Western literature (Bloom, 1994, pp. 2-3). Without a doubt, Freud had the skills for being a novelist. Probably, not just any novelist, either. He could have been as great as Dostoyevsky or Shakespeare. He achieved being in the Western Canon, only with the by-product of his scientific works. It is not hard to imagine Freud as an epoch-changing novelist.
His writing skills were good enough to make him a name in literature. There was one more critical aspect that could have made him a novelist. Freud’s themes were not only used by himself. As he explored, Wilhelm Jensen was interested in similar themes with psychoanalysis around the same time (Freud S. , 1975b, p. 8). We can count Arthur Schnitzler and the Young Vienna (Jung-Wien) Movement as his contemporaries who tackled similar themes (Pouh, 2000, p. 2). Both Jensen and Schnitzler graduated from the German-speaking world's medical faculties. Why did the German-speaking medical community raise topics such as sexuality, repression, dream interpretation in some of their members? While Jensen and Young Vienna had similar topics with Freud that they had explored through their fictional writings, one notable name had similar topics; nonetheless, he withdrew himself from publishing it: Josef Breuer.

German-speaking medicine gave an impetus to modern psychology. In addition to Darwin’s seminal work, the Helmholtz School had the most powerful impact on the foundation of scientific psychology. Helmholtz’s pupil Wilhelm Wundt, Ludwig’s pupil Ivan Pavlov, du Bois-Reymond’s pupil William James, and Brücke’s pupil Sigmund Freud founded the modern psychology. As discussed above, the Helmholtz School had the theoretical tools for studying the realm of mind with the means of natural sciences. Their anti-vitalistic monism brought the mind into the realm of science from the field of philosophy (Decker, 1971, p. 477). Nonetheless, their understanding only allowed experimental works in science at first sight. Wundt and Pavlov explored the aspects of mind in their ground-breaking works from these experimental methods. The objective science of subjective experiences (not its form but its content) could not find an outlet. Jensen’s and Schnitzler’s method was the work of art. They focused on subjective experience through fiction. On the other hand, Josef

---

127 Freud was also aware of Schnitzler’s similarity to his themes. In a birthday celebration letter to Schnitzler, Freud called him his Doppelgänger [double] (Kupper & Rollman-Branch, 1959, p. 109).

128 According to Gay, medical Vienna was a German city: “With other luminaries, including that celebrated surgeon and talented amateur musician, Theodor Billroth, Claus, Nothnagel — and Brucke — helped to make medical Vienna a German city. . .” (Gay, 1982, p. 299).

129 Problems for German and Austrian physicians who wanted to pursue their studies in the field of neuropathology were not only about the publication. Conducting their studies in an appropriate department or outpatient clinics was also problematic, and it required a great deal of sacrifice by the researcher (Hirschmüller, 1992, p. 42).

130 Although this could be seen as a short encounter, du Bois-Reymond’s influence on James was significant (Finkelstein, 2013, pp. 279-280).
Breuer could not find a way to bring his study into the realm of natural sciences and did not publish his Anna O. case for eleven years. As argued in this study, Freud’s psychoanalysis was the product of German medicine. Nonetheless, Freud had to find a way to research subjective experiences in an objective way. Freud wanted to conduct the science of fiction.

Freud wrote a letter to Martha Bernays in 1883. In this letter, Freud reports his friend Nathan Weiss’s suicide to his fiancé. Freud goes on for pages about the reasons for his friend’s suicide (Freud, E. L., 1975, pp. 59-65). This early letter signifies Freud’s keen observatory and analytical skills (Sulloway, 1979, p. 49). We can also add that this letter shows that Freud had all the skills to write, analyze, and observe psychological causality as early as 1883, yet he did not possess a way to communicate his skills to the public, neither as a scientist nor as a novelist.

This situation had changed with Freud’s trip to Paris in 1885. As discussed earlier, Freud’s conception of scientists and scientists’ material was fundamentally changed after Paris. Clinical records, which carried subjective accounts of given pathology, became Freud’s main area of research. Therefore, Freud used observations instead of experiments (Vassalli, 2001, p. 5). If Freud had a tool for the objective study of subjective experiences, he had no reason to withhold himself from the domain of science anymore. Freud was not a novelist. Since he found a way unlike his contemporaries such as Jensen and the Young Vienna Movement. This was the same way that his master took long before him:

“\textit{The performative, theatrical nature of hysteria was appealing to a man who in his youth chose a career in medicine over art. Charcot was a life-long patron of the literary and artistic avant garde in Paris and he brought his considerable artistic and performative skills to bear on his study of hysteria}” (Stephenson, 2001, p. 28).

---

131 Freud concludes his letter by saying: “\textit{Thus his death was like his life, cut to a pattern: he all but screams for the novelist to preserve him for human memory}” (Freud, E. L., 1975, p. 65). Freud did not know any other way than fiction to preserve and articulate the patterns of human stories. He was on the path to find one.

132 When evaluating \textit{Gradiva}, Kofman agress that it appears as if Jensen has an endopsychic knowledge of repression (Kofman, 1991, pp. 99-100). The source of this “endopsychic knowledge” could be trailed to the similar educational background of both men.
This was the first distinct characteristic of Freud’s psychoanalysis. Before Freud, German medicine could not discharge its own need: the objective study of subjective experiences. It either transposed itself to art (as in the case of medical men who turned to literature), or it suppressed its own achievements (as in the case of Breuer). Freud found a way for German medicine to abreact its own need. His science can be read as “short stories” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 160), or people can have the urge to read them as roman à clef (Freud S., 1986ae, p. 9), yet it is a natural science to him in the materialist tradition of German medicine.

5.2. The Objective Science of Subjectivity

Why did Freud not establish strict categories? This question is the second one to be posed to unite our study. In his intellectual journey, what convinced Freud to think that most of the categories he established (pathological ones to social categories) are a matter of degree, not a kind? It is hard to answer and directly related to the hard problem. For Freud, the question was how to maintain a materialistic point of view when dealing with subjectivity. Was it possible to maintain what he learned from quantities and apply them to the consciousness that only knows qualities and nothing about quantities? Three things can guide us here: Freud’s disagreement with Breuer (and with the French School), his understanding of the philosophy of science, and his conception of totality.

When Freud met with Salvador Dali, he said something strange to him: “In classic paintings, I look for the sub-conscious—in a surrealist painting for the conscious” (The Diary of Sigmund Freud, 1929–1939: A Record of the Final Decade, 1992, p. 244). That can be

133 The hard problem of consciousness is a problem of the philosophy of mind. It refers to the problem of explaining the subjective experience by exploring the easy problems such as the focus of attention, categorizations, and so on. While the easy problems are explainable by neurological or computational methods, the hard problem appears to be immune to be grasped by the sum total of easy problems. Therefore, even if we explain every easy problem with absolute certainty, we still cannot explain the hard problem (Chalmers, 1995, pp. 1-3).

134 Freud’s first explicit formulation of the hard problem can be found in his Project as The Problem of Quality (Freud S., 1991g, pp. 307-308). In his article The Limits of our Knowledge of Nature (1874), the same problem was also formulated by du Bois-Reymond. More importantly, for our present concern, it can be found in Freud’s master Brücke, as well: “No one can prove that these attributes have a real existence, in the strict sense of the word, that they exist in the things themselves, and beyond the domain of human thought” (Brücke, 1858, p. 83).
understood as a joke, and it probably was. Still, it bears a truth value in it. Freud did not look for complex or underlying reasons in his studies. Freud always looked for a totality (Brill, 1973, p. 164). Where the conscious was presented\(^\text{135}\), he looked for the unconscious. Not because the unconscious tells us the true story, but it tells us the whole story when coupled with the conscious. Freud wanted to see any given subject as a whole on a scale, and he tried to determine where the subject is in the scale and alongside the other possible explanations.

Freud wanted to evaluate things in their totality. Therefore, his first attempt was always to find the limits of possibilities. The turning point for this way of thinking appeared after Freud distanced himself from Charcotian aetiology.\(^\text{136}\) When Freud rejected hereditary as a necessary condition for pathologies, everyone became equal in their susceptibility to pathologies for him. Therefore, every life event, especially childhood experiences, became the possible cause of pathologies, not agents provocateurs. Human beings are born with possibilities, and their life events have the determining power over who they are. To solve the problem of these new limitless possibilities that Freud introduced, he had to find his subjects' limits first.

Freud tried to find the limits (usually on the one end there were physiological and biological limits, and on the other, there were social limits, or their internalized form—the superego) of possibilities and placed his subjects on a scale of possibilities. Two ends of his scale often contradicted each other by their nature. Therefore, while Freud located his subject, sometimes contradictions emerged in his explanation. They were not contradictions in his theory, according to Freud. They were the contradictions of the given subject. When he wanted a clearer picture, he looked for a symptom; therefore, we can recognize his

\(^{135}\) Frattaroli correctly observes that “all the hard data of psychoanalysis are acts of consciousness. . .” (Frattaroli, 1992, p. 58). If psychoanalysis were the study of unconsciousness, Freud would not have abandoned hypnosis where the conscious is bypassed. However, this does not mean that psychoanalysis is the study of consciousness, as Frattaroli perceives (Frattaroli, 1992, p. 58). If it were, there would be no reason for Freud to apply the rules of physiology as his limits.

\(^{136}\) While Charcot looked at his subject and photographed them, Freud listened to them. Charcot’s objectivity was almost too literal because he actually used the “objective” of a machine. What Freud aimed was an objective study of subjectivity. Therefore, he listened and recorded the words instead of observing bodies. He tried to find the patterns in patients’ stories. In therapy, Freud attempted to uncover the forgotten parts of these stories and holes in the formation of neuroses, and he tried to reassociate existing ideas with their actual causes. He measured his “objective” success by the annihilation of symptoms in the subject, and this was his way of conducting objective science of subjectivity.
methodology as symptomatic (Žižek, 1989, pp. 3-6; Althusser, 2005, pp. 253-254). Symptoms are localizable distortions that can solve the contrary or overlapping explanations. Freud explains his method as follows:

“Examination of the clinical material gives us no unequivocal answer here, because, as our hypothesis tells us, the two classes of instinct hardly ever appear in a pure form, isolated from each other; but an investigation of extreme cases would probably point in the direction I anticipate” (Freud S., 1986h, p. 138).

Freud found strict limits. As subspecies of the animal kingdom, humans are determined by their bodily needs, the pleasure principle, the compulsion to repeat, or simply by their instincts. As social beings, humans are determined by their culture and their superego, which is the internal representation of that culture. What is strict in Freud is the limits of possibilities. The Oedipus Complex is the expression of these two opposing forces, giving rise to ambivalence. Where the contradictions became visible or unavoidable, the limits of possibilities became more intelligible. This is why Freud searched for psychopathologies of everyday life, dreams, and so on to define the limits of humans. He looked for qualities as the extensions of quantities; therefore, he searched for subjective accounts incompatible with objective realities. This was his way of answering the hard question of consciousness.

After finding the strict limits, Freud’s categories did not have to be strict anymore. They could have been temporary, interwoven, or contradictory. For instance, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905) was devoted to showing how strict the categories of sexuality, development, or perversion were; according to medical communities at the time. Freud tried to show how underdetermined their categories were based on their evidence. The preconceptions of scientists were neither objective nor captured the subjective experience.

137 The name can be relatively new, but the formulation of the hard problem can be found in du Bois-Reymond’s The Limits of our Knowledge of Nature. There is a good chance that Freud was aware of this paper. This is very likely since du Bois-Reymond’s ideas concerning the hard problem were formulated as ignoramus et ignorabimus [we do not know and will not know]. It was attracted much criticism, most notably by Haeckel (Finkelstein, 2013, p. 271). Since Freud was aware of the work of both parties, he must have known the discussion by these notable intellectuals of the time.
On the other hand, Freud attempted to “find a balance between theoretical speculation and observed data” (Gamwell, 2006, p. 8) by following the footsteps of Helmholtz. Freud accepted instincts as a point of departure and the social necessities as the limitations. However, nothing in between was readily determinable. The mere existence of instincts would not justify the heterosexual object-choice, and the social limitations (or neuroses and aberrations as symptoms) would differ in different times and societies. Therefore, sexuality was an acquired feature that has been shaped by the social and personal history of human beings, and the true nature of sexuality could not be categorized as normal by commonality (Freud S., 1986aa, pp. 146-148). The source and the pressure of an instinct were the strict limits that could not be surpassed. Everything else, the most notably the object of instinct, was accidental. We can formulate Freudian psychoanalysis as a contingency between strictly determined limits.

5.3. Socializing the Mind

We have explained how Freud psychologized the theory of instincts in detail. Freud psychologized many things. Psychoanalysis, or psychological analysis, means applying a psychological point of view to the given subject. This description may give the impression of a reductionist approach, and psychoanalysis might be a reductionist endeavor. Nonetheless, we should look at what is psychological in the psychoanalytical investigation.

In Freud’s studies of society, group, culture, religion, etc., we see an almost immense psychologization. Everything comes to a point where they could be explained by the relationship between father and son. The crystallization of that relationship is the superego. We rarely recognize how social the mind was in the Freudian oeuvre. Freud socialized the mind as much as he psychologized society.

By introducing the unconscious to the realm of mind, Freud transposed the mind to a social realm. He found the mind as the place of conflict where more than one agency is in play. His peers from the same perspective offered “splitting of the mind” (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 225) since after the introduction of the unconscious activities to the mind, it was not plausible to depict a human being as an individual. The pleasure principle works as a state of nature or primal paradise. Then, unpleasurable activities occur, and struggles begin. There are inadmissible ideas to consciousness because they would distort harmony. However, when
they are repressed, they continue to create unpleasure without finding a voice in the conscious.

Where his peers saw more than one conscious state in hysteric (therefore, two people in one), Freud saw human beings as a totality where the conscious and the unconscious coexist. Freud’s disagreement with Breuer (and the Paris School)\(^\text{138}\) that we have discussed in the chapter on hypnoid hysteria and defense hysteria was just an extension of their view on the mind. Breuer thought the socialized mind (where more than one agency is active) was a strict category of pathology. Freud, on the contrary, thought that the socialized mind was the mind itself since this conception of mind was not in contradiction with any fundamental limits of biology. Again, Freud dismissed the strict categories of pathology that do not contradict his strict limits.

Freud transformed the ego as an agency that “is not master in its own house” (Freud S., 1991l, p. 143). First, with the conscious, the preconscious, and the unconscious system, and then, with the id, the ego, and the superego, Freud socialized the mind. According to him, even ego (only one agency in the whole mind) was more social than it recognizes itself:

“In this way, then, the ego detaches itself from the external world. Or, to put it more correctly, originally the ego includes everything, later it separates off an external world from itself. Our present ego-feeling is, therefore, only a shrunken residue of a much more inclusive—indeed, an all-embracing—feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond between the ego and the world about it” (Freud S., 1986h, p. 68).

Further proof of this can be found in his metaphors for describing the mind. As Brunner (1995, pp. 45-88) has shown, by using metaphors such as repression, occupation (cathexis), censorship, representation, resistance, and so on, Freud portrayed the mind as a place of socio-political events where independent organs fight against each other. Therefore, the mind was not the place of one of these agencies. It was the place of conflict between

\(^\text{138}\) For the ideas of the Paris School about this issue, see: (Cordón, 2012, p. 214; Ferguson, 1996, p. 41; Colombo & Abend, 2005, p. 377).
agencies. For dialectical logic, these opposing forces can cancel each other or sublate (aufhebung) to something independent of all of them. For Freud, the fundamental conflicts are permanent since their conflicts reside within strict limits. The categories between the limits can change; moreover, they change constantly.

This is why it was easy for Freud to travel between primal and civilized societies. He believed that the fundamental limits of the human species were the same. Even in the highest cultural production, Freud could have found the expression of most basic needs. Therefore, he challenged another dichotomy —by recognizing the differences (Kroeber, 1920, p. 54)— between the civilized men and the primal men: “It is easy to see how war impinges on this dichotomy. It strips us of the later accretions of civilization, and lays bare the primal man in each of us.” (Freud S., 1986ag, p. 299). Freud wrote these lines during the war. He undoubtedly benefited from the conception of the death instinct a few years later. The conflict between two opposing instincts could better exemplify his understanding of mind and society as a place of eternal conflict. While we have the instincts of life, we cannot be entirely subjugated by society, and while we have the death instinct, we cannot do without society's restrictions. This was the range of possibilities for Freud. Then he tried to understand where we are as a society and how different we could be if we explore our full potential or other options. The opposite is also true. Even if we change gravely, we will always carry the potential to regress.

The whole endeavor of Freud was changing the strict categories to states. These states bore the possibility (and the necessity) of change between the fundamentally strict limits. The given subject could not be strictly fixated but determined by life events or history—especially in childhood or prehistoric times. However, it could have been overdetermined and even determined by contradictory causes. Constitutional bisexuality was also part of this

139 The fact that Freud called them also districts or provinces shows how socio-political his metaphors of mind were: “We now distinguish in our mental life (which we regard as an apparatus compounded of several agencies, districts or provinces) one region which we call the ego proper and another which we name the id” (Freud S., 1986o, p. 96). Additionally, Birken offers a perspective to read Freud’s metaphors (economy, gain, loss, dreamwork, the tendency to economize, and so on) from a perspective of political economy (Birken, 1999, pp. 311-314).

140 His interpretation of Da Vinci “who is among the greatest of the human race” (Freud S., 1986af, p. 63) and his dissection of so-called “oceanic feeling” were the result of this understanding (Freud S., 1986h, pp. 64-66).

141 The feeling of ambivalence (love and hate at the same time) is a good example of this.
framework. His ideas on transference and countertransference could be understood within this framework. From the Oedipus Complex to his social psychology, every subject that psychoanalysis investigated could be explained by this method. Freud invented the death instinct with the same methodology. He was convinced that his then-current strict limits could not explain the developments in post-war society. Then, he decided to change the limits.

At the beginning of this study, we have promised that our approach should make Freud’s psychoanalysis more intelligible. We have also asserted that: “The object of sociological analysis should be a better understanding of the given subject. When the subject is science or philosophy, the aim of sociology should be a better understanding of the methodology and theory of a given scientific or philosophical school.” If we have succeeded, this is the picture we get after examining Freud’s relationship with his masters. We got a closer picture of how Freud operationalized his theory by networking Freud.

5.4. Freud’s Hard Problem

There is one striking limitation or contradiction in our explanation: Freud’s specific Lamarckism. We have discussed Freud’s Lamarckism already with his adjustments. Freud transformed Lamarck’s “animal volition” to unconscious first, then he applied a theory about species to a race. If Freud had strict limits for his framework and one of them is biological limits, how can he apply a biological theory (Lamarckism) to a social category (race), or how can he describe a biological category (race) by social and psychological (sense of guilt and memory-traces) processes? The solution may be found by explaining the contradiction of the conception of race: a category that can be explained by both social and biological terms. First, we should look at the place of women in Freud’s theories.

While Freud worked with many women in his clinical practice, his theory is very male-oriented. The case studies that depend on Freud’s clinical reports of his female patient quickly become male-oriented when a theory is constructed upon them. While his psychological studies still contain women in theoretical constructions, the whole body of Freud’s social studies revolve around the father-son relationship. It is hard to find any sign of women on a social level. Freud insists that his primary source of information is his clinical
studies, yet his theories grow away from women every step of the way.\textsuperscript{142} In his clinical practice, he saw women with utter respect and even called one woman his true teacher (Masson, 1985, p. 229). An explanation of misogyny could be an easy exit for this problem.\textsuperscript{143} Freud explains the lack of women in his analysis as follows:

"Furthermore, women soon come into opposition to civilization and display their retarding and restraining influence—those very women who, in the beginning, laid the foundations of civilization by the claims of their love. Women represent the interests of the family and of sexual life. The work of civilization has become increasingly the business of men, it confronts them with ever more difficult tasks and compels them to carry out instinctual sublimations of which women are little capable. Since a man does not have unlimited quantities of psychical energy at his disposal, he has to accomplish his tasks by making an expedient distribution of his libido. What he employs for cultural aims he to a great extent withdraws from women and sexual life. His constant association with men, and his dependence on his relations with them, even estrange him from his duties as a husband and father. Thus the woman finds herself forced into the background by the claims of civilization and she adopts a hostile attitude towards it" (Freud S., 1986h, pp. 103-104).

It is almost as if Freud says, "I must console myself with the reflection that the nature of the subject is evidently responsible for this, rather than any preference of my own" (Breuer & Freud, 1991b, p. 160). For Freud, civilization was the result of inhibition or renunciation of male-libido.\textsuperscript{144} Therefore, it can be plausible to explain social dynamics by male activities. If society is patriarchal, a study of subjective experiences shall explain society with a male-oriented theory. This is plausible to one degree, yet it becomes unintelligible again when applied to a matrilineal race: Jewishness. Moses and Monotheism run into contradictions by

\textsuperscript{142} Another possible reason for this might be the gender of Freud’s most occupying patient: himself. His publication of the case histories of male patients also coincides with his increasing interest in social theory (Paul, 1992, pp. 13-14).

\textsuperscript{143} The problem of women in psychoanalysis converges to the problem of women in Charcot’s theory and practice, where women are respected but sometimes poorly treated, both theoretically and practically (Marshall J. W., 2016, pp. 8-9).

\textsuperscript{144} Freud’s ideas on the renunciation of female-libido to nurture the child during the ice age could be found in A Phylogenetic Phantasy. We gave a summary of it under the subchapter called Lamarckian Theory. Some other explanations of women’s role in society can be found in Moses and Monotheism, where again, Freud mentions the short reign of matriarchal societies after primal parricides. These short periods can be followed in the formations of mother-goddesses (Freud S., 1986o, p. 46; 83).
explaining a matrilineal race by a male-oriented theory and using social and biological conceptions of race interchangeably.

*Moses and Monotheism* was a problematic text for Freudians, as discussed earlier. We could not foresee finding ourselves in the same positions as Freudians such as Jones and Kris. If Freud really set strict limits of possibilities, as we have claimed, how can we explain his theorization of the Jewish race as a social and biological category at the same time while changing the meaning of both social and biological? In this text, Freud almost treated biology and social psychology as his interchangeable categories, not as his strict limits. Should we be tempted to say that “Freud's Lamarckian propensities were much regretted by many of us” (Sulloway, 1979, p. 439) as Kris did? Since it was Freud’s last book, should we explain our failure of classifying this book under our proposed framework by asserting Freud’s deteriorated health? Should we place this book outside of Freud’s psychoanalysis as some of his followers would like to do (Reik, 1942, pp. 90-91)? These solutions are attractive without a doubt. Nonetheless, we can try to make sense of this book, even if we admit that this book is not readily explainable by our framework.

According to Slavet, the matrilineality of Jewry is only a matter of practicality since it is the easiest and most accurate way to decide the lineage of the offspring. Despite the matrilineal outlook, rabbinic family law has a paternal character (Slavet, 2009, p. 186). Therefore, there is no contradiction in researching Jewish characteristics by following the paternal superego. Jewish communities can decide who is Jewish by looking at the mother; nonetheless, what makes them Jewish is their primal crime and its undeletable mark in their identity: “Mixtures of blood interfered little with this, since what held them together was an ideal factor, the possession in common of certain intellectual and emotional wealth” (Freud S., 1986o, p. 123). Again, Freud's perspective can justify the exclusion of women in the psychoanalytical study of society. We should keep in mind that we are still in the realm of the superego.

As Freud repeatedly confessed, the real problem is explaining how memory traces of primal parricide can be transmitted to subsequent generations. Concomitantly, how this transmission influences women as much as men. Biology and physiology were the universal factors of Freud’s theory. He acquired this dimension of his theory from Charcot’s model and used it against the strict pathological categories between men and women and between
pathological and normal. In *Totem and Taboo*, Freud’s theory was justified by the recapitulation of the phylogeny of the human species. In *Moses and Monotheism*, Freud did not claim a disposition stemming from the recapitulation, but he claimed a sense of guilt arising from transmitting actual memory traces.

Additionally, he did not claim this transmission for the human species but for a specific race. He did not use genetics for his claim (Holmes, 1983, s. 188) (even though he was familiar with the work of Weismann). He did it by the discredited theory of Lamarck. It means a group of people, namely Jews, had committed a grave crime and repressed it. Nonetheless, the content of this repression was stored in the id of the successive generations of Jews. The content of the memory, or the memory traces, was in both the unconscious and the preconscious. Freud explains this formation as follows:

“*The repressed is to be counted as belonging to the id and is subject to the same mechanisms; it is distinguished from it only in respect to its genesis. The differentiation is accomplished in the earliest period of life, while the ego is developing out of the id. At that time a portion of the contents of the id is taken into the ego and raised to the preconscious state; another portion is not affected by this translation and remains behind in the id as the unconscious proper. In the further course of the formation of the ego, however, certain psychical impressions and processes in the ego are excluded [i.e. expelled] from it by a defensive process; the characteristic of being preconscious is withdrawn from them, so that they are once more reduced to being component portions of the id. Here then is the ‘repressed’ in the id. So far as intercourse between the two mental provinces is concerned, we therefore assume that, on the one hand, unconscious processes in the id are raised to the level of the preconscious and incorporated into the ego, and that, on the other hand, preconscious material in the ego can follow the opposite path and be put back into the id. The fact that later on a special region —that of the ‘super-ego’—is separated off in the ego lies outside our present interest*” (Freud S., 1986o, pp. 96-97).

We have claimed that deciding the limits of possibilities was Freud’s working principle. There were social limitations on the one hand, and natural limitations on the other. The social limitations followed the structure of the Oedipus Complex. Nonetheless, the content of the social limitations was ever-changing, and context depended. The universality of the Oedipus Complex was in its ambivalence, acquisition, renunciation, and so on. What

---

145 He reiterated this thesis in *Moses and Monotheism* (Freud S., 1986o, pp. 124-125).
person really acquires through this process depends on the society, time, or group he was part of. Since the superego's content was context-dependent, Jews could not transmit the sense of guilt merely by the superego for centuries. Freud turned to the other end of his scale for an answer.

The natural limitations for Freud were two-fold. They were either physiological or biological. They were natural sciences in equal dignity. However, there was a change in the weight of Freud’s usage of biology and physiology over time, especially after 1914. When Freud created his instinct theory, he was careful to dissect the concept of instinct. His main aim was to decide what was truly the domain of natural science in it and what was for him to claim for conducting his psychological studies. The decline in physiological principles for biological ones indicates a need for a more qualitative framework (Rodeheaver, 1980, pp. 163-164). Freud clearly expresses this need:

“What is unsatisfactory in this picture—and I am aware of it as clearly as anyone—is due to our complete ignorance of the dynamic nature of the mental processes. We tell ourselves that what distinguishes a conscious idea from a preconscious one, and the latter from an unconscious one, can only be a modification, or perhaps a different distribution, of psychical energy. We talk of cathexes and hypercathexes, but beyond this we are without any knowledge on the subject or even any starting-point for a serviceable working hypothesis” (Freud S., 1986o, p. 97).

In this conjunction, creating the second model of the mind (structural model) resulted from the increasing importance of biology. We have already claimed that Freud socialized the mind. He socialized the mind from the beginning by introducing the conscious, the preconscious, and the unconscious. However, by socializing his biology (Hacker, 1973, p. 331), he socialized the limits of mind to a certain degree.

Why does the regression of physiology for biology's sake make the limits more qualitative, and why does it help the socialization of the theory of mind? The answer is in evolutionary biology. How much Freud was aware of this aspect is another question. For instance, for du Bois-Reymond, science could not answer how quantitative mechanisms find a

146 When Freud needed to alter his pleasure principle, he was only convinced to do it by a biological theory. We have discussed this in Influence of Neurology in Freud’s Later Studies.
qualitative expression in the conscious (du Bois-Reymond, 1874, p. 24). Even if we had discovered all the quantitative mechanisms of the soma, we could not explain their translation to the qualities. Evolutionary biology, however, claims that what is quantitative in the soma could be an expression of what has already qualitatively taken place in the history of the species: “What Newtonianism and its analogies in psychology, politics, and social theory had failed to bring about—including man and society in the domain of natural law—had finally been achieved. . .” (Young R. M., 1971, p. 486).

Robert M. Young assigns this aspect to Darwin. His idea might be controversial even though Darwin’s theory was not devoid of social elements (Wallace E. R., 1980, p. 155). In another paper, Young said: “Indeed, it was Evolutionism which brought the distinction between mind and body into question: if man is considered a person for social purposes, he remains an organism from a biological point of view” (Young R. M., 1969, p. 111). For our present purpose, we can claim that this social aspect of the organism was included in the evolutionary ideas that preceded Darwin. Freud’s reference to Lamarck instead of Darwin is most likely an expression of Freud’s perception of Darwin as the sole researcher of natural sciences while seeing social elements in Haeckel and Lamarck. In this connection, we can bring Ernest Jones’s somewhat interesting but not conclusive comment about Freud’s Darwinism:

“Freud has told us that learning of Darwin’s work on evolution had been a main motive in deciding his choice of a scientific career. By this he evidently meant the general theory of evolution, which Darwin had made acceptable through his detailed investigations, and above all by the disclosure of the means by which it is brought about. It is the latter that constitutes the essence of what is called Darwinism, though to the popular mind the word is often taken to be identical with the doctrine of evolution itself. This doctrine had been promulgated in the eighteenth century by Darwin’s grandfather, Erasmus Darwin, by the Frenchmen Buffon, Cuvier, Lamarck, . . .”

147 Freud’s high esteem towards Darwin seems like a repetition of Claus’s attitude towards Darwin (Ritvo, 1970, p. 200). Nonetheless, Freud was an admirer of British culture. He named his third son Oliver, after Oliver Cromwell. Molnar observes that Freud’s admiration of the British culture extends to the social role of the British scientific culture: “Above all, though, it was probably admiration for the British scientific tradition that had inclined him away from pure research in favor of a more socially useful career” (Molnar, 1998, p. 49). Therefore, we cannot be sure if Freud realized the social aspects of Darwin’s theory. However, we can say that he was aware of the social aspects of evolutionary biology and the British scientific culture.
This quotation is not a general introduction to evolutionary biology. It is an introduction to Freud’s understanding of evolutionary biology. In the following paragraph, Jones adds that he searched for references in Freud’s writings to specifically Darwinian evolutionary theory, namely the natural selection, and he failed to find it. Then, he says: “A stranger might almost suppose that Freud was ignorant of the doctrine, which is assuredly out of the question” (Jones E., 1957, p. 310). Of course, it is out of the question if Freud had read Darwin. More covertly, Jones suggests that Freud never referred to Darwin when discussing Darwinism or evolutionary biology. This argument is plausible only if we accept it in the realm of social applications of Darwinian biology. Freud never failed to recognize the social aspect of evolutionary theory. However, he did not consider these social implications an integral part of Darwin’s theory. He thought Darwin’s theory contained the possibility of social constructions. Freud found the applications of those implications in Haeckel and Lamarck. By placing his understanding of evolutionary biology as the natural limits of his theory, he was finally able to present psychoanalysis as an inevitable theory for understanding the qualitative character of quantitative processes of hominization (Freud S., 1986, p. 75).

Freud finally found his determined limits on both ends of his scale. With the supplements of father, social authorities, and tradition, the superego represents the socially

---

148 Later, Jones suggests that Freud always used Lamarckism when referring to evolutionary biology. We have discussed in length and concluded that this was not the case. Freud’s instinct theory is also the influence of Darwin and Darwin’s influence on psychology in the broader sense (Angell, 1909, p. 154). Additionally, we should not forget that Freud started his research career under Darwinian professor Claus, and he conducted research in zoology in Darwinian lines (Gandolfi, 2010, pp. 134-135). He knew Darwin’s work before any other Darwinian or evolutionary biologist. He used Darwinian concepts such as primal horde and the principle of the overflow of excitation. For a detailed discussion on Darwin’s influence on Freud, see also: (Ritvo, 1990).

149 English and Continental differences to the evolutionary ideas might be the reason for Freud’s assignment of certain evolutionary ideas to Darwin and others (more socially oriented ones) to Haeckel and Lamarck (Spain, 1987, p. 642). The tradition in morphological research and its naturalist and dual approach (Benson, 1981, pp. 116-117) was more akin to Freud’s usage of biology in his social studies.

150 Surely, Freud’s later networks and their cultural capital and emotional energy could better explain the subtleties of Freud’s transformation. However, they are not in our scope; thus, we should be content with our present conclusion.
determined structural limit. Its content can change depending on time and place. The id, both with physiological and biological mechanisms, represents bodily limits determined by the rules of physics, phylogeny, and the psychological history of human species, certain nations, or communities.

This new formulation brings us again to the issue of women. The psychological determinism of live events (stemmed from primal parricide and biologically transmitted to the individual) was the new limit of Freud’s schema after WWI. Gradually, it became stricter. Freud’s neurological principles, which he acquired from Charcot, helped him place women on equal ground with men in their susceptibility to neuroses and hysteria. However, with the new schema, women should be carrying the sense of guilt of a crime that they have not committed. It could be thought that biological transmission could only affect men. Freud applied Lamarckism to a race; therefore, he could have applied it to sexes.

Nonetheless, Freud did not choose that route. In earlier work, he said: “The male sex seems to have taken the lead in all these moral acquisitions; and they seem to have then been transmitted to women by cross-inheritance” (Freud S., 1986u, p. 37). We have not discussed in length the nature of civilization in Freud, but we can illustrate it by a quotation from him. In Moses and Monotheism, the advance of civilization is described as follows:

“But this turning from the mother to the father points in addition to a victory of intellectuality over sensuality—that is, an advance in civilization, since maternity is proved by the evidence of the senses while paternity is a hypothesis, based on an inference and a premiss. Taking sides in this way with a thought-process in preference to a sense perception has proved to be a momentous step” (Freud S., 1986o, p. 114).

It should be remembered that Freud does not find anything worthy of praise in the form of intellectuality. Intellectuality can pave the way for art, philosophy, or science as much as totemism, animism, religion, and other forms of spirituality. Intellectuality, in its form, is the renunciation of instincts that Freud finds many reasons to despise. Sensuality can be seen as an embrace of instincts, and again nothing worthy of praise since it may welcome aggressiveness. These are non-strict categories for Freud, neither to be fully endorsed nor to be entirely rejected. They themselves do not bear any strict existence. Therefore, it is hard to find moral judgments upon categories in Freud. Thus, his final blow comes to genders:
“We must not allow ourselves to be deflected from such conclusions by the denials of the feminists, who are anxious to force us to regard the two sexes as completely equal in position and worth; but we shall, of course, willingly agree that the majority of men are also far behind the masculine ideal and that all human individuals, as a result of their bisexual disposition and of cross-inheritance, combine in themselves both masculine and feminine characteristics, so that pure masculinity and femininity remain theoretical constructions of uncertain content” (Freud S., 1986ah, p. 258).

In the final analysis, Freud does not see any problem in inverting the matrilineal story of Jewish characteristics to a patriarchal one. Religion is a result of renunciation of male-libido, and it has little to no importance for the biological formation of the group.151 Race, however, is a biological category that social events have influenced in the history of both the species and the specific group. Therefore, when Freud introduces race as a social category to the id, he merely carries the premise of biology. He does not find big trouble in expanding the limits of possibilities with biology since he finds biology “equal in dignity to the chemical physical forces” (Bernfeld S., 1944, p. 348). His strong emotional energy towards Brücke’s science, however, forces him one last time to admit that:

“‘It is likely that we have not achieved more than a certain degree of probability. Let us suppose, however, that we have succeeded in completely proving it. Even so the impression would remain that we have merely satisfied the qualitative factor of what was demanded, but not the quantitative one as well” (Freud S., 1986o, p. 128).

151 It has great importance for social formation.
6. CONCLUSION

Freud was born in 1856. For us, this was a crucial reminder to understand which social settings he was born into. In this study, we have focused on his intellectual interactions to understand what made Freud’s psychoanalysis. As mentioned earlier, we wanted to distance ourselves from the eternal trial. Instead, we solely focused on his theory and included Freud’s personal life as long as it helps us understand his theories better. Now, we may recapitulate what we have come across during our analysis.

First, we have focused on Claus’s influence on Freud. According to our observations, Freud’s relationship with Carl Claus did not build strong emotional energy, and this aspect may have influenced Freud’s decision to leave the field of biology. However, his real force to follow biology was Darwin. Therefore, biology was always an essential component of Freud’s ideas. Despite the poor relationship between Freud and Claus, Freud’s biological cultural capital was accumulated under the influence of Carl Claus. We were able to follow the traces of Claus’s teaching in Freud’s usage of biology until 1915. With the influence of war and its results, Freud had to rethink his biological assumptions. Before the war, Freud used biological facts as presuppositions and built his psychological theories upon biological formulas. After the war, Freud started to discover new biologists and new biological theories on his own. Darwin and Haeckel were the real thrust behind the psychoanalytical imagination until the war. After the war, Lamarck and the death instinct became a part of the picture. The new theories were controversial even among the followers of Freud, yet, he insisted on them.

Freud was not a part of any movement in biology. Claus’s influence convinced Freud to withdraw from the field of biology of his days. Therefore, he did not have any advantages of being in the networks of the field of biology. When a crisis occurred in society with the war in the fields of medicine and psychology, Freud had to reflect. Nonetheless, his biological knowledge was outdated, and he could only see things psychoanalytically. Probably, this was the reason behind his alignment with the Lamarckian theory. His retreat from the importance of sexual instinct and the invention of death instinct was also very psychoanalytic decisions despite their biological outlooks.

However, Freud’s earlier usages of biological theories were not very cautious, either: “In nothing is the courage of the psychoanalysts better seen than in their use of the biogenetic law. They certainly employ that great biological slogan of the nineteenth century with a
fearlessness that makes the timid twentieth century biologist gasp.” (Wheeler, 1920-1921, p. 317). Freud’s inclination to generalizations was not a result of any intellectual encounter but his personality, as Breuer said: “Freud is a man of absolute and exclusive formulations; that is a psychic need which drives him in my opinion to huge generalizations” (Schwartz, 2003, p. 46). Therefore, whatever entered to the realm of Freud’s imagination, they were amplified. Especially biology was the “land of unlimited possibilities” (Freud S., 1986f, p. 60). Freud did not hesitate to explore terrae incognitae of the human mind with the help of biology.

One of the most important terrains of biology in Freud’s psychoanalysis was social psychology. Freud’s clinical results were generalized to societies with the help of causative biological theories. However, especially after the refutation of Haeckelian biogenetic law, Freud’s causal relationship between ontogeny and phylogeny turned into analogies. Even though he used traditions as a part of his social psychological analysis, he was never convinced of the possibility of social psychology without the causative explanatory power of biology.

Freud was always materialist as far as we can follow from the available historical documents. Nonetheless, in Ernst Brücke’s laboratory, he became a devoted materialist. His disposition was turned into position by the supervision of Brücke. In Brücke’s laboratory, he turned his idealistic understanding of materialism into a scientific endeavor by proving the evolutionary continuity of observable particles. The actualization of his dreams only attached Freud more to his beliefs. His admiration for Brücke and Brücke’s continuous support shaped Freud’s understanding of science and the world.

The studies of the Helmholtz School gave an impetus to modern psychology. The end-products of Wundt’s, Pavlov’s, and Freud’s psychology might be different. Nonetheless, it is not hard to see their mutual devotion to materialism. Freud probably seems like the most distinct of them from materialistic grounds. Freud’s metaphors and his reception in some philosophical movements (along with his rejection in some scientific movements) might have helped Freud’s image as an idealist or a follower of romantic medicine. However, as we have shown, his ontological and epistemological approach, dual-aspect monism, was rooted in materialistic grounds. Freud’s urge for materialistic explanations is most visible in Project, yet, it was concealed in all his writings. Freud’s most significant gains from dual-aspect

---

¹⁵² For arguments that represent Freud as a follower of romantic medicine, see: (Galdston, 1956; Holt, 1989; Talvitie, Ihanus, & Kaitaro, 2013).
monism were putting the pleasure principle and conservation of energy into use in the domain of psychology. We can assert that these were the foundations of psychoanalysis. Therefore, Ernst Brücke was the most influential of Freud’s masters alongside Charcot.

Freud was fully aware of his most influential masters, and he introduced himself as the pupil of Charcot and Brücke (Freud S., 1986e, p. 325). As we have explained, Freud’s most creative invention was his understanding of normal and abnormal on the same scale. As we have said, normal and abnormal were only a matter of quantitative displacement of the same energy. According to Freud, abnormalities should not create social stigma since nothing was innately wrong with someone with a pathology. Also, nothing was profoundly great about being normal. Indeed, this reasoning was yielded from Freud’s physiological education.

In our research on Freud’s masters, Franz Brentano holds a different position than every other master. We saw almost an opposite relationship when we compared it with Carl Claus. There was high emotional energy and no transmission of cultural capital between Brentano and Freud. Brentano’s influence on Freud was studied by many scholars before. The influence was unmistakable for some of them, while some did not see any resemblances in their thoughts. We found similar results with the latter group. The sociological method helped us situate Freud in his network; therefore, we did not mislead by the apparent similarities in Brentano’s thinking to Freud’s.

Accordingly, Brentano’s discussion on the unconscious could have influenced Freud, yet, as we have shown, Freud’s source of the unconscious was influenced by his physiology training. The philosophical unconscious of Cartesian tradition shares no resemblances with physiological studies. We did not even see any moral obligation from Freud’s side to refute philosophical unconsciousness. Thus, we concluded that he did not acquire the problems of that field. Therefore, there was no trace of transmission of philosophical cultural capital. Brentano raised Freud's emotional energy toward philosophy, and Ernst Brücke eliminated it.

Freud and Brentano’s differences are evident in their ontological approaches. Brentano was a dualist; therefore, he believed mind and body were different realms. Therefore, epistemologically they must be investigated by different means. Brentano’s epistemological dualism was the logical consequence of his ontological dualism. As we have already explained, Freud was in the exact opposite camp. Freud did not actually decide between monism and dualism based on a philosophical debate. There is no indication that Freud made a philosophical decision by addressing canonical philosophical debates and selecting between
opponents. Far outside conventional philosophical interactions, Freud made his philosophical (ontological and epistemological) decisions under the influence of his scientific training. Consequently, Freud and Brentano were not even speaking the same language.

When we evaluated Freud’s encounters, we realized that Charcot had an immense influence on Freud. Charcot’s influence on Freud was way more than even Charcot could have imagined. Before studying with Charcot, Freud did not even think of his clinic as a place to conduct science. Under the influence of Brücke, Freud thought that clinic was a place to earn money. Freud’s scientific inquiries were conducted in his free time from 1882 to 1885. Charcot changed Freud’s conception of science and scientist. Without this paradigm shift, psychoanalysis would not have emerged.

The changing conception of the scientist was only a result of Freud’s paradigm shift. Freud started to understand scientific activity from a clinical-descriptive point of view. In Vienna, the ruling paradigm was the anatomical-explanatory approach. This paradigm used the localization approach, where the changes in the anatomy were associated with the clinical observation. Hysteria was an unexplained clinical entity from this perspective since it “behaves as though there were no such thing as cerebral anatomy” (Freud S., 1986b, p. 248). Charcot’s clinical science put clinical observations first, or as he would like to say: “Theory is good; but it doesn’t prevent things from existing” (Freud S., 1986g, p. 13). According to Charcot, if hysteria did not match the scientists’ knowledge of anatomy, they should have changed their understanding of anatomy. Therefore, Freud developed his dynamic approach and traced the functional changes instead of the structural ones. This innovation was the kernel of Freud’s new cultural capital. After his Paris visit, Freud started to think more clinical-oriented, and his approach became more dynamic. This visit was also the first step in Freud’s understanding of normal and abnormal from a different perspective.

---

Ellenberger evaluates Freud and Charcot’s relationship as an existential encounter (Ellenberger H. F., 1994, p. 436). The fact that they only studied together for four months seems to justify Ellenberger’s claim. We agree that Charcot probably did not put much effort into converting Freud into his ideas. Yet, he did not have to since Freud was captivated by Charcot’s teaching in a flash.

Breuer, another pupil of Brücke, owned pigeons at home to conduct his scientific studies. He did not think of his clinical practice as a scientific activity. If Freud had not visited Charcot, we would not have heard of the Anna O. case because of these men’s understanding of science.
The second step was his visit to Nancy. In Nancy, Freud worked under Bernheim. The initial reason for this visit for Freud was to perfect his technique of hypnosis. However, he soon realized the hypnosis of Bernheim was not suitable for his private patients, either. Freud found in Nancy a different conception of hypnosis, and this new conception helped him understand psychology from a different angle.

According to Bernheim, hypnosis was a form of suggestion; therefore, it belonged to the domain of psychology. Everyone was susceptible to hypnosis. This was fundamentally different from Charcot’s approach. Charcot believed hypnosis was a form of nervous disease. Consequently, only the people with hereditary disposition were susceptible to hypnosis. Bernheim’s theory of suggestion showed Freud the power of psychology both in aetiology and in the treatment. Psychological components were represented only as *agents provocateurs* in Charcot. However, Bernheim was who gave psychology a fundamental role in his theory. In this respect, Freud benefited greatly from Bernheim.

Freud’s interaction with Bernheim changed his understanding of psychotherapy and shifted his understanding of hysteria to a psychologically oriented theory. The Nancy School was underlying the importance of rapport between patients and physicians for successful suggestion therapy. Freud’s understanding of transference is the result of the studies of the Nancy School. Freud wanted to detect and solve the conflicts that were emerged out of transference. However, he owed his realization of the transference element as an essential component of psychotherapy to Bernheim. Finally, Freud’s abandonment of seduction theory may also result from Bernheim’s teaching.

Freud’s admission to the debate by a significant contribution occurred with *Studies on Hysteria*. In 1895, Freud and Breuer published their finding upon their hysterics and put their approach to hysteria forward. Before the publication, Breuer helped Freud to increase his knowledge about hysteria through his cathartic method. They discussed their patients and hysteria for years before their publication. We see an essential transmission of cultural capital from Breuer to Freud. However, Freud was more familiar with the French schools and carried their ideas to Breuer. An interesting difference between Breuer and other masters is Breuer’s hesitation to enter the field of psychopathology. Historical documents suggest that Freud is the one who increased Breuer’s emotional energy toward the field, as

---

155 Freud had important contributions to the field by various articles; however, they are not comparable with *Studies*. 
opposed to what can be expected. Therefore, their master-pupil relationship was not the conventional one.

Freud and Breuer were both the pupils of Brücke, and their theories bear the stamp of the School of Helmholtz. Their ontological and epistemological approach to the hysteria was similar due to their shared master. Theoretical representation of their ontology can be seen in the pleasure principle. The pleasure principle gave a common ground for both authors to work with, and it was one of the pillars of psychoanalysis. We observed that after the oscillations between Charcot and Bernheim, Freud returned to his Viennese approach, dual-aspect monism, to surpass the French conflict with the help of Breuer. However, as we have explained, the new theory of hysteria was not a mere repetition of the old paradigm but its application to a new problem. This is what we can call creativity. Freud discovered the psychoanalytic approach through the influences of Charcot and Brücke’s emotional energy alongside the various sources of cultural capital. The end-product is what we call creativity through the agency of a network.

An important innovation in Freud and Breuer’s work was their integration of germ theory into the field of psychopathology. In the second half of the 19th century, pathogen microbes were identified as the sole cause of some infectious diseases. There were even some studies that applied the germ theory to nervous diseases. In Studies, Breuer and Freud used the same schema. By doing so, they deemed that everyone was susceptible to psychopathologies as much as organic diseases. Freud was more eager to use this theoretical stance than Breuer. Breuer still held hypnoid states as a barrier between healthy individuals and hysterics, while Freud opened the gates of psychopathology to everyone. After his separation from Breuer, Freud moved beyond this point, also. From 1899, Freud applied psychopathologies to healthy individuals with a minor degree in everyday life. Therefore, Freud’s creative process was completed by understanding psychopathological categories as universal traits.

Finally, we have posed additional questions to make our research more intelligible. We have questioned why and how Freud focused on subjectivity from an objective point of view, how he understood science and conducted his own science. Additionally, we have explored Freud’s understanding of culture, women, Jewishness, etc. Freud’s approach to the hard problem was also discussed to understand Freud’s works better. These discussions aim to make more sense out of our fragmentary study and gain a deeper understanding of Freud’s way of thinking.
As we have repeated a few times, one of the major sources of Freud’s theory was his clinical experience. His readings, personal inclinations, identity, pupils, and opponents were crucial sources for understanding how psychoanalytical ideas were shaped. We only focused on one social aspect of Freud’s sources in our study. We believe studying all masters of Freud in one study helped us understand Freud’s theory’s social roots. Some of the studies in literature can mistakenly associate two things by focusing on Freud’s relationship with one field or one scholar. It is easy to associate Freud’s conceptions of acquired characteristics of hysteria with Lamarck’s theory of inheritance of acquired characteristics if researchers study Freud only from a biological point of view. The same can occur while evaluating Freud’s relationship with Brentano. However, a sociological perspective can prevent scholars from these associations. Therefore, a more comprehensive study of Freud’s networks could correct our mistakes, also.

This study aimed to expose Freud’s psychoanalysis to understand it better. We believe sociology is a great tool to explore intellectuals and intellectual knowledge. We hope that our endeavor will prove our point. Additionally, sociology is a good tool for producing knowledge, yet, not superior to any other method. As discussed earlier, if the sociology of philosophy would not aim to be a part of the philosophical discourse, it would put itself, as Bourdieu criticizes, to be a sophisticated form of philosophy without concerning anything else than abstract knowledge. Philosophy is about producing abstract knowledge.

Furthermore, philosophy would be universal or not exist at all (Badiou, 2015, p. 10). We should situate philosophical knowledge to understand it better; however, we cannot claim that philosophical knowledge can only be meaningful in its context (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 221). On the contrary, context can help us distinguish what is in the heart of any theory.  

---

156 As the theory of Collins demonstrates, this kind of knowledge production can only cause stagnation in intellectual production (Collins, 1992, p. 76).

157 We should remember Gadamer’s critique of Bourdieu’s work on Heidegger to protect ourselves from this mistake. Gadamer says: “This is Bourdieu’s methodological procedure, which certainly has nothing to do with philosophy, but produces its own cache of knowledge. Yet, I repeat that this method, which bypasses the content of philosophy, could also be applied even to Aristotle, if we only had the historical knowledge at our disposal to see through this stylistical ‘imposition of form’. [Formgebung]. In the end, I would also have to acknowledge that Bourdieu’s ‘interpretation’ of the ontological difference is coherent from the perspective of the social sciences. This becomes clear to me when I read in the second edition that what is actually philosophically essential for Heidegger is ‘l’essentiel impensé social’. I would like to understand this, without any contradiction, as the ‘strategy of euphemization’ of the social
from the interferences of its days. Even the most practical texts can survive without context, such as Machiavelli’s *The Prince*. A good sociological inquiry should tell us why it stands through the test of time and what is in the heart of the theory of Niccolò Machiavelli. Therefore, we can say that the sociology of philosophy should bring philosophical texts today, not place them into distant memory where no one can achieve without the special key of the sociologist.

We should not forget that the theory of Freud affected millions of lives (Ellis, 1939, pp. 309-310; Henerey, 2004, pp. 268-269). Philosophical knowledge, as well as its effects, are real. Therefore, the sociology of philosophy should aim to understand any given theory or philosopher better. The sociology of philosophy can be effective only if it does not demand any meta-position over philosophy. Sociology and philosophy can orchestrate together instead of being against each other.

We aimed to capture what was essential in Freud’s theory throughout this study. We did not aim to discredit or credit any of his theories. If we accomplished the task, this study would make Freud’s theories more accessible and understandable to the readers. If we have failed, well, “philosophy is just a by-product of misunderstanding language” (Ali, Asai, Gibson, & Mellor, 1993).

158 Stefan Zweig vividly captures how sexual diseases left untreated by doctors and how many people suffered from it (including himself) and how the theory of Freud changed the understanding of the medical world and paved the way for acceptance and treatment for the ones who suffered from sexual diseases and repression (Zweig, 2018, pp. 18-24). Similar accounts can be found in Arnold Zweig (Freud E. L., 1970, p. 1) and many more artists and scientists of the time.

159 Gadamer adequately describes the gaze of Bourdieu: “In Bourdieu’s eyes, philosophy seems to represent a kind of intellectual pretence that has established itself as a respectable social institution.” (Gadamer, 2016, p. 167).
References


Ferenczi, S. (1921). Symposium on Psychoanalysis and the War Neurosis Held at the Fifth International Psycho-Analytical Congress Budapest, September 1918. In E. Jones (Ed.), Psychoanalysis and the War Neuroses 2 (pp. 5-21). London: The International Psycho-analytical Press.


Jung, C. G. (1959, October 22 ). Face to Face: Professor Jung . (J. Freeman, Interviewer) BBC.


Summary: This study aims to conduct an impartial sociological study on Freud to understand his theory better. For its aim, it employs a historical, interactionist method called the sociology of philosophy and examines Freud’s relationship with his masters through primary and secondary sources. Ontologically, this study presupposes that social interactions determine intellectual activity through knowledge transfer and emotional attachment to the person and the intellectual field, and the field dictates the content of the intellectual activity. Epistemologically, it focuses on the sources of these above-mentioned concepts, such as intellectual production, personal history, and paradigm of given fields.

This study focuses on six important masters of Sigmund Freud in the formation of his psychoanalytical theory: Carl Claus, Ernst Brücke, Franz Brentano, Jean-Martin Charcot, Hippolyte Bernheim, and Josef Breuer. These names and their influence on Freud’s theories are examined and explained throughout this study.

Accordingly, Brücke and Charcot have been identified as the primal sources of Freud’s framework. Brücke’s teachings on physiology and neurology helped Freud identify the limits of his scientific endeavor, and Freud remained faithful to Brücke’s ideas during his career. Charcot showed Freud the importance of clinical studies and how to apply to and derive from clinics for medical science. Freud had an immense emotional devotion to these two masters and stayed within the limits of their paradigms. Claus was Freud’s biology teacher, and Freud derived his initial ideas about biology from him. However, due to the lack of emotional component in their relationship, Freud was more comfortable defying the boundaries of the biology of his days. Brentano’s relationship with Freud was the exact opposite of Claus’s. Brentano raised Freud’s interest in philosophy yet could not raise his knowledge in this field because of Freud’s more intense relationship with Brücke. Therefore, in Freud’s psychoanalysis, it is hard to find any trace of Brentano’s teachings. Bernheim and Breuer helped Freud give his theory a final shape before the conception of psychoanalysis. The analysis showed that their influence was within the limits of Charcot’s initial emotional stimulus; therefore, their knowledge transfers were crucial but limited and inconsistent throughout the Freudian oeuvre.

The application of the methodology showed Freud’s intellectual sources and their comparative importance in psychoanalysis. In the final analysis, we were able to identify Freud’s intellectual working principles as it was constituted in his psychoanalytic works. Accordingly, the whole endeavor of Freud was to change the strict categories to states. These
states bore the possibility (and the necessity) of change between the fundamentally strict limits that his esteemed masters defined.

**Összegzés:** A tanulmány célja, hogy egy pártatlan szociológiai tanulmányt készítsen Freudról, hogy jobban megérthessük az elméletét. E célból használ egy történelmi, interakcionalista metódust, amit a filozófia szociológiájának hívnak, és elsődleges, illetve másodlagos forrásokon keresztül vizsgálja Freud kapcsolatát a mestereivel. Ontológiailag, ez a tanulmány feltételezi, hogy a társas interakciók meghatározzák a szellemi aktivitást tudástranszferén keresztül, az érzelmi kötődést egy személyhez és az intellektuális mezőhöz, és ez a mező diktálja a szellemi aktivitás tartalmát.

Episztemológiailag pedig a fent említett koncepciók forrására fókuszál, mint az intellektuális termelés, az egyén múltja, és az adott tudományos terület paradigmái.

Ez a tanulmány Freud pszichoanalízis elméletének kialakulásában szerepet játszó hat fontos mesterére fókuszál: Carl Claus, Ernst Brücke, Franz Brentano, Jean-Martin Charcot, Hippolyte Bernheim, és Josef Breuer. Ezek a nevek és a hatásuk Freud elméleteire meg vannak vizsgálva és magyarázva ebben a tanulmányban.

A metodológia alkalmazása megmutatta Freud szellemi forrásait, és a viszonylagos fontosságukat a pszichoanalízisben. A végső elemzésben képesek voltunk felismerni Freud szellemi munkaelveit, ahogyan azokat lefektette a pszichoanalitikus munkáiban. Ez alapján, Freud teljes törekvése az volt, hogy megváltoztassa a szigorú kategóriákat állapotokra. Ezeknek az állapotoknak volt lehetősége (és szükségessége) változni, amiket a nagyra tartott mesterei definiáltak.