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Between Hopes and Reality

About Civil Society and Political Participation in Hungary Between 1990 and 2010

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Introduction: Civil society, Participation, and Democratization

The notion that civil society is fundamental for a thriving democracy was reintroduced to sociology and political science in the late 1970s, following the work of such Central European dissidents as Leszek Kolakowski, Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik, the Czech Charter‘77 movement or the members of the Hungarian Democratic Opposition (Arato, 1981, 1992). As their ideas of possible democratization and resistance to the socialist state were heard and generalized by researchers worldwide, and the expectations toward civil society were enormous at the time of the Velvet Revolution (Baker, 2003).

In this dissertation, I examine the extent civil society was able to fulfill these expectations in Hungary. Obviously, I do not intend to reheat unrealistic expectations towards civil society, or to present civil society as a mysterious cure for all the problems of contemporary Hungarian democracy. Instead, based on the literature on civil society published around the transition, I will carefully explore the main expectations towards civil society, take the results as hypotheses, and translate them into an empirical examination.

These expectations, or hypotheses, at large, are that civil society, understood as a sphere of voluntary associations, performs a twofold role in the process of creating the new democracy. First, that this associational sphere expands itself and the pool of citizens engaging in exercising their civil and political rights. Second, that participation in voluntary associations fosters the individual engagement in political participation and political activities described by using the language of civil and political rights.

Since Hungarian civil society is generally regarded as weak (Gerő - Kopper, 2013; Howard, 2003; Kuti, 2016, 2017; Szalai et al., 2017), the necessity of such an evaluation requires further justification. The interesting fact about this alleged ‘weakness’ of Hungarian civil society is that the statement was first made right after the Velvet Revolution (see for example Arato, 1992; Bozoki - Sükösd, 1993; Kaldor, 1991; Ost, 1993) and since then it has been emphasized in almost every account.

This rash and rigid claim makes it clear that after the Velvet Revolution the high hopes towards civil society were followed by quick disillusionment. Nevertheless, its empirical ground changed. In the early nineties, authors emphasized more the demobilization of society and its democratic deficit (Arato, 1992), while the rise of populism and non-democratic movements (Pakulski, 1995; Tismaneanu, 1993) strengthened the view that civil society was unable to
deliver. Later, the main empirical ground this evaluation was its comparison to the strength of Western European civil societies, mainly measured by the number of participants in associations, protests and other events (Ekiert - Kubik, 2014; Foa - Ekiert, 2017). 1

Although the comparison obviously stands, this verdict might be a bit suspicious. Firstly, because the development of a democracy is a process, not a one-time act of establishing democratic institutions. The role of civil society would be the stabilization of this process by creating a new type of political culture and through the increasing participation, creating a balance between different subsystems of society. This obviously takes more than just a few years. Besides, there is a flaw in the argument, as Foa and Ekiert (2017) point out, proposing a strong civil society in the late eighties and a weak one just years after the regime change. Furthermore, according to Cohen and Arato (1992), civil society itself should develop parallel to democratic institutions.

A further contradiction fuels this suspicion. Despite the importance attributed to civil society in building a democracy, and its alleged weakness, the state of Hungarian democracy was often referred to as satisfactory and stable (Ágh, 2014; Bernhard, 1993; Bogaards, 2018; Ekiert - Kubik, 1998; Foa - Ekiert, 2017). If civil society is indeed important in building a democracy, then how it is possible that civil society is weak, but democratic institutions are stable? The developments of Hungarian democracy since 2010 show that these institutions were less stable and more fragile than perceived earlier. Thus, if institutions were also fragile, then it is still worth examining how civil society performed throughout the period preceding the demolition of democratic institutions after 2010.

The main reasons which led to the almost immediate blaming of civil society for its weaknesses probably lie in the various uses of the concept. Most importantly, two very distinct purposes of its use should be distinguished. First, it was normatively or analytically used for the aims of social sciences, mainly for political sociology. Second, it was used to describe a political strategy by oppositional movements and political actors (Baker, 2003; Gellner, 1994; Seligman, 1995).

The strategic use of ‘civil society’ marks an important difference between the usage of the concept in the previous 300 or more years and after its reinvention in the 1970s. After Adam Michnik launched the project of New Evolutionism, or Havel and Konrád published their idea

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1 As examples of articles, research reports applying this strategy, see: Hajdu (2012); Howard (2003); E. Sik and Giczi (2009); Wallace et al. (2012).
of antipolitics, the theory of civil society was intended to be applied. Furthermore, dissidents and oppositional movements proposed a strategy based on civil society under non-democratic circumstances. Thus, their intention was not only to explore how civic engagement contributes to a vital democracy, but to figure out how to develop a new democracy based on civil society and against the socialist state. This was a real-life test of a theory, which naturally led to debates in the social sciences and contributed to the increasing expectations towards civil society as a sphere or subsystem.

The strategy of civil society is a long-term, bottom-up strategy. Under authoritarian rule, when violent revolution is not an option, as in pre-1989 Central and Eastern Europe there is no other possibility than to engage in such a long-term strategy. However, the transition provided an unforeseen possibility, which found the opposition unprepared. In this unforeseen situation, when new politicians had to handle constitutional changes and the struggles of normal politics at the same time, the circumstances are not in favor of the bottom-up strategy of civil society. As a consequence, even the most committed protagonists of the political strategy based on civil society abandoned their previous strategy (Bozoki - Sükösd, 1993). Instead, actors were engaged in top-down institution building, and focused on regulations, creating a new economic and political framework, hoping that these new frameworks would transform the polity and political culture (Ekiert - Kubik, 2014).

Thus, civil society as a political strategy failed after the Velvet Revolution and since the boundaries between the two types of usage were blurry, this might lead to the perception that civil society itself has failed. It is likely that this is the view that prevented most political sociologists from a careful evaluation of the role civil society has played in the democratization (or the lack of democratization) in Central and Eastern Europe, leading to the idea that civil society is no longer a useful category.

However, even if the political strategy has failed, examining the processes based on the analytical and normative concepts of civil society is still relevant in understanding the past decades of democratization. This work should focus on the process of democratization, rather than the legal acts of creating institutions. Therefore, I am going to examine processes, rather than the state of civil society in a given year or engage in cross-country comparisons. This

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2 For further details on this process, see Chapter I.2.
means that the impact of civil society should be examined **longitudinally**, and the **comparison should be made with its own state in different periods of the post-transition era.**

The empirical examination should be **based on the carefully explored expectations towards civil society.** These expectations, however, might be highly dependent on the very definition of civil society. Therefore, the first step to arrive at the two hypotheses formulated above was to **explore the various meanings of civil society in relation to the Hungarian developments around the transition.**

It is well known, that the term ‘civil society’ has many meanings. There are eminent authors who have successfully unpacked the concept’s centuries-old history, including Adam Seligman (1995), Andrew Arato, Jean L. Cohen (1992) or Jeffrey Alexander (1998), or proposed a categorization of the various usages of the concept. These attempts, however, offer mainly general, context-free categorizations (Edwards, 2009; Perez-Diaz, 1998).

It is much less common for authors to review the usage of civil society in relation to the Velvet Revolution or a specific country like Hungary. It seems, however, crucial to identify the various meanings of the concept to identify the main expectations. **Since civil society is a normative concept in most cases, and it is certainly normative in the environment of the socialist state, its usage always refers to the impact civil society should achieve:** sometimes as a function, sometimes as a goal, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly. Furthermore, either openly or as a latent assumption, authors engaging in civil society theories propose certain mechanisms to reach these results.

Based on reviewing the literature between 1985 and 1995, I have identified five main models. The first understands civil society as a **social order** and focuses on the structural characteristics of society. Besides the proponents of this idea, as Ernest Gellner, this is the group of authors where the fiercest critics of the usefulness of the concept are found, such as Adam Seligman or Krishan Kumar. The second and third group of authors use **dualistic models,** where civil society consists of everything outside the state: not only voluntary associations, or the public sphere but enterprises, family and friends as well. One of them proposes a general model, mainly based on John Keane’s and Ralf Dahrendorf’s work, while the other is applied to

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3 Interestingly, for western societies, this type of analysis stands without a problem. For example, Putnam et al. (1993) examines the long-term processes of Italy and Putnam (1995b) the USA without any reference to other countries. In the Hungarian context, mainly trends in the number of non-profit organizations is published regularly (Balogh et al., 2003).

4 See Chapter 1.2.
Hungarian and Central and Eastern European countries under socialism. This second view is often referred to as the second society (see Hankiss, 1988) and in relation with the concept of antipolitics proposed by György Konrád or Václav Havel.

The two remaining views present civil society as a more demarcated social sphere. The grand theory of Arato and Cohen (1992), or Márkus’ (1992) concept offer a view where civil society is the intermediary sphere between the state or economy and the informal, private sphere. This view often serves as a ground for authors presenting civil society as a network of voluntary associations. Finally, the most practical, analytic view presents civil society as the opposition under socialism.

As it turns out, after reviewing their differences, the various views have important commonalities. First of all, they all expect civil society to contribute something to the freedom of citizens. Freedom, on the one hand, is understood and described by individual freedom rights, using the language of human rights (Judt, 1988) and on the other in practical terms, thus as the actual realization of these rights by citizens. Thus, they share their main expectation, the increasing realization of the civil and political rights on the individual level.

A further commonality is that, although they define it very differently, voluntary associations are always at the core of this civil society. Furthermore, associations are not only important as actors, or a terrain for mobilization, but that they take the main part in the democratic socialization of people who engage in civil society. The various groups of authors might offer different definitions for associations, but as the main understanding I see them as organizations joined or established voluntarily, mainly by individuals, for the sake of a public aim, or for the sake of the aims of a given community (Braun, 2014; Freise-Hallmann, 2014).

The main difference between the five groups of theories originates from the ways they see the differentiation between the state and civil society. As a result, they propose different mechanisms leading to the development of the associational sphere. For example, authors defining civil society as a social order emphasize centuries-long historical processes, while proponents of the second society emphasize the role of structural inconsistencies in the process of awakening, where inconsistencies and structural conflicts lead to the articulation of interests, and associations will be gathered to represent these interests.5

Therefore, in the background of the two hypotheses, there is a unified model of democratization. This model has three elements: 1) the desired outcome, the growth in the

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5 See Chapter 1.2.
application and practice of civil and political rights by citizens. Although many of these rights appear, rights securing the organization of the associational sphere, such as freedom of association, or the rights providing the foundations and guarantees of political participation, as freedom of expression or assembly and the right to take part in public affairs have an exceptional role. 2) civil society, as the sphere of voluntary associations, considered as a major actor in fostering the use of civil and political rights. The theories often refer to the Tocquevillian approach to voluntary associations. According to this, associations might foster participation and the realization of rights connected to it by distributing information, serving as a pool of building networks of mobilization, finding partners for collective actions, developing skills through face to face contacts, negotiating or organizing. 3) the various mechanisms leading to the development of the associational sphere.

The first and second elements of the model serve as the guiding hypotheses for the empirical examination carried out in this dissertation. The empirical test of the third element, although such mechanisms are identified in Chapter I.2, would exceed the boundaries of this work.

The disillusionment in civil society and the debate about the usefulness of the term had a further consequence. In the scholarly debates, at least in Hungary, ‘civil society’ has been replaced by economic theories of the non-profit sector, which pushes me to explain why despite its problems I use the concept of civil society to examine the impact of voluntary associations.

On the one hand, the dominance of non-profit theories is due to the decision researchers at the Hungarian Central Statistical Office took in the early nineties that they would join the promising Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project of the John Hopkins University and apply the non-profit definition of Lester M. Salamon and Helmut Anheier to the sphere of associational and voluntary organizations. On the other hand, non-profit theories focus on explaining how non-profit organizations work under democratic circumstances, while civil society theories always emphasize the fight for such a democratic environment. Thus, when I focus on democratization, civil society fits better as a conceptual framework.

To examine the two hypotheses, I needed to conduct two different analyses. The first was to identify the changes in the level of the practice concerning civil and political rights between 1990 and 2010. Measuring the tendencies in exercising rights is quite problematic, since the existing methods, applied by such world-wide reports as Freedom in the World, presents

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7 For example, see Salamon (1994); Salamon and Anheier (1997, 2006)
Hungary, surprisingly, as an established democracy\(^8\), which guarantees civil and political rights on a high level already in the early nineties, and the evaluation does not change throughout the examined period. Therefore, based on these measurements, it is not possible to follow the changes in the realization of civil and political rights, especially the four rights listed above. Since it is hard to accept that there was no progress or setback in the state of rights between 1990 and 2010, I need to identify the main causes of the shortcomings of the existing methods of measurement and to develop a new approach that can capture the changes. The reasons for their shortcoming, i.e. that they unable to capture changes, are connected to the aforementioned contradiction between the weakness of civil society and the stability of democratic institutions.

**Civil society and human rights theories approach democratization from different angles.** Human rights theories assume that the flourishing of exercising human rights is dependent on the environment that we create; they consider the state as the most important factor in this environment. Thus, if the state performs well, people are supposed to start embracing and exercising their rights. **Consequently, to capture the state of human rights, it is supposed to be best to examine the state, its regulation, and policies.** For civil society theories, however, the democratic quality of these institutions is caused by structural factors, their historical, cultural and social embeddedness, which is expressed through civil society. Accordingly, the praxis of rights might be less dependent on the state and is mainly influenced by other factors. **This leads to the very different approaches of the two: while civil society theories emphasize the bottom-up nature of building a democracy, human rights theories assume the top-down process of democratization.**

This yields an **action-based approach of measurement** worked out in Chapter II.1. This type of measurement relies on different types of data, most importantly on large-scale, representative, individual level surveys. The last two chapters are designed to examine the hypotheses proposed in chapter I.2, however with a different design. Chapter II.2 is not only a long-term evaluation of exercising rights but investigates how the general, constitutional framework, certain policies supporting participation, political opportunity structures or political turbulences influence the individual level engagement to exercising the four fundamental rights listed above. Since there is no specific data constructed for my purposes, I need to apply various surveys to build the timelines of exercising rights, confront them with the literature on such activities and sometimes apply supplementary data on the organizational or on the event level provided by the authorities. The last chapter (II.3) before the Conclusion turns to the role of

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\(^8\) Most of the Central-European, post-communist countries appear similarly as established democracy.
associations and examines the extent associations influence political participation. In this chapter, I use the three waves of the European Values Study (1991, 1999 and 2008)\(^9\) to examine this question.

The chapters of the dissertation use various methodologies to unpack the proposed questions. I have always tried to choose the methodology most suitable for answering these questions, rather than relying on my preferences or earlier practices. Thus, the first part of the dissertation, dealing with the meaning of civil society, the failure of civil society as a political strategy and the usefulness of the term mostly builds on the available literature. The results of this analysis serve as the grounds for the further empirical analysis presented in the second part of the dissertation.

This empirical analysis, although civil society consists of organizations, is based on surveys conducted on the individual level. The reason for applying this strategy is that the available data on civil society organizations on the organizational level is mainly gathered for the aims of the non-profit research, leaving out non-formal associations and including non-voluntary nonprofit organizations. The scope of information collected is also limited to “organizational demographics”, which does not enable us to examine the realization of civil and political rights. The individual-level data is able to provide the possibility to examine the fulfillment of rights, however, offers little information about the types of associations or voluntary organizations respondents are involved in. Still, it offers a better chance to examine the relationship between associational involvement and the realization or practice of rights. Naturally, when it fits the aims of the analysis, I use other sources as well, for example, the figures of registering associations, or the yearly number of assemblies.

The reason that my analysis does not go beyond 2010 is that a new era started in Hungarian politics in 2010. There are harsh debates, domestic and international, scholarly and public, about what is happening in Hungary, but there is agreement that the situation is new.

Most of the commentators identify the decline of democracy and the creation of a new authoritarian or illiberal government and a limited democracy. Over the last eight years, criticism has become louder and might lead to sanctions from the European Union. In the annual Freedom in the World Report of Freedom House, Hungary receives worse and worse scores each year.\(^10\) In 2018, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs of the

\(^9\) (EVS, 2011)

European Parliament issued a report to the EP, in which they formulate serious concerns with the state of Hungarian democracy, identifying several aspects where rule of law and fundamental rights are in real danger.\footnote{Rule of law in Hungary: Parliament should ask Council to act, say committee MEPs. Press Release by the European Parliament. Ref.: 20180625IPR06503.\url{http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20180625IPR06503/rule-of-law-in-hungary-parliament-should-ask-council-to-act-say-committee-meps}, last accessed: 10/20/2018. Since then, the report was passed by the European Union and the procedure of Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union was initiated.} Besides political and policy claims, the scholarly literature is filled with similar concerns, claiming that Hungary has turned away from the path of building democracy (Ágh, 2014; Kornai, 2015), labeling the recent developments as selective democracy (Varga - Freyberg-Inan, 2012) a neo-prebendal state (Csillag - Szelényi, 2015) or defective democracy (Bogaards, 2018).

Interestingly, this is also a time when debates about civil society have become prevalent in public discourses. The attacks on civil society organizations since 2014, a new law labelling civil society organizations accepting funds from abroad “as foreign-funded organizations”, the campaign against the Open Society Foundation and its founder George Soros, and human rights organizations have brought back the issue into the public discourse (Gerő - Kerényi, 2017; Susánszky et al., 2017; Szalai et al., 2017; Torma, 2016)

Although it is very tempting to include the post-2010 period into the analysis, I have good reasons for leaving it out. First, it would go beyond the scope of a dissertation and twenty years is enough to cover. Secondly, by examining the 1990-2010 period this contradiction could be exploited and used to contribute to our understanding of the preconditions of the development of the last years, in short, why Hungarian democracy is so vulnerable.

The structure of the dissertation

The dissertation is built of more or less independent chapters. Each chapter has its own theoretical or introductory part, its own statement or hypotheses to examine. Although I sought to write most of the chapters so that they could be understandable on their own, they share their terminology and their main problematique revolves around the main question of the dissertation and the chapters build on each other’s results, as the cross-references will show.

The dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the period of the “Velvet Revolution”. After a short outline of the context of the revival of civil society (Chapter I.1), chapter II.2 fulfills three tasks. First, it explores the different usages of the concept around the
transition by reviewing and analyzing the scholarly literature in English and Hungarian connected to Hungarian civil society. Second, it defines the model I will use by highlighting their common features of. Third, by accessing the hidden assumptions built in civil society theories, it explains why the political strategy of civil society has failed since the transition. The third chapter provides reasons for the further use of the concept of civil society, even if its place has been occupied by non-profit theories, via highlighting their different origins and the theoretical consequences of this fact.

Part II turns to the measurement and evaluation of the trends in exercising political rights between 1990 and 2010. Chapter II.1 examines why the existing methods of measurement are not satisfactory for my purpose and introduces the action-based measurement of exercising four fundamental rights. The four rights are the freedom of association, the right to peaceful assembly, freedom of expression and the right to take part in public issues.

Chapter II.2 evaluates the tendencies of exercising these rights between 1990 and 2010, based on information provided by nationally representative surveys, data gathered by authorities and by previous research. In this chapter, I also try to identify the influence of institutional factors: the general framework, policies introduced by the different governments, the political opportunity structures, and political turbulences. While the general framework was stable, several policies supporting civil society and participation were introduced in the second half of the 1990s and in the first half of the 2000s. Supporting policies were introduced under left-wing governments, which might indicate that the rule of these governments meant more open political opportunity structures. I consider as political turbulences mainly the transition and the political crisis in 2006. To explore the possible impact of institutional settings, I identify three policy and five electoral periods and the time points of turbulences, examining whether the longitudinal data, where it is available, shows any changes in relation with the periods or time points.

Part II.3 returns to the second element of the expectations towards civil society: the role of associations in fostering political participation. This is the chapter where the expectations and the international literature on the mechanisms will be confronted. Based on the previous research, two types of political participation, electoral and extra-parliamentary participation, are distinguished. The main assumption, namely that associational participation has a correlation with these two types of participation, is further sophisticated, by identifying additional types of associations: political, non-political interest and religious associations. The correlations between associational and political participation are examined through regression
models in three years, 1991, 1999 and 2008, by using the three waves of European Values Study.
Part I. Hopes and Disillusionment: Civil Society and the Revolution in 1989
I.1. The Socio-political Context of the Rebirth of Civil Society in Hungary

Probably most of the readers are well aware of the socio-political and economic context, which characterized the period when the concept of civil society had re-emerged. Thus, the following pages serve only as a reminder to draw an outline of what happened and when prior to the transition. I will shortly discuss the Hungarian version of socialism, some of the factors led to its fall and the actors, who played important role in the transition. During this short chapter, however, I will start to introduce some of the terms, as the ‘second economy’, ‘second society’ or the ‘democratic opposition’, which will be referred to in the next chapter.

1.1.1. The fall of socialism and the socio-political consequences of the transition

A. The socialist system in Hungary

The Hungarian version of socialism, although it was undoubtedly a socialist system, and shared the main attributes of socialism with its Soviet, Polish and Czechoslovak counterparts, showed significant differences from the other members of the Soviet-bloc. However, its distinctive characteristics appeared primarily after the 1956 revolution. According to Kornai, (1992) the main distinctive characteristic of a socialist system is the bureaucratic coordination, which is originated in the Party’s dominant role in the political structure and controlling of property. Thus, the main characteristics of a socialist system can be summarized as (Kornai, 2007:305-306):

1. The dominant role of public property. Private property has only a complementary role if any.
2. The coordination of socio-economic activities is based on central-bureaucratic coordination. Market-based coordination has only a subordinated, complementary role if any.
3. Political power is monopolized by the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party, which is opposing the idea of capitalism.

Csanádi and Lörincz (1992) specify further how the influence of the Party over economic processes and the property permeates the decision-making system, creating parallel and cross-cutting decision-making structures, causing uncertainty and the primacy of political interests over economic rationality.
Hankiss (1989a) defines the socialist system in its relation to the European ideal-type of modernization: Thus, a socialist-system, although it is an effort of modernization itself, it is seen as an anti-modernization attempt, by Hankiss, since it is characterized by the lack of chance to fulfill modern freedoms, as freedom connected to rationality, humanism and European liberties.

Although the features defined by Kornai and Hankiss, listed above, defined the whole period between 1948 and 1989, there were certain differences in the various periods of Hungarian socialism. The main distinction between these periods is often made in the mid-1960s.\(^\text{12}\) The period prior to the mid-1960s was characterized by an orthodox and totalitarian rule, by aggressive and often violent nationalization, the formation of cooperatives and atomization of the society. Between 1956 and 1963, the methods of developing a socialist society became more sophisticated and less aggressive, but more effective (Rainer, 2004). This is the stage of the *demobilization of the society* (Hankiss, 1989a), a period under which the socialist system was fabricated, democratic institutions were demolished, and existing identities were destroyed. (Based on the experience that led to the Revolution in 1956, Kádár slowly started to develop a more balanced type of socialism. The differences of the pre- and post-1956 (or 1963, respectively) periods are well represented by the mottos of the Rákosi and Kádár era. The period among 1948 and 1956 can be described by the motto: ‘he, who is not with us, is against us’ indicating a continuous “war” against society, while Kádár has changed this motto to ‘he, who is not against us, is with us.’ \(^\text{13}\) Clearly, it is a motto that refers to the willingness of reconciliation with the Hungarian society (Rainer, 2001).

In this second period, labeled as liberalization by Hankiss (1989a) the distinctive characteristics of the Hungarian version of socialism were its relatively liberal and reform-oriented nature, compared to other socialist countries, which was expressed in the constant commuting between reforms and turnbacks or at least by the continuous talk about reforms (Rainer, 2007; Miklós Szabó, 1989).

In this period, the society and the elite lived together more or less peacefully. The government provided the society with a better standard of living than the other socialist countries, the possibility of the slow accumulation of wealth and with a kind of consumer society. In return,\(^\text{12}\) The staging, however is not clear. While the post-1956 period (1956-1988) is often labeled as Kadarism, based on the rule of János Kádár, (Rainer, 2010), while the aims and characteristics, of the system suggests a staging similar to Hankiss’ version (Rainer, 2004).

\(^\text{13}\) Kádár first used this phrase in December 1961, (Rainer, 2001)
the average members of the society accepted the rule of the Party and did not interfere with politics. (Hankiss, 1989a) since the regime was unable to convince the people to engage in the official ideology, this “deal” between the regime and the society aimed to provide legitimacy of the system based on satisfying the material needs and slowly raising the living standards. (Tökés, 1979)

This is the period, however, which concluded in the dissolution of the system. The causes were the growing indebtedness of the state and the failure of keeping the deal on the side of the state, the growth of the second economy and second society and naturally the changing international circumstances.

B. Processes demolishing the socialist system

It is hard to point out when the fall of socialism has started. Some processes, which might play a role along the way, started already in the sixties. Kornai (1998) points out that with regards to the coordination mechanisms of the economic system, certain transformations were initiated already in 1968, with the introduction of the “New Economic Mechanism”. This reform allowed some autonomy to the state-owned companies and increased the role of market-based coordination. Although the reform was withdrawn in 1973, it increased the importance of autonomous economic initiatives and slowly changed the social structure and the economy under the surface.

The second economy and the second society

In the economic sphere, Gábor and Galasi (1981) detected the development of the second economy, a set of economic activities which in sum, utilize the labor outside the official economic sector of the socialist system. These activities contributed to the stabilization of the socialist economy in the 1960s. The second economy at first was mainly constituted by small household farms, then small enterprises of an informal private sector.

Such private informal economic activities were restricted in the fifties and early sixties and became “legal” when the New Economic Mechanism brought a more supportive direction of politics in this sense. The first and second economy was interdependent, the first often provided resources and raw material for the activities of the second, while through the possibility of accumulating some wealth and supplementing the family’s income the second stabilized the
first. However, as an unintended consequence, the strategy of letting the second economy prevail, led to the further paralyzation of the first economy,

“where everybody from managers to unskilled workers looked to tricks, lobbying, bargaining and loopholes rather than improving efficiency or quality, where all sorts of personal networks and informal organizations run the economy, (Sik 1992:170)

Sik (1992) argues further: these practices led to a dense, informal network which effectively helped the families to survive or accumulate wealth step by step. Eventually, these practices and networks affected everyone’s lives, became stable and contributed to the transition by transforming itself - partially - into the informal economy. They became a lasting strategy to cope with economic hardships.

Kis (1989) in the same time claims that the growth of the second economy, although it gave some autonomy to people, also caused self-exploitation. According to Kis, the destructive effects of the self-exploitation made clear that the double life, work in the first and then the second economy at the same time, cannot be maintained on a long term.

Second Society

Hankiss (1988) extends the idea of the second economy into the notion of a second society. He claims that second society, a “latent, second sphere of socio-economic existence” (Hankiss, 1988:1) started to grow in the late 1950s. Second society consists of not only economic activities but a second public sphere, a second cultural sphere, and even a hidden, second consciousness. Civil society and the oppositional movements also fall into the category of this second society and they strongly connect to the second public sphere and preserving of “original” values. (Hankiss, 1988, 1989a)

Both notions the second economy and the second society represent the duplication of structures. People often managed to live a double life, one in the official economy and public sphere and one in their private life and the second society. The reason, that the regime allowed and sometimes encouraged this duplication of life, was its need for a silent legitimation, which came in the aforementioned “deal” between the elite and the society. The people do not question the rule of the Party and mainly stay out of public issues, and in exchange the Party creates an

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14 The state’s attempt was even to connect the two in a way which would subordinate the second economy to the official one, thus keeps it under control and avoid its unwanted expansion. The tools of doing this are twofold: first, regulations describing activities allowed in the second economy, the maximum size of enterprises and production, and taxation. Second, the state tries to make the second economy dependent on the first one as the source of its raw material, tools and even markets. (Galasi, 1985)
environment in which the living standard is relatively high, compared to other socialist countries, and informal activities are allowed in order to a slow accumulation of personal wealth and increasing this standard of living. (Miklós Szabó, 1989)

This lead to the duplication (or multiplication) of the mechanisms, which rendered the social stratification as well. Besides the positions occupied in the first economy, the second, informal spheres increasingly influenced the structure of the Hungarian society. Authors refer to this phenomenon as double stratification or double structures. (Gagyí - Éber, 2015)

The increasing importance of the second spheres was accompanied by decreasing economic growth and economic stagnation in the eighties. The two factors together started to undermine the legitimacy of the ruling elite. (Szelenyi - Szelenyi, 1994). The economic stagnation was manifested in the fall of the ratios of GDP growth (which fell from 4 to 1.5 percent in 1979) or in the growing indebtedness of the state. Evidently, the slow growth caused hardships in the struggle to keep the living standard on a relatively high level and enforcing full employment.

The important role of the stagnation in the collapse of the system is unquestioned. However, different explanations of this stagnation are available. Some of them emphasize internal reasons as the structure of labor force (Csanády, 2009) or a governance crisis (Hankiss, 1989a), while others focus on the oil crisis of the late seventies or the slow collapse of the two-block world system, the consequences of the arms race and so on (Bozóki, 2002).

Csanády (2009) offers a macroeconomic explanation for this stagnation and the collapse of the system, based on the theoretical approach of Ferenc Jánossy. Jánossy examined the long-term processes of GDP growth of the twentieth century in different countries, from Germany to Japan. Jánossy found that each nation’s growth of GDP is tied to a distinct, linear trend, which shows surprising stability. Even a crisis or a large-scale reform hardly modify this path. The reason for this stability – according to Jánossy - lies in the structure of labor force. The growth first is fueled by simply the flow of labor from agriculture to industry. However, after a while, the sources of this flow are drained. From this point, the growth could continue only on the basis of productivity, which requires a labor force and institutions suitable to production governed by the principle of effectiveness. Csanády argues that the problems of the socialist system were twofold: 1) the first phase of growth has stopped too early (in the middle 1970s). Although a significant proportion of labor force remained working in the agriculture, it could

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15 Naturally, a crisis causes a sharp decline in the GDP. However, after a short reproduction period, characterized by a much steeper growth-rate than usual, the level of GDP finds its way back to the trend line. This point is followed by the decline of growth, usually. (Csanády, 2009)
not have been redirected to the industry since it was not fit for performing in the industry. 2) The structure of production in the Kadar era was not able to perform effectively, thus the second phase could not be launched.

(Hankiss (1988, 1989a) identifies the starting point of political processes that led straight to the fall of communism in 1978, just a year before a second economic reform was initiated. The failure of the renewed reform attempts and the ongoing economic downfall are a sign of governance crisis for Hankiss. This crisis slowly undermined the Kadarite reconciliation, the growth of living standard could be maintained on the price of foreign indebtedness. The Party slowly lost its control over the resources, the public sphere and its legitimacy weakened. Through these processes, the economic and political crisis cumulated in the rise of opposition movements and later in the velvet revolution itself.

I.1.2. The opposition and the Negotiated Revolution\textsuperscript{16}

It is beyond doubts that the fall of socialism is caused by external and internal factors. External factors are the changing global economy, the developments of international relations, such as signing the Helsinki Accords in 1975, and that eventually the Soviet Union lost the arms race in the 1980s, therefore introduced Perestroika. (Bozóki, 2002; Franzinetti, 2008) Internal factors are the changing power relations, the growing dissatisfaction with the regime, all of which became visible in the late seventies and increasingly apparent in the eighties (Szelenyi - Szelenyi, 1994). There is less consensus on the importance of the reform-communist and the opposition. I do not want to evaluate, to what extent the large-scale economic and social processes and the reformists and oppositional actors contributed to the regime change. I think, however, that the role of these actors in exploiting and channeling social change and turning into a non-violent transformation of the system is important. Since these actors did not consist of a unified reform or opposition force, it is necessary to account the most important ones, who played a role in channeling these structural changes into the systemic transformation.

First of all, the Hungarian Worker’s Socialist Party consisted of different fractions. The reform-attempts and their withdrawal marked the current situation of the power struggles between the Party’s orthodox and reformist fractions. Thus in 1968, 1978 and in the second half of the

\textsuperscript{16} The term, ‘negotiated revolution’ is used to describe the non-violent nature of the Hungarian transition and to emphasize the role of roundtable discussions by Bruszt (1990) and Tökés (1996)
eighties reformist fractions had a better position, while between reforms the orthodox fractions could secure their leading roles (Kornai, 1992).

After the revolution in 1956, and before the late seventies there was no sizeable and visible opposition, but small groups of critics were formulated in opposition to the Party or the official ideology. The source of these critics, as they often connected to the reform waves, was coming from state or Party-institutions and from the Marxist intellectuals.

Although the criticism of the command-economy and discussion of economic reforms started already in the 1950s inside the party, the first publicly released criticism concerned not only with economic planning but with the organization of society and the socialist ideology, appeared in the mid-late 1960s, parallel the preparations for New Economic Mechanism were prepared. Besides the more market-oriented coordination of the production and distribution of goods, sociologists and philosophers formulated their ideas which were, with the withdrawal of reform activities, treated as an attack on the system. Among these, the most notable was the renewed attempts of research in social stratification.

In the late sixties Zsuzsa Ferge, András Hegedűs, Iván Szelényi and György Konnrád, in the early seventies Tamás Kolosi initiated their research on inequalities and social stratification. (Ferge, 1968; Szelenyi, 1969) Without dwelling into the details, Ferge, Hegedűs, or Kolosi challenged the socialist picture of society, highlighting that there are still inequalities in Hungary. (Gagyi - Éber, 2015) Besides them, István Kemény just started his research revealing the marginalized position of the Roma (Miklós Szabó, 1989). In philosophy, Lukács’s followers tried to revitalize Marxism by engaging with its humanist-critical version (Kammas, 2007).

In 1973, with the withdrawal of the reform, these attempts were put on hold. Szelényi and Konrád finished their seminal work, the ‘Intellectuals on the road to class power”, in 1974, for which Konrád was banned from work and went into internal dissidence, Szelényi left the country. Kolosi was, according to Gagyi and Éber (2015:601) “persuaded to refrain from his critical class analysis”. Philosophers of the forming Budapest School were forced into dissidence.

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17 The different phases of reforms and the dependence on the leadership is reviewed and well documented by Berend (1990)
18 Some modifications to the centrally controlled command economy was introduced between 1953 and 1955, however they were seen as strictly economic. See Berend (1990)
19 (György Konrád - Szelenyi, 1979)
Although the first wave of critics in the 1960s were later considered as dangerous, their approach or at least their argumentation was to take seriously and restore the Marxist roots of socialism and try to find solutions to the existing problems from inside. This point of view is gradually changed and by late eighties, intellectuals and reform economists proposed alternative models, based on market economy and political pluralism. (Bozóki, 1999)

Probably the first turning point for most of the critical intellectuals, who first wanted a reform for the regime, was the brutal oppression of the Prague Spring. This could be the point when they realized that the Soviet Empire would suppress any peaceful initiative as well, and the reform from inside is not possible (Bozóki - Karácsony, 2002; Kammas, 2007).

Then the withdrawal of reforms strengthened their alienation from the system and an opposition started to develop. This developing Hungarian opposition consisted of relatively separated groups of intellectuals, who applied different strategies, based on their background and their position within the system. However, besides using their roles as experts to criticize the system, their repertoire increasingly included other forms of protest, such as petitions, creating samizdat publications, establishing informal organizations, and in the late eighties, organizing demonstrations as well.

The first semi-public forms of opposition were underground, new-wave cultural events and to write, publish and multiply samizdat publications\(^{20}\). The first of its kind was published in 1972, collecting the underground writings of the sixties (Haraszti, 2000). At that time, the main forum of the underground publication was Magyar Füzetek, edited and published in France by Péter Kende. Writers had to smuggle out their articles from the country while others had to smuggle the printed publications in (Bajomi-Lázár, 2005; Haraszti, 2000).

The mid-seventies brought a change in many Central and Eastern European Countries. In 1975 the Helsinki Accords were signed and this brought human rights into the discourse as a reference point for the opposition (Judt, 1988). A group of Czech and Slovak intellectuals crafted a Charter to protest against the violation of human rights, theoretically guaranteed on the basis of the Helsinki Accords. The Charter received a harsh response from the Czechoslovakian government, which triggered a collective action from Hungarian intellectuals as well. They started to circulate an open letter of solidarity and to collect signatures. (Bozóki, 1999; Judt, 1988)

\(^{20}\) Samizdat publications are “uncensored, illegal journals and books that were published by dissident intellectuals” (Sükösd, 2012:62)
After Charter’77, oppositional activity became more frequent and more organized.\textsuperscript{21} Opposition groups started underground periodicals. By the late eighties, there were 30 of them. Although these were produced in a small number, the Radio Free Europe, a radio broadcasting from abroad aiming to provide independent news coverage in countries under repression, reviewed them systematically (Bajomi-Lázár, 2005).\textsuperscript{22}

The increasing ‘second public sphere’ already meant the establishment of small informal organizations providing the ground for these periodicals. The informal networks of the intellectuals provided the distribution system for the samizdat, which probably also helped to maintain and strengthen this network.

Together with the growing dissatisfaction and the system’s decreasing capability to keep the opposition under control, more and more groups, from different intellectual traditions and background activated themselves. Basically, there were two main fractions of oppositional movements. As Bozóki and Karácsony (2002) described, they chose different strategies. The \textit{democratic opposition} took a leftist and liberal stance and chose human rights as their ideological background. Their strategy was the open objection of the system. This broad group consisted of mainly urban intellectuals from the Capital, had members actively participating in oppositional activities since the sixties, and engaged intensively in creating and distributing the samizdat literature. In the 1980s the democratic opposition started to form organizations providing social care for the poor, hidden seminars, as the flying university. Independently, but connected to the democratic opposition, the environmental and the peace movement were born. (Mikecz, 2012)

Also, close to the democratic opposition, whose members were mostly in their late 30s and forties, the younger generation started to form their organization. Colleges of Advanced studies, as the Rajk and Bibó Colleges were the bases of their network which later formalized as the Party of Young Democrats (Bozóki - Karácsony, 2002).

\textit{The Populists}, who emphasized the legacy of the populist writers of the 1930s chose a somewhat different strategy. Instead of publishing samizdat they tried to establish their own periodical officially. Just after the regime refused to give permission, they participated in the conference in Monor, the first all-opposition meeting. Two years later they organized their own conference in Lakitelek, to where they did not invite the representatives of the democratic

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Napló (between 1977 and 1981), Hirmondó, Beszélő (1982-) or Demokrata and many others.
\item \textsuperscript{22} The proportion of the adult population managed to listen to Radio Free Europe had been 19 percent already in 1981 and it increased to 27 percent to 1987. (Hann 1989 cited by Bajomi-Lázár, 2005)
\end{itemize}
opposition but they invited the leading figure of the reform wing of the Party, Imre Pozsgay. At Lakitelek they announced the foundation of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, which became a leading organization in the process of the transition. The Forum kept contact with Pozsgay and the reform-communists in the following years\textsuperscript{23} (Bozóki - Karácsony, 2002).

In 1986 and 1987, two significant reform-programs were published: The *Turnabout and Reform* by the so-called reform economists and the *Social Contract* by the editors of Beszélő. The first focused on the necessary economic reforms, however, mentioned the restructuration of property and provision of rights as well. The second emphasized the changes in regulation, how the political system, decision making should be reformed. Both programs accepted the one-party system and the leading role of the communist party (Kis et al., 1987).

However, the activity of both the democratic opposition and the populist movement increased, and the reform-economists were allowed to publish more openly, the distinctive characteristics of the Hungarian opposition at the time, compared to the Polish one is their relative isolation from the masses. The demonstrations they held up until 1988 received only a small popular support. The demonstrations they organized mobilized only a couple hundred of people at the maximum.

Their mobilization capacity has changed in 1988 when two mass demonstrations were held: the commemoration of 15\textsuperscript{th} of March attracted thousands, and in June a march against destroying villages in Romania also mobilized tens of thousands. After that, it was less surprising that the commemoration of 15\textsuperscript{th} of March and the reburial of Nagy Imre on the 16\textsuperscript{th} of June in 1989 attracted even more, 150 or 200 thousand people. It is important to emphasize that both the democratic opposition and the populist movement participated in the organization of these events\textsuperscript{24}

Inspired by the success of the demonstration on the 15\textsuperscript{th} of March, 1989, the Independent Lawyer’s Initiative called for an Oppositional Roundtable to discuss a unified strategy against the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. To participate in the Roundtable a wide range of oppositional forces was invited. The most important actors were the Hungarian Democratic Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats. While the former was the representative of the

\textsuperscript{23} One of the leading organizers of the so-called populist movement at the time, Zoltán Biró was working in the administration. He maintained a close relationship with Pozsgay, since he was one of the closest colleague of him as a minister of Cultural Affairs between 1975 and 1983. (Bozóki - Karácsony, 2002)

\textsuperscript{24} Although the number of participants is not that well documented, the scope of mobilization can be easily defined based on the recordings of events by Fekete Doboz (Black Box) Foundation, committed to the objective reporting to the events prior 1989. (Révész, 2007) For the review of changes in mobilization see (Elbert - Jávor, 1990)
populist movement, taking a more or less right-wing stance emphasizing the need for a unique Hungarian way, the latter considered itself as the successor of the democratic opposition. Besides the two major parties, historical parties also joined the Roundtable. These were re-established in the late eighties, with the participation of those elders, who originally were members of these prior 1948. However, their record of opposition activities was not as impressive as the other two groups’, they were seen as a linkage between the democratic traditions of the 1945-1948 period and the transition. Civil organizations, as the Federation of Young Democrats (Fidesz), The Democratic League of Trade Unions and The Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Friendship Society participated as a third type of actors. (Bozóki - Karácsony, 2002)

The Hungarian Socialist Workers Party and its satellite organization, the National People’s Front joined the negotiations in June 1989 and the Roundtable transformed itself into The National Roundtable. The negotiations aimed to work out the timeline and the legislative background of the transition. The negotiations ended on the 18th September and however, an agreement was reached between most of the parties, the Free Democrats and the Young Democrats did not sign it for various reasons. Probably the most important reason was the disagreement on the time and method of the election of the president. (Bozóki - Karácsony, 2002)

On the 23rd of October, the III. Republic was announced and in April 1990 the first free and fair elections were held. Prior the elections, several fundamental laws, as the Constitution, the Act on the freedom of association and peaceful assembly were accepted by the Parliament to ground the peaceful and legal transition of power to the newly elected parties.

Among the Successors of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party the Hungarian Socialist Party, led by the second line reformist leaders of the former state party entered the Parliament with a 10.9 percent result. The Hungarian Democratic Forum won the elections (24.7%), The Alliance of Free Democrats (21.4%) occupied the second role. Besides, the Independent Smallholder’s Party (11.7%), the Alliance of the Young Democrats (8.95 %) and the Christian Democrats

25 Prior to SZDSZ, the Network of Free Initiatives was founded. The Network was intended to be civil society organizations, but as the events speeded up, they turned it into a party named as the Alliance of Free Democrats (Bozóki, 1993).

26 The re-established groups were the historical parties, as the Christian Democrats, the Independent Smallholders Party, The Social Democratic Party of Hungary and the Hungarian People’s Party (Cf. Bozóki - Karácsony, 2002:72).
entered the Parliament (6.5%). Thus, the government was formed by the Hungarian Democratic Forum, in coalition with the Independent Smallholder’s Party and the Christian Democrats.

As I have mentioned, the different branches of the opposition had different ideological background. However, the idea of civil society is often seen as a common ground for the pre-1989 opposition (Lomax, 1997), it is clear that at least the emphasis on it was different by the various groups. In according to Bozóki and Karácsony (2002) and Bozóki (1999), the populist movement and the historical parties were committed to a minimalist project of democracy and to a market-oriented economic system and they were also suspicious towards the western-oriented ideas of civil society and western institutions. Thus, when one examine the concept and performance of civil society, he or she mostly examine the strategies prior the transition, and the ideological background of the democratic opposition and groups connected to it, such as the students in Colleges of Advanced Studies or the newly formed trade unions, which engaged to the ideas of human rights, western-oriented reform, and widening citizen’s participation much more.


In the late eighties and early nineties, the term, ‘civil society’ was among the most popular expressions in describing, explaining or understanding the transition. The “rebirth”, “reinvention” or “revival” of the concept of civil society first started in Central and Eastern Europe and in Latin-America followed by Western Europe and North-America (Gellner, 1991a; Kaldor, 2003; Ost, 1993; Seligman, 1992a, 1995). Although the process of rebirth and the concept’s diffusion itself could deserve a separate chapter, I will trace back neither the historical origins of the term nor the roots of its revival. Instead, I am interested in, if it was once “revived” or “reconstructed”, how international and domestic academics’ understanding evolved in relation to the Hungarian regime change and what role they attributed to civil society in the building and in the functioning of the future democracy.

Since the concept is used to explain or predict the possibilities and mechanisms of democratization, its reconstruction has crucial consequences for the models, proposed by the authors, as those contain the assumptions about the process on how democratization should happen.

By ‘models’, or ‘understanding’ I refer to a loose way of defining the concept. Considering that civil society is mainly about the relationship between the citizen and the state (and their intermediaries) the main task of concept definition is drawing the boundaries between the two. Thus, the main aspect of the examination the concept is about what constitutes civil society and where the border between civil society and the state lies. The reasoning backing up this distinction is often based on the roles or function the authors attribute to civil society.

As I will show, the models explored here are too divergent to simply merge them into one consensual model of civil society. However, exploring the main commonalities between the different models allows me to suggest a core set of actors and a core mechanism of democratization, mechanism and a core set of hypotheses of democratization. Their differences, nonetheless, contribute to our understanding of the loss of popularity of the civil society as a political project among the political elites after the transition.

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28 This work has been done by seminal scholars such as Seligman (1995), Cohen and Arato (1992), Keane (1988d) or Edwards (2009) just to name a few.
To explore the different models of civil society used around the transition, I reviewed the English and Hungarian academic texts applying the term, between 1985 and 1995. In the English case, I have used some well-known online journal databases and tried to explore the most important books about the concept. In the Hungarian case, I reviewed the most prominent Hungarian journals of the period.

The chapter will be structured as follows. First, I will shortly introduce the most well-known typologies of civil society. Second, I will introduce the methodology and the corpus I used. Third, the models of civil society will be presented and fourth their commonalities and differences will be explored. At last, I will propose the hypotheses of democratization embedded in the models.

I.2.1. Variations to civil society

Since the concept has a long history and its meaning was the subject of fierce debates, many authors reflect on the different uses and meanings of the concept. Most of them start with a historical review of the concept beginning with Aristotle, Saint Augustine and going through Locke, Smith, and Hobbes or focusing on Tocqueville, Hegel, Marx or Gramsci (see Alexander, 1998; Cohen - Arato, 1992; Keane, 1988d; Kumar, 1993; Seligman, 1995).

However, since most of the texts are dealing with the possibilities of transition from socialism to democracy, references to the history of the term are used to justify the author’s specific concepts and ideas of this transformation. By reconstructing their own versions of civil society, they try to answer questions such as: is the transition possible at all; What is the role of the actors in this transition? What is the role of the state? How could the paradoxes of democratization be resolved? For me, thus, it is more important, how contemporary authors build their own concepts, than providing a particular pre-definition of the subject. Interestingly, such a review is rather uncommon and rarely focuses on Central and Eastern Europe.

Historical references highly influence how the authors define the border between civil society and the state. As Perez-Diaz (1998) also notes, those, who tend to rely on the early protagonist of the concept (as Locke or Smith) gravitate towards to a generalized model of a democratic

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29 When it was necessary for the understanding of the debate about civil society I included earlier writings as well, but the principle is to select articles and books from the years between 1985 and 1995.

30 They often include the transition to capitalism or to a market economy as well, however, usually this is not their main focus.
society (Gellner, 1994; Perez-Diaz, 1998), while Hegel is the road to a model in which civil society and the state are rendered into a dualistic model, where the differentiation can be described in terms as institutional-non-institutionalized, formal-informal, politics-economics, public-private (for example Keane, 1988a, 1988c, 1988d). Gramsci, Luhmann, and Habermas (with a little Parsons, of course) provide a ground for a more differentiated view of society, in which civil society, state and economy are separated (as Cohen - Arato, 1992).

Perez-Diaz (Huszár, 2009; Perez-Diaz, 1998) differentiates between three main understandings of contemporary civil society: *generalists*, who tend to understand civil society as a unique social order, and an “ideal type of a society characterized by a set of socio-political institutions as the rule of law, limited and accountable public authority, economic markets, social pluralism and a public sphere” (Perez-Diaz, 1998:211), those, who apply the dualistic model, where every non-state sphere is part of civil society, and *minimalists*, who understand civil society as a non-state, noneconomic sphere (mostly associations and the public sphere) of life.

Similarly, Edwards (2009) identifies three categories: He labels the generalist approach as the ‘good society’ model. Edwards rather emphasizes values, such as tolerance, non-violence or cooperation as the fundamental characteristics of this good society, as opposed to the role of institutions. Instead of a ‘minimalist’ model, the model of ‘associational life’ is defined. According to this view, civil society consists of voluntary associations, which are non-state, non-market actors. Edwards criticizes this approach for the unrealistic expectations about the effect of associations on social integration and democracy. A third view presented by him is to understand civil society as the public sphere, with an important function to control those in power.

Sales (1991) also describes various models of the relationship between the private and public spheres: First, a dualistic model, in which the public and private spheres are the opposites of each other. In this model, civil society is equated with the private sphere. It includes everything that is non-state from families to economic organizations. Second, in a model where private and public mutually infiltrates each other, civil society serves as a mediating sphere basically consisting of the public sphere, including the press, clubs and any other organizations or activities respected as public space outside of the state. The third model considers civil society as the domain of public opinion formation. Although it is similar to the previous view, it is
connected to the contemporary form of the modern state and possible only in systems which recognizes the freedom of expression and association.\textsuperscript{31}

These reviews do not differentiate between Central and Eastern European and Western variations. Some of them touch upon the particular period of the Central-European transition. Sales (1991), for instance, uses the Eastern-European opposition as the primary example of the dualist model, but only a few authors, as Cohen and Arato (1992) or Baker (2003) try to identify the main, country- (or region-) specific discourses of civil society of the seventies and eighties. Even these authors do not discuss the reception of the ideas proposed, they rather use these particular versions of the notion as a ground for their own theory.

In the Hungarian context, Glózer (2008) examined the discourses of civil society and the terms used to describe the sphere of voluntary organizations from 1990. She identified a shift in which the usage of the concept of civil society was abandoned and as service provision became a major activity of associations and foundations and as the professionalization of these organizations proceeded, the ‘nonprofit sector’ became the dominant frame used.

Thus, a review of the models of civil society focusing on Hungary during the transition period is still missing. This is particularly interesting when it is taken into account that even the academic debates about civil society of the time were more than abstract debates. The period around 1990 was one when academic debates could influence politics and policies to a much greater extent than in other times. This is because these debates served as a think through of the tasks of the transition and since the academic and public - even political - circles were highly interconnected. Thus, although my review focuses mainly on academic sources, these concepts could be the distilled versions of more popular, intellectual understandings of civil society.

The categorization will be similar to Perez-Diaz’s and Edward’s threefold system, however, as I will show, there are important differences between variations of the dualistic system constructing a general theory or relying more on a sociological analysis of the Central European societies. Moreover, the minimalist approach is motivated by the view that there is a “way out” from the situation defined by the political and historical legacy of the Central and European Region.

\textsuperscript{31} Sales concludes that based on these models, civil society should be defined as a diversified sphere of public opinion formation, which is also a sphere of integration and mediation between individuals and groups, the economy and the state and “where social identities and new lifestyles are formed” and “having fundamental ties with democratic systems as a condition for existence and development” (Sales, 1991:309)
I.2.2. The corpus

In conducting a systematic search for texts using the concept, I had to face two challenges: The first and easy way to construct a corpus for my research would have been to search among journal articles. Unfortunately, the debate is not limited to journal articles. Moreover, there are some authors (as John Keane), who primarily expressed their opinion in books. Second, I needed both Hungarian and English language sources. While English language articles are better “searchable” in large online databases, Hungarian sources are less available in such a collection.32

Thus, I tried to find the relevant literature by using three starting points. Firstly, I went through the most well-known articles and books in the field33. Secondly, I searched for articles published between 1985 and 1995 in electronic scientific databases34 using the term “civil society” and one of the following key-words together: Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and Hungary, between 1985 and 1995. Thirdly, I collected the Hungarian articles dealing with the topic found in the journal, ‘Valóság’ from 1985 to 1990, in the Hungarian Review of Sociology and Political Science between 1990 and 199535 and I also included the articles of a short scientific debate in ‘Magyar Tudomány’ in 1987.

A. The collection of journal articles in English

To find journal articles published in English, in international journals I searched four of the largest online databases: JSTOR, EBSCO, SCOPUS and Web Of Science. I applied the search term ‘civil society’ together with the keywords Central Europe(an), Eastern Europe(an), and Hungary(ian), between 1985 and 1995.36

32 However, there is a Hungarian search engine, MATARKA, which contains bibliographic information about every article published in Hungarian journals.
33 Those books, which are unavoidable after some desk research on the topic, as John Keane’s and Andrew Arato’s work.
34 I conducted this search in the available databases, (JSTOR, Web of Science, Scopus, Science Direct and EBSCO), then I made a selection based on the abstracts, which resulted in 130 articles. Further selection based on content and availability issues reduced the number of the articles even more. There was also some overlap with articles identified previously.
35 The first volume of the Hungarian Review of Political Science was published in 1992.
36 In each case I used the abbreviated for of the terms: e.g 'Hungar' instead of Hungary to include matching cases for Hungary and Hungarian as well.
Altogether I have found 2077 matches in the four databases. After clearing the duplicates\(^{37}\) 1426 articles remained as results. By filtering cross-database duplicates, this number decreased to 1413 cases (table 1).

**Table 1. Matching cases in the four online databases by search terms: total and duplicates removed, N of results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Database/Keywords</th>
<th>Civil society + Central Europe(an)</th>
<th>Civil society + Eastern Europe(an)</th>
<th>Civil society + Hungary(ian)</th>
<th>Altogether with duplicates</th>
<th>Altogether without duplicates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ebsco</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>1007</td>
<td>699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jstor</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scopus</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOK</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>462</strong></td>
<td><strong>1087</strong></td>
<td><strong>528</strong></td>
<td><strong>2077</strong></td>
<td><strong>1426</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a second step, I examined the relevance of the articles based on their abstract. In this round, I have excluded the articles which were not relevant (e.g. used the term in relation to military-civil relations, or were written about other regions of the world, etc.).

At last, I had 249 articles which had a definition of civil society in their abstract (or in the full text if it was available). Among the 209 mentioning Hungary, 175 were available in full text. I examined the text of these 175 articles. 76 of them explained or used the term in greater detail beyond only making a reference to the concept. further than mentioning as a single reference to the concept.

B. **The collection of journal articles in Hungarian**

The Hungarian sources were researched in a different way. In this case, I tried to find the major platforms of the debate (table 2). Prior to 1989, the major academic platform was Valóság, a journal in a semi-independent position. Social scientists were able to express their thoughts with fewer constraints in this journal as compared to other platforms.

After 1990, Valóság has lost its significance, since each discipline founded its independent journal. Thus, for the 1990-1995 period, I searched for relevant articles in issues of the

\(^{37}\) Interestingly cross-database duplicates were rare (13 cases) the main problem was that the different search terms matched for the same cases.
Hungarian Sociological Review (Szociológiai Szemle) and the Political Science Review (Politikatudományi Szemle).  

Table 2. Number of articles found in Hungarian journals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journal</th>
<th>No. of relevant articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valóság (1985-1990)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Besides, I have included five articles (Ágh, 1987; Kiss, 1987; M. Szabó, 1987; T. Szabó, 1987; Urbán, 1987) found in the Review of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Magyar Tudomány, which serves as an interdisciplinary journal to inform the different disciplines about what is going on in other fields.

C. Handling different sources

The academic and intellectual circles of Hungary and the Western world were interconnected even before the transition: Dissidents of the Soviet bloc worked and published in Western countries, scholars, future politicians, intellectuals visited Western Europe and the United States with scholarships. Also, in the early nineties, many western scholars spent considerable time in the Post-Soviet bloc. For this reason, the analysis is not divided into international and Hungarian, or Western and Eastern discourses.

The following review cannot be fully exhaustive. It is probably not possible to mention all the authors who have published at least a single article on the topic, but I hopefully managed to find and review the most representative works.

D. Dimensions of examining the discourse

In this part of the analysis, I am trying to capture the expectations towards civil society. These expectations are, however, highly influenced by the actual model of civil society by the authors, in my opinion. As I already showed above, the late twentieth-century usage of civil society could be categorized by the place of the border between state and civil society. Therefore, at first, I will look at this differentiation by examining:

- **Who are the actors, constituting the civil society?** Through exploring the elements of civil society, the analysis identifies, whether there is a differentiation between state and

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38 Founded in 1992
civil society and what the term, civil society refers to. Are individuals, families, the economic organizations part of this sphere, or it refers to groups, organizations of a certain kind?

- **What is the basis of this differentiation?** For example, are there certain principles, processes or mechanisms that render certain actors to an independent sphere, or is it just their relation to the institutionalized forms of power?

- **What are the functions attributed to civil society?**

After identifying groups of theories, I turn to their differences and commonalities in their definitions of civil society and expectations towards a ‘future’ or ‘imagined’ civil society. Through these, I will be able to identify how civil society should contribute to the process of democratization or what is the role civil society should fulfill in an established democracy.

Based on the three dimensions, mentioned above, I defined three main categories of the usage of civil society. This main categorization is similar to what Perez-Diaz (1998) suggests. The first type understands civil society as a social order (I), The second category, the dualist model of the state versus civil society has two sub-categories: a universal model dualist model of state versus (civil) society and a dualist model under state socialism. The third category considers civil society as a more strictly defined sub-sphere of the society. This latter category can also be divided into two sub-categories: the non-economic, non-state sphere mediating between individuals and informal networks of the society as well as one referring to the opposition under state socialism.

A particular task of discussing civil society in relation to Central and Eastern Europe (or Hungary in my case) is to explore the relationship between civil society and the socialist state. Authors do that either by or by defining civil society as a broader social realm, a second society independent from the state, which will be discussed under the dualistic approach, or by discussing the opposition’s role in civil society, which I will introduce under the third category of theories.
I.2.3. A typology of approaches to civil society in relation to the Hungarian transition

A. Civil society defined as the Western society

A minority of the authors define civil society as a certain social or political order. The difference between the two seems to be important since this is the terrain where the usefulness of the term is the most fiercely debated. For example, Seligman (1992a, 1995) and Kumar (1993, 1994), argue that ‘civil society’ has too many meanings and as such cannot be used as a clear analytical concept and more importantly, ‘civil society’ has no additional meaning to democracy, citizenship or constitutionalism.

Seligman (1992a, 1995) claims that ‘civil society’ is popular only because ‘democracy’ has lost its meaning and mobilizing power since the socialist regimes acted in the name of democracy and named their systems as People’s Democracy. Civil society, however, is able to mobilize, because it is exhausted.

As an analytical concept, writes Seligman, civil society raises the same questions as the development of a bourgeois society. Thus, the differentiation between public and private, tensions between the state and its citizens and most importantly, the transformation of a group of individuals into a society of citizens and its integration all need to be addressed. The question is, how autonomous, rational individuals will constitute a community in which members will be able to trust each other and have rights at the same time. According to Seligman, in a ‘classic civil society’, rights are based on mutual trust (and obligations), thus both are embedded into the community. In the modern forms of civil society theory, rights are based on universal principles (e.g. human rights) which leads to an internal conflict between rights and solidarity. Civil society theory, in Seligman’s view, tries to overcome this conflict, however, with not much success. It only tries to redefine solidarity as part of the universal principles of rights and imagined communities based on these universal values, still the process of this transformation is not clear. Then, in dealing with this problematique it is better to turn to the concept of citizenship (Seligman, 1992b, 1995).

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39 Timothy Garton Ash partly shares his view. Ash notes that the ideas used by Havel, Michnik, Konrad or Lipski - notable Eastern European writers, political essayists of the time - might not be relevant for western societies. “Attempts to interpret the activity of Western peace movements as part of the struggle for civil society, for example, are not very convincing” (Ash, 1989[1986]:212).

40 Seligman mainly refers to Habermas, Arato and Cohen as a contemporary theory of civil society.

41 Although from this article of Seligman it is not quite clear, why citizenship would be a better choice.
Both Seligman and Kumar (1992, 1993, 1994, 1996) point out the difference between “civil society” as a universal idea and civil society as the political project of the opposition under state socialism. Kumar argues that the opposition understood civil society as a sphere of independent institutions, for strategic reasons and because of the specific circumstances of the transition. When the transition occurred, this view has lost its significance and it turned out that in fact, the opposition meant constitutionalism, democracy or citizenship under the term of civil society: a way of managing the relationships of individuals and institutions in a “society of citizens” (Kumar, 1994:128).

In sum, civil society could be characterized by the features of liberal democracy, which Seligman (1992a, 1995) identifies with the following characteristics, based on Dahl and Lijphart’s definitions:

“1) the freedom to form and join organizations, 2) freedom of expression, 3) the right to vote, 4) eligibility for public office, 5) the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, 6) alternative sources of information (what we would call a free press), 7) free and fair elections, 8) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference” (Seligman, 1992a:5)\textsuperscript{42}

In opposition to Seligman and Kumar, Ernest Gellner (1991a, 1991b, 1994), claims that the concept of civil society is not only useful but even more useful than the notion of ‘democracy’ in describing what has happened in Central and Eastern Europe. Gellner would regard Seligman’s definition as the institutional or procedural features of democracy. In his view, procedural democracy constitutes an insufficient, abstract and naive definition of democracy, since it assumes that the establishment of such institutions on its own is able to lead to a properly functioning democracy. This view presents democracy as a context-free concept, although, Gellner argues, it requires quite specific conditions to emerge. Merely the institutional definition of democracy cannot explain how a lasting democratic order is established. A lasting and proper **democracy requires a civil society as a precondition.**

The concept of civil society, in opposition to the concept of ‘democracy’, includes the necessary preconditions for a democratic political order as well. Gellner argues that democratic procedures are proper to make “relatively minor choices within an overall settled structure”. (Gellner, 1994:185) The implementation of democratic principles, maintaining democratic institutions, however, is not a question of choice but it is based on such structural preconditions, as value systems and certain configurations of the social structure. These preconditions highly

\textsuperscript{42} Translations are mine, unless otherwise indicated.
influence how the institutions function. The problem is, that they are a product of long-term historical processes and, as a consequence, they are culturally embedded and often non-reflected. Therefore, it is impossible to make conscious decisions about the long-term maintenance of institutions, or the track they will follow. People might be able to decide about initiating a parliamentary system, but they cannot decide whether the new institutions will be used according to intentions since this depends on the already given social structure, culture, and values.

To Gellner, the key concept, the aim of social change and development, is individual liberty and civil society is a social order which nurtures the modern notion of individual freedom. Civil society enables people to act independently not only from the state but also from strict kin-networks and bounding social norms (rituals) (Gellner, 1991a, 1994). A civil society is distinct not only from authoritarian and totalitarian systems but also from societies where traditional communities prevent individuals from practicing modern liberties, most importantly civil liberties and political rights.

“his [the citizen of a modern state] membership of the national state is not conditioned either by rites or by membership of ritually demanding sub-communities. His membership of associations within the state is optional, revocable, and does not determine his status. He can eat marry, dine, associate, work and pray (or not pray) as he thinks fit. None of its legally (or even socially) connected with his effective citizenship. (Gellner, 1991a:498)"

Based on Gellner’s two works (1991a, 1994), the following seven main characteristics of civil society can be identified.

1. Civil society is an industrialized, modern, complex society, with a high level of differentiation. Gellner does not present a detailed picture of its composition but he makes it evident that it has a state, a political, economic and some kind of societal (family or kinship networks, religion) sphere.

2. The state and other spheres of the society are separated. Gellner is not totally coherent in his definition of civil society, sometimes his phrasing refers to civil society rather as a sphere, not as the whole of society: In one instance, he defines civil society as the sphere of “institutions and associations independent from the state” (Gellner, 1991a:498), he states in his other piece that civil society is not subordinated to the state (1994). Nevertheless, it is clear that the community structure, the private sphere and
the economy are separated from the state. In a civil society, the state should not be able
to dominate the other spheres.

3. Political, ideological and social pluralism, in the sense that there are plural institutions,
ideologies, and identities. Belonging to communities and associations is based on free
choice. In civil society, there is no dominant ideology or religion. Not only because it
would possibly harm liberty, but as Gellner notes, for doubt is essential for the civil
society, since it enables self-reflectivity and defends everyday life from being
sacralized.

4. Centralized state power. Securing liberties requires a central state and its monopoly of
violence. Political pluralism does not eliminate institutions linked to the nation-state.

5. Civic spirit: Citizens have civic spirit, which is “...the presence and authority of a moral
conscientiousness, which binds a man to his contractual and other obligation without
needing to be underwritten by a torrid network of ritually reinforced social links”
(Gellner, 1991a:501, italics in the original). Civic spirit associates with inner
reinforcement of the abstract rules of law and trust in it.

6. Pluralism and civic spirit have a center in the economy: first, economic success
requires civic spirit, second, the economic sphere is the key (probably it provide
resources and fosters modernization) to the freedom from the “the tyranny of cousins”
(Gellner, 1991a:502) To achieve such a strength, economic decentralization shall
prevail.

7. Civil society requires constant economic growth so that social conflicts can be resolved
moderately. At this point, Gellner binds civil society to capitalism or the market
economy.

Similarly to Gellner, Jenő Szűcs43 (Szűcs, 1988) also defines civil society as the western socio-
political order.44 The essay was written as a tribute and reaction to István Bibó’s work, who

43 Miklós Molnár (1996) also mentioned the notion of civil society as a social order. Molnar agrees with the idea
that civil society is a “political culture…… the forms of the civilized public and private life” (1996:12) and the
“fundaments of a specific civilization: of the European-North-American one.”(1996:13). On the other hand, to
understand the role of civil society in the dissolution of the socialist regime, he sticks to a dualist approach in his
work. For this reason, I will discuss his work among dualist theories.

44 His essay was originally published in Hungarian in 1981 in Történelmi Szemle (Vázlat Európa három történelmi
régiójáról, issue 3, p 313-359,) and in 1983 in English (The three historical regions of Europe: An outline. Acta
Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 29(2/4), 131-184)
I have included the essay in my analysis, since it was translated and republished in English in 1988 in Keane’s
‘Civil society and the State’.
although did not use the term ‘civil society’ but defined the characteristics of the European society in a similar manner to Gellner (Bibó, 2004[1971-1972]).

Szűcs’s essay is an outline of the historical development of three regions (West, East, and Central) of Europe in the longue durée to explain how the twentieth century Europe was developed. For Szűcs and Bibó, such as to Gellner, the stake of the European development or civil society is to bring about a system which nurtures individual liberties. \(^{45}\) The main features of this civil or European society are:

1. The division of state and society (in a different way or to a different extent in various historical periods, but the division exists as a principle);

2. The relationship between individuals has a contractual nature, since the formation of feudalism.

3. The important role of human dignity and the gradually universalized, contractual-based liberties, that are strongly connected to the aforementioned contractual relationships. The breach of a (however abstract) contract humiliates the principle of human dignity and fundamental liberties.

4. Democracy is not a structural element of a certain social order but “the objective technique of exercising freedom” (Szűcs, 1983:131)\(^{46}\) a political order which might exist among different social circumstances.

5. These societies are moving towards reducing fear, which supports the institutionalization of the “rule of liberty and fearless, calm reason” (Bibó, 2004[1971-1972]:155)

The theories of Gellner and Szűcs share two common characteristics: the first is individual freedom as a key notion, an objective of civil societies. The second is the source of this freedom: the structural balance between the different subsystems or spheres of the society. For Gellner, the balance has two foundations: 1) the differentiation between state and society, and 2) his view of human nature.

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\(^{45}\) In according to Bibó, the western society should enforce social justice and equality as well.

\(^{46}\) This phrase as I quote here appears only in the Hungarian version and in the English version, published in 1983, since it is part of the introduction explaining the paper’s connection to Bibó’s work and this part was left out from the 1988’s publication. However the notion and a similar phrase appears in the version published in Keane’s book as well.
The structural balance is important because it is the guarantee for civil rights, individual freedom can flourish. For Gellner, (1994) balance means the lack of groups or actors who could rule over or dominate other groups. The source of this balance is the systematic differentiation between state and society, where society consists of the market and voluntary organizations, informal networks, family and so on. As he notes himself, from the point of view of civil society not only the division of politics and economy is important, but also the balance between the two. In this arena, he pictures the citizen as a rational, utilitarian individual. The utilitarian nature of individuals is the other source of the same structural balance.

These utilitarian individuals aim to articulate and fulfill their selfish interests and attempt to rule over others. However, in a society where this is impossible, simply because none of the actors has the power to ascertain such a rule, they are well aware that others would act similarly. So, the only possibility to eliminate the constant threat to one’s interests posed by others is to establish a system in which everyone mutually recognizes the rights to articulate and achieve the interests of others with certain limitations in place. Therefore, civil society is civil not only because of the “civilized men”, or moral laws of human nature, but mainly because of its structural constellation, rooted in the utilitarian citizen’s nature and interests. Gellner identifies such a balance in the 17th-18th century Europe, where the ruling actors were not equipped with enough resources to exercise total control above the ruled, but the division of labor, the extent of economic growth, the strength of the new, Reformists religions leads to an ideological and political stalemate. Unfortunately, in a modern society, the state or the economy are both capable to endanger such a structural balance.

For Szűcs, the source of the balance is clearly attributed to the weakness of the rulers in medieval Europe. In the Early Middle Ages, kings could not maintain their rules without the lords, and lords could not maintain their rule over their territory without offering something (defense and some basic rights, at least in principle) in return for the services of the peasants. This initial situation, where the actors had to rely on each other to some extent, became a structural characteristic by becoming a norm. Even with the growing centralization, this principle was central to the medieval European kingdoms and to the particular rights originated from these contracts between lords and king, cities and king or lords and servants became universal rights. The balance is based on these rights and on the norm, which constitutes the basic element of Western political culture (Szűcs, 1988).

B. Dualist approach I.: Civil society is everything but the state

The second group of studies defines civil society as a sphere that consists of every or almost every aspect of life outside the state. Authors who apply this approach strongly emphasize civil organizations’ and groups’ autonomy from the state. Two novel advocates of this approach are John Keane (1988a, 1988c) and Ralf Dahrendorf (1990, 1991). Other authors referring to this generalized type of model are usually much less detailed about it (see Ding, 1994; Eyal - Townsley, 1995; Goldstein, 1995; Joppke, 1994; Kolankiewicz, 1994; Krygier, 1990; Lengyel, 1987; Ronning, 1995; Schopflin, 1991; Stewart, 1990; Yanqi Tong, 1994; Y. Tong, 1995; White, 1993; Williams - Reuten, 1993).

The main aspect behind the dualist approach is the classical dichotomy of the public and the private. The public is the state and private is everything else, the economy, the family or voluntary associations.

“the schema 'the state versus civil society' is used to refer to the public versus the private, the coercive versus the voluntary, or the compulsory versus the autonomous.” (Ding, 1994:294-295)

“The model of change seems to be that of eighteenth-century France. The hope is, presumably, that if a sphere can be created for the bourgeois entrepreneur, then ineluctably and behind the scenes, the social conditions will arise in which Hungary's ancien regime will fall and the, previously half-fulfilled bourgeois in the Magyar population will realize its other, citizen half.” (Stewart, 1990:157)

As I already mentioned, the main philosophical reference for these authors is Hegel, however, most of them propose important differences to the Hegelian model. Hegel outlined a dualist model in which civil society is a subject of the state. In civil society, private interests prevail, however, the various interests might be at conflict. The state in the Hegelian model not only mediates between private interests but represents the public good, the interest of the public itself. (Keane, 1988d) To the authors reflecting on the revolutions of 1989, the dichotomy is important and the relationship between the two spheres is (or supposed to be) more equal and supplementary.

Keane uses this dichotomy to prepare the ground for claiming a renewed social democracy, which would create a balance between the preservation of individual liberty and increased equality. The warranty of such a society is the proper differentiation between the state and the civil society: strict contours for the former and growing autonomy of the latter (Keane, 1988c).
In this context, Keane defines civil society as:

“aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities - economic and cultural production, household life and voluntary associations - and who in this way preserve and transform their identity by exercising all sorts of pressures or controls upon state institutions.” (Keane, 1988c:14)

In other textual references Keane enumerates other institutions as elements of civil society, the list seems inexhaustible. What is repeated constantly is the emphasis of their independence or autonomy from the state. They range from households to enterprises through voluntary associations.

Keane always mentions groups or institutions as constituents of civil society, but never individuals. Civil society should be plural, it opposes or controls state power, creates an identity (connected to being in opposition to the state), and some of its institutions, like political parties, should mediate between civil society and the state, thus sending, receiving, and recoding demands.

His broad definition of the notion comes from the idea that civil society can be found in different forms, not necessarily in the form of voluntary associations. How can someone recognize civil society then? Through its opposition to the state, which is, according to Keane always the characteristic of a civil society, and through civic virtues, which would encompass “self-interest, hard work, flexibility, self-reliance, freedom of choice, private property, the patriarchal family and distrust of state bureaucracy” (Keane, 1988c:6-7).

The relationship between the state and the civil society should be co-dependent: Neither a totally free civil society nor the dominance of the state will produce growing freedom and equality. The fight between groups can degenerate civil society (the strong overcoming the weak) so the state should regulate this fight with a legal system and the articulation and protection of universal rights (Keane, 1988c). The interdependence of the two would lead to growing freedom, equality and participatory decision making. Still, there is no stable balance between the state and civil society. Keane notes that “there is a constant danger in democratic systems that party competition, freedom of association, rule of law and other democratic procedures will be used to defeat democracy.” (Keane, 1988b:181).

Dahrendorf, based mostly on his “Reflections on the revolution,” (Dahrendorf, 1990) draws a similar picture of civil society, however in a slightly different context. Although Dahrendorf does not oppose state intervention and redistribution and share the concerns over solidarity, he
considers increasing liberty as the primal aim civil society should achieve, through the establishment of an open society in the Popperian sense. Dahrendorf emphasizes that the open society has an untidy, chaotic order filled with uncertainty, but the answer to this uncertainty is not the establishment of monopolies of ideologies or groups, but to provide the possibility of trials and errors. Everyone can make mistakes and try again, but for this, the society shall preserve its openness.  

Although Dahrendorf points to existing open societies as examples, (as Sweden, Germany, and Japan) his collection of characteristics is more of a Weberian ideal-type, representing a political system that might be also labeled as liberal democracy (based on the rule of law, separation of different powers, primacy of individual rights) or as a market economy with a state. In such a political system, the ruling elite changes peacefully. The state is strong enough to provide defense and safety in times of crisis, but its power is limited by decentralization. Most importantly for us, the open society’s social foundation, which is the key in anchoring and stabilizing its constitutional and economic characteristics is the civil society.

Civil society should be a dense, multi-centered network made up of autonomous organizations such as media, local governments, small businesses, political parties, universities and independent churches or voluntary associations and situated between the state and individuals.

This list of institutions suggests that autonomy is not exactly a matter of financing or ownership. Autonomy rather stems from the logic of operation, as civil society organizations are those “forms of organization which enable people to conduct their lives without being permanently exposed to government and notably to the central government” (Dahrendorf, 1991:23). That being said, civil society and the state could perform the task of liberating the individual only together.

Members of civil societies are respectful towards each other and are “able and willing to go and do things themselves, if necessary by forming action groups with others, confident men, women, who are not frightened and have no reason to fear, citizens.” (Dahrendorf, 1990:105-106)

Without civil society, and this is extremely important in the context of the transition, the other characteristics of the open society are weak and vulnerable. The source of the autonomy of civil

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48 Dahrendorf argues that societies should not perceived as ‘systems’ since in his view, every ‘system’ is a closed society.
society institutions is its network which is robust enough not to collapse from the elimination of one important actor and to be also self-sustaining.49

C. Dualist theories II: Civil society under state socialism

A specific version of the dualist approach is used to describe a sphere independent from the state under state socialism. The totalitarian regime until 1956 (or 1963, arguably) tried to control every sphere of life: independent associations, networks, social circles could not be maintained. However, the shift in the paradigm of the Kádár Regime after 1963 allowed a limited autonomy for the private sphere and small-scale economic activities. (Hankiss, 1988, 1989a) The dualist approach to civil society is also used to describe this relatively autonomous and informal sphere. (Benda et al., 1988; Bernik, 1994; Hankiss, 1987, 1988, 1989b; Jewsiewicki et al., 1995; Molnár, 1993a, 1996) Besides civil society, they call it as an independent, alternative society or parallel polis (Benda et al., 1988), a second society (Hankiss, 1988), a self-regulating or self-defense society (Ágh, 1987, 1989) depending on the different theoretical aspects emphasized.

Hankiss’s (1988, 1989a) notion of the second society is somewhat a starting point for others to engage this specific version of the dualistic theory of civil society. He basically expands the notion of the well-known idea of the second economy to state that the second society is a sphere which is basically the mirror of the first, official society. While the first is centralized and organized by vertical relations, a top-down information flow, dominated by political intentions and ideology, the second society is decentralized, horizontal relations are more prevalent, the information flow is bottom-up and it applies the notion of interest representation, and the main activities are socio-economically oriented.

The second society is a parallel society with all the sub-spheres a whole society has: a second economy, a second culture, a second public sphere, or a second social consciousness, and a second sphere of socio-political interactions. (Hankiss, 1988, 1989a).

Molnár (1993a, 1996)50 heavily relies on Hankiss’s work in building his own model of civil society. First, he reconstructs various meanings of the concept. 1) As a concrete phenomenon dividing politics and activities outside of politics. 2) As a tool of heuristic thinking about the relation between the state and society, in the last three centuries, which resulted in the very

49 In the social movement literature, Baldassari and Diani (2007) explains this relationship between the robustness and vulnerability of a network of social movements organizations and the topology of such a network.
50 His book was published in French in 1990. The shortened and revised version was published in 1996 in Hungary, but Molnár and his French book entered into the debate in the early nineties as well. (See the discussion in the Politikatudományi Szemle (Molnár, 1993a, 1993b; Szelényi, 1993).
different meanings of civil society. 3) As a plan or model of the desired society and 4) finally as a “political culture…… the forms of the civilized public and private life” and the “fundaments of a specific civilization: of the European-North American one.” (Molnár, 1996:12-13). Although Molnár suggests that each of the four approaches are relevant, he emphasizes three main aspects of the explanation of civil society, which makes clear that he applies a dualistic model:

1) The importance of the social structure. (The organization of the society)

2) Family and private life as spheres that were able to resist the interference of politics.

3) The history and the sphere of associations since the 17th to the 18th century. Molnár does not equate civil society with associations. He states that the network of autonomous associations is only a characteristic of a civil society,

At one point Molnár equates civil society with the people51, and at the end of his book he gives a definition as follows: “Civil society cannot be reduced to the autonomous activity of the associations and movements – the term includes the formation of political culture, civilized manner, and behavior as well.” (Molnár, 1996:241)

It would be simplistic to say that every author referring to the second society equates it with civil society. Molnár clearly uses the two concepts as synonyms. Hankiss divides the second society into different sub-realms52 and places civil society in the second sphere of socio-political interaction (cf. Hankiss, 1988:28). The slow re-establishment of social networks, informal community associations, single issue movement and so on were considered as the main processes in this sphere of political interactions.

Hankiss and Molnár use the term of autonomy to describe the relation between the first and second society. In defining autonomy, Hankiss applies the criteria of the second economy developed by Gábor R. (1983). In sum, an activity would be autonomous, if it is as little related to the first society as possible: it is not organized or controlled by the state; it is informal, avoids formal activities and forms of organization such as state ownership; it is not really visible and it rejects the official ideology. Of course, it is a relative autonomy. In an ideal alternative society, autonomy would be the main principle of the whole society, while activities

51 p.157.
52 As the second consciousness or second culture.
under state socialism could be autonomous only in comparison to the activities of the first society. (Hankiss, 1988)

Tőkés (1988) and Manchin (1988) ask the following question: what is the relation between the second economy and the second society. Tőkés suggests that the second economy is not only the sum of alternative economic activities, but it is a precondition of autonomous political activity, since “collective personnel autonomy was born when the individual’s right to private property acquired unconditional legal protection and became the material guarantee for the substantive exercise of the rights vested in all citizens.” (Tőkés 1988:42, emphases are in the original). Manchin (1988) falsified this hypothesis examining the empirical associations between economic carriers and civic culture: Basically, no relationship (or even a negative correlation) was found between civic values and being partly self-employed or having a complementary income from overtime work.

Interestingly, as part of the second society approach, antipolitics, an approach emphasizing the distrust in politics and withdrawal from the public, instead of engaging it, also gained much attention. Antipolitics is less emphasized by empirical sociology and mostly connected to the work of Vaclav Havel and György Konrád, whose work is not the subject of the recent thesis in greater details, both of whom treated civil society or second society as a sphere of antipolitics. Antipolitics goes beyond simply being outside of the state’s terrain: it is a lack of trust towards state institutions, people withdrawing to the private sphere and continuing living as no oppression would prevail. For Konrád. this is a strictly individual strategy, however, Havel is less clear about that. Havel’s “living in truth” approach (Joppke, 1994:551), refers not only to the uncompromising way of life but to the civil society’s capacity to preserve the real substance of the nation or community. The official public sphere is based on a lie, thus this truth cannot be expressed, it has to be preserved buried into the private realms. (Joppke, 1994)

“Living in truth” or double consciousness has two different understandings: Hankiss (1988) and Ash (1989[1986]) describe a phenomenon when people develop a (false) mind or mask for their public and a (true) mind for their private lives. Hankiss writes that this type of second consciousness is observed mainly during the totalitarian period, while others (as Ash or Scheye) see it as a constant characteristic of living under socialism. Scheye, (1991) as a psychologist emphasized the positive role of this type of split in one’s self: it has an important role in preserving the integration of the personality.
Hankiss describes a second type of understanding of this double consciousness. It can be also characterized as a sign of a value-set, believed to be lost, such as religious values, humanism or a pluralistic set of political ideologies, which started to appear again in the late Kadarite period (Hankiss, 1988). For Hankiss, this type of consciousness contributes to the fall of socialism. Although it is similar to the former variation of antipolitics, since it transcends to the strict sense of individualism, it is less understood as ‘letting out the true nation’. For Sawatsky (1991) the liberation of the truth is a characteristic of the intellectuals, while “The ordinary people, who in the end made the revolution happen, needed to discover that truth and commit themselves to it” (Sawatsky, 1991:726)

D. Civil society as a mediating sphere

The next group of literature had probably the most significant influence on the international research on civil society. It presents civil society as a non-state realm which is also independent or separated from the other realms, such as the economy or the private sphere (family friends). The body of works cited here can be divided into two parts. First, there are authors trying to formulate a systemic view of civil society as a mediating sphere between individuals, or informal spheres of life and the state. Among these, the grand theory of Andrew Arato and Jean L. Cohen (Arato, 1990, 1992, 1999; Cohen - Arato, 1984) is undoubtedly the most well formulated and serves as the main reference point. (A. Gergely, 1992; Bryant, 1993, 1994; Gubán - Weiss, 1987; Márkus, 1992) However, there are also studies using the concept independently or at least without reference to the former theory. (Molnár, 1993b; Pehe, 1995; Szelényi, 1993)

Second, authors use the ‘mediating sphere’ concept in a more practical manner as well, refer to the organizations of civil society as an independent sphere of organizations and networks. (Bajomi, 1994; Koslowski, 1992; Quigley, 1993; Sandi, 1992; Máté Szabó, 1993, 1994, 1995b). First, I will introduce the systemic theory of Cohen and Arato, second the connected theoretical approaches and third, the ‘practical’ usage of the mediating sphere.

This approach marked with the name of Andrew Arato and Jean L. Cohen heavily relies on the systemic-theory of Jürgen Habermas. The main idea of Habermas (1987) is a differentiation between the System and the Lifeworld, based on their logic of operation. In short, the System includes the state and the economy, while informal spheres outside of the System are considered as the Lifeworld. While the System is responsible for administration, large-scale management, the necessary production of goods, the Lifeworld has three main functions: the reproduction of
personality through socialization, the reproduction of culture, and the husbandry of the necessary knowledge for the operation of the System (language, unknown background knowledge etc.). Through these processes of reproduction, the Lifeworld also provides the essential ground for the operation of the System as well (common knowledge, healthy personality etc.). The main difference between the two spheres is their different logic of operation: the System’s main governing principle is goal rationality, since it has to carry out policies, projects, and administration effectively, while the Lifeworld is the terrain of communicative rationality, in which the main drive for action is basically the need for mutual understanding. The main point of Habermas’ argument is, that in modern societies, the System colonizes the Lifeworld. Colonization means, in short, that the state and the economy is transforming the communicative actions of the Lifeworld into actions oriented by their goal-rational logic (e.g. through elections: the choice between parties is not based on the interests articulated in debates that fulfill the conditions for communicative rationality, but by creating enemies out of the other parties, presenting elections as matters of life and death.) As a consequence, the collectively shared interpretations and meanings of the surrounding world and events could be lost along with the freedom of the actors. The reproductive functions of the Lifeworld are threatened and the roots of the System itself are in danger.

Cohen and Arato supplement Habermas’ theory with two elements: First, they introduce the political and the civil society, two interrelated associational spheres, placed between the System and the Lifeworld. Second, they argue, that not only colonization can take place, but the democratization of the System is also possible. Civil society can induce communicative rationality in the operation of the state and the economy. To explain what civil society is, in this context, I will elaborate on the notion of civil and political society and their relation.

The main organizational forms of both civil society and political society are associations, thus both of them are associational spheres. These associations could be formal or informal associations, e.g. voluntary associations for civil society and political parties for the political society. Political society often originates in civil society, as it was the case during Central European transitions. However, they have important differences, most importantly they are integrated through different logic of operation.

Civil society is, in principle, coordinated by the logic of communicative action which “involves a linguistically mediated, inter-subjective process through which actors establish their interpersonal relations, question and reinterpret norms, and coordinate their interaction
by negotiating definitions of the situation and coming to an agreement” (Cohen - Arato, 1992:435).

In practical terms, this means that the aims of the actors in civil society are based more on values than on rational effectiveness. Although they also apply rationality in their everyday work and they have organizational aims and strategies, accordingly, the aim of fulfilling and representing given values should overwrite other criteria of organizational (e.g. financial) efficiency.

**Political actors, however, need to prioritize between various values and interests, since their main criteria of success is to win the elections and gain the support of the citizens.** Thus, their organizational effectiveness will overrule the values and interests they represent if needed. Therefore, the political society is governed by goal-rationality and, as such, it represents the System, while civil society is tied to the Lifeworld.

It is important to note, although civil society overlaps with the Lifeworld and political society with the System, they are also differentiated from them. The institutions of civil society are fundamentally different from the very informal and unconscious institutions of the Lifeworld while the organizations of the political society bear only legislative authority if elected, otherwise, they should be separated from the state.

The common origins and interrelation of political and civil society, the complex mechanisms, rules, and processes enhancing mediation between them provide them with a possibility to understand each other, thus to mediate between the System and the Lifeworld, and as I mentioned earlier, in both directions.

To understand why Arato and Cohen call for civil society, I need to elaborate the need for a rationalized lifeworld, its connection to democracy and the inevitable role of civil society plays in establishing a democratic order. The Lifeworld does not necessarily support modernity and democracy in itself. To serve as a ground for democracy, the Lifeworld needs to be modernized and rationalized. Rationalization means that traditional norms of the Lifeworld could be replaced by “communicatively achieved ones” (Cohen - Arato, 1992:456) which are, similarly to the ones Gellner proposed, based on civil rights. 53 However, the Lifeworld modernized only by the System presents a problem, because the communicative rationality is lost, which would result in a new type of non-communicative set of norms. Civil society is able to prevent such a systemic penetration of the Lifeworld by the System and it can constantly introduce new

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53 Cohen and Arato calls it as right of the intimate or private (Cf. Cohen - Arato, 1992:455).
channels and methods of communication via its institutionalized forms coordinated by communicative rationality. (Cohen - Arato, 1992)

So as to prevent the ‘loss of freedom’, civil society needs to develop its own institutions, which is a time-consuming process. In the context of the transition, this means that the strategy of civil society clearly opposes the logic of revolution. Revolutions might be based on associational forms of collective action, but they are intended to be fast, they are often violent and attack persons instead of structures. Revolutions are also often followed by the demobilization of the masses. The institutionalization of civil society requires time and the rights of communication to be guaranteed, thus, the limitation of the newly emerging political power.

This idea of civil society is clearly based on the strategy of New Evolutionism, however, Cohen and Arato try to extend the strategy to established democracies as well. Their main point is, that democratization means essentially the decolonization of the Lifeworld, which not only prevents the “loss of freedom” it is also able to restore it and democratize the System. Based on this extension, the theory can be generalized, and presented as a systemic social process.

However, democratization cannot lead to the destruction of the System and to the hegemony of the communicative logic. In Cohen and Arato’s view, this would lead to the destruction of differentiation, which is the basis of modernity (and freedom). Thus, civil society requires the existence of the political society, the state, and the economy. The former guarantees the rights for the operation of civil society while the latter provides the basis of production.

Márkus (1992) develops a very similar theory: Civil society is a non-economic and non-state sphere, differentiated from the private sphere as well. Civil society is able to operate only in a society protected by the state, where the state guarantees the fundamental rights of individuals and collective actors.

The difference is, introduced by Márkus is that needs fuel the whole concept. While rights could be universalized, needs are necessarily plural and particular. The definition and the decision which need should be fulfilled is a result and subject of political competition. Thus, the sphere of civil society in a liberal democracy

“primarily appears as an institutionalized sphere for the competition between different social groups, which represent their own particular interests, separately and isolated from
each other, against the state. They try to pressure the state to prefer the interests they represent.” (Márkus, 1992:46).

The function of civil society is to channel these interests into the state. The competition of the different civil society actors in representing their particular needs might give birth to or raises universalized interests as well.

Molnár, who proposes a model which fits into the dualistic argument under socialism, in a response (Molnár 1993) to critics moves towards the intermediary sphere

‘which is neither smaller, nor less than the sphere of politics, or the guarded private sphere. It exactly has the additional value which is “cannot be caught with the tools of class analysis but cannot be reduced to the legal categories of citizenship or the philosophic category of human rights.”’ (Molnár 1993:109).

However, it is not clear what would differentiate this sphere from other spheres, more importantly from the economy. For example, Szelényi (1993) points out that Molnár, suggests that the development of civil society could be understood as the diffusion of private economic activities.

For Márkus, or Cohen and Arato, civil society is a sphere of intermediary organizations, networks, and the non-political (or cultural) public sphere. Family and friends are clearly excluded from civil society as institutionalized political actors (as parties) as well. Arato and Cohen, however, distinguish between civil society based on formal, more stable associations and social movements. Social movements are much more fluid and dynamic. They add new ideas and values to the discourse. In spite of might be more successful in challenging the System, their achievements cannot be institutionalized without the associational sphere of civil society (Arato, 1992).

The theory of Cohen and Arato provides a theoretical ground for other authors, who defined civil society as a mediating sphere for more practical purposes. They use it to analyze specific phenomena or processes of the development of the sphere of voluntary associations or the political sphere. For example, Szabó (1995b) examines how the political and civil society have been differentiated after 1989, through research on protest activities. In his article, he points out that protest activity became more formalized in the first election-cycle of the Parliamentary system, and was the main terrain of civic actors (including trade unions and parties outside of

54 I translated the term 'érdeksöport’ as 'social group’, despite it could be translated as interest group as well. However, based on the context I think that the meaning of 'interest group’ is too narrow, since it might refer to well-organized lobby groups only.
the Parliament), while political parties elected into the Parliament became almost totally inactive in this field.

Szabó (1993, 1994) in his other articles rather uses the concept of social movements or the movement sector, which consists of civil society organizations, authoritarian movements and even political parties. The movement sector might be understood as the overlapping terrain of civil and political society, but his typology is rather based on the level of institutionalization of collective actions. Thus, Szabó distinguishes between less formalized and structured mass action, and the more structured, more stable forms of collective action. This latter pool of organization might include subcultural spheres, political parties and civil organizational networks.

Related to the concept of the intermediary sphere, without much reflection on their own concepts and led by their narrow focus on a given set of organizations, many articles use the concept of civil society emphasizing the importance of voluntary associations. For example as Quigley describes civil society as “Institutions characteristic of civil society include a free press, independent legislatures and judiciaries, trade unions, chambers of commerce, and voluntary associations. (Quigley, 1993:4)”, or Sandi does as

"... private or voluntary arrangements between individuals and groups outside the direct control of the state” and “Such decentralized structures, of a network type, can offer the framework for individuals to manifest themselves, to participate”. (Sandi, 1992:111)"

When authors referring to civil society as an intermediary sphere, identify the actors and institutions of civil society, they emphasize the associational nature of these actors the most. The actors of civil society include certain types of organizations, as human rights organizations or groups, civil society organizations, NGOs, cultural organizations, etc. They often include the groups of opposition, trade unions, and the Church, especially in relation to Poland. To explain why associations are important, they usually refer to Alexis de Tocqueville’s theses about the importance of associations. According to that, in associations people will learn to deal with public issues and they develop respect and tolerance towards others. Altogether associations enhance communication among the members of the society and they serve as a cross-cutting bridge between social groups. Through the representation of interests and negotiating between associations they will also create the public sphere.

55 Although Szabó does not refer to civil and political society in these articles.
E. Civil society as the opposition

The last group of authors uses the term with a focus on the opposition under state socialism. They often mention specific actors, organizations or refer to civil society as a network of organizations. The approach is similar to the approach of the intermediary sphere in the sense that these organizations and networks are seen as non-state, non-economic actors and are differentiated from the family and individuals. It is also similar to the dualistic approach since they appear as a homogenous sphere opposing the state. (Ash, 1989a, 1989b; Bruszt, 1990; Bruszt - Stark, 1991; Kolankiewicz, 1994; McCormick - Kelly, 1994; Yanqi Tong, 1994; Weigle - Butterfield, 1992)

The most important characteristic of civil society, pointed out by these authors, is its autonomy or independence from the state. Interestingly, despite the emphasis put on it, independence is rarely explained and as a feature is taken for granted.

“the independent self-organization of society, the constituent parts of which voluntarily engage in public activity to pursue individual, group, or national interests within the context of a legally defined state-society relationship” (Weigle - Butterfield, 1992:3)

The authors do not go beyond the declaration of independence and as a consequence, their definitions often become tautological. They mostly use the concept to picture the dichotomy of state and civil society without analyzing it. Those, who try to explain it somehow, mainly understand it as being outside of the state and the official public sphere. There are a few exceptions, mostly Hungarian authors, or those who had spent some time in Hungary. They do not question the autonomy of the opposition – which means acting outside of the state or void of state control – but analyze if there is a strict dichotomy between the two parties, in terms of their relation. For example, Ash describes the opposition’s outside nature on the one hand – as the opposition tries to act by neglecting the state’s attempts to control or intimidate them – and an important difference between the Polish and Hungarian opposition on the other hand: the border between the Party and the opposition is much less clear in the Hungarian case than in the Polish one (Ash, 1989a). The difference is also emphasized by Bruszt and Stark (1991), who also stress the importance of the relations between the reform wing of the Party and the

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56 Kolankiewicz distinguishes between civil society of state socialism, which he equates with the opposition, and civil society of a democratic state. In the latter case, he uses a simple dualistic model, similar to Keane’s.

57 “with the concept of ‘civil society’ under state socialism, we refer to the self-organization of society in spheres relatively autonomous from the state” (Bruszt - Stark, 1991:202). “building civil society in these conditions meant organizing society for self-management in any sphere of social life where the state was either not paying attention or was willing to tolerate autonomy.” (McCormick - Kelly, 1994:810)
opposition in the Hungarian case: the Hungarian opposition is louder, but weaker than its Polish counterpart, in terms of social support and embeddedness. Interestingly this weakness leads to the possibility of being a partner to the ruling party at the end of the eighties since the reform wing of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party believed that its power could be stabilized through elections. Bruszt (1990) argues, that one of the internal conditions of the fall of communism in Hungary was the alliance between the opposition and the reform wing of the Party, and there were attempts to reach a compromise between the two parties. Although the strategies of the Party to defeat the opposition did not work, as the elections in 1990 showed, in some way the possibility of connections or the alliance with the reform wing helped to avoid polarization and contributed to the non-violent nature of the Hungarian transition. (Arato, 1992; Cohen - Arato, 1992; Yanqi Tong, 1994)58

Besides the relationship between the opposition and the Party, the opposition's social embeddedness is also problematized, however to a smaller extent. First as noted, the Hungarian opposition is seen as weakly connected to larger social groups. Kolankiewicz (1994) however argues that the opposition is a) part of the elites, at least in a sociological sense. b) “oppositional activity was equally a blend of second economy and second society.” (1994:149). This view contradicts the general view on the relatively low level of social embeddedness of oppositional organizations. Although it does not challenge the view that established, institutionalized channels are needed to include the particular interests of the different strata to these debates.

Only Ash (1989b) differentiates59 between the narrow opposition, or politically involved groups, and the wider range of association, others mainly write about the political opposition or define civil society as a whole. For Ash, the non-political civil society is only semi-independent and its growth is dependent on the strategy of the political opposition.

A less problematic, widely accepted feature of the opposition is its highly pluralistic and fragmented nature. It consists of different groups sometimes fighting, competing with each other. A quote from Ash’s description of the Hungarian and Polish opposition illustrates well this plurality.

“In both Poland and Hungary, groups or grouplets whose identities or programs arise from specific postwar realities, overlap or combine with groups raising almost every flag, slogan, aspiration, or prejudice of the pre-war political spectrum (except

58 In Poland the strength of Solidarity pushed the government towards negotiations.
59 Tong (1994) uses a different separation; he defines different civil spheres (e.g. the sphere of trade unions or smaller industrial and commercial enterprises), but this differentiation does not have important consequences in his article.
Another widely acknowledged feature is the Hungarian opposition’s self-limiting nature. Self-limitation means that the privileged role of the party is not challenged and in relation to that, non-violence. Self-limitation is not only frequently mentioned in the academic literature, but it is also expressed by the actors in the Hungarian opposition as well. The most obvious example is the program titled ‘Social Contract’ released in 1987 by Beszélő, which declared the privileged position of the Party and offered to be a partner in implementing the necessary reforms (Kis et al., 1987).

I.2.4. Expectations and the road to freedom

Despite the diversity of the approaches presented above, they evidently share a main problematique: the transition from socialism to democracy. By reviewing the aims attributed to and expectations towards civil society I might point out the main similarity in their argument: Democratization requires participation in the end. Although this seems to be an evident statement, it has important consequences.

A) Participation requires fundamental rights, in principle and in practice;

B) The question, how civil society contributes to democratization gains central importance.

While statement (A) is shared by most of the theories and authors cited here, the answer to the question (B) is influenced by the model of civil society proposed. Therefore, I will shortly discuss the typical aims and expectations raised by the corpus, then I will turn to the assumed mechanisms of democratization.

A. Aims and Expectations.

Democratization has two layers: Establishing democratic institutions and the democratization of the society. Most of the authors understand it as the contribution of civil society to the establishment of rule of law or legal institutions.
Among legal institutions, especially **fundamental rights** are emphasized. Mainly freedom of expression and freedoms guaranteeing self-organization are mentioned, however other rights, less connected to the political sphere (e.g. freedom of movement) also appear.

The reference to fundamental rights is also used to connect the institutional aspects to the transformation of the society. Freedom rights should be legally institutionalized by the state and understood and realized by the citizens at the same time. As such, they lead to the self-organization of society. It is not clear, whether civil society constitutes a means or an end of this process, but democratization is mostly understood as the capability of self-governance. The desired scale of self-governance is not clear, however, it always includes self-expression, self-organization of associations or other organizations, and influencing decision making.

Self-organization is connected to the goal of a **limited state**, balanced by an autonomous sphere of social activity. The two are connected. If the limited state is the new democratic state, then civil society should perform its control function. If the state is still an authoritarian one, civil society is eroding its authority by establishing a parallel society which undermines the legitimacy of power.

Besides nurturing individual freedoms, equality or solidarity is also present among the goals of civil society, albeit to various extent. Mainly Keane (1988a, 1988c) emphasizes equality and the importance of the balance between equality and freedom. He identifies three major threats of achieving such a balance: 1) The contradiction: on the one hand, modern mass societies need a state responsible for legitimate regulation, managing infrastructure, etc. on the other hand a state with the necessary strength these tasks require can threaten citizens’ liberties and their autonomous self-organizing capacities. 2) The fight for liberty and equality at the same time. The two are often mixed up and people tend to replace the fight for liberty with the struggles for equality, which leads to demands of increasing state intervention (e.g. services) in social life and the unintended narrowing of liberty. 3) Most of the theories ignore the heterogeneity of civil society and its changing relation to the state, as they stress conflict or harmony between the two (Keane, 1988a).

Keane’s fears could be understood better from his attack on neo-conservative thinking and, at the same time on, in his own terms, state-administered socialism. Neo-conservatism in order to save classical libertarian values, such as mutual reliance and freedom of choice, would place

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60 Interestingly, the notion of citizenship appears very rarely in these texts.

61 Gellner also worries about the strength of the state, however he adds that either the state or the economy could threaten citizens’ freedoms (cf. Gellner, 1994).
civil society above the state, which in principle would mean the restriction of state offered services and would allow the principles of the free market to prevail in most areas of life. Yet, conservatives perceive civil society as the source of disorder, which requires national traditions and centralized power as means of containment. Therefore, they would increase state power in the end. In turn, state-administered socialism subordinates freedom to the principle of equality. In this case, the growing number of services provided by the state indicates the growing intervention into private life.

The solution Keane (1988c) offers has two elements. 1) Societies have to apply a pluralist and complex notion of liberty and equality, which allows citizens to define how they understand these notions. 2) An institutional setting is needed which distributes decision making power among different institutions of the state and civil society. These institutions then perform two functions: they dismantle or block monopolies and distribute different goods (and access to liberty) in different ways according to the complex definitions of equality and liberty, which lead, through the growing number of choices to the increased possibility of participation.

Between institutions and the society, the aim of a free public sphere appears. It is either the alternative public sphere of samizdat publications or its extended form for authors who are addressing civil society under socialism and the velvet revolution. Among democratic circumstances, it might mean the better visibility of groups, organizations, and interests. It might be also understood as the institutionalized public sphere but in a generally limited scope. Only a few authors address the question of the mass media. The “public sphere” is rather referred to in a Tocquevillian sense, that is a space created by associations, organizations and interest groups to express their opinions. (see Benda et al., 1988; Bernhard, 1993; Dipalma, 1991)

The aim, which connects all of the aims mentioned above is to increase political participation and collective action. Evidently, participation is the key in creating the autonomous sphere of social activities through establishing associations and in expressing opinions in the public sphere. Participation will provide the pluralism of interests, opinions and organizations. Participation is defined in terms of freedom rights, but not only theoretically. It is expected that citizens understand the concept of freedom rights and they emotionally engage with them. As a result, participation would increase. Freedom rights are also the key to counterbalance atomization. The strong engagement entailing individual rights and the communitarian ideals

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62 Which did indeed lead to the use of increased power in favor of the privileged groups and to the freedom of the few (my conclusion).
of civil society are connected through political freedoms. These are meant to be exercised with others, thus, by engaging them, post-communist societies will be able to overcome atomization and to create the desired autonomous, strong sphere of independent activities.

When legal and institutional institutions are mentioned, authors emphasize the importance of the realization of the possibilities provided by these legal institutions.

“Every act of defiance helps us to build the framework of democratic socialism, which should not be merely or primarily a legal institutional structure but a real day-to-day community of free people.” (Kennedy, 1992:38)

In sum, there is a great emphasis on the foundation and practice of civil and political liberties: the picturing of the citizen who is able to exercise liberties is a common feature of the articles and books belonging to the corpus above. The picture of such a citizen or community of citizens is always accompanied by the assumption or desire for developing a civic virtue. As Cohen and Arato (1992) point out, this civic virtue has much to do with the self-limiting approach of the opposition and is a crucial element in forming this expectation of increasing participation.

Similarly to the importance of freedom rights plurality of civil society or the sphere of independent groups is beyond any doubt. The descriptions of the opposition introduced above, by Bruszt and Stark (1991), Ash (1989b) or Hankiss (1988), the emerging social movements and associations mentioned by Molnár (1996) and the expectations that different social groups would find their voice through civil society point in this direction. But more importantly, plurality is proposed as a structural feature of civil society by Dahrendorf (1990), Arato (1992) or even by Gellner (1994). Structural means the lack of dominance of any type of activity, aim, identity or ideology between the independent and informal groups of the civil society. In addition, Dahrendorf and Keane⁶³ refer to the messiness of such a system, filled with uncertainty but still encouraging participation, which is possible only if neither the state nor any other groups manage to suppress the citizens.

Although plurality is emphasized, a quite homogenous civic virtue is proposed or accepted by most of the authors. The primacy of civil and political liberties and expectations towards the growing level of participation as the foundation of the future requires a certain value-set, all

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⁶³ Dahrendorf sees this uncertainty as a defining characteristics of the open society: “But if we want to move forward and improve ourselves and the conditions in which men and women live on this planet, we have got to accept the untidy, antagonistic, uncomfortable, but proud and encouraging concept of open horizons.” (Dahrendorf, 1990:28) In Keane’s work it could be derived from the constant need for defining the boundaries between the state and the civil society the constant struggle for freedom and equality in the same and because the struggle for equality and redistribution cause results which will not be self-sustaining. (Keane, 1988c)
collected under the five models of civil society mentioned above. The value set consist of values such as willingness to do actions, reducing fear (of the state or negative consequences of action), self-reliance, respect toward each other, being committed to non-violence, be able and willing to articulate and vindicate self-interest, hard work, flexibility. The values of the ability to tolerate others and being patient, non-violent and self-confident, are emphasized by authors who stress the uncertainties caused by the continuously and dynamically changing environment.

B. Assumed mechanisms of democratization

After pointing out the expectations towards a rising trend in participation, the question arises, about how civil society is going to achieve the desired goals. There are four answers to this question, and the exact answer is based on the model of civil society the authors use. Thus, in the following part, I will introduce four mechanisms of democratization and argue that they are proposed as a logical consequence of the given models of civil society.

Institutions vs. society: Democratization is basically impossible.

It seems that there are two main opposing views explored with regard to the ‘civil society as a social order’ approach: First, according to the top-down approach proposed by Seligman or Kumar, civil society is defined by democratic legal and political institutions. Once these are established, democracy is forming an order. The other view considers civil society as a specific kind of structural setting and value system. For Gellner and Szűcs, a structural balance should emerge first, in which the different actors are not able to rule over each other. This situation leads to the emergence of rights as a specific political culture. Institutions in this view are preconditioned by the structure and the value system maintaining this structure.

Thus, it seems, that Szűcs’s and Gellner’s message for the Central-European transition is that even if a society decides to move towards democracy, even if the majority supports the transition, or takes part in the decision-making process somehow, it is not a question of a conscious decision to what extent this democracy will work, but it is mostly based on structural preconditions shaped by long-term historical processes.

According to this argument, a civil society could be formed among very specific circumstances and its formation requires a centuries-long (or even longer) period starting in the Early Modern Period (or even earlier). Not only the time frame of such a transformation is not acceptable for a program aiming at the transition. The specific structural conditions, which results in the
specific political culture allowing individual liberties grow, are long gone in the 20th century. The state and economy are too strong, a different type of political culture is already set. Gellner refers to this explicitly:

“The first thing to note, is that the natural selection mechanism, which worked in favour in its [the civil society’s] favour, so dramatically and conclusively in the past, need no longer work for it, or at least not for it alone” (Gellner, 1994:197)

In evaluating the future chances of civil society, Gellner expects the guarantees to be established by the world powers, who are engaged in this type of society and he does not believe in the possibilities of a further, organic democratization.

Although Dahrendorf defines civil society in a dualistic model, and his standpoint is often misunderstood as optimistic, a closer examination of his book reveals that the strong emphasis on the open society leads to a pessimistic conclusion, similar to Gellner’s. The optimism attributed to Dahrendorf is based on a famous quote implying that the constitutional change can be done in six months, economic change in six years and the social transformation, the new political culture will develop in sixty years. Unfortunately, some important elements of the quote are often left out:

“The formal process of constitutional reform takes at least six months; a general sense that things are moving up as a result of economic reform is unlikely to spread before six years have passed; the third condition to the road to freedom is to provide social foundations which transform the constitution and the economy from fair-weather into all-weather institutions which can withstand the storms generated within and without, and sixty years are barely enough to lay these foundations.” (Dahrendorf, 1990:99-100, my highlights)

A false version of the quote is often used to support the thesis that the development of democratic culture needs only time (or generational change) to evolve under democratic institutions. Dahrendorf, instead, uses this phrase to illustrate that the development of civil society is key to a successful transformation and, how fragile the chances are for a civil society to be developing on its own. The problem proposed by Dahrendorf is that the constitutional and normal layers of politics are mingled in the Velvet Revolution. While constitutional politics should engage to the “framework of the social order and institutional forms” (Dahrendorf, 1990:34), normal politics should be driven “by interests and other preferences within this framework” (Dahrendorf, 1990:34). During the Velvet Revolution, the two happened parallel. While realpolitik requires the mobilization of citizens loyal to a party, constitutional politics requires debates based on deliberation. When the balance between the two is distorted there are greater chances in spreading a
“combination of a nostalgic ideology of community which draws harsh boundaries between those who belong and those who do not, with a new political monopoly of a man or a ‘movement’ and a strong emphasis on organisation and mobilisation rather than freedom of choice” (Dahrendorf, 1990:104)

In sum, if one takes the approach of Gellner, Szűcs, or Dahrendorf, the hypothesis is, that the transformation would require too much time, too specific conditions, **so the chances of success are close to none.**

**Tensions in the social structure**

The second mechanism is proposed by the authors of the dualistic approaches. The main argument is that there are tensions in the structure caused by the fragmentation of its different aspects. These tensions will lead to conflicts in which people will recognize their interests and learn ways to participate. This inevitably leads to the recognition of democratic action.

The tension could be rooted in the cleavages in the social structure.

1. Where there is no real chance to discuss different social and political conflicts, peace is only provided by economic growth or the perception of economic growth. With the changes in the perception, latent conflicts become manifest. In the eighties, the debt-driven economic growth turned into stagnation and decline, the improvement in the quality of life has stopped, thus the conflicts became sharpened. (Dahrendorf, 1990)

These conflicts will lead to the awakening of the articulation of interests and decreasing legitimacy of the system. Although Dahrendorf has seen it as the causes for the fall of the system, the economic hardships after the Revolution might cause similar effects: sharpening social conflicts and disappointment in the newly formed political system. (Ferge, 1994, 2000)

2. The different, emerging problems in the late seventies and eighties caused distortion in the power and economic structure of the system. On the one hand, officials started to follow their own interests and built clientelistic networks. On the other hand, this caused dissatisfaction. Besides the system had to allow the operation of the second economy increasingly to cover its failure to provide the necessary economic stability. This slowly leads to the self-organization of the society (Molnár, 1996).

3. The withdrawal to the private sphere is also a source of tension, so when the power of the state started to erode, it also led to the manifestation of suppressed values, as nationalism civic values and so on (Hankiss, 1989a; Scheye, 1991).
Although the tension might have various sources, it would lead to the recognition and articulation of interest, which will lead to the emancipation of the “masses”.

The second economy as a practice field

The basic assumption is that the increasing, independent economic activity support the formation of civic engagement because it requires making decisions, developing managing skills and the financial independence serves as a ground for political independence as well. Ágh (1987, 1989) argues, that the growing individualism in the economy leads to political individualism. Individualism is understood as articulation and advocacy of individual interests. Economic activity causes the accumulation of wealth. Individuals, who would not like to lose the fruit of their work will require guarantees to be able to continue their activity and have a stable economic activity. So, they will form associations to represent more efficiently their interests.

Tőkés suggests that the second economy is not only the sum of alternative economic activities, but it is a precondition of autonomous political activity, or to the entire second society, since “collective personnel autonomy was born when the individual’s right to private property acquired unconditional legal protection and became the material guarantee for the substantive exercise of the rights vested in all citizens.” (Tőkés, 1988:42, emphasis is in the original).

Although the validity of this thesis is at least challenged by Manchin’s empirical results (1988) it might be possible in theory, the economy gains a role Gellner (1994) attributes to it as the ground for civic virtues, after the Velvet Revolution.

“New evolutionism”

For the majority of the authors, civil society consists of groups, organizations and communities. These groups mediate between the society and the state and play a crucial role in the development of the necessary skills and values needed for the successful building of a democracy. This is mentioned by a wide range of authors and is emphasized by Bibó, Gellner, and Dahrendorf as well (even if they understood civil society differently), however, it was elaborated more precisely by Cohen and Arato (1992). The systemic link between the state and the society or individuals is provided by the autonomous groups, interest organizations, voluntary associations, the media, etc. This mediating role of civil society is possible only if it is well embedded in the less formal spheres of the lifeworld. If this is the case, civil society
integrates the Lifeworld as well, and by socialization it fosters participation in decision-making. In this regard, mediation and integration are mutually strengthening each other.

Mediation is connected to the mass basis of these organizations. The mass basis is a precondition of the successful interest representation, while successful mediation provides a necessary motivation to believe in the process, thus to maintain and increase participation in civil organizations. Consequently, “New Evolutionism” counts on the constant struggle for engaging citizens increasingly. Civil society organizations work parallel to widen their social basis, thus to spread democratic values and to democratize the system. The two are interconnected democratization provides legitimacy to their engagement to the given value set and to their methods of organizing.

The main hypothesis of democratization, in this case, is thus connected to the Cohen-Arato theory. Basically, they build on New Evolutionism: civil society first develop as a parallel society, which occupies more and more space including more and more people and activities. The parallel society serves both as a sphere of socialization and a growing control over the governments which is pressured to apply more democratic procedures. According to Cohen and Arato, this process should continue among the democratic institutions after the Revolution. Therefore, civil society remains a sphere which is not only defending the Lifeworld from the System, it also mediates democratic procedures applicable in the system: control via the public sphere, opinion formation, building a value system and social dialogue as well.

Although other authors would not build such a theory, their focus on the actors or groups of actors also implies that actors have a role in democratization: they are able to control the government, mobilize people, develop skills and suggest democratic procedures.

I.2.5. The model of democratization and the role of civil society

Above I defined the main expectations (aims) towards civil society and the four processes through which civil society might contribute to the achievements of the goals. Based on these expectations and processes, I propose a model of democratization, a mechanism, which define the role of civil society in the process.

The first element of the mechanism is its outcome: the increasing number of people practicing their freedom rights. The second element is civil society, which serves as the main agent in fostering individuals’ engagement with their rights, and, at last, a mechanism, which leads to the birth of the associational sphere.
The first element is the least problematic, since increasing freedom in terms of exercising individual freedoms of fundamental rights, as a result of the activities of civil society is the most common expectation formulated by the authors.

The two other elements of the model require more explanation. Among the four processes of democratization, **New Evolutionism has an important role**. First of all, it is shared by many authors, regardless the exact model of civil society they propose. The role of association-like organizations is often emphasized and it is expected that these organizations might serve as socializing and mobilizing agents for ordinary citizens. This is the Tocquevillian core of most of the theories (even Gellner and Szűcs refer to such agents and mechanisms occasionally), where voluntarily joined associations, either with private or public aims support the development of skills, networks, values required by democratic politics.\(^{64}\)

Processes “(b)” and “(c)” are connected to the growing tensions of the social structure and to the second economy are mechanism preceding the formation of associations. These theories assume that these tensions, inconsistencies, cleavages and new activities will lead to the awakening of interest articulation and to the formation of associations. After this happened, associations will do the rest of work what they would do in a democracy. According to this idea, the mobilizing and socializing effect of associations lie in their universalistic characteristics. Thus, once associations are born, their universal characteristics inevitably lead to the enhancement of the practice of freedom rights.

Democratization process “(a)” in this regard formulates similar Tocquevillian expectations, but states that the preceding mechanisms and conditions are not suitable for the development of such a sphere of voluntary associations since the institutional structure and political culture is not favorable for its development.\(^ {65}\)

The model of democratization is summarized in Figure 1. The preceding processes, through tensions and emerging alternative activities, lead to the formation of the associational sphere, which serves as socializing agents and an arena of mobilization. The participation in associations leads to the increasing chances for individuals to practice individual freedoms, especially connected to the politics, interest representations and so on, while the associational

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\(^{64}\) The Tocquevillian theory is elaborated in details in Chapter II.3.

\(^{65}\) Although I could conclude that there is no civil society and even it has, it do not have the expected impact on the practice of rights.
sphere is able not only to teach and collect those, who would already acquire these skills or ready to participate but also to expand itself, thus to include more and more citizens.

**Figure 1. The process of democratization**

![Diagram showing the process of democratization with Civil Society at the center, leading to increasing participation and realization of civil and political rights.]

Based on the model presented in Figure 1, an empirical examination might have three different focuses: First, to explore, which mechanisms lead to the formation of associations. Second, to what extent the engagement to associations increase the probability of the realization of civil and political rights, most importantly those, which are connected to political participation. The third focus might be the extent associations are able to increase the proportion of people exercising their rights.

In the remaining part of the dissertation, I will engage the last two questions: **the trends in exercising rights and the association’s impact on participation.** However, before turning to these questions, I shortly explain the failure of civil society as a political project and challenge the main considerations targeting the use of the concept of civil society after this failure.
I.2.6. The failure of civil society as a political project

Probably most of the reviews discussing the revival of civil society, especially those which focus on the opposition, would start with introducing Michnik’s New Evolution, the political strategy which based on the disappointment of previous failed attempts of changing the political system. These previous attempts, as the Poznan Uprising in 1956, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 or the Prague Spring in 1968 ended with their violent oppression by using military force and leading to deaths. Michnik wanted to avoid the same fate, so he announced a strategy, which had two main principles:

- Self-limitation: “The leading role of the party in the state sphere would not be challenged” (Cohen - Arato, 1992:32), and non-violence (Bozoki - Sükösd, 1993)
- Its subject is not the state. In Cohen’s and Arato’s words, this means that the: “agent or the subject of the transformation must be an independent or rather a self-organizing society aiming not at social revolution but at structural reform achieved as a result of organized pressure from below” (Cohen - Arato, 1992:32)

As a result, this strategy would build a parallel society, independent from the state, avoiding and blocking state interventions, building parallel educational and cultural institutions, and as such, placing itself in more or less total opposition to the socialist state. The power of the parallel society would be its high capability for mobilization and activity in the civic sense, shredding constantly the area in which the state rules. (Cohen - Arato, 1992)

This strategy was introduced in Hungary in the eighties as well. (Hankiss, 1988), however with important modifications. The first, self-limiting characteristic of the strategy was implemented by the Hungarian opposition. The application of its second characteristic, the total opposition of the state is much less clear in the Hungarian case. As I mentioned, Ash (1989b), and Bruszt (1990) pointed out that the Hungarian opposition, in comparison with the Polish Solidarity, was much weaker in terms of its social embeddedness. This weakness was perceived exactly in its lack of capability to reach out to non-intellectual groups, being incapable of mobilizing them. Molnár (1996) rightly pointed out, that self-organization was an activity of the intellectuals, as the workers and trade unions were not part of these self-organizing efforts. Apart from several politicized movements, such as the environmental, or right-protectionists movement, or social scientists working with the Roma and the poor, the non-political associations cannot be seen as part of this sphere, since there were doubts about their independence (Ash, 1989b).
Despite the knowledge about the lack of the opposition’s social embeddedness, it was often referred to as part of the larger, second society. The main features connecting the opposition and the second society were their informality and their autonomy or independence from the state. However the meaning of autonomy was not really reflected and its usage mixed up two distinct meanings, which might be best described by the Hirschmannian terms of ‘exit and voice’ (Hirschman, 1970). The opposition, although it tries to act autonomously from state control, clearly aims at least to influence state policies and public discourses. The so-called second society, on the other hand, tries to avoid any contact with the official world, it just wanted to be left alone.

This dual picture of autonomy was present even in the intellectual scene: Despite, the democratic opposition was clearly trying to claim more possibilities of participation, György Konrád, one of the most well-known writers, expressed the idea of antipolitics, the idea of being left alone. Although he sees the networks of self-organized groups, communication, solidarity as part of his concept, antipolitics, is basically about non-action and being political only by monitoring the state and rejecting its ideology or actions. Konrád was as much a propagator of individual, universalistic human rights as others of the democratic opposition, but he describes antipolitics as:

“The antipolitician tries to escape from the authority of organizations, he suspends its communal obligations, he has no other mandate, just what he gave to himself” (György Konrád, 1989[1986]:157).

Bruszt, in his research in 1985 examined the citizen’s opinion about democracy. He found that for the majority of citizens democracy means equality. Besides, one-third of the respondents answered that democracy is the possibility of participation in politics, while another one-third said it is a situation when the state doesn’t intervene into the citizen’s life (Bruszt - Fehér, 1988). By supplementing these findings with Manchin’s Manchin (1988) about the non-existent correlation among economic strategies involving complementary income-sources to values of political autonomy, it seems evident that the second society, the spheres of economic and private activities and the area of politically involved organizations had different strategies toward the state. The task would have been not only to increase the embeddedness of the political opposition but to mobilize the second society, it seems, against its intentions.

Therefore, as a result, although there was a second society in Hungary at the time,66 the opposition could not relate to it as Solidarity did in Poland. The criteria of the parallel society,

66 On the second society see chapter I.1.
which is step by step democratized by the ‘second civil and political society’, could not be fulfilled, which had serious consequences for the transition and for the new political system after 1989.

One of these consequences is highlighted by Molnár (1996), who argues, that the approach of civil society he applies for the period prior to 1989, *cannot be applied after 1989 or in a democratic political order*. The main argument is, reflected well by most of the other authors as well, that under democracy, *civil society and the state (or politics) are complementary to each other since they have their own functions*. The existence of the democratic order relies on their mutual, conflictual but also complementary relation. This notion is well described above in relation to the work of Keane, Arato and Gellner. The second society, although it contributed to the dissolution of the authoritarian rule, could not contribute to a democratic system, at least not in the participatory sense proposed by the New Evolutionist approach. The same applies to civil society in the narrower sense, for another reason: Many examples show that the opposition was not only the “civil society of the authoritarian state”. This would be the case if they would have not only accepted the rule of the Party but the principles of the political system. As Konrád describes:

“We have to test the flexibility of those elements of the system which have not been declared axiomatic. We ought to regard the Communist Party as a party that just won 51 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections.” (George Konrád, 1984:79)

or three pages later:

“The greatest act on behalf of freedom is to behave toward everyone as though we were free men – even toward whom we fear.” (George Konrád, 1984:82)\(^{67}\)

The main point is that the second society wants to be left alone, but the opposition proposes a system working according to different principles and as such would not only control or correct the government but would replace it with itself. Thus, the civil society of the socialist system is the seed of the political society of the new one and will become the political society later, when it is possible.

So, how shall one overcome this problem? A common answer is to ignore the problem and use the term similarly in both cases (for example Dahrendorf, 1990, 1991; Keane, 1988a, 1988c; 1988b).

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Weigle - Butterfield, 1992). Another answer is to escape from it, like Molnár (1996), who states that he is only talking about the socialist times. Cohen and Arato (1992) try a third way by putting the emphasis both on the civil and political society. Although they do not write about this explicitly, in my opinion, the emphasis put on political society as a sphere separate from the state and on the civil society as well was necessary to describe the shift from opposition to becoming the political society of the socialist regime (around 1988-89 with the Roundtable Negotiations, forming parties etc.) and then to the political society of the new regime.

“In the 1980s this project [New Evolutionism] was, amazingly enough, not only not abandoned but extended to two other countries: Hungary and the Soviet Union. Two reasons, aside from that of the inherent normative validity of the basic ideas, were responsible. One was geopolitical: Important shifts had occurred in the international economic and political environments in which the project had originally led to stalemate. The other was theoretical, involving an expansion of the original framework by introducing the category of political society.” (Cohen - Arato, 1992:60)

The reason for the emergence of this new political society is a common perception that reforms must touch not only the economy but other spheres of life as well, which required partners on behalf of the society (Bruszt, 1990). Still, the collapse of the socialist regime was not foreseen, and with the rapid changes, the opposition (every group) was challenged by the problematic choice of maintaining a civic movement or forming a political party. The choice was also pressing, since those who would choose to remain faithful to the civil society project would quickly find themselves on the margins. Sooner or later, most of the major groups decided to enter party politics, becoming the main actors of the political society. (Bozoki - Sükösd, 1993)

To be precise, as Máté Szabó (1995b) suggests, this sphere slowly differentiated into civil and political society. Although, the new parties tried to act against this differentiation with their extensive campaigns of the first popular election and trying to maintain the movement and the party at the same time (Arato, 1993; Bozoki - Sükösd, 1993), the new political organizations lost their direct connection (which was also not very strong originally) with the people. Civil society was also somewhat weakened as its most experienced actors left for politics (Arato, 1999). Unfortunately, I do not have concrete evidence on how much of the former opposition left and stayed in civil society, but among the different elite-segments (economic, cultural, political) the political needed the greatest recruitment: the former political and state leaders naturally became persona non grata in politics (however one of the successors of the Party was able to achieve an eight percent share of the vote at the first elections) and tried to secure their
position in the economy, while the cultural elite remained almost unaffected by the transition (Kristóf, 2014).

A third piece of the puzzle is still missing: Hankiss (1988) shows the process of atomization, and suggest that it was partly successful: mostly the closed circles of friendship and the family, the closest and most trusted networks, resisted the process which led to the situation best characterized by familism (Dupcsik - Tóth, 2008), where trust is only directed towards these closest circles, while no outsider can be trusted. Molnár (1996) emphasizes that workers remained the most contained group; they remained separated from the new organizations of the intellectuals. The circumstances of the atomized society, where the necessary networks and trust for interest articulation did not exist, paired with the highly legislative approach of the opposition, which assumed that the establishment of formal institutions of social debate and the public sphere will automatically help these groups to find their voice.

Also, as I mentioned, the assumption that the new association will be based on common interests tied to social status (through occupation, profession, educational level, locality, etc.) seems quite unquestioned.

In sum, the four pieces of the puzzle: 1) The two different criteria of autonomy (being left alone and independent participation) of the second society and the opposition, 2) the lack of connections between the opposition and other social groups and 3) the opposition becoming the new political society, and the 4) assumption that social groups will find their voice, once the democratic institutions are introduced.

All this led to a blind spot of the opposition and intellectuals in their expectations. No one (or at least not the political elite) exactly had a plan on how to build the civil society of the new political order in terms of fostering (creating the structures, allocating the money), independent organizations and autonomous political and social participation. Since interest-articulation was expected to pop up with the establishment of (more or less) uncontrolled communication channels, and associations were expected to form based on these interests, no one had in-depth policy-plans about how to introduce the teachings of democratic behavior into public life and into the educational system.68

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68 Democratic political socialization remained weak in the Hungarian education after the transition, on each level of the education. Many research points out, that political socialization is a marginal issue in the Hungarian education and it maintains the apolitical attitudes of the Youth while avoids to strengthen civic values. (Bognár - Szabó, 2017; Csákó, 2004, 2009; A. Szabó, 2018; A. Szabó - Bauer, 2009; A. Szabó - Oross, 2012; I. Szabó, 2009)
I.2.7. Summary

In this chapter, by examining the different understanding of civil society, I explored the expectations towards civil society in the period around the transition. Based on the Hungarian and English language academic literature between 1985 and 1995, I identified five models of civil society. 1) Civil society as a social order identifies civil society as the Western society and focuses on the structural settings of a whole society. 2) A dualistic model, which redefines the Hegelian distinction of the state and civil society. This approach understood civil society as a sphere, including everything outside the state. 3) A dualistic model under state socialism, which equates civil society mainly with the second, non-official society. While the activities of the second society are considered as independent from the first, the two spheres are heavily interdependent. 4) Civil society as a mediating sphere, in which civil society is understood as a nonstate, non-economic sphere of organizations (and movements), which is mediating between the state and the society and provides important functions of social integration. 5) The civil society as the opposition under socialism refers to the networks and organizations of the dissident groups prior to 1989.

Despite the five models define civil society differently, they share their main expectations. Most importantly, they form expectations and aims connected to the democratization of the society and the public sphere through the support of democratic institutions. The language of human rights undoubtedly penetrates the whole literature. Human rights and mainly civil and political rights serve as a tool to tie the needs for democratic institutions, participation, social self-organization and the public sphere together. The notion of these rights makes possible the communitarian, associational characteristic of civil society and its activities on the basis of individual rights.

To fulfill the expectations, several mechanisms are proposed by this literature. These mechanisms are highly influenced by the given model of civil society. While authors identify civil society as a social order, they are necessarily pessimistic about the chances of democratization. The particular models propose different ways to change the power structures and political culture of the society. The dualistic approaches mainly emphasize the role of growing tensions in the society. These tensions could be economic or based on the suppressed values, the important thing is, that they lead to the recognition and articulation of interests because conflicts become manifest. This is an unconscious way of democratization, while the ‘mediating sphere’ and ‘opposition’ approach emphasizes the more classic, Tocquevillian
effects of civil organizations reformulated by Adam Michnik’s New Evolutionism. According to this approach, civil society organizations serve as a main network for the diffusion of democratic values and skills necessary to operate among democratic conditions. The autonomous sphere of civil society mediates between the state and society by proposing democratic mechanisms and suggesting that the people are able to influence the state’s operation.

Based on the expectations and mechanisms of democratization I proposed a unified model of democratization, in which civil society is understood as a sphere of voluntary associations, serves as a pool of socializing and mobilizing agents. In this model, associational participation would increase the chances of practicing civil and political rights, and the associational sphere would be capable of extending the social groups able to engage in such activities.

However, the processes of democratization might be the hypotheses for further examination, they are also assumptions of different political strategies of democratization. The strategies being parallel, the interplay between them and the expected nature of the collapse of the regime leads to a blind spot, which might explain, why the strategy of civil society was abandoned after the transition. All this might be summarized as follows:

1. Using the notion of autonomy in two different ways but treating them as a similar phenomenon: Under the label 'civil society is everything but the state’ or the so-called dualistic approach, there are two approaches used mainly to describe the situation of civil society under the socialist regime. One of them uses the term second society, or civil society to label the whole society which tries to avoid the state’s control from the second economy to the people withdrawing into the safe nets of their families and close friends. The other approach labels the opposition, independent political and cultural groups as civil society. They are both seen as a composition of autonomous actors, however, the criteria for their autonomy is different. The members of second society wanted to be left alone by the state. They did not want to participate in political processes. The opposition, however, aimed at political participation and the active exercise of freedom rights.

2. Forgetting the lack of embeddedness of the groups of opposition, and expecting the second societies democratization, which would mean to foster its participation, despite its different criteria of autonomy
3. The assumption, that voluntary associations has to and will be based on common interests. Furthermore, the common interest is based on a shared social status, therefore it is always bound to distinct social groups.

4. The necessary focus on legal institutions: The programs and reforms of the opposition focused on the establishment of the legal framework, which is necessary, but not sufficient for establishing a new democracy.

5. The rapid and unexpected changes which put the forces supporting the “civil society project” into a situation where they had to choose between marginalization or building professional political organizations based on the principles of effective operation.

If the project of civil society has failed, the question then arises: Should I stick to the concept? Many scholars decided to move on and use the concept of nonprofit theory (Glózer, 2008). As a closing chapter to Part I, I am going to explain, why it is better to use the concept of civil society than non-profit theories when someone intends to understand the role of the associational sphere in democratization.
I.3. The Usefulness of the Concept of ‘Civil Society’ in Understanding Democratization

Having defined civil society in the previous chapter, I also showed what has led to the failure of civil society as a political strategy. Parallel to its ‘political failure’ it lost its dominance in describing the sphere of independent, voluntary associations. Instead, non-profit theories became popular worldwide and in Hungary as well. Therefore, it is important to clarify, why I still want to use this as the main concept in my analysis, whilst drawing less on other significant directions of scholarship, such as non-profit theories or social movement studies. Although these concepts are often used as synonyms with civil society, they are targeting somewhat different forms and volumes of organizations. Further, they grew out from different theoretical traditions. As I will argue, the separate traditions of their origins and the context of these origins influence the questions researchers ask, and the answers they find through their hidden assumptions.

As Glózer (2008) and Kuti (1998) convincingly point out until the mid-1990s ‘non-profit sector’ or ‘non-profit theories’ became the dominant framework of examining associations and similar entities. Sometimes the notions of ‘third’ and ‘voluntary’ sector also appeared, but only as synonyms to the non-profit sector.}

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69 This is especially prevalent in the Hungarian case for reasons discussed later. This practice of usage is apparent in the short introduction of the Civil Review (Civil Szemle), a Hungarian journal about the non-profit sector and civil society. In the short text about the aims and scope of the Journal uses ‘non-profit Sector’ and ‘civil sphere’, ‘civil society’ as interchangeable terms: The Civil Review is a theoretical journal: it is a periodical, which aims the introduction of the civil sphere, social cooperation and non-profit organizations. … Beyond tracking the development of the domestic civil sphere, it is open internationally and it describes the processes of the European region…. The Journal discusses all the aspects of civil/non-profit sector and civil society…. it shall contribute to the development and institutionalization of civil/non-profit sector as independent area of social sciences. http://www.civilszemle.hu/hu/folyoirat last reached 2018.06.27. (the translation is mine)

70 Although I am not discussing the most recent developments in this regard, it is clear that the term ‘civil society’ gained more popularity recently, both in international and domestic research, even among the former proponents of non-profit research (Anheier, 2017; Antal, 2016; Kuti, 2017; Vándor et al., 2017). The main reason for that is change of the political structure. As the level of democracy is connected to the question of civil society, I believe that this chapter will also contribute to the explanations of the recent shift in the terminology of scholarly debates and the public discourse.
Besides ‘non-profit theories’, ‘social movement studies’ could be a contender to the civil society approach. However, during the 1990s and 2000s ‘non-profit’ is a far more popular term, than ‘social movements’.\footnote{However, I have to note that research on social movements started to become fashionable in Hungary recently. In the nineties, early 2000-s there was only one notable scholar nurturing this line of research, Máté Szabó. In the last years however, new volumes are published on the topic (Máté Szabó - Mikecz, 2014; Van Til - Krasztev, 2013).}

A simple literature query among the titles\footnote{I also searched among ‘subject words’. However, as I checked the results, I found out that in phrases every word is searched independently. Thus, the results for subject word ‘civil society’ would contain any title that has the subject of civil or civil+ something and society or society+ something. To search just among the titles might neglect some books and articles, but works much better as an illustration of the range of uses of the concept.} available in Hungarian at the Metropolitan Szabó Ervin Library\footnote{The Metropolitan Szabó Ervin Library is one of the main libraries of Hungary and its main focus is to collect the literature of the social sciences, especially sociology.} between 1985 and 2014\footnote{I decided to end the period for searching the titles in 2014, since in 2014 the government launched an attack on civil society organizations, in relation with the Norwegian Fund. From this year, similar discursive and legislative attempts to discredit certain organizations were repeated by the government and by pro-government media outlets. (Kuti, 2016, 2017; Torma, 2016)} illustrates the prevalence of the three concepts: The ‘non-profit sector’, ‘civil society’ and ‘social movement’. Civil society and related search terms gain most hits, followed by ‘non-profit sector’. ‘Social movement’ is lagging far behind (table 3.).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Concept appearing in the title & N \\
\hline
civil society & 659 \\
non-profit sector & 235 \\
social movement & 84 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Hungarian titles available 1985-2014\footnote{Search terms: social movement: Social movement (társadalmi mozgalom), social movements (társadalmi mozgalmak); civil society: civil society (civil társadalom), civil sector (civil szektor), civil sphere (civil szféra), civil organization (civil szervezet), civil organisations (civil szervezetek); non-profit sector: non-profit sphere (non-profit szféra), non-profit sector, (non-profit szektor) non-profit organization (non-profit szervezet), non-profit organizations (non-profit szervezetek). To the term non-profit I always searched for nonprofit and non-profit as well.} Metropolitan Szabó Ervin Library}
\end{table}

Thus, in the following pages, I will explain, how the non-profit and the late twentieth-century civil society theories are different by their origin, how this difference affects the implicit questions they ask, and to some extent, how this affects empirical research. The last point is a crucial question since in many countries – among them in Hungary – non-profit research fuels the collection of large-scale, quantitative data. Due to the lack of other organizational level data, these datasets are often used for the purposes of research on civil society. As a consequence, the differences between nonprofit ad civil society research appear as a data-collection problem.
As I will show, this is not a sufficient argument and it is important to point out that data collection is also driven by implicit presumptions of the nonprofit theories. Thus, based on the Hungarian case, I will argue, non-profit data can only be used with caution, and controlled and supplemented by other sources.

There are some limitations to the discussion of scholarship worth to mention. First, I will treat groups of theories as single frameworks, which is a necessary simplification to focus on the fundamental difference between the two directions of research. Second, since I introduced civil society earlier I will mainly focus on some early work of the non-profit sector from the seventies and from the second wave of non-profit research has been done during the nineties.

I.3.1. The origins of non-profit and civil society theories

The reinvention of civil society and the birth of non-profit theories happened in parallel in the seventies. The first in Poland, whereas the second in the United States. As I see it, both branches of theory circulate around the questions of the relationship among the state and its citizens. However, in details, they are asking very different questions and start answering these questions on a very different ground.

The central question of civil society theorists is how the human and political rights universe can be introduced into the relationship of the state and its citizens, thus how limiting the state’s power and empowering the citizens is possible. Conversely, non-profit theory asks a different question, namely, how the public good is produced and what is the role of non-profit organizations in this production. The first question is more political, the second is more economic, which leads to some fundamental differences in the basic assumptions about their answers and explanations. To understand why they start with differing questions, it is necessary to introduce the different contexts of their birth.

The context

There are significant differences between the United States and Central-Eastern Europe in the seventies, and this section highlights two of the most important aspects.

Civil society was born in a context when citizens did not have the choice – or even the illusion – to control a major part of their public lives in Central-Eastern Europe. Although it would be a mistake to picture socialism as a total lack of individual freedom, it’s principles of operation were clearly against exercising civil and political rights.
Non-profit theory was born in a context where the principle of providing basic rights was not in question. The initial work of Weisbrod (1975), one of the founders of non-profit studies in the USA, clearly stated that his work tries to answer the question of public-good production where public, private/for-profit and non-profit sectors are in operation. Weisbrod intended to develop the theory of this third, understudied voluntary sector which would explain the existence of the legal non-profit, voluntary organizations. These organizations were already, legally working, without any kind of constraint on self-organization, which Central-Eastern Europe experiences. Furthermore, in Weisbrod’s theory there were clear references to ‘voter demands’, and ‘consumer-voter demands’ as a tool of expressing satisfaction with the state’s or other provider’s performance. In the socialist one-party state and its shortage economy, these tools were evidently missing.

The main questions and answers

The main explanations of the origin and operation of the non-profit organizations, such as the theory of the public goods, the failure of the state (Salamon, 1991; Weisbrod, 1975), the contract failure, or the idea of consumer-control mechanisms (Hansman, 1987; James, 1990), are clearly economic in nature.

It is important to note, that these non-profit theories are mostly about service-providers and consumers in the field of education, healthcare, or other similar fields. The problem of public-good production is twofold: first, why do these consumers turn to non-profit organizations instead of the state or for-profit firms? Second, why do non-profit organizations appear among service providers (and why do some people tend to participate in these organizations or support them)?

In their answers, these early theories assume that somewhere in the process of producing a public good there is a failure, which makes it hard for the consumer to:

a) satisfy their needs, since there is not enough in terms of quantity or quality of these goods;

b) make the best decision on the possible forms of supplementing the required, but not available public good.

Thus, the consumers of any public good would be ‘homo oeconomicus’, who turns to the public good provider with which they can reach the optimal (or the best available) option. Thus, the consumer is trying to maximize her utility functions by a rational choice.
Since the easiest and often the cheapest way to acquire these services is through state-owned institutions, the homo oeconomicus needs **extra motivations or selective incentives to turn to any other provider then the state.** Explaining participation or action in relation with non-profit organizations thus requires a motivational, if not a demand-supply approach.

This is the point, where the two theoretical traditions diverge in my opinion. Civil society theory in the late twentieth century incorporates the human rights approach. Even if this human rights approach is fostered by the international circumstances, and even if the language of human rights served as a means for the opposition,\(^{76}\) (see Michnik, 1999) as a consequence of its application, its main assumption, namely perceiving these rights as inherent to the human nature, built in the discourse about civil society. In this discourse the fulfilment of human rights belongs to the human nature, therefore one has to explain first **why someone does not practice their rights.** Only subsequently arises the question of **the means (public, private, formal, informal) through which she fulfils the needs motivating the practice of these rights.** This leads to the critical nature of civil society, despite the non-normative nature of non-profit theories.

Coordination of the relationship among the state and the citizen

There is a further consequence of this difference, introduced above, regarding the relationship among the state and the citizen. This relationship is based on different types of coordination: Within civil society theories, this coordination is based on legal rules, regarding what the state can and cannot do, and how much it is allowed to interfere with the individual’s life. The most important point is to keep the boundaries and prevent the citizens from any harm in their rights.

To non-profit theory, this coordination is based on demand and supply\(^{77}\), which assumes that citizens have the possibility to express their demands either in a political way (votes), or via consumer choice. The first requires democracy, the second necessitates the market.\(^{78}\) Both democracy and the market require legal boundaries regulating the relationship between the state and the citizen. Thus, the questions of civil society theory target the very conditions assumed

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\(^{76}\) Michnik Michnik (1999) refers to the impact of the Helsinki Accords from 1975 on the situation of oppositional initiatives. As signatories of the Helsinki Accord, countries of the Warsaw Pact formally accepted to incorporate human rights in their legal system. This served as a reference for the opposition.

\(^{77}\) Which is the extension of the classic liberal approach of coordination actions, the invisible hand, to non-market realms.

\(^{78}\) I am not suggesting that market processes are entirely missing from socialism - Bródy (1983) highlights that cycles of supply and demand worked in the planned economies as well, only instead of consumers the state officials provided the demand side. These demands were partly based on the confidential reports of public opinion researchers, which are now available at the Open Society Archive.
as given by non-profit theory. Furthermore, non-profit theory inquires how public goods are produced among the already given circumstances of democracy and market-oriented economy.

I.3.2. Empirical consequences

It would be a mistake to identify every non-profit research with such a narrowly defined economic theory. The attempts to measure the size and significance of the non-profit sector cross-nationally in the 1990s are more focused on the activities of the organizations, their organizational behavior, as well as their incomes and expenditures, and do not necessarily refer closely to the theories of the seventies and eighties. (see for example Salamon - Anheier, 1997, 1999) In the nineties, political and cultural factors also appear among explanations of the size, strength and vitality of the non-profit sector (Salamon - Anheier, 2006).

The legacy of economic theories: The non-profit organization

The 1990s is also the decade of clarification, working out a widely accepted definition of the non-profit organization by Salamon and Anheier (Salamon, 1994; Salamon - Anheier, 1997, 2006)79. Although explanations started to diverge from economic theories, the definition itself carries the legacy of these theories. The sector then is defined as the totality of these organizations.

Thus, the unit of the non-profit sector is:

a) an organization: It has a sustained, systematic operation, an organizational structure and it is institutionalized to a certain extent. There are some ambiguities with regards the formal or informal nature of this organization. While Salamon et al. (Salamon et al., 2003) state that the organization-like operation and not its legal personality is important, the Hungarian approach tends to be more formalistic and usually requires a legal personality (Kuti, 1998).

b) not distributing profit: Generally, the income-sources of these organizations are not commercial ones. Financing is based on membership fees, donations, and support from the government (local or national), through various financing mechanisms. But non-commercial activity is not a distinctive characteristic of non-profit organizations. Furthermore, they can operate on the same ground as for-profit organizations,

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79 As an illustration of the prevalence of the definition, see: (Bocz, 2009; Kuti, 1998; Salamon, 1994; Salamon et al., 2003)
competing for the same pool of clients, providing similar services (Galaskiewicz - Bielefeld, 1998). What is distinctive in this case is the – mostly legal – restriction on distributing profit among members. Thus, the profit – if there is profit – always contributes to the mission of the organization.

c) self-governing: Every definition emphasizes the self-governing nature of these organizations. They have the competence to make decisions, to start and to cease actions, alliances etc.

d) private or independent from the state: Salamon et al. Salamon et al. (2003) emphasize the private nature of these organizations, while Kuti (1998) only the institutional separation from state institutions. This separation does not prevent them from contributing to the public good or to the tasks the state has.\textsuperscript{80}

e) voluntary: with regard to its membership or participation in its activities.

Further criteria features less strongly: Kuti (1998) refers to the non-political (not involved in party politics) and non-religious (the exclusion of churches) nature of non-profit organizations. Salamon and Anheier list these features among the main elements of the definition in their book in 1996 (Salamon - Anheier, 1996), but they do not in their study a year later (Salamon - Anheier, 1997). This latter, broader-definition is recalled by Salamon and Anheier in 2006 as well (Salamon - Anheier, 2006).

Kuti (1998) mentions two further characteristics of non-profit organizations. First, their necessary contribution to the interests of the wider public or to the public good, second, the organization’s activity has a support from the citizens. This support might be expressed through volunteer work and civic initiatives.\textsuperscript{81}

To understand how the definition is constructed, we shall remember the initial questions of Weisbrod indicating that the curious thing about non-profit organizations is that they are not the result of any state pressure of economic constraints, and cannot be explained evidently by self-interest, which would be profit making. \textit{The implicit assumption of this view is that people tend to participate in public affairs only if they have a special interest in it or if they are pressed to do this.}

\textsuperscript{80} This seems to be a small difference, however, eventually this is the bases of including public charities and public beneficiary organizations, both founded by the Parliament, local governments or other governmental institution in the domain of non-profit sector in the Hungarian case.

\textsuperscript{81} Interestingly, more than a decade later in the new Law of Civil Organisation this last element gained an important role, as a basis of holding a public benefit status.
This view has its empirical consequences. Evidently, the examined organizations cannot be profit-oriented and researchers have to explore the specific interests – called motivations in empirical research on volunteering – which inspire the operation of these organizations despite their unlikely existence. The self-governing characteristic is a consequence of the non-state, non-compulsory, non-profit feature of these organizations.

The social theory and the unit of analysis

Kuti in 1998 stated that ‘non-profit’ in the Hungarian case became a well-established and institutionalized term as the label of the ‘world of associations and foundations’, over other terms, such as ‘civil society’. Indeed, it became one of the most important notions in studying these organizations. The Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) accepted it as a basis for shaping the yearly data collection about non-profit organizations, having a great impact on research.

However, as Table 3 suggests, the discussion goes on. The majority of the 659 hits of ‘civil society’ have been produced after 1997. However, among the search phrases related to ‘civil’ the distribution is different: while 59% and 60% of hits for the phrases ‘civil society’ and ‘civil sphere’ appear after 1997, nine out of ten titles containing ‘civil sector’ or ‘civil organization(s)’ were written after this year. Thus, based on the titles, an assumption can be made that the literature on civil society shifted from a social-theoretical scope to the organizational level. A similar shift occurs with ‘non-profit sector’ as well. While only 51 percent of titles containing ‘non-profit sector’ has been authored since 1997, 80 percent of titles including the term ‘non-profit organization(s)’ is written after 1997.

This shift is associated with the convergence of the two bodies of research and probably fostered the confusion of terminology. Further, this change seems to reflect international trends. Interestingly, after the theoretical and conceptual efforts to clarify the non-profit concept in the 1990s, in the 2000s non-profit researchers started to use the notion of civil society again. The

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82 Balogh et al. mention three approaches: they name the applied one as statistical definition, but the criteria of being non-profit organisations are the same as mentioned above. The other two is the legal (every non-public organisations which are not profit-oriented) and a national-economic one (those non-profit organizations by the statistical definition, which helps the population primarily and do not have income collecting activity.) (Balogh et al., 2003)

83 In 1997 a new regulation on the public benefit status of nonprofit organization was established and the tax-designation system was introduced. Kuti Éva published her influential book summarizing nonprofit research in Hungary in 1998. Thus, 1997 seems to be a good point of demarcation.

In some cases non-profit organizations are referred to as civil society organization (CSO), but the definition is exactly the same. As an example, compare Salamon and Anheier (1997:31-32) and Salamon et. al. (2003:7-8)

The main source of non-profit research is the database of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office on non-profit organisations (Non-profit Register) collecting data about voluntary associations and foundations. The Non-profit Register codes associational organisations according to their specific form: voluntary association, trade union, professional-employer’s advocacy organisation, professional organisation, public law associations and public-beneficiary companies.
associations (e.g. chambers, the Hungarian Academy of Science) are also problematic. They are legal associations, but they have as strong competencies as authorities have. Besides, they are neither under the control of the government nor their members (Kuti, 1998). Most importantly the legal background of their foundation requires an act of the lawmakers, which means that every public body is named in specific legislation. Their organizational culture and behavior are often similar to authorities.

A general strategy to tackle this problem is to exclude these organizations from the analysis if it is possible. Based on this strategy, there were several, more systematic attempts to clarify the relationship between civil and non-profit organizations. The Hungarian Central Statistical Office started referring to private foundations and associations as ‘Classical civil organizations’ (Balogh et al., 2003). Using a different approach, Biró (2002) introduced the term ‘civil-nonprofits’ to separate civil organizations from the publicly owned-governed non-profits. Thus, in this case, non-profit organization is a broader category, which contains the smaller sub-section of civil organizations.

The second problem occurring during the data collection is the problem of gathering information from non-institutionalized organizations. These can be communities, social movements, informal alliances of organizations, and so on. Both the ‘civil-nonprofit’ and ‘classical civil’ approach admit their limitation in this sense, thus they cannot report anything about these informal entities.

Thus, this data-based, formal approach offers a simple solution: non-profit organizations and civil organizations are different, but overlapping categories (Figure 2). For civil society researchers, this approach offers conveniently available, large-scale data for a “small” price: sacrificing information about informal organizations.
The further, non-reflected price is that this approach cannot handle the issue of civil society theories incorporating some profit-oriented organizations. This differentiation among profit and non-profit organizations is explicitly denied by dualistic theories of civil society, and implicitly in the three-sector approaches which often treat actors of the public sphere (e.g. media organizations) as part of civil society. The role of political parties and trade unions is also problematic when interpreting data through that approach.

In my opinion, using such data is advantageous only if the researcher uses it together with information about different forms of participation in different types of organizations and on different fields of activity.\textsuperscript{87} Organizational level data about the material and human resources of nonprofit organizations might be treated as an organizational pool for human resources and associational and political participation. This supplementary information then allows us to examine the outcome of organizational participation: whether a given type of organization contributes to the functions of civil society or not. \textbf{This is the strategy I apply in this study as well: the emphasis in the analysis will be on the individual level data from various surveys, but sometimes I utilize the information about non-profit organizations as well, and interpret the non-profit data from the aspects of civil society research.}

\textsuperscript{87} For example, nationally representative individual level surveys on associational participation could be used.
I.3.4. Summary

The terms ‘non-profit sector’ and ‘civil society’ are often used as synonyms. This unreflective usage of the two concepts is problematic, even when they are used in a supplementary way: civil society as a social theory, to which non-profit organization is the unit of analysis. The two rely on different theoretical core and have different assumptions and questions. Non-profit theory asks the questions: why someone acts for the public good, or why someone does volunteering. This requires a rational choice, motivation, or selective incentives. ‘Civil society’ in principle cannot understand these questions since its inquiry focuses on how to introduce human rights into the relationship of the state and its citizen. The main assumption here is that human rights somehow inherently belong to the individual. Thus, participation in the public sphere and governing her own life are part of the nature of the citizen. Selective incentives in this approach are not required to foster participation. However, they can be a tool to block participation, especially when they are coming from the state or the economy.

Civil society examines problems to which non-profit research is blind. The models, non-profit economic theories propose, require democracy and market-oriented economy. Civil society theories target the development of democracy (and sometimes the market) which is the framework for non-profit theories. Probably this is the explanation of the adaptation of the non-profit framework by the Hungarian researchers in the early nineties. The problem of democracy seemed to be solved, at least at the institutional level. The failures of democratization might have directed the attention of non-profit researchers to the notion of civil society again in the 2000s.

However, the new interest of non-profit researchers in civil society and the convergence of the two research traditions might foster the confusion in terminology and in empirical research as well. The Hungarian Statistical Office offers a great data source on non-profit organizations, which is constantly used for research on civil society as well. Problems arise from the divergent theoretical core, often seen as issues of data collection. These questions are treated as ‘solved’ by paying a seemingly small price: the data offered by non-profit research is seen as information about an organized civil society which cannot reach informal actors of civil society. However,

88 Even Gellner (1994), who pictures the citizen as close to the ‘homo oeconomicus’, treat public participation as a “normal part” of life, which results from the fact that everyone tries to follow their own interests, however in a peaceful way. This might be a discrepancy in my argument, but Gellner treat civil society as a whole, not separated into the three realm. Following someone’s interest in a peaceful way is the action of the civil society even (or for him especially) in the economic sphere as much as in the non-economic realms.
this approach not only abandons informal actors but treats civil society organizations as non-profit and excludes parties and other formally political actors by default.

Thus, non-profit data can be used with caution and mainly as supplementary information about the organizational pool of organized civil society. The main empirical focus should be on data on participation and information gathered for the sake of civil society research.
Part II. Civil society, Human rights, Participation
II.1. Measuring Civil and Political Rights: the Action-Based Approach

In the previous chapters, I have argued that the main expectation towards civil society is to have a strong, positive impact on the level of individual freedom in a society, including the increase in democratic participation. Before turning to the evaluation of this expectation, it needs to be introduced how such an expectation, the level of exercising rights and freedoms, can be measured.

Since scholars of civil society understand freedom and participation in terms of human rights, I will also conceptualize freedom itself, using the theory and concepts of human rights. From the point of view of civil society, civil and political rights are of the utmost importance, thus I will primarily focus on four of them, all directly connected to participation: freedom of association, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of expression and the right to participate in public affairs.

At first, it might appear that measuring the state of these freedoms in a society is a simple task, since numerous tools of measurement are already available. Various NGOs, international agencies, social scientists developed indexes to evaluate the state of human rights. Unfortunately, these metrics suffer from various problems which make it difficult to apply them for my purposes. Most notably, they are unable to follow the changes in the realization of human rights including the developments or setbacks, unless they are marked by a significant change in the regulation. Consequently, they have been presenting Hungary (and other transition countries) as a stable and free democracy already since 1990.⁸⁹

Their main shortcoming is originated in human rights theories’ feature, that they treat the need for freedom as an inherent characteristic of the human nature, thereby suggesting if factors restricting this need are removed, freedoms will flourish. Human rights theories consider the state the most important factor in providing the environment for influencing the fulfillment of human rights, through legislation and policies.

⁸⁹ I am well aware of the recent, worsening evaluation of the Hungarian democracy by the Freedom House or the Bertelsmann Institute. (For more details, visit the Freedom of the World report on Hungary: (https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/hungary or the Bertelsmann Institute’s country reports: https://www.bti-project.org/en/reports/country-reports/ both URLs was last accessed: 11/11/2018. However, these evaluations, as I will argue, rely on the legislation and state-policies or actions of the government and authorities. Consequently, the changes will reflect on the changes in the main institutional and legal framework.
Consequently, if the state is the most important factor responsible for providing a nurturing environment in terms of the need for freedom, the measurement should focus on state policies and legislation only. This is exactly what most of the existing measurement tools offer, despite the research on political participation evidently pointing out that other socio-economic and cultural factors are as much important as the state’s behavior in explaining participation. Thus, if participation is perceived as the praxis of certain rights, considering the role of non-state factors becomes unavoidable.

Furthermore, such measurements present the countries of the first world\textsuperscript{90} as a homogeneous, free and democratic group for the 1990-2010 period. Despite the rosy view provided by these indexes, scholars are well aware of many substantial differences between countries and particular time periods, especially considering the fulfillment of human rights\textsuperscript{91}. When one examine to what extent people act upon their civil and political rights, a very different picture is found in each country, even in those with a very similar institutional design. Therefore, their differences cannot be explained on the basis of existing human rights measurements. Thus, I will argue, in order to get a more accurate picture, existing measurement tools relying on evaluating state policies, legislation or governance should be supplemented by a measurement based on the action of the people.

To arrive at such a conclusion in the first half of this chapter, I revise the mainstream approach to human rights, highlighting the role it attributes to the state and its relation to the inherent nature of human dignity. Through the critical evaluation of these assumptions, I will argue for the need of an action based approach of measurement. To support this claim, I will review the main tools of human rights measurements and I will illustrate the problem by examining the Freedom House’s Freedom of the World reports and the Cingranelli-Richards index. In the end, I will introduce an approach on how to measure the four political rights mentioned above based on representative surveys on the actions of the people.

\textsuperscript{90} e.g. North American countries and those now forming the European Union.

\textsuperscript{91} For example, Tökés (1979) explores the differences in the understanding of human rights between Central and Eastern Europe and Western countries. Moravcsik (2000) discusses how human rights regimes develop in different European countries and Landman (2005) reviews how studying human rights fits into the field of comparative politics.
II.1.1. Human rights and the role of the state

The use of the term ‘Human Rights’ has several sources, all referring to different groups of rights. There is a consensus on the three most important sources or documents which constitute the International Bill of Rights: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the two covenants\footnote{International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights} defining more precisely the ‘civil and political’ and ‘social, economic and cultural’ rights. (Conte - Burchill, 2009). Some authors refer to cultural rights as a distinct group of rights whereas Frezzo (2011) indicates that a new “generation” of rights, namely environmental rights are in the making. For me, mostly civil and political rights are important, although to a small extent I will refer to their relationship with other groups of rights. Hence, it is important to note that, in this study, I use the term ‘human rights’ to refer any group of rights, while I will use the term ‘civil and political liberties or rights’ when I refer to the exact rights I am examining (table 4).

### Table 4. The main groups of human rights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil and political rights*</th>
<th>Social, economic and cultural rights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>right to life,</td>
<td>the right to food, shelter, housing,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>freedom from torture and slavery,</td>
<td>the right to employment*,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>freedom of the person,</td>
<td>the right to adequate education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the right to a fair trial,</td>
<td>right to adequate healthcare,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the right to private life,</td>
<td>right to adequate housing,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>freedom of thought,</td>
<td>right to decent work,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>freedom of conscience,</td>
<td>right to social security**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>freedom of religion,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>freedom of speech, assembly, association,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>right to marry, to found a family,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>right to vote,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>right to personal property</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Foster, 2011:14) and **(Fukuda-Parr et al., 2008:5-6)

It is almost a common knowledge that civil and political **rights are seen as negative rights.** ‘Positive’ and ‘negative’ refer to the type of action imposed on the actor (mostly the state) who should guarantee the given rights. When a right is considered as ‘negative’, the state should not
intervene (withholding itself from restricting the right), while being ‘positive’ means that the realization of the right requires intervention by the state.

The negative nature of human rights is emphasized by Foster (2011) in his definition of liberty: “The term ‘liberty’ used in its general sense refers to basic principles of autonomy and freedom. One is free to do what one chooses and the right to individual autonomy protects us from state interference as to what we do, with whom we associate and what choices we make with respect to our lives.” (Foster, 2011:269 italics are mine).

Traditionally, civil and political rights are considered as negative, while social, cultural rights are treated as positive rights. The assumption behind the negative-positive approach was that the protection of social and economic rights require the intervention of the state (Ssenyonjo, 2010). To put it simply, the level of inequality would not decrease without the state providing sufficient education, social care or welfare measures. Medical care would not be available for everyone if the state would not build and maintain hospitals. Although, this argument seems plausible, human rights theorists lately challenged this view.

Some theorists point out human right theories have changed in this regard and recognize that guaranteeing a right always requires some kind of intervention (Bódig, 2015; Fagan, 2009). For example, the necessary safety of individuals provided in everyday life requires the operation of the police. Individual safety is considered as a civil right, thus, this example clearly shows the view considering only social and economic rights as positive, since they require “action” from the state (and the allocation of resources), while considering civil and political rights being the opposite is false.

However, the nature of intervention could be positive or negative. Thus, it is possible, that the (negative) action of the state aims to limit the state’s possibly for intervention into someone’s life, while it means some active (positive) help in other cases. (Bódig, 2015; Landman, 2006)

Although the recognition that civil and political rights need intervention from the state is an important point in my research, it still leaves another aspect unexplored. Regardless of the type of intervention being positive or negative, civil and political liberties are still seen as “institutional mechanisms for securing a certain set of conditions” (Fagan, 2009:102)\(^3\). Thus, the fulfillment of rights still depends on institutional mechanisms, and on the main institution(al setting), or on actors whose civil and political rights require action on the side of the state.

\(^3\) Institutional is understood as the establishment of the necessary conditions by regulation.
This view is driven by three assumptions: *First*, human dignity is inherent to human nature; *second*, the state is the most important actor creating the environment for rights in practice; and *third*, there is a unidirectional causation between institutional design and practicing rights. All of these assumptions are highly questionable. By challenging them, I will try to establish the ground for an approach of measurement emphasizing the action of the citizens.

II.1.2. The inherent nature of rights and the institutional design.

The inherent nature of human rights and the importance of institutional design is strongly connected. The basic assumption is that the needs providing the ground for human rights are inherent to human nature. In this regard, in a (socio-)psychological terminology, human rights theories are motivation theories. The main implication of motivation theory is that human behavior is driven by certain biological or psychological needs. (Ryan - Deci, 2000). Abraham Maslow, an early and well-known protagonist of motivation theory, identifies motivations along the goals of the individuals. These goals (like acquiring safety) are connected to certain levels of physiological and psychical needs: when needs are satisfied on a certain level, new goals can emerge on a new level. (Maslow, 1943). Self-determination theory, a more recent version of motivation theory, also emphasizes that certain needs, like the need for competence, relatedness and autonomy, are connected to human nature but “will flourish if circumstances permit.” (Ryan - Deci, 2000:69)

The logic of human rights theories seems similar. People have their basic needs implying the need for human dignity (Fagan, 2009), freedom of expression, and so on, while rights guaranteed by the state are the main tools for providing the environment in which these basic needs can be fulfilled. When the circumstances are good, freedom will flourish. When the environment is not so favorable, people will not be able to exercise their rights.

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94 Not so surprisingly human rights theory and motivation theories are connected: I might cite Maslow as an early example: in the 1940s he identifies the guaranteed freedoms as a pre-condition of the basic need-satisfaction:

“There are certain conditions which are immediate prerequisites for the basic need satisfactions. Danger to these is reacted to almost as if it were a direct danger to the basic needs themselves. Such conditions as freedom to speak, freedom to do what one wishes so long as no harm is done to others, freedom to express one's self, freedom to investigate and seek for information, freedom to defend one's self, justice, fairness, honesty, orderliness in the group are examples of such preconditions for basic need satisfactions. Thwarting in these freedoms will be reacted to with a threat or emergency response. These conditions are not ends in themselves but they are almost so since they are so closely related to the basic needs, which are apparently the only ends in themselves. These conditions are defended because without them the basic satisfactions are quite impossible, or at least, very severely endangered.” (Maslow, 1943:384)
Motivation theories are frequently used by theories of modernization, social change and development. These might also emphasize the role of institutions, however, other factors outside the state. For example, a modernization theory forged by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel is a more recent example of how motivation-based theories align with, but at the same time, offer alternatives to human rights theories. At the center of Inglehart’s work, there is the rise of self-expression or post-materialist values. When people during their formative years experience problems with providing the basic necessities, they are more likely to develop survival related values emphasizing the safety of themselves or their families and order in a society. Those who experience affluence rather than the constraints of resources in their everyday lives would accommodate self-expressive values related to more universal/abstract problems affecting humanity as a whole (e.g. environmental issues) and they are more likely to engage with various forms of participation. (Inglehart, 2008; Inglehart - Welzel, 2005b).

Besides postulating that the contexts of socialization matters, the theory also assumes that

“Virtually everyone aspires to freedom and autonomy, but people tend to place the highest value on the most pressing needs. Material sustenance and physical security are immediately linked with survival, and when they are scarce people give top priority to these ‘materialistic’ goals; but under conditions of prosperity, people become more likely to emphasise ‘post-materialist’ goals such as belonging, esteem, and aesthetic and intellectual satisfaction.” (Inglehart, 2008:132)

As a result, the theory is very similar to Maslow’s idea of the hierarchy of needs: first, there is the need for safety and only after it is successfully met, the need for freedom will rise. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005c) connect the satisfaction with different needs to different phases of modernization: Existential safety is guaranteed in the phase of modernization by the previously unprecedented economic growth of industrialized societies. The need for freedom arises in the post-industrial phase. In this second phase of modernization, self-expressive values will be more prevalent, since the threats to everyday survival are mostly eliminated. The strengthening of self-expressive values causes people to start to care about abstract problems, threats to humankind instead of personal safety. As Inglehart and Welzel (2005c) note, the two phases of modernization differ in their relation to freedom as well. Despite existential threats

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95 First he discussed materialist and post-materialist values, the first reflecting to survival and the second reflects to more abstract values (Inglehart, 1971), later he broadened the scope of values to survival and self-expressive values. (Inglehart, 2008)

96 According to (Inglehart - Welzel, 2005c) childhood and adolescent years, when formal education occurs, are the most important years of acquiring values.

97 The post-industrial phase in Western Europe starts with the end of world War II.
having been eliminated already in the phase of modernization, the principle of leaders’ selection
will still rely on respect for authority, although the method of selection is evidently changing.\footnote{As the selection of political leaders’ happens through elections or the power of the church is at least replaced by the power of scientific institutions (Inglehart - Welzel, 2005b).}

In the post-industrial phase, on the contrary, the emphasis is placed on human choice and autonomy, which leads to challenging the authority of the state and the elites. This is why the diffusion of self-expressive values leads to increasing elite-challenging actions. In light of these developments, it is hardly surprising that the notion of human rights has strengthened in post-industrial societies.\footnote{The authors are well aware, that values similar to human rights emerge among other cultural settings as well as that the specific forms of the human rights agenda are connected to particular historical development of the Western societies.}

According to this theory, the main factor behind modernization is socio-economic change, the economic growth of modern, industrial and post-industrial societies. This economic growth is a) capable of eliminating the feeling or perception of everyday existential threats. b) It increases the levels of formal education, and c) “increases occupational specialization and social complexity, diversifying human interactions” (Inglehart - Welzel, 2005b:24). The role of existential security was already discussed. Education makes people more independent and autonomous. Increasing complexity weakens the pressure of traditional structures and relationships (as kin-relations). It is important to note that these factors are more important from the point of institutional change, on the community than on the individual level. The change of political, legal institutions requires a certain threshold to be passed by the level of education or self-expression values present in a society (Inglehart - Welzel, 2005b).

Hence, the main factor behind increasing the level of freedom is economic growth, so the assumed direction of causation between freedom and the state is different in Inglehart and Welzel’s modernization theory as compared to human rights theory. First, socio-economic changes liberate people from under existential threats, and then a transformation of motivations emerges together with changes in the value system and levels of education. Legal and political institutional change is only at the end of this chain of causation.
II.1.3. Human dignity developed by action

The replacement of the state with the economy illustrates that non-state factors might be important, but it does not challenge the unidirectional link from institutions' performance to citizen’s rights and their behavior.

The problem with this direction of causation will be clear if we examine how Amartya Sen (2004) understands the capability of exercising rights. Sen’s approach starts by simply defining the possibilities of practicing freedoms provided by both the state’s performance and by persons’ capability to practice their rights. By capability, he means whether someone has the opportunity to realize his or her rights, even if he or she chooses not to do so. Sen sees the opportunity of exercising rights similar to accessing services or goods. For example, he writes, someone has to have access to medical care even if he or she does not want to use this opportunity.100

When rights are perceived as services, one could argue that people, even those who have the capability to realize them, might choose not to exercise their freedoms. Or, theoretically, a situation, where there is no need for practicing political rights, other than voting is possible since every need might be satisfied.

However, in a democratic political order, rights are institutions constructed by a legal framework for representing any interests, opinions or identities. (see Cohen - Arato, 1992). These rights are not representing particular issues, in which one might choose to take a stance or to remain silent. These rights address the assumption that everyone has at least one issue which is important, affecting his or her life in which he or she would like to influence how decisions are made. Since things constantly change, new issues, identities, interests or groups emerge, hence a final balance, stability, or fulfillment of interests cannot be reached in a democracy. The need for action – practicing political rights - is constant.101 Thus, it might be

100 This approach is probably fueled by Sen’s interest in social and economic rights, which are often realized by the use of social care or health care services. Despite its particular focus, Sen proposes this idea as a general theory of human rights.

101 This argument is in line with the shift in political sociology about the ideal-type of the citizen a democracy requires. While Almond and Verba (1963) writes that the stable functioning of a democracy requires the majority of allegiant citizens, who bear a value set which allows moderate action, emphasize loyalty to the system and supports the maintenance of the social and political order. In the seventies, when Inglehart identified a change in the value system and argued that a new type of “democratic citizen” appears who is more willing to challenge the hierarchy in the society. As a continuation of this line of research, Dalton and Welzel (2014) formulates the model of the ‘assertive citizen’ who is not only interested in politics, and aware of the procedures and outcomes of the decision-making processes, but ready to participate in collective action when it is necessary. This type of citizen is more likely to distrust state institutions and willing to engage in elite-challenging actions.
assumed that, among democratic conditions, the vast majority of people will exercise their rights at least once or twice in a lifetime, if not even more frequently.

A further problem with treating rights as “access to services” is the providing of those services. The task will be more or less about to identify those who need this service, how to provide enough of this service and remove the barriers preventing citizens from accessing them (e.g. the services have to be available at low cost and the service provider has to inform the people.).

**The practice of rights, such as expression of opinion, freedom of association or assembly, however, heavily requires the resources and skills of the individuals as well:** the recognition of their interests, the articulation of these interests, the know-how of cooperation, organizing and so on. Even using a specific service requires some of these skills, which points out the weakness in Sen’s definition of capability of exercising rights. *Capability, in this sense, means more than the access to a service, it means the people’s capacity to be able to do these things.*

This capacity depends on many things. As research shows, besides the legal environment or material resources, the role of less formalized spheres and activities are also important. The role of the socialization in the family, the number and quality of interpersonal networks, belonging to communities and values acquired in peer groups are unquestionably essential factors in enhancing participation. (See Chapter II.3) Furthermore, the skills necessary for participation do not only have to be learned, but they have to be constantly practiced to be maintained.¹⁰²

Hannah Arendt proposes a theory for the development of human rights which suits this idea of constant learning. Isaac Isaac (1996) reconstructs her approach from Hannah Arendt’s different works, emphasizing the individual’s action, instead of the self-limitation or the interventions of the state. This approach confronts the idea of inherent human dignity which is so important for the institutionalist approach. In Arendt’s view, Isaac argues, human dignity has to be developed and maintained by action. When people are deprived of their rights, they are deprived not only of their freedoms – as legal construction - but of their rights to act.

This approach implies by questioning the primacy of the state and the inherent nature of human rights that a measurement of rights should be based on other factors than the state’s intervention or non-intervention. *Therefore, I recommend an inverse approach: to measure to what extent people exercise their rights.* This way, too much weight provided to the state in measurements could be avoided. As a second step, through the examination of the determinants of the people’s

¹⁰² At least this might be the conclusion drawn from recent research, which shows that political and civil attitudes and participation have a reciprocal relationship (J. Gastil - Xenos, 2010) or, even the act of participation leads to the development of attitudes important for further participation (Quintelier - Van Deth, 2014).
behavior, one might be able to explore, which factors influence them in exercising their rights: what is the role of values, psychological factors, economic performance or even the state’s performance. But first, to illustrate why existing measures are insufficient, I will review these existing methods of measurements by quantitatively comparing different countries.

II.1.4. Methods of measurement: missing the differences

The use of quantitative methods is extensive in human rights measurement. (Green, 2001). According to Landman Landman (2004, 2006), there are two main, well-established approaches in the praxis of human rights measurement, both relying on taking stock of harms to human rights. As Landman calls them (Landman, 2006:81 and 84):

1. Rights in principle: Examining whether rights are provided on a constitutional level and protected by state institutions.

2. Rights in practice: Examining the fulfillment of the rights of the citizens in practice or the exercise of these rights by individuals.

The first, “rights in principle” approach is better elaborated: International governmental institutions and non-governmental organizations evaluate the state of human rights mostly by methods relying on constitutional and legal analysis. Measurements of the second type consider the implementation of the rules or intend to capture to what extent individuals have the possibility to practice their rights. Although this type of methods contains data about individuals’ opinions (to what extent they support human rights or what is their opinion about the fulfillment of rights), none of them tries to assess to what extent citizens or individuals explicitly exercise their rights (Landman, 2004, 2006). Landman (2004) mentions statistics on participation as indicators of the outcomes of government policies on human rights, but those serve only as indirect measurements. Some authors use opinion surveys to measure the perception of human rights policies, the operation of the justice system or the experiences on human rights violations (Botero et al., 2011; Landman, 2006). Even though, these large-scale surveys are considered successful in measuring state institutions’ activity from the client’s perspective, while offering valuable feedback on how to improve the performance of institutions, they are, in fact, not able to measure the actual realization of rights.
These approaches to human rights measurement represent the institutional insight discussed above. They focus primarily on governments, states, and legal institutions. No doubt these are important actors, however, if we look at the new democracies, we should not forget Gellner’s words about the inability of a community to decide on how to act as a democracy or Szűcs’s and Bibó’s thoughts about the long-term structural constraints of the political culture and power relations. A suitable legal environment and state policies supporting the realization of rights are necessary preconditions in securing human rights, but they will not necessarily cause citizens to actually exercise their freedoms.

In reviewing the existing indices applied to produce a comparative, quantitative measurement, I have identified two types of datasets: 1. Human rights data, which explicitly aims to review and evaluate the state of human rights in a country, 2. Composite indicators identifying the political structure of a society or governmental performance using human rights indices as part of the larger indicator of social development or political situation.

Comparative human rights datasets are constructed by mostly international NGOs and researchers. Among these, there are some, which cover a wide range of civil and political liberties, while others only evaluate the state of specific rights. Probably the most well-known data is produced by the Freedom House, released every year in the Freedom in the World” report. The report uses various variables to construct indices for civil and political liberties separately and the average of the two provides the overall evaluation of a country. The data is based both on legal analysis and on expert’s judgments to consider not only the legal but on-ground information as well. The Freedom in the World index – since I will use it in a comparison to survey-based data - will be introduced in more details later.

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103 Many of the papers, discussing these indicators, acknowledge that these are measurements of mainly and only legal institutions (Botero et al., 2011; Gajduschek, 2014; Krever, 2013). However, in these papers this appears as a natural feature of human rights indicators. For example, Bradley Bradley (2015) criticizes the Freedom in the World Report, that it takes a narrow understanding of freedom leaving out social, economic and cultural rights, but suggesting that the institutional approach (emphasizing the state) otherwise fits to the concept of freedom. Bradley even writes that a measurement aims at to explore in what extent citizens are able to live with their rights would “have the effect of hindering the indicator’s usefulness as a measure of effective governance, because factors beyond the control of governments- natural disasters, resource constraints, or regional instabilities – can severely impact the scores” (Bradley, 2015:41)

104 Reports on the state of human rights are produced by other organizations as well: For example, the European Agency for Fundamental Rights produces reports, publications on several topics, while Amnesty International also releases annual reports on a global and on a country level. However, these reports are not accompanied with an index aiming to compare the countries quantitatively.

105 About the history of the Freedom in the World report see (R. D. Gastil, 1990)
Another quite exhaustive dataset of the first type is the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights dataset evaluating how much governments respect human rights. The data evaluates government policies from 1981 to 2011 based on the US State Department’s Country Reports and on partially Amnesty International’s annual reports. Civil liberties are assessed through several indicators, including social rights data as well. To evaluate political rights, four indicators are constructed: Freedom of Speech and the Press, The Freedom of Assembly and Association, Electoral Self-determination and Women’s political rights. The first three indicators measure to what extent the state respects or limits these rights: is there any attempt by the government to restrict citizens from expressing their opinion (including media ownership) or are there any limitations to their freedom of assembly or association? Women’s right indicator examines gender inequalities in the case of the right to vote, running for a political office, joining political parties, holding government positions and the right to petition government officials. (Cingranelli - Richards, 2010; David L. Cingranelli et al., 2014; David L. Cingranelli et al., 2014)

Reporters without Borders established the World Press Freedom Index\textsuperscript{106} released yearly since 2002 and evaluating 180 countries. The index focuses on the situation of the press by defining seven variables (pluralism of the media, media independence, environment and self-censorship, legislative framework, transparency, infrastructure, and abuses against journalists). The index is compiled from the answers provided by experts to an online questionnaire and from quantitative data on the number of abuses and violent acts against journalists, also compiled by experts of each region. (Reporters, 2018)

The second, broader type of indices on the performance of governments is mostly produced by international governmental organizations and research centers. The Center for Systemic Peace built the Polity Scores dataset which contains the institutional authority characteristics of regimes from 1800 to 2017. Their evaluation is based on the coding of monthly event-reports. Among other variables, Polity Scores include the democratic or autocratic nature of a polity’s political regime. One of the indicators used to evaluate the political order is “the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation” (Marshall et al., 2018:14).

The scope of the Worldwide Governance Indicators\textsuperscript{107} by the World Bank is even broader. World Bank understands governance as

“(a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; (b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.” (Kaufmann et al., 2011:222)

This quite illustrates the institutionalist approach. The index is concerned with features of governance but not with its outcomes and results. It is worth to note that the sources of measurement modify this picture to a certain extent: in the definition - and data collection - of the sub-indices individual perceptions have an important role.

Three of the six dimensions of the worldwide governance Indicators touch on the areas of my interest. These are the rule of law, control of corruption, voice and accountability, the absence of violence sub-indices. ‘Voice and accountability’ is the closest to my concerns, since it tries to capture “the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.” (Kaufmann et al., 2011:223) The index uses a wide range of data sources from experts assessments to surveys\textsuperscript{108} with a lack of any data on exercising political rights. Variables of ‘trust in Parliament’ and ‘satisfaction with democracy’ are the closest to measuring the actual practice of rights in the whole index. (Kaufmann et al., 2009)

At last, one of the broadest measurements is conducted by Pippa Norris at Harvard: the Democracy Time Series data\textsuperscript{109} which basically tries to collect all the available datasets at one place, including Freedom House’s ‘Freedom in the World’ or the Polity Scores. For human rights measurement, the dataset uses the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset. The only variable based available in the Democracy Time Series on action is the number of anti-government demonstrations, found among the socio-economic/demographic variables. Still, it does not cover the proportion of people participating in actions where they are exercising their rights.\textsuperscript{110}


\textsuperscript{108} To the construction of the dataset, Freedom House’s various indices and the Cingranelli-Richards dataset was also used.

\textsuperscript{109} Available at: http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm last accessed 26/10/2018.

\textsuperscript{110} In the next chapter I will also use the number of demonstrations as an indicator, but I will also show that the increasing number of demonstrations are not necessary correlated to the changes in the proportion of participants.
Even from this short list of available datasets, it is clear that these are based mainly on institutional characteristics. When data gathering is using other sources, such as expert evaluations, expert surveys or legal analysis, it is generally still restricted to attitudinal variables, such as trust in parliament or satisfaction with democracy.

Since most of the databases are not available for the time-frame I examine\footnote{Although The Democracy Time Series Data contains data between 1971 and 2007, information about Hungary is available only between 1994 and 2006. The Worldwide Governance Index begins with 1996.} or they are already using the Freedom House scores\footnote{It is missing only in cases when new countries were established during the period, as in the Balkans.} or the Cingranelli-Richards Dataset (CIRI) covering my period to evaluate the state of human rights, I will look closely into these two datasets to examine to what extent they are capable to capture the differences among developed countries.

**Missing the differences: the example of Freedom in the World and the CIRI**

Both the Freedom in the World and the CIRI cover the whole period between 1990 and 2010. Both apply quantified rankings but only the Freedom in the World has aggregated measurements for civil and political rights. The CIRI evaluates the Freedom of Assembly and Association, Freedom of Speech and the Press and Electoral Self-determination on a scale from 0 to 2 – where 0 indicates a situation with rights restricted and 2 indicates freedom of rights guaranteed to the fullest extent. The scores are counted by coding the reports prepared by the US State Department.

The Freedom in the World has a more sophisticated system by using different sources. It applies a score (separately for political rights and civil liberties) from one to seven, where one indicates the best and seven the worst situation. Each score is an aggregated variable based on local and international experts’ judgments and contribution to the evaluation, trying to consider formal and informal aspects. Freedom House, similarly to my approach, acknowledges that legal guarantees are not equal to “the on-ground fulfillment of those rights” (Freedom House, 2018:1).\footnote{The rating process goes in two steps: First, every country (or territory) is evaluated by ten political rights and fifteen civil liberties indicators. For every indicator a country can get four points. Therefore, 40 points is the maximum for political rights, and 60 for Civil Liberties. Then, according to the results, the 40 and 60 point scale is transformed into a seven point one. The rating has changed slightly throughout its history, but its basic structure and main dimensions are remained the same.}

There are 25 indicators in total, grouped into seven subcategories (three for political rights and four for civil liberties). Political rights are measured as categories of the ‘Electoral Process’, the ‘Political Pluralism and the Participation and functioning of the government, while civil
liberties are measured as categories of the ‘Associational and Organizational Rights’, the ‘Rule of Law’, the Freedom of Expression and Belief, the ‘Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights’. Thus, both groups measure rights which are in the focus of this chapter. These indicators cover a wide range of aspects from political features, such as the functioning of the government, accountability and corruption, to the fulfillment of individual freedom rights, such as freedom of movement. Since, Freedom House publishes only the two aggregated scores, but not the individual scores of the seven sub-categories, I will examine both the scoring of civil and political rights. 

I do not have the space to discuss these indicators in greater details, so I just try to give a taste of them by citing some of the questions used for creating the indices.\textsuperscript{114} Although some of the indicators sound very similar to what I try to measure in my action-based approach, the following questions, presented as part of a checklist for the first indicator of Political Pluralism and Participation\textsuperscript{115}, illustrate the difference well (Puddington, 2010:806):

- Do political parties encounter undue legal or practical obstacles in their efforts to be formed and to operate, including onerous registration requirements, excessively large membership requirements, etc.?
- Do parties face discriminatory or onerous restrictions in holding meetings, rallies, or other peaceful activities?
- Are party members or leaders intimidated, harassed, arrested, imprisoned, or subjected to violent attacks as a result of their peaceful political activities?

These are questions concerning the behavior of political actors, parties and state institutions, not the average citizen’s. The CIRI was discussed in this regard earlier. As a result of this approach, an important problem emerges: These indices are not really able to differentiate between European countries. To illustrate this problem, I will compare the scores (civil and political liberties of Freedom of the Word and three scores for political rights of CIRI) of the countries that participated in the European Values Study survey program between 1990 and 2010. There are 25 countries in total which participated in the three waves of the period.

\textsuperscript{114} The questions used for examining the other aspects are listed in the Appendices. (Appendix 1) To present the most appropriate dimensions and sub-categories, I took the phrasing of subcategories from the yearbook of 2010. (Puddington, 2010)

\textsuperscript{115} This dimension is aimed to measure whether: „Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?”
First, I examine the year furthest away from the transition, assuming that – in line with the assumption of learning democracy – this will show the most developed state of the countries in the period. In Freedom House’s 2010 index, 22 countries were listed for political rights and 21 were listed for civil liberties with the best available score (1). The rest of the countries got ‘2’ in both cases. Naturally, all of the 25 countries were classified as free in 2010. According to the CIRI, the situation is a bit more complex. With regard to the ‘Freedom of Assembly and Association’ and ‘Electoral Self-Determination’, the picture is very similar to what Freedom in the World presented: five and six countries got the ‘middle’ score (1), while 19-20 have the highest (2) score. Most of the countries with the lower scores are post-socialist countries. However, in the Freedom in the World Index, Italy was scored only ‘2’ for Political Rights and Germany and Austria has only achieved the middle rank in CIRI’s ‘Freedom of Association and Assembly’, including Portugal’s ‘1’ score for the ‘Electoral Self-Determination’.

Interestingly, in CIRI’s ‘Freedom of Speech and the Press’, the situation is reversed: most of the countries reach only ‘1’, while only four countries are evaluated as totally free from any form of censorship (Estonia, Portugal, Slovenia, United Kingdom).

Overall, it seems that European countries are evaluated very similarly to each other concerning their state policies and legal system in guaranteeing political rights in any given year, even when they are troubled with some problems, as the CIRI dataset implies in relation to the Freedom of Speech.

Since I examine a twenty-years long period, a given year’s evaluation might be not the best measure to rely on: differences might be better captured by the mean score of the twenty years or by the change in the scoring during the period.

In the Freedom in the World index, the distribution of the mean of scores between 1991 and 2010 is somewhat different, but the mean score for most of the countries falls between 1 and 2. For political rights, 15 countries have the average of 1, which means that their score has remained unchanged throughout the period: only one country has an average score larger than two (2.6, Romania), the other nine varies between 1.1 and 1.65. For Civil Liberties, only eight countries have ‘1’ and 11 countries have a mean-score between 1.51 and 1.99 with three of the post-communist countries (Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Romania) having a mean higher than 2. (table 5)

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116 One country, Northern Ireland had no independent evaluation in the Freedom House data.
117 I am well aware that the Hungary’s scores have been worsening in the last years. (see footnote 89.)
Table 5. Mean-scores of Freedom in the World scores between 1991 and 2010 (N of countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Political rights</th>
<th>Civil Liberties</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.01-1.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.51-1.99</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 or higher</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total (N of countries)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
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The CIRI index works better only when I look into the evaluation of Freedom of Speech: the variable’s mean score varies between 1.05 and 1.95. For freedom of Assembly and Association, the mean is ‘2’ for 11 countries and larger than 1.85 for six more. Again, the countries with the lowest scores are mostly CEE countries, however, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic have 1.85 and Slovenia has 2 as a mean score. Only four countries have a mean score below 1.8 for Electoral Self-Determination (Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic).

Only nine, post-socialist countries had a change in their scoring by the Freedom in the World index. This change mostly that they reach a better, or even the best scoring after a couple years. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia reached ‘1’ in 1993 and their scoring remained unchanged until 2010. The remaining countries also reached the best score in the 1990s. Only Romania’s ranking remained worse than ‘1’ throughout the entire period. Freedom House decreased the scores of only two countries: Bulgaria and Latvia in the late 2000s (table 6).

The changes in the CIRI index go less in the same direction. CIRI detects that the situation is getting worse from the middle of the 2000s, at least in the case of Freedom of Speech. While most of the countries had the best score in the early nineties, the evaluation worsened for a growing number of countries in the late nineties and 2000s. However CIRI seems to me as a less reliable index than the Freedom in the World: for example Romania, the Slovak Republic, Lithuania, and Latvia got ‘0’ for ‘Electoral self-determination’ in 2008 which would mean that electoral rights were restricted in the country, while the situation in these countries did not explain this.\(^{118}\) Also, there are some unexpectedly low scores given to Latvia and Lithuania.

\(^{118}\) Although corruption scandals and political turmoils were reported from Latvia and Romania and some instability was perceived in Slovakia, the implementation of electoral rights and procedures did not change compared to the previous years. (See for example the reports on these countries by Freedom House: Slovakia https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2008/slovakia, Romania: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2008/romania.
concerning the Freedom of Assembly and Association in 2007 and 2008. If these faults would be corrected in the coding process, the countries would have gotten even closer to each other.

In sum, it seems that the ranking system of the Freedom House’s and the CIRI’s indices is best performing in differentiating between countries having a democratic political order on the basis of being an old or a new democracy. Furthermore, Freedom in the World preserves a difference between countries’ democratic trends only for a couple of years and assumes that a country is able to build a “consolidated democracy” in a relatively short period of time.

Latvia: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2008/latvia
All of the url’s were last accessed: 27/10/2018

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110
A. Indicators of exercising rights

To handle the problem of the lost differences I will propose an approach aiming to measure to what extent people are exercising their fundamental freedoms connected to the terrain of political participation. The proposed method of measurement relies on nationally representative surveys. Various research projects collect data which can be attributed to the four rights under examination. It is important to note that this type of data is generally collected with a different aim to measure participation or other types of political behavior, not to measure how and to what extent people are practicing their political freedoms. Based on this information I compose several aggregated variables to measure the practice of each right on the individual and community levels.

To illustrate the approach, comparative research programs should be taken into consideration. Even though the number of these programs is growing, there are only a few ones, which contain the necessary data while repeating the same (or nearly the same) questions over time with data going back to the early nineties. The only survey project to fulfill these criteria is the European Values Study project (EVS, 2011). Thus, I will operationalize the measurement based on EVS data. EVS has four waves, one in every 9th year starting with 1981. The first wave does not measure political participation in the post-socialist region, so I will use only the last three waves (1990-1993, 1999-2000, 2008-2010) and I will include only those variables which are present in all of them. Of course, in discussing a specific country, other sources can be taken into consideration as well. To illustrate the measures, I will select a country from each larger region of Europe: a West-European country (France), a Northern-European (Sweden), a Southern (Italy) and one from the Baltic region (Estonia) and Hungary from Central-Europe.  

Freedom of association

The examination of the freedom of association could be based on data about belonging to, participating or having membership in any organization with associational characteristics. Associations could be defined as organizations or groups joined or established voluntarily for the sake of a common aim, which should be distinct from profit-making. Associations are joined primarily by natural persons and they have an organizational structure independent from state

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119 None of the Eastern-European countries are involved in all of the three waves, thus I have to leave Eastern Europe out from this illustration.
and market organizations\(^\text{120}\) (Braun, 2014; Freise - Hallmann, 2014). In terms of measurement, these are voluntary, civil organizations, political parties or trade unions. Besides the extent of participation, its intensity (how frequently or how intensely someone takes part in an organization's activity) might also mark important differences. The intensity of participation sometimes could be measured by the frequency of participation, but most of the times only by counting how many activity fields (e.g. sport, environmental protection) someone participates in.

In the EVS data, the extent of participation can be measured by the proportion of the adult (18+) population belonging or volunteering to a voluntary organization, including 14 fields of different activity. The intensity of participation is measured by the proportion of people participate in at least two fields of activity (e.g. in sports and recreation and peace movement) and by the average number of fields of participation among those participating in any voluntary organization.

**Figure 3. The extent and intensity of associational participation in five countries, EVS IV. (2008-2010), percentage of the adult population**

\(^{120}\)The idea behind this restriction is that associations can serve those functions through face-to-face contact. Thus, associations formed by organizations cannot fulfil at least the socialization task.
The comparison of the five countries makes a remarkable difference evident. In Sweden, for example 2/3rd of the population belonged to at least one association, while this proportion is only 22 percent for Hungary. Intensity of participation provides a similar picture, however, the differences between Estonia and France disappear when the ratio of people participating in at least two associations is presented, or by comparing the mean number of associations one respondent participates in.

Freedom of peaceful assembly

Variables examining freedom of assembly can be separated into two groups. The first group of variables examines the extent and intensity of participation in protests, demonstrations, strikes, political/election assemblies, occupying buildings, etc. By intensity, I mean how many of these activities someone participates in. The second group contains information about practicing freedom of assembly in less formal or less political ways: meeting friends, colleagues, relatives or attending religious services. Since attending religious services is a result of traditionalism, habits or a religious worldview, to imply that the more people go to church the better the situation is, would be a mistake. The question is, whether people are able to gather for any reason or not. Since in the EVS the only variable measures such a gathering is attending religious services, at this point, I will use only the public aspect of freedom of assembly.

To measure the extent of exercising freedom of assembly, connected to political participation, I apply three variables. Each variable contains three possible answers, thus three categories:

1. The proportion of people who ever took part in protests, occupying building or strikes.
2. The proportion of people who might take part in protests, occupying building or strikes.
3. The proportion of people who never and wouldn’t take part in protests, occupying buildings or strikes)

The first category measures political participation in a slightly different way, than it is usual, since other instruments (as the European Social Survey) ask about participation in the last 12 months or last couple years, while EVS counts any participation the respondent has pursued in his or her whole lifetime. However, the questions based on time restrictions might be more precise in terms of the recent level of political participation or the exploration of the experiences about participation, which should have a crucial role in developing one’s ‘human dignity’ in the light of the theory of Hannah Arendt.
Interestingly, the direction of changes takes several different paths in the examined countries: while, in 1990, a relatively large proportion of Estonia reported participation in participating in assemblies, this proportion has decreased with time to 6% in 2008. In Hungary, the level of participation remained unchanged over time, while it has grown in France and Italy. In Sweden, the level of participation went up and down with time. Independent from the direction of changes, Italy, France and Sweden produce much higher levels of participation as compared to Hungary and Estonia (except in 1990) and the ratio of people who would never participate in any area grows only in the post-socialist countries as well (table 7).

**Freedom of expression**

This is a group with more data available, including the formal or public and informal forms of activity as well. Similarly to the measurement of the freedom of assembly, variables measuring participation in various actions, all belonging to the freedom of expression are available in different datasets. To name a few, it is possible to gain information about the extent of signing a petition, participating in boycotts, buying products for political reasons, wearing political signs or participating in a campaign, donating money to an organization or writing public comments, articles. Data about less organized, more informal activities, as talking about politics, or persuading friends might also be considered as indicators of exercising freedom of expression.

The extent of exercising freedom of expression based on the EVS data can be measured by the two variables of taking part in signing a petition, and joining in boycotts. The answer categories are the same as for participating in demonstrations, strikes.121

Figure 3 indicates whether someone has participated in any of the two activities122. The figure clearly shows the difference between the countries: While in Sweden, France and Italy only the minority of the respondents would stay away from singing a petition or joining in boycotts, in Hungary and Estonia this is more the two-fifths of the population. In Hungary, actually this was the most frequent answer to these questions.

The examination of the informal practice - discussing politics – is worth a separate, longitudinal chart illustrating the changing nature of these behaviors: In table 8, it is clear that Hungary and

121 Have done, Might do, Never would do

122 A respondent is counted as ‘have done’ if he or she participated in any of the two activities, ‘might do’ if did not participated o any of them but indicated a ‘might do1 in one of them. Consequently, ‘never’ includes the respondent who would not participate in any of the two activities.
Estonia are the countries in 1990, where people are discussing politics the most frequently. This is not really surprising given 1990 is the year of transition, the year of the first free national elections in these countries. Until 1999, the ratio of people discussing politics frequently radically decreased in both countries, while it has remained on the same levels in the other three. Hungary has experienced a further decrease until 2008. However, the Hungarian dynamics has two contradicting directions, since the proportion of people never discussing politics also decreased between 1999 and 2008. In other countries shocking changes cannot be identified. The ratio of people discussing politics frequently has increased and the ratio of “never” has decreased in France between 1990 and 2008 and in Italy, the middle group has grown during the same period.

Figure 4. The extent of participation in signing a petition and joining boycotts, aggregated variable, by countries, EVS IV. (2008-2010), percentage of the adult population

The right to take part in public affairs

Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights defines a set of rights considering political participation or influencing politics:

“(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;”

Data on running for any office is rare in survey databases. Fortunately, information about voting is much more prevalent, and there are questions about contacting a politician, representative or civil expert in most of the studies. Unfortunately, EVS contains only the people’s intent about participation in the elections. However, more accurate data might be available about voter turnout, despite the different electoral systems causing difficulties in comparing them.

As a single indicator, I use voter turnout to evaluate this particular right based on the election held in 2010 or in the prior year.

Although similarly to the situation experienced in the case of the other rights, the voter turnout was the highest in Sweden in 2010 (84.6%) the overall picture of the five countries is different. France, Estonia and Hungary had a similar, relatively low voter turnout, (60.4%, 61.9% and 64.4%) while Italy was closer to the Swedish rate with its 78.1 percent voter turnout.
Table 7. The ratio of people participated, might participate and would not participate in protests, occupying buildings or strikes in five countries EVS 1990-2010, percentage of the adult population

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>31%</td>
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<td>59%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>11%</td>
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</table>

Table 8. The ratio of people frequently, occasionally, never discussed politics with friends in five countries EVS 1990-2010, percentage of the adult population

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990 frequently discussed</th>
<th>1990 occasionally discussed</th>
<th>1990 never discussed</th>
<th>2008 frequently discussed</th>
<th>2008 occasionally discussed</th>
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<td>12%</td>
<td>53%</td>
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II.1.5. Summary

In this chapter, I argued that existing measurements of human rights records of states have to be supplemented with measurements based on another approach. Most of the indices capturing the state of human rights rely on sources on regulations and state policies. Despite their crucial role in supporting – or threatening – human rights, measurements based on this information are not able to differentiate among countries of the developed world. I have argued there are three main reasons for missing the differences. First, when measurements are trying to capture the differences between a large pool of countries, among those ones that are experiencing serious human rights violations – as torture of state prisoners – on an everyday basis and ones that have a relatively stable rule of law, the scale applied will not be able to differentiate between cases that lie relatively close to each other. While the differences might seem quite small from this view, they might be quite significant if we conduct a closer examination of the same countries.

Second, human rights theory attributes central importance to the state in guaranteeing and supporting human rights. Through a critical analysis, I have shown that this approach might be relevant to some of the civil liberties but it is certainly not sufficient in understanding rights connected to political participation and civil society, such as freedom of assembly, freedom of association, freedom of expression or the right to take part in the country’s public life. These are rights based on action and participation in these actions is determined by more factors than by only the state’s self-restriction in suppressing these rights.

Third, human rights theory treats these rights as inherent, which means that people would start exercising their rights as soon as external inhibiting factors disappear. However, another approach is available to suggest that human dignity and the need for freedom is a result of a self-enhancing learning process in which taking actions plays a key role.

When I apply these ideas, a different approach to measurement is needed: namely measuring the state of the four political and civil rights through the actions of the people. As I have shown, the two main datasets about human rights rate European countries quite similarly throughout the twenty years after the transition, despite the significant differences in participation or in the extent people are discussing politics. Thus, I introduced a grouping of information collected by the European Values Study – an international, comparative survey program – that suits the measurement requirements of the four rights and illustrated the differences between European countries. For example, while almost all the countries participating in the EVS since 1990
reached 1 or 2 or the best scores in either of the Freedom in the World’s report, a great difference is found if associational participation is applied as an indicator of ‘freedom of association’. In the last EVS Wave about Sweden (2008-2010), two-thirds of the people participate in at least one association and the average number of associations per person is 1.75, as compared to only 21% of Hungarians participating in any association, with a mean of 0.3 for the same period. Similarly, large differences can be found with regard to the other indicators as well.

However, it is important to note that the ranking of the countries is not always the same. Along different dimensions, the ranking and differences between the countries might change. Between the five countries used as an example, the electoral participation is the lowest in France, while France is generally second after Sweden in all other dimensions.

Also, the direction of changes is not linear. Among the two human rights datasets, CIRI captures the deterioration of the situation of the Freedom of Speech. The survey data clearly shows the direction of changes can be reversed from time to time in some of the cases.
II.2. Institutional Change and Exercising Civil and Political Rights

In Chapter I.2, I emphasize that each model of civil society is a response to the challenge that a newly emerging democracy not only needs to establish democratic institutions, but should also transform the political culture and the society in which these institutions are embedded in. This is a paradoxical situation, since the main tool of actors advocating the transition is to establish institutions, which long-term functioning is dependent on the lacking political culture and structural settings. To overcome the paradox of transition theories of civil society emphasize the importance of civic virtue and regard the independent sphere as its most important carrier, therefore they suggest a bottom-up approach.

At the end of Chapter I.2, I also highlight that for political actors, the bottom-up approach is hardly a possibility. During the transition, they are preoccupied with securing their role in the forming political system, and in the political competition, therefore, they are interested in relatively fast solutions. Thus, they prefer top-down solutions and quickly try to establish the main legal institutions of the democratic system. This approach is often supported by the legalist perspective of human rights among members of the democratic opposition (and reform economists), as well as the sudden changes of circumstances and the need for urgent action. Finally, it leads to focusing on regulation and state institutions in political programs and actions.

Therefore, there is a tension between the strategy and theories of civil society, and the political program applied by the newly emerging political actors after the transition. Whereas theories on civil society take a bottom-up approach to social change, political actors are engaged in a top-down approach. In this chapter, I analyze the validity of the top-down approach, investigating to what extent institutional change influences the practice of rights. In order to do this, I will examine the trends of exercising the four fundamental rights related to civil society between 1990 and 2010. My analysis is based on the action-based approach of measurement.

Institutional conditions are defined by five factors, related with the two types of politics identified by Dahrendorf (1990) or Offe and Adler (1991): Constitutional politics consists of the constitutional framework, and the specific laws on fundamental rights, while normal politics is captured by policy actions and political opportunity structures.

Since I examine the impact of the transition, the first and probably most important factor is the overall constitutional framework: the constitution itself, the main regulations on fundamental
rights related to participation and the main political and state institutions. The framework remained largely the same throughout the period and it might be assumed that the main institutions in direct interaction with civil society organizations (such as courts or the Police) had the same approach throughout the period.

Normal politics includes changes in regulation and in policies. While the fine-tuning of regulations aimed at handling problems which emerged from the practice of new regulations in the early nineties, policy changes often intended to vitalize participation.

Policy changes are closely related to political opportunity structures. This term refers to the way political adversaries or social actors outside dominant political forces (Kriesi, 2004) can access or influence decision-making processes. Even with unchanging regulation, governments and governing parties might use these institutions in favor of their view of democracy. Since political opportunity structures are expected to influence the extent and channels of participation, its changes might be reflected in the data.

Finally, connected to both layers of politics, certain important events and turmoils occurred in the examined period. These might have an impact on the practice of rights. Strategies based on large-scale mobilizations by political parties in the early nineties and in the 2000s, as well as the political turmoils caused by political changes in 1990 and the political and economic crisis following 2006 could be important breaking points in the development of political opportunity structures or political culture.

Thus, in the following chapter, I will examine whether the impact of these factors could be traced in the level of exercising the four fundamental rights: freedom of association, the right to peaceful assembly, freedom of expression, and the right to take part in public issues. In doing so, I build timelines from different sources: mainly from surveys of the European Values Study, Hungarian Election Studies, and the European Social Survey. To supplement this data, I also use publicly available data provided by public agencies, as applicable.

In the following section, I will introduce the general legal framework, and a few important policy changes in the period. I will briefly outline the concept of political opportunity structures, and name a number of political turmoils. Then, I will give a detailed picture of the individual practices connected to the four fundamental rights in Hungary between 1990 and 2010. In every subsection where the data allows, I will reflect on the possible impact of policy changes, electoral periods and political turmoils.
II.2.1. Legislation of associations, assemblies, and elections

In order to examine how institutional changes influenced the exercising of rights, I will first summarize the main legislative framework concerning the practice of the freedom of association, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of expression and the right to participate in public life. As Dahrendorf (1990) or Offe and Adler (1991) suggest, this framework has two main layers: constitutional and normal politics. Constitutional politics are decisions about the Constitution and acts of fundamental rights, defining the borders of the polity and its basic rules. Normal politics is the everyday competition, the utilization of particular interests of actors within the rules established by constitutional politics. Among the factors examined here, the Constitution and fundamental laws on civil and political rights are closer to Constitutional politics, while policy-making and political opportunity structures are closer to normal politics. Political turbulences sometimes serve as an opportunity for altering constitutional politics, such as the transition, or for normal politics, the political crisis of 2006.

I will start with outlining the constitutional framework and then turn to the acts regulating freedom of association freedom of assembly, and the different types of elections. Since associations might participate in decision-making processes, I will summarize the state of social dialogue in the period. I will not pay particular attention to the freedom of expression beyond the constitutional framework, since its complex and far-reaching regulation would exceed the limits of this chapter.

A. The constitutional framework

At large, the main framework constructed in 1989 and that was in effect until the beginning of the 2010s\textsuperscript{123} is considered as a suitable framework to European norms, to a representative democracy or to the European Convention of Human rights. This framework regulated the right of association, peaceful assembly and other rights related to the world of politics during the examined period.\textsuperscript{124} This framework was

\textsuperscript{123} The Constitutional framework was replaced piece by piece between 2011 and 2018. The Act XX of 1949, The Constitution of the Hungarian Republic was replaced by the Basic Law of Hungary in 2011, the electoral system was changed in 2012, while the Act II of 1989 on the Freedom of Association was replaced with the civil law in 2013. The Act III. of 1989 on the Right to a peaceful assembly was significantly modified in 2018.

\textsuperscript{124} Some elements of this framework can be dated a bit earlier. The form of foundations was included into the Civil Code in 1987 (Rixer, 2014)
constructed by accepting a new Constitution\textsuperscript{125}, establishing a “multi-party system, democracy, and social market-economy”. (Act XX of 1949, 1989: Preamble) The Constitution incorporated human rights, starting with the right to human dignity and freedom from torture (54§), continuing with most of the Civil and Political Rights.\textsuperscript{126} Three of the four examined freedom rights were stated in article 61, (freedom of expression and media),\textsuperscript{127} 62 (freedom of peaceful assembly) and 63, (freedom of association). The fourth right, to take part in public affairs is not stated as such, but ensues from several paragraphs, as from article 42, which define local governance as “the independent democratic governance of issues concerning local constituents” or from those that dispose about the right to participate in the local and national (and later the European) elections and popular votes, and the right to hold a public office. (§44 and §70).

Among the fundamental laws, the most important items for me are the Act II of 1989 on the Freedom of Association and the Act III. of 1989 on the Right of Assembly. Naturally, these were supplemented by other laws or decrees, further specifying their implementation. Besides the former laws, the establishment of foundations was regulated by the Civil Code and the interest representation and the right to strike was regulated by Act VII. of 1989 on Strikes and the Labor Code\textsuperscript{128} (Arató - Mikecz, 2015) Instead of introducing the specific juridical texts, I will shortly summarize the main characteristics of the legal situation of associations (and other civil society organizations) and how people could engage in demonstrations and protests or voting and the most important policy changes regarding these issues.\textsuperscript{129}

\textbf{B. Freedom of Association}

In relation to establishing associations, the main regulation was Act II. of 1989 on the Freedom of Association, which governed the foundation and main characteristics of so-called societal organizations (referred to as associations later, see Drinóczi - Petrétei, 2003) and the Civil Code, which regulated the establishment and operation of foundations (Arató - Mikecz, 2015).

\textsuperscript{125} Technically, it was only a modification of the 1949 XX. Law of the Hungarian Constitution, but its content was replaced to a large extent.

\textsuperscript{126} Hungary has ratified the European Convention of Human Rights in 1992.

\textsuperscript{127} Besides the general rule, §64 also stated that everyone has the right to write a complain or petition to the relevant governmental organization.

\textsuperscript{128} Act XXII of 1992.

\textsuperscript{129} There is a new law since 201, which has changed the terminology and slight changes in the available legal forms of organizations. My analysis stops in 2010, I refer to the regulation available before 2011.
It is important to note that although the organizational structure and decision-making processes of foundations and associations differ significantly,\footnote{On these differences see (Bullain, 1995).} they share even more similarities. Therefore, I can treat both types as ‘organizations with associational characteristics’. They both disregard profit-making, rely on the work of volunteers and – at least in theory – they also share the idea of implementing deliberation-based decision-making processes.\footnote{The common practice is also to handle foundations together with associations. This is especially true when surveys examine the belonging to or membership and volunteering in such organizations since these surveys usually neither distinguish between different forms of organizations, nor between formal and informal organizations. For example, the question, ISSP Citizenship asks starts with the following question: “People sometimes belong to different kinds of groups or associations.”, The European Values Study asks about voluntary organizations and so on.}

Associating does not necessarily mean that someone creates or joins a formal organization. Thus, the Act on the Freedom of Association commenced with the statement that the Hungarian Republic guarantees the rights to everyone to form communities and organizations. To form communities or associations without legal personalities did not require any formal procedures. The only condition was that the association may not violate the 2§ of the Hungarian Constitution and it cannot realize or call to accomplish any crime or activity in breach of laws (Act XX of 1949, 1989:1-2§).

Associations with a legal personality could be set up voluntarily by at least 10 natural or legal persons. Anyone could be a member of associations, but only Hungarian citizens and foreigners with a residence permit could be on the board of such an organization.\footnote{This is somewhat stricter in the case of political parties: A party member or party board member could be a person only, who has the right to elect or to be elected in a local or national election.} Associations should have a bylaw accepted by its members, and an elected governing body. Societal organizations might be established with any aim that does not contradict the laws and the Constitution of the Hungarian Republic. They should primarily focus on non-entrepreneurial activity. Between 1989 and 2011, the following types of organizations were treated as associations: voluntary associations, political parties, trade unions, mass movements, and public bodies by this law (Act II. of 1989, 1989) In proper sociological terms, these mean associational organizations, with voluntary membership and self-government. According to Drinóczi and Petrétei (2003), the subjects of the right of association are voluntary organizations, as associations, trade unions, political parties or mass movements. Public bodies and chambers, however, do not fall into this
category, since these are established by a law or a decree of a governmental institution and not by the volition of citizens.\textsuperscript{133}

The other type of registered organization is the foundation. Foundations are established on the ground of the Civil Code. There are two types of foundations: private and public. Both had an autonomous legal personality, organizational structure and a governing body independent from its founder, which was responsible for managing the fund and the activities carried out by the foundation. Foundations are also established primarily for carrying out a non-entrepreneurial activity. Traditionally, foundations are established to collect and distribute money, but in Hungary, most of them are small organizations established by social entrepreneurs. They usually formulate one main idea and aim for the foundation, however, due to the regulation which seriously limits the founder’s influence on the organization (Bullain, 2008) they usually do not serve as founders, but as members of the supervisory board.

Hungarian regulations and statistics confused the notion of non-profit and civil foundations both before and after 2011. As it has been discussed in Chapter I.3, there are types of non-profit organizations, both founded and funded by governmental organizations. These can neither be treated as independent or established by the volition of citizens. These state-funded non-profit organizations were, public foundations, public benefit companies or non-profit companies.\textsuperscript{134} This environment went through only small changes in the discussed period. Since 2006, it is no longer possible to establish public beneficiary companies. A year later the concept of non-profit enterprises was introduced instead. Although non-profit companies might be civil organizations, most of them are probably former public benefit companies.\textsuperscript{135}

\textsuperscript{133} This means that although there are enterprises based on association of several people (as in the case of Ltd.-s), these are not considered organizations based on the right of association because of their profit-oriented nature (Drinóczi - Petrétei, 2003).

\textsuperscript{134} These forms were created legally in 1993. (Kuti 2008). Public bodies are bodies, having a decision-making process similar to associations (as the Hungarian Academy of Sciences or chambers), but having special rights and responsibilities and budget provided by the Central Budget secured by specific legislation. Public benefit companies and non-profit companies are firm-like organizations, the basic rules apply to them are the same as to for-profit enterprises, however their aim is to provide public goods and they do not distribute their profit among owners or shareholders. (Rixer, 2014)

\textsuperscript{135} For more information, visit: Mi az a nonprofit gazdasági társaság? (What is a nonprofit enterprise?) https://www.nonprofit.hu/tudastar/ni-az-nonprofit-gazdasagi-tarsasag last accessed. 11/11/2018.
C. The Right to Peaceful Assemblies

The regulation concerning the right to organize and participate in a peaceful assembly is quite simple. Events taking place in public and aiming at expressing an opinion should be registered with the Police at least three days before the event. Events held in private need not be registered. The Police could refuse to approve an event (or the access to the public domain) in a very limited number of cases. Compared to the legislation of other countries, Hungarian regulation seemed to favor protesters. (Kádár - M. Tóth, 2007) Máté Szabó (1998) argues that in the first half of the 1990s the practice of the Police in this regard met the standards of established democracies. Nevertheless, the regulation, raised certain questions: first, it does not really define the concept of a peaceful assembly (Kádár - M. Tóth, 2007; Sólyom, 2007; Tallódi, 2008). Thus, it is not entirely clear, what events fall under this law. Sólyom (2007) argues that a distinctive characteristic of an assembly is that it happens with a clear aim of a collective expression of opinion and that it wants to “give weight to this aim with the presence [of the participants]” (Sólyom, 2007:6).

Thus, in order for an event to be treated as an assembly, it needs to be public, or it needs to be announced. Events falling under this definition might be protests, demonstrations, cultural events, sporting and religious occasions or any assembly (Tallódi, 2008). The other major feature of an assembly, is that it is peaceful. Sólyom (2007) argues that a demonstration is not peaceful, if “participants march with guns or objects threatening the physical integrity of others” (Sólyom, 2007:14). He claims that harmless objects like eggs do not fall under this category. Consequently, a protest does not become violent only because a protester throws eggs at a politician. This point is crucial, for the Police might consider intervening in such a case.

Kádár and M. Tóth (2007) further elaborate on the meaning of ‘peacefulness’: if one consider the violent nature of a protest, two aspects should be taken into account. 1) the repertoire of the protesters, and 2) the aim of the protest. An assembly would be violent not only when the protesters have guns, but when the aim is to threaten the democratic order.

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136 The access to the public domain could be denied only if the event would do harm to the operation of the Judicial system or to the Parliament or would cause too much obstruction to transportation.

137 Kádár and M. Tóth (2007) argues that electoral assemblies and other assemblies should be distinguished from each other, but it is not clear, whether it would mean a different status form the point of right to peaceful assembly.
Beyond defining what a peaceful assembly is, the regulation had more practical problems, namely situations where the requirement of registering the event three days in advance was in conflict with the Right to Peaceful Assembly. (Sólyom, 2007; Tallódi, 2008). For example, insisting on a three-day registration period might contradict the actuality of the event or limit its effectiveness. Sometimes the information triggering a protest is not available three days prior to an event. There are two types of such events:

A. A spontaneous non-organized assembly, started by people who gathered on their own.

B. An organized assembly, where the information triggering an immediate response from protesters was not available before, and in which case a three days delay would significantly lessen the effectiveness of the assembly.

To deal with this problem, the regulation and practice of registration have changed in 2008, based on the decision of the Constitutional Court. The Court stated that those assemblies organized and held spontaneously, or those triggering an instant response are also rightful assemblies and the fact that they were not registered with the Police is not caused to deny permission for holding them (Badó, 2011). Although the problems with the definition were not solved, this change in the regulation might encourage protesters to go to the streets.

D. **Elections, popular votes, and initiatives**

The electoral system of the examined period was also forged in the process of transition and remained largely unaltered until 2011. Both national and local elections were held once in every four years. The national election was a two-round mixed system combining voting for individual candidates based on single-member districts and regional party lists. This second element of the system was proportional. The local elections were also two-round systems, and also combine the voting for individual candidates and local-level party lists. Hungarian citizens were eligible both to vote and to run as candidates on the national elections. On the local elections, foreigners with a residence permit were also eligible to vote. (C. Tóth, 2015).

The original aim was to create a stable system enabling representation regarding both local and national issues. Although many of its features were subject to debates later, the conditions for eligibility and the fair and free nature of the elections were not questioned (C. Tóth, 2015).

The most debated feature of the system was the 5% electoral threshold \(^{138}\) for party lists, and the resulting tendency to favor stronger parties as well as the unproportional gain of the winner in

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\(^{138}\) In 1990 the threshold was 4%. It was changed to 5% in 1994, prior the Elections. (C. Tóth, 2015).
the elections (C. Tóth, 2015). The relatively high threshold is one of the main reasons for the emergence of two large political camps in Hungarian politics. The left and liberal alliance of the Socialist Party and The Free Democrats on the one hand, and the Centre Right-Conservative block led by Fidesz (joined by The Independent Smallholder’s Party and the Christian Democrat Popular Party) on the other. They emerged by 1998 and defined party politics until 2008-2010. (A. Szabó, 2015)

Since 2004, Elections to the European Parliament are also held once every five years in Hungary. During these, all European citizens with a registered address of residence in Hungary (Bux, 2018) may vote. On the European Parliamentary Elections, voters are able to choose among national party lists only. Similarly to the national elections, the European Parliamentary elections also has a five percent threshold.

Moreover, tools of direct democracy, such as agenda initiatives and referenda were available to citizens. The former was a weaker tool, which could be used to press the Parliament to discuss an issue, while referenda could be peremptory if certain conditions were fulfilled (Kukorelli, 2009).

Rules of referenda changed in 1998. Whereas the previous regulation was quite permissive, as there were only a limited number of issues which could not be voted in a referendum, and the exact amount time allotted for collecting signatures was unclear, referenda were regulated in a more detailed manner in 1997 and 1998. Its role became more explicit in the Constitution and a more coherent, although much stricter regulation was applied to it, and the procedure of registration and signature collection became more complex and difficult. For an obligatory referendum, one was obliged to collect 200,000 signatures in four months. However, the legal category of optional referendum was also introduced: the Parliament it was possible to could decide to ordain a referendum when less than 200,000, but more than 100,000 signatures were collected. Mandatory votes were always binding, while optional votes could be both binding or consultative (which means that the result of the popular vote is not binding for the legislature (Kukorelli, 1998, 2009). The number of signatures required meant that initiating a popular vote was hardly possible without considerable resources. Meanwhile, participation would not require much effort.
II.2.2. Social dialogue

Arató and Mikecz (2015) summarize the conditions of participating in the decision-making process for civil organizations and trade unions. In the period, the right to participate in the process of forming policies and preparing decisions was regulated by Act of 1987 on Legislation. Based on this regulation, government institutions and municipal governments had to include civil society organizations in the preparation of decision-making processes. Despite the original aims, the process was selective for a number of reasons. Institutions only involved organizations that appeared on their specific lists; they only sent out expert-materials in the final phase of the decision-making, and they did not let their partners come up with their alternative concepts and policies.

The Act of 1987 on Legislation also introduced the institution of public consultation, which in principle, guaranteed the right to express an opinion about draft versions of regulations. Basically, it meant that draft regulations were published for a short consultation period or that they were sent to a selected number of organizations. This practice weakened the deliberative nature of consultations, as they were mostly done in a one-way manner: civil society organizations and citizens sent their opinion to the legislator and institutions decided what to include into the draft if any changes were made (Kalas, 2006).

But even this practice of social consultation was violated by numerous problems embedded in the bureaucracy: “non-published drafts, the governments’ non-transparent system of consultation, deadlines of consultations, shortened arbitrary, non-accessible officers, opinions neglected without justification, the practice of handling complaints” (Kalas, 2006:26)

As part of the social dialogue processes, tripartite and bipartite Committees were responsible for negotiating workfare issues between employers, trade unions, and the government. These committees were to be consulted about any changes in the regulation affecting the Labor Code. When the Committee became bipartite in 2004, the state remained an observant participant and besides trade unions, civil organizations were also involved (Arató - Mikecz, 2015).

II.2.3. Policies aimed for civil society

Although the basic legal framework did not change much, a few changes did take place with regards to civil society organizations. The legislation became more and more elaborate, and the administrative weight increased in the 1990s. In the early 1990s, associations had to meet only
a few standards, and together with foundations, they were given tax returns on a general basis. (Arató - Mikecz, 2015; Rixer, 2014).

This changed in the first half of the 1990s, as the registration became more difficult and tax returns were cut. Furthermore, by defining public benefit companies, the financing of the sphere gradually changed as most of the public funds’ money went to such organizations instead that of self-organized organizations.

In 1996-1997 a new supporting concept, the 1% system was introduced. This enabled non-profit organizations (and churches) to receive one percent of a citizen’s tax if he or she so disposed of. This change, however, occurred at the same time as the introduction of the public benefit status of organizations. Only associations and foundations with a public benefit status were enabled to become beneficiaries of the tax-disposal and, such organizations had to meet stricter requirements.

After the changes of 1996-1997, the next supportive policy-action was taken in the first half of the 2000s. The left-wing-liberal government introduced a Civil Strategy in 2003 with which they launched a unified, stable fund for civil society organizations: the National Civil Fund. Its budget was adjusted to the tax-disposal of citizens. Each year, the Fund received an amount of money from the Central Budget equal to the aggregated amount of the one percent or income tax citizens disposed of. The Fund was managed by a supervisory board. Two-thirds of the board members were delegated by civil society organizations. This was the first time, apart from project financing, that everyday operations of organizations were supported (Kuti, 2008; Rixer, 2014).

As a summary, it can be stated that the transition period gave birth to a legal framework that matched the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, certain concerns were raised about the exclusion of various groups from practicing a number of rights. All in all, most were enabled to exercise rights, and there were only a few, and reasonable exceptions.

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139 1997. CIVI Law on Public Benefit Organizations. Rixer (2014) also notes that the whole process went along with the privatization of public services. As the resources were scarce, the state started to privatize its services to public benefit organizations, especially public benefit companies. However, this process also gave new meaning to the term ‘public benefit’. From 1997 it meant that an organization provides a service, or an activity which should be done, in principle, by the state.

140 E.g. a foreigner to act as an organizer of an assembly held on a public domain.(Sólyom, 2007).
In the implementation of the legislation, however, there were two, contradicting tendencies. First, the legislation became stricter in terms of administrative requirements related to practicing certain rights, such as the right of association. The operation of administrative organizations and the judicial system was unstable. Moreover, the results of procedures were difficult to calculate, and similar processes could lead to different results. These two characteristics could discourage groups from engaging in practicing rights (at least as far as formal or legal actions were concerned).

Nevertheless, the legislation remained largely the same throughout the whole period, and efforts were made to support the activity of civil society, and to invigorate civil activities.

II.2.4. Political opportunity structures and political turmoils

Changes in legislation can occur for a number of reasons. But one of the main factors behind them might ensue from the approach of governing forces’ to decision-making processes. Governing bodies might think that they could rule more easily or maintain their popular support if they allow other actors to participate in decision-making processes or, quite the contrary, if they exclude everyone else and make sure that they control both the process and its outcomes.

The openness of the decision-making process is often called a political opportunity structure. The basic idea is simple. Political opportunity structures refer to the access non-governing actors have on the system and processes of decision-making. The question is, whether and how these actors (non-governing political parties, civil society organizations, trade unions etc.) are able to influence decision-making processes (Kriesi, 2004). The openness or closeness of political opportunity structures depend on several factors, such as the centralization of decision-making processes, the bureaucracy, the separation of powers, the structure of governance (e.g. whether the government needs to form a coalition), how disciplined parties are,141 and what the strategy of the ruling party is for handling its challengers (Kriesi, 2004). Although the general framework remained the same throughout the entire period, different governments took different approaches to civil society. This is well captured by the fact that policies intended to revitalize the civil sphere were implemented by left-wing (or liberal-left) governments. These policies were born during 1994 and 1998, when the law of public benefit organizations and the

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141 For example, whether they use unified communication channels, or whether it is possible to establish an independent opinion or developing different platforms in the party.
1% system was introduced, as well as after 2002, when the National Civil Fund was established and the government launched civil strategies.

On the other hand, parties often relied on mass mobilization. There were three main „waves” of politically driven mobilizations. First, in the early nineties, politicians belonging to the Alliance of Free Democrats (then in opposition) organized a movement, called the Democratic Chart. The Hungarian Socialist Party (also in opposition) joined the movement. During its short existence, a long list of organizations joined the movement which used the repertoire of demonstrations, petitions and different forms of media-representation. The movement was partly fueled by the actions and demonstrations of the increasingly organized extreme right. The movement lasted until 1994 when the Socialist Party won the elections and then it formed a coalition government with the Alliance of Free Democrats (Bozóki, 1996).

The second wave of politically driven mobilizations occurred during and after the electoral campaign of 2002. In 2002, Fidesz surprisingly lost the first round of Parliamentary elections. As a reaction, their campaign between the first and second rounds relied on mass mobilization. Although the campaign mobilized its voters (Mihályffy, 2005), the incumbent Party still lost the elections. After the Fidesz lost, its leading figure, Viktor Orbán announced the initiation of the movement of Civic Circles and asked people to form small clubs, associations, circles all around the country. Although after several years, the movement lost its significance, it was the basis for the strategy of engaging in a repertoire way more similar to a social movement, than a Parliamentary party (Gerő - Kopper, 2013; Máté Szabó, 2006).

In 2006, a recording of a speech of incumbent Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány was leaked (this was the so-called Ősződ Speech). In a non-public speech, held after the electoral victory of the Hungarian Socialist Party the Prime Minister, Ferenc Gyurcsány said that his pre-2006 government lied about the economic situation of the last 1.5-2 years and that the government’ only aimed at covering this lie. His words (‘we did not govern but lied for the last couple years’) incited protests in Budapest and in other cities. The events of the autumn of 2006 were characterized by a diversity of actors, aims, and ideologies. Most of them, however, were related to the far right. The events of 2006 were exploited and in some case even organized by Fidesz and by the Jobbik Movement for Hungary, a far-right party that managed to get into the Parliament in 2010 (Mikecz, 2012, 2014; András Tóth - Grajczjár, 2015).

One major transformation and a political turmoil of the Hungarian political structure might be important even beyond its connection with civil society and the use of mass mobilization:
namely, Hungary’s accession to the European Union in 2004. This not only meant additional resources for the country, but it was largely anticipated with positive feelings by the general public (Grzymalala-Busse - Innes, 2003). The EU did not only promote democratization (Raik, 2004), but it also strengthened a framework of multilevel governance, in which actors could use the international political scene for their domestic purposes (Holzhacker, 2006).

Political turmoils and crises might also change opportunity structures by re-shaping the political sphere. One obvious example is the transition in 1990 itself, which was followed by a turmoil that unleashed a crucial change in the political structure and the explosion of the two-party system of Hungarian politics. The political crisis unleashed by the Őszöd Speech in the autumn of 2006 took place right before local elections.¹⁴²

When the speech was leaked and protests broke out, the situation quickly evolved into a legitimacy crisis, lasting for years. This was a major factor contributing to the formation of new parties, to the rise of the extreme right JOBBIK and Fidesz’ landslide victory (they gained a 2/3 majority) in 2010. (Deák, 2013; Enyedi - Benoit, 2010; Grajczjár - Tóth, 2011) Thus, it is fair to say the speech and its consequences led to the reshaping of the Hungarian political sphere.

Policy periods and electoral cycles

Based on the literature reviewed above, I propose two different versions of dividing the period between 1990 and 2010.

The first one is based on major policy changes towards civil society and the legal-institutional environment. From this perspective, the first period between 1990 and 1996 would be the period of professionalization and consolidation. The second one starts with the introduction of the law on public benefit status and on the 1% system, while the third would start in 2004, with the establishment of the National Civil Fund and Hungary’s accession to the European Union.

As an alternative, one could divide the period according to elections. However, there are authors suggesting that these periods could be grouped by the political ideologies of the governments (conservative vs. left-right), or their respective attempts at forming structures of open or closed political opportunities (Róbert - Szabó, 2017), there are too many contingencies that may

¹⁴² It is worth to note that the speech was only a trigger of the crisis. The incumbent, left-wing and liberal parties won the national elections in 2006. Although their campaign was built on the increase of social expenditures after the elections they engaged to restrictive policies. Thus, when the speech leaked out it found a disappointed frustrated public, which already felt that the government lied. (Enyedi - Benoit, 2010; András Tóth - Grajczjár, 2015)
influence the relationship of political parties and civil society organizations as well as social movements. Therefore, I will examine electoral periods separately. (See table 9.)

Table 9. Electoral cycles and governing parties 1990-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994-1998 (Left-wing, liberal)</td>
<td>Coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Alliance of Free Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2002 (Right-wing)</td>
<td>Coalition of Fidesz Hungarian Civic Party, the Independent Smallholder’s Party and the Hungarian Democratic Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2006 (Left-wing)</td>
<td>Coalition of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Alliance of Free Democrats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II.2.5. Previous research

Since measuring the practice of rights by action is not a well-developed domain of political sociology, I rely on research concerning associational and political participation and non-profit research. Although these are different domains of political sociology I emphasize the importance of the realization of these rights, thus to take actions. Therefore, exercising the rights I examine could be also understood as a wide range of political participation, or voluntary actions “by people in their role as citizens” (van Deth, 2014:352)

The evidence collected by previous research suggests that the overall activity has not changed much in the examined period (Arató - Mikecz, 2015; Gerő, 2012; Kern - Szabó, 2011; Róbert - Szabó, 2017). It is not clear, however, how institutional changes contributed to trends of participation they support or suppress participation. In relation to that, it is also not discussed in the scholarly literature, whether the different institutional changes highlighted above strengthen or counteract each other.

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143 For example, the first years of the period are the beginning of the transition, when the whole political system was under construction. The stable two-party block system was stabilized only by 1998, and it collapsed after 2006. The hopes towards the EU accession might also have influenced people’s behaviors beyond the effects of actual policies.
Moreover, the existing literature is limited in its scope of activities or in its timeframe. Articles that discuss trends of participation, either focus on only one of its forms, Kukorelli (1998, 2009) for example, discusses only popular votes (1998, 2009), or they examine only parts of the period I cover. While Angelusz and Tardos (2005) examine electoral participation, participation in voluntary organizations and protest activities up to 2003\textsuperscript{144}, Kern and Szabó (2011) and Róbert and Szabó (2017) discuss the 2000s. In my analysis, I try to complete these shortages of the literature. I cover both the 1990s and the 2000s and I also draw a broader picture by examining different types of participation at the same time. Furthermore, since other studies focus on associational and political participation they cover a somewhat narrower set of data. Moreover, their grouping is also different from that of my analysis, as I focus on fundamental rights as the basis of operationalization instead of focusing on resources required by different forms of participation, or their relationship with political institutions.

The extent of the impact of institutional changes on participation in Hungary is not known. Róbert and Szabó (2017) examine the impact of political opportunity structures, using the government’s political affiliation as a proxy. The political opportunity structures are assumed to be closed during the reign of right-wing governments, while they are thought to be more open under left-wing governments. Although they expected significant differences concerning the social profile of mobilized groups, only minor ones were found.

Research on the number of associations and non-profit organizations show a somewhat different picture. It seems that institutional changes have an impact on the number of organizations. For example, the introduction of the ‘one percent’ system and the establishment of the National Civil Fund affected the number of associations. In general, the number of active organizations increased throughout the period, from an initial 8,796 to 60,536.\textsuperscript{145} After the relatively vital first few years, the number of organizations stagnated until 1997. After that, there was a slight increase, which developed into a new wave by 2004 (Bocz, 2009). On the other hand, changes in the legal environment and the government’s changing attitude towards civil society after 2010 coincided with the significant destruction of the sphere of nonprofit organizations. It has at least slowed down the growth of civil society in terms of the number of

\textsuperscript{144} However, they give a detailed analysis only for 2003.

\textsuperscript{145} Including associations, private foundations, trade unions, employer’s advocacy groups, and professional organizations. My own calculation, based on the Nonprofit Database of the HCSO. Data source: (Bocz, 2009 until 2003; HCSO, 2014 between 2003 and 2010).
organizations and shaken their financial bases (Kuti, 2016, 2017) which might give us the impression that institutional configuration matters.

II.2.6. What to expect?

Although my analysis is mainly exploratory, I could form some preliminary hypotheses. Most importantly, although the existing research points to a different direction, one might assume that among democratic institutions, activities related to most of the examined rights will gradually increase (H1).

The general trends, however, would not indicate that the direction of changes should be linear and continuous. Policy changes sometimes supplement, sometimes counteract the influence of the general framework. Thus, the increasing administrative load in the first half of the 1990s might slow down organizations, while the changes introduced in 1997 and 2004 foster them, especially when associational participation is examined (H2).

Political opportunity structures sometimes support policy changes aimed to vitalize the practice of rights, and sometimes counteract them. Between 1990 and 1994, political opportunity structures gradually became closed, in line with the stricter and more detailed regulation. Between 1994 and 1998, regulations gradually clarified the way popular votes could be used. Then, the one-percent system was introduced, which might have contributed to the growing number of popular votes launched and to associational activities. However, closing opportunity structures between 1998 and 2002 might have counteracted the positive influence of these policy changes. After 2002, establishing the National Civil Fund, and introducing a Civil Strategy indicated an opening of opportunity structures, which would vitalize associational participation and consequently, the organizing of assemblies and other forms of expressing an opinion. (H3)

Protesting and expressing opinions could be the most intense during times of crises. Therefore, the transition itself and the period after 2006 should be the most intense in this regard. Thus, I expect that people have engaged in protest activities, signing a petition, boycotts or talking about politics mostly in the first years of the 1990s and after 2006. (H4)

II.2.7. Methodology

The impact of institutional changes is examined through time series of exercising the four fundamental rights. After introducing the available data and by building a twenty-year long
time series (when it is possible) the changes in the level of individual practice at relevant points in time can be examined. Following the initial examination, the different policy and electoral periods can be compared. I will do this by comparing the annual means of the level of activity in a period where such data is available.

The data is collected from various sources. These include the secondary analysis of nationally representative surveys, data generated by the functioning of the political system (such as voter turnout) or during bureaucratic procedures (such as registering associations). Although I give a detailed introduction of the data for every subsection, I shall give a general outline of the sources used.

First of all, in the cases of the freedom of association, the right to assembly and the freedom of expression, I will primarily use information extracted from large-scale, nationally representative surveys. The main source of a comparative research asking similar questions is the European Values Study taken in 1991, 1999 and 2008. (EVS, 2011) This will be supplemented by the first five waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) between 2002 and 2010 (ESS, 2012), the data of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on Citizenship from 2004, (ISSP Research Group, 2012) and the two waves of Hungarian Election Studies (HES) from 2003, 2008 and 2009 (Tardos, 2003, 2008-2009). For a detailed picture of participation, I mainly rely on the proportion of people who participate. It is important to note, that in order to build a twenty-year long time-series, I have to use surveys that ask somewhat different questions. They apply different time scales, phrasing and sometimes even a different number of items were asked. As Ulzurrun and Morales (2002) show, the number and phrasing of items might change the results significantly. As a consequence, I have to be really cautious about comparing them. Fortunately, in some cases, I have multiple data from the same year, which allows me to explore the differences that the phrasing of the questions might generate. I will constantly refer to this in the interpretation of the results.

As a second source of information, I use data provided by authorities. For example, the National Office for the Judiciary provided data about the number of registrations of associations and foundations. The Police also publishes statistics about the events that fall under the effect of Act III of 1989. The National Tax and Customs Administration Office releases the number of people designating the 1% of their personal income tax to civil organizations, whereas the

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146 I provide a short overview of their representativeness in the Appendices (Appendix 2).
147 However, this information is available only sporadically.
National Election Office publishes data about participation on elections, popular votes, and popular initiatives.

To supplement and to control the results of my secondary analysis, I will review the relevant literature and compare its results to the sets of data I analyze. Due to differences in the data, I will introduce it in detail in every subchapter.

II.2.8. Trends in exercising rights

A. Freedom of association

In examining the practice of the freedom of association, I focus on two indicators: the proportion of people that belong to associations and the annual number of registrations of associations and foundations at the court.

I use the concept of belonging, instead of membership. In many cases, formal membership does not apply very well. Besides, the formal membership does not suit certain types of association (such as religious ones) well. Forms of participation vary in general and they became less formal in the last decades, especially among the youth (Hustinx et al., 2012).

Furthermore, belonging to an association is a broader concept than membership, as it can not only refer to formal membership, but also to a sense of emotional engagement. Belonging includes voluntary work done by non-members as well. In the operationalization of the concept, however, this does not mean great variability when a survey is used as an instrument: These surveys typically measure belonging by a sense of identification with an association: belonging to, being a member or volunteering.

The data comes from two sources. The extent of associational participation is derived from a secondary analysis of large-scale, nationally representative surveys, such as the European Values Study (EVS), the European Social Survey (ESS), or the Hungarian Election Study (HES). The number of registered associations and the number of annual registrations is based on a database about registrations constructed by the National Office for the Judiciary.

The variables used to measure the ratio of participation are based on questions of belonging, membership, participating and volunteering in voluntary organizations. The examined surveys ask their questions by enquiring whether the respondent belongs to an association working on given activity fields (such as human rights, education, sports and recreation, etc.) or in
associations of a given type, such as political parties or trade unions. EVS and ESS 2002 have the most, and ISSP 2004 the least detailed list of fields or organizational types.\footnote{148}{The list of activity fields by research program and the ratio of participation in individual fields is reported in the Appendices (Appendix 3)}

The questions also vary by the time frame they are asking about. EVS, HES and ISSP 2004 refer to the moment of data gathering, while the question asked by the ESS 2002 contains a 12-month time frame.

Apart from belonging, EVS also gathered replies about volunteering. ESS 2002 provides a more detailed overview by asking questions about membership, participation in the organization’s activity, donating money and volunteering.

Belonging to or membership in associations

Table 10 presents the frequencies for belonging, membership, and participation. Surprisingly, the year 1990 seems salient. But this is a remnant of mass trade union organizations. Before 1989, membership in trade unions was almost compulsory for professionals. These unions were, however, not really advocacy organizations but rather satellites of the Party, serving as ‘transmission belts’\footnote{149}{The expression ‘transmission belt’ is used to describe associations, such as trade unions, mainly under state socialism, aiming at interest representation in principle, but functioning as organizations enhancing the goals, policies etc. of the government. (Makó, 2010)}. After the transition, to the end of the millennium, membership in trade unions decreased by two-thirds (from 32 to 7-11 percent.\footnote{150}{According to EVS, membership in trade unions was 7% in 1999, while ESS measured it to 11% in 2002.}) But even without trade unions, the sporadic data from the ‘90s shows a slight decline (from 29% to 25%), which persists. It seems that to the 2000s, levels of belonging or membership in any association or voluntary organization stabilized around 20 percent. The only exception is the ISSP in 2004 which measure that 40 percent of the respondents belong to voluntary organizations. However, 29 percent of the respondents indicated that they belong to a religious or church organization, which is unexceptionally large, compared to the other dataset, thus the respondents probably people indicated not only belonging to religious voluntary organizations but identification with a denomination as well.\footnote{151}{This assumption is supported by the large difference between the ratio of respondents marked active participation and belonging without participation. Only 9 percent of the respondents participate actively in such a religious organization and 20 percent answered that they ‘belong but do not participate’. The difference between the two groups is much larger than in other fields. The ratio of those, who marked ’belong but do not participate’ exceeds the ratio of active participants only for trade unions but the difference is only 1.3 percent (4.4% vs. 5.7%).}
Table 10. Belonging to, or membership in any voluntary organization, 1991-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say which, if any, do you belong to?</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>(EVS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For each of the voluntary organisations I will now mention, please use this card to tell me whether any of these things apply to you now or in the last 12 months, and, if so, which (member+participated)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We listed various types of associations in the following card. Please indicate if you have any memberships or leading function in any of them.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People sometimes belong to different kinds of groups or associations. For each type of group, please indicate whether you, (belong to and actively participate in them + or belong to but do not participate in them)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Volunteering

Data about volunteering is fuzzier than that about membership or belonging. Although, there are a number of available datasets and results from the 1990s and the 2000s are all published, they are controversial. EVS, supplemented with ESS shows a decreasing or stagnating trend similar to that observed concerning membership. HCSO data show stagnation, whereas studies based on two comparable Hungarian surveys from 1994 and 2005 show increasing engagement to volunteer work.

Similarly to the direction of changes, the ratio of volunteers also differs radically. There are some methodological issues behind the contradicting results. First, measurements apply different definitions of volunteering. Some research focuses on organized activities, while others also include non-organized activities. Second, the unit of analysis might be different: individuals versus organizations. By briefly addressing these, I will try to clarify the data and

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152 ESS and ISSP are datasets distinguishing between membership and participation. According to the ESS 2002, 27 percent of the respondents mentioned that they are a member of any organizations, while only 20 percent of them indicated participation. in the ISSP citizenship data active participation is 19 percent while passive belonging is 27 percent. From the aggregated figures it is clear that the two types of belonging are overlapping only partially.
argue that **from the point of freedom of associations, organized volunteer activities should be taken into account.**

Under the term *organized volunteering*, I refer to voluntary work done for organizations. The subjects of non-organized *voluntary work* or informal help are however individuals (strangers, acquaintances, friends or family members). The broadest definition is applied by Czakó et al. (1995) and Czike and Kuti (2006) in their research conducted in 1993 and 2004 respectively. Czakó et al. define volunteer work as “assistance to any individual or organization that does not belong to the individual’s kin- or friendship circles” (Czakó et al., 1995:7). The definition of Czike and Kuti is similar:

> „We define volunteering in this study as a voluntary activity, for which the individual does not accept any payment in return, and which is conducted **primarily beyond his/her own and her families’** advance, for the sake of other people, groups or the building of the community (2006:13 highlights are mine)."

Although they would exclude family members from the beneficiaries of voluntary work, later Czike and Kuti abandon this restricting element, and sometimes they include helping a family member in volunteering.\(^{153}\) Fortunately, they differentiate between organized and non-organized volunteering.

EVS, ESS, and Hungarian Statistical Office (HCSO) are interested in organized volunteering. Thus, they implicitly apply a narrower definition, as per their method of measurement). EVS measures volunteering in the same structure in all of its waves, while ESS only measured it in the first (2002) and third (2006) wave, but with different batteries. The first wave records volunteering related to certain fields, as in the case of associational membership, while in 2006 the questionnaire includes two general questions about organized and one about non-organized activities. The Hungarian Central Statistical Office conducts research almost yearly among non-profit organizations and since 1995, they have also been recording the number of volunteers at each organization. The EVS asks individuals and their activity at the time of filling in the questionnaire (EVS) and 12 months before it (ESS), whereas HCSO asks organizations about the previous calendar year. The HCSO’s definition is the narrowest since it only deals with the number of *regularly working* volunteers.

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\(^{153}\) For example, „According to our research, more than 36% of the Hungarian population above 14 years old, helps in their family and among their friends and do volunteer work outside of these circles as well” (Czike - Kuti, 2006:34).
According to different definitions and methodologies, the results are also different: EVS and ESS report a proportion of volunteers ranging from 5.8% to 16.4%. HCSO (Bocz, 2009; HCSO, 2014) declares that there are about 350-440,000 volunteers (four to five percent of the adult population), while Czike and Bartal (2005) or Czike and Kuti (2006) state that 30-40 percent of the adult population participated in volunteer work.\footnote{The population of people older than 14 years old, in 2005.} The latter contains non-organized volunteer activities as well. Organized volunteering was around 7% in 1993 and 10.5%\footnote{The data from 2005 contains volunteer-work organized by state-owned organizations as well, thus the ratio of „civil” voluntary workers is lower. Czike and Kuti suggest, that there is a difference based on people volunteering for state institutions - which would be possible since its ratio was 6.1% in 1994 and 8.4% in 2005, but none of the other surveys have asked about it.} in 2005 according to Czakó et al. (1995) and Czike and Kuti (2006).\footnote{The identification of the subject of volunteer work appears among the a questions only in the survey conducted in 2005. Their identification varies on a wide spectrum: Respondents primarily named their settlement (27%) and individuals (19.8%). After these two, they mentioned state institutions, (8.4%) care-taking, fund-raising, (7.7 and 5.9%) as the goal of volunteer work. 4.7% mentioned churches and only a small proportion (0.8-1%) help organizations (of which they were either in the board of trustees or helping in administration) and volunteering for parties. (Czike - Kuti, 2006:35).} This result is much closer to those published by others (table 11).\footnote{Kuti (2017) still writes that one-third of the Hungarian adult population does volunteer work in 2017, but she admits that only a minority of this is organized by civil society organizations.} 

The five-to ten percent discrepancy between the HCSO’s data and the results based on individual surveys might be due to the lack of volunteering for churches\footnote{According to Czakó et al. (1995) in the middle of the nineties, 2.3 percent of the adult population conducted voluntary work for religious organizations, which would explain 25-50 percent of the difference. EVS and ESS both ask about volunteering conducted for religious voluntary organizations, but not churches specifically. The proportion of people who volunteer only for religious organizations is only 1.3-1.7 percent of the population. The total results (volunteering for religious and other organizations) vary between 1.9 and 5.4 percent, which is similar to the data collected in 1994 and 2004 by Czike and Kuti (2006). Volunteering for political parties explain less than 10 percent of the differences (0.5 percent of the population is engaged in political organizations).} and political parties in the HCSO’s data and to the research design (only organizations were asked). Organizations count only “official” volunteers, those who do not take part in their daily operation but help instead to organize its programmes or provide its services.

Organized voluntary-work is perhaps a too narrow metric to measure the actual proportion of volunteers. But a too broad definition is equally problematic. For example, although assistance in the closer community or acquaintances might fall into the category of the quite modern phenomena of volunteering, they might be the results of pressure exposed by kinship networks or constraints of employment. Systems of giving presents and reciprocal help are able to maintain traditional networks not only at the level of kinship but on the level of whole
settlements (Sik 1988). Even when the activities or the motivations reportedly driving them are seemingly similar to volunteer activities, their social consequences can be totally different. More importantly, traditional networks or volunteer groups organized by state institutions cannot be considered as agents exercising the right to associate. In order to be counted as such, self-organized voluntary associations with public aims, as well as shared, public common goals are necessary. Thus, only volunteering within the framework of independent, non-state owned organizations can be considered as acts of ‘associating’. Furthermore, it is the kind of activity which has the potential to maintain an organizational sphere independent from the state or governmental organizations.

Therefore, it is best to consider only activities organized by or belonging to voluntary associations. As table 11 shows, this type of activity is stagnating at best, according to any recorded data. The first row of the table below contains the extent of organized volunteer-work and although there are changes, higher ratios of volunteering tend to include volunteering organized by non-voluntary organizations. This was the case in 1994, when organized volunteering reached 11 percent only with counting activities organized by non-voluntary organizations which approached the frequency of volunteering recorded in 2004. The data from 2006 and 2008 is somewhat ambiguous, probably due to differences in questions, or maybe to the context (inquiring about local activities) in which they were raised in ESS 2006.

\[\text{159}\text{ For example, ‘kaláka’ a form of reciprocal help-networks aiming at providing the necessary labor force to build a house might be interpreted as a stable, informal organization which is supported by the network in which it is embedded. Although this network is informal, the pressure it places on individual leads to an almost obligatory participation. (E. Sik, 1988). Similarly, data on non-organized volunteering might cover personalized inter-organizational relationships or actions performed to maintain these networks (Cf. E. Sik - Czakó, 1987).}\]
Table 11. The extent of volunteering 1990-2009, percentage of the adult population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary work(^{160}), organized by voluntary organizations</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7 (^{161}) (11)(^{162})</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11(^{163})</td>
<td>19(^{164})</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary work (organized and non-organized)</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the past 12 months, how often did you help with or attend activities organized in your local area(^{165})</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The date indicates the year of data collection.

Local participation

Questions about local participation also highlight possible problems of measurement: local participation might not be captured by questions concerning membership since it can be less formal and more fluid than participating in regional or national organizations. Therefore, boundaries between self-organized actions and events organized by local governments might be blurry. This might be well captured in the differences between the results of ESS 2006 and HES 2008. In the third wave of ESS (2006), local participation was referred to through a general question and the ratio of people participating in any local event (attending or helping with) outnumbered the proportion of volunteers by 8 percent. However, this might be the result of phrasing: HES in 2008 also asked about membership in local organizations and in organizing local activities, such as sports events. Altogether only 6% of the population answered that they are members of any organization as such.

\(^{160}\) Questions were similar, only slightly different in the ESS and EVS. Both questionnaires asked about voluntary work with the same questions proposed for memberships/belonging above. (see table 11).

\(^{161}\) Counted based on table 8.4 in Czakó et al. (1995:33)

\(^{162}\) Contains voluntary work organized by non-voluntary organizations as well.

\(^{163}\) Contains voluntary work organized by non-voluntary organizations as well.

\(^{164}\) The question was: “Were you involved in work for voluntary or charitable organizations, and if so how often in the past 12 months?”

\(^{165}\) Although the question did not involve the term volunteer or voluntary work, it was asked in the context of two other questions about volunteering and informal help, thus I think it could be understood as a question referring to volunteering.
Registering associations

An attempt of registering an association is clearly a form of exercising one’s right to the freedom of association. The prevalence of this practice could be examined by the raw numbers of registrations handed in to the Court. The data provided by the National Office for the Judiciary includes the registrations of associations and foundations as well. As I mentioned earlier, in this analysis, I consider foundations as associations thus I will also include their registrations in the analysis.

During the 21 years following 1989, 105,062 organizations were registered. Two-thirds of them are as associations. The total number of organizations with a valid registration was lower in 2010, since 23,511 organizations were dissolved by the court during the period.

In 1989 more than 9000 organizations appeared in the registry. However, this includes organizations that had already existed before 1989 and which had to be re-registered or gained legal personality due to changes in the legal and political environment. As Kuti (1998) mentions, in the first years of the nineties many local organizations vanished, since their main supporters, the cooperatives were dissolved. These associations (mostly sports and recreation) were often saved by local governments or their supporters and re-registered later or simply changed their name. Some organizations, which were founded before 1945 and nationalized (as large umbrella organizations of the disabled persons regained their independence and registered as associations). Other, formerly non-formal organizations – such as political organizations of the opposition, or environmental organizations – gained legal personality as soon as it was possible.

Excluding 1989, the number of registrations peaked in 1991 (8240 registrations) and until 2010 it slowly dropped to around an annual 3000. The cumulative trend of registrations display the same phenomena, as its curve is similar to the Mitscherlich model. (Fokasz, 2006) (Figure 5) This shape has a characteristic of growth, which is usually caused by an external factor, such as a changing legal framework enabling the free registration of organizations or fast mobilizations by the mass media, which gives a great impetus to hidden potentials.

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166 The data is a bit different than the law on associations would suggests, since this data contains churches as well.
167 Based on interviews conducted in 2006 as part of a research on human rights organizations (Cf. Gerő - Fonyó, 2013).
The motor of the potential for growth until 1995-1996 was probably the formalization of previously existing communities within new possibilities of self-organization the tax-allowances for non-profit organizations. Then, around 1998 the curve became similar to a linear growth model, meaning that after that people attempt to register the same number of organizations every year.

A closer examination of the data divided into different organizational forms\textsuperscript{168} uncovers the role foundations play in the time series. The growth of 1991 is a result of the number of foundations registered. These organizations (or even their registrations) should have existed at least partially already in 1989, since the possibility of establishing foundations opened in 1987 (Kuti, 1998) and the HCSO registered 400 functioning foundations already in 1989 (Nagy - Sebestény, 2008). The annual distribution of the two types changed accordingly: In 1990-1991 the proportion of foundations rose to 54 percent then it constantly fell during the period. In 2010, 26\% of the registrations aimed at establishing a foundation.

Except for 1990 and 1991 association was a more popular form. The gap between the two forms narrowed in the late nineties but opened up again in the 2000s. While it seems that registration

\textsuperscript{168} 1989 is excluded from the time series.
of associations found its stable level around an annual 2200-2300 (or around 2500 in average of the last 5 years), registering foundations became less and less popular after 2005 (Figure 3).

**Figure 6. Number of registrations per year, 1990-2010 associations, and foundations and foundations**

![Graph showing number of registrations per year, 1990-2010 associations, and foundations](image)

Data source: (OBH, 2010)

The cumulative data shows, that although association remained the dominant form, the proportion of foundations grew rapidly until 1998, reaching more than one-third (38%) of the organizational population. Then, after five years of stagnation, their proportion dropped a bit. In 2010, the proportion of foundations was 35% among organizations with active registrations.

The figure on yearly changes (figure 7) provides a more detailed picture of how the trend changes. At first, it seems that the first years witnessed the largest changes (an average of 15 percent decline per year until 1994), and the average fluctuation decreased to less than +/-5 percent until the end of the period (with the exception of 2008). However, a closer look reveals, that although the trend smoothened, there were years, when the ratio of decline compared to the previous year was 10 percent or more. The number of new registrations increased with 10 percent only once, in 1995, compared to 1994.
Belonging and registrations by policy and electoral periods

Belonging to associations and volunteer activities have somewhat contradicting tendencies. While the number of memberships in associations has decreased since 1990, it seems that it stabilized around 20 percent by 2010. As for organized volunteering, we have two types of data: the comparable dataset of the EVS shows a decline (from 16 to 11 percent), while the ESS indicates an increase from 9 to 19 percent in the same period. The Hungarian data shows a rather stable result, considering that in 2005, activities organized by state institutions were also counted. These results are contradicting, and we cannot relate it either to policy, or to electoral periods. It seems, that none of these have a direct impact on the changes in belonging to associations, and in volunteer activities.

The case of registering associations is quite different. Although the raw number of registrations declines continuously, the steepness of this trend is changing.\textsuperscript{169} By policy periods, there is a clear positive tendency: Although the number of registrations is declining, the extent of the average change between years is also declining. Thus, the decline in the average number of annual registrations slowed down. By policy-periods, the trend seems straightforward: the first

\textsuperscript{169} Although none of the two produces statistically significant differences, I think it is worth considering these results, since this is not a sample-based analysis, but one that can be considered as an analysis on a whole population.
period experienced the largest decline, while the second and third had significantly smaller negative changes (table 12).

Table 12. The annual, average number of registrations and the yearly change in the number of registrations by policy periods, 1990-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy period</th>
<th>Average N/year</th>
<th>Average change/year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-1996</td>
<td>6195</td>
<td>-10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-2003</td>
<td>4059</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2010</td>
<td>3454.7</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13. The average number of registrations and the annual change in the number of registrations by electoral periods, 1990-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral period</th>
<th>Average N/year</th>
<th>Average change/year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-1994</td>
<td>6616</td>
<td>-14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>4892.2</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2002</td>
<td>3985.4</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2006</td>
<td>3680.6</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>3362.6</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The picture is different, if one considers electoral periods: The first couple years had the largest number of registrations per year and also, the largest changes between years. Although all other electoral periods experienced a less steep decline in the registrations, there are important differences among them. After the first electoral period, the third one had the largest average fluctuation between years, and also the most decreasing trend. Between 1998 and 2002 there was no single year when the year-to-year change was positive. Compared to 1994-1998 the 1998-2002 period accelerated the decline, while the 2002-2006 period slowed it down. This is the only period when the number of registration increased as compared to the previous year respectively. Then in the last electoral period (2006-2010), the results deteriorate once again, inasmuch as the number of registrations decreases. (table 13)

The differences in the average yearly change can be partly explained by the political affiliation of the government. The first and third governments were conservative, or right-wing oriented, while the others considered themselves left-liberal. However, it is important to remember that behind the first period’s high average decrease we will find the already existing but re-registered which make the number of registrations from the first year seem deceptively high.
To sum up, it seems that the trends of belonging decreased in the middle of the period while volunteering stagnated or maybe even increased. The number of registrations also decreased from 9 to 3 thousand per year. While the trends of belonging and volunteering cannot be tied to electoral or policy periods, they contribute to the changes in the numbers of registrations.

B. Freedom of assembly

The second set of indicators belongs to activities which fulfill the definition of peaceful assemblies provided by Sólyom (2007) and Tallódi (2008). These activities cover various forms of protest (participation in demonstrations, strikes, occupations), electoral assemblies, and religious activities. The selected variables refer to

As Tallódi (2008) writes, the right to a peaceful assembly could be practiced, for example, in relation to politics, sports and religious events. The available data measure a) individual participation in political and religious events, b) the number of assemblies. Among political gatherings, electoral assemblies, demonstrations, strikes, occupying buildings were asked in a way that participation in them is comparable, while religious participation is generally measured by the attendance of religious events. In discussing the data, I will separate extra-parliamentary activities, which are activities not necessarily connected to the institutionalized channels of representation, electoral assemblies and participation on religious events.

As for phrasing the questions, similar phrasing was applied by different research programs. Nevertheless, their referred time scale is different. Questions vary from referring to the last 12 months (ESS) to the last couple years (HES) or ‘ever’ (EVS). Since changing the time frame might affects the results, in the tables below I publish their results in separate columns. (Table 14-Table 17)

Besides the surveys, I use the data provided by the Police on the number of events that fall under the effect of Act III. of 1989 on the Right to Peaceful Assembly. Since this data is available only from the second half of the 2000s, I will supplement it with the sporadic data collected and published by other scholars.

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170 Assemblies require the physical presence of people and should aim to express an opinion publicly. The peacefulness of events could be assumed only, since we do not know, what are the exact aims of participants or what are the means they used to express their convictions.

171 Attending religious services could be an indicator of freedom of religion too. The reason I chose this as an indicator of freedom of assembly was that under state socialism, attending religious services fell under the same category as any other assembly, as it was not welcomed by the regime and it was often similarly suppressed.

172 In more details, see chapter II.3
Demonstrations, occupations and strikes

Related to protest activities four activities are measured: 1) Attendance or taking part in peaceful demonstrations, 2) participating in illegal protests, 3) occupying buildings and 4) joining strikes.

Although from a methodological point of view the comparison is not easy, the data gives little room for multiple interpretations. The proportion of the population that participates in different forms of extra-parliamentary political action stagnates. Participation in lawful demonstrations varies from 2 to 5 percent. The lower ratios belong to a more limited timescale in 2004-2005. It seems that in 2006, there is a small increase in the ratio (4 percent) of people attending demonstrations.

Table 14. Forms of political participation between 1991-2010, percentage of adult population, various datasets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Attended/took part in a lawful demonstration</th>
<th>Attended/took part in illegal protests</th>
<th>Occupied buildings</th>
<th>Joined strikes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ever</td>
<td>last 12 months</td>
<td>ever</td>
<td>ever</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>last couple years</td>
<td>last couple years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 (EVS II)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 (EVS III)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 (ESS I)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 (HES)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 (ISSP)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 ESS II</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 ESS III</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4 (EVS)</td>
<td>3 (HES)</td>
<td>1 (HES)</td>
<td>0.3 (EVS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 (ESS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4 (EVS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 HES</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 ESS V</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Participation in illegal protests shows a similar trend. Irrespective of the time scale included in the questions, its prevalence is one percent in the entire period. This is the case after 2008 as well when the meaning of “illegal” or non-announced protest changed because of the inclusion

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173 In 1990 the Hungarian version was wrongly translated to 'official strike', later the question was translated as 'unofficial strike' in line with the source questionnaire.
of spontaneous protest in the legislation, which has broadened the legally guarded possibilities of protesters.

Since EVS, ESS and HES also measure more than one of the above-mentioned variables, they allow a limited comparison of an aggregated variable. Although EVS cannot be compared to the ESS and HES data, and the latter two are conducted in different years, EVS allows to compare its three waves separately and HES and ESS together could be used to examine the years between 2002 and 2009.

The aggregated data from 1990, 1999 and 2008 shows a little decrease in the prevalence of the examined activities,\(^{174}\) while the ESS-HES data series show complete stagnation and does not reflect on electoral periods, or policy periods at all.

Table 15. Participation in demonstrations, occupying buildings and strikes, 1991-2008
percentage of adult population EVS, HES, ESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Lawful demonstrations, occupying buildings, strikes</th>
<th>Lawful and illegal demonstrations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>6 (EVS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>5 (EVS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 (ESS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 (HES)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4 (EVS)</td>
<td>3 (ESS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>4 (HES)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Electoral assemblies

Information about participation on electoral assemblies is available only from 2003 and 2008. This information is based on the HES and ISSP datasets. It seems, that independently of the slightly different measurement methods, the results are similar and show stagnation. However, compared to other forms of participation, the prevalence of this activity seems to be relatively high.

Table 16. Attending political or electoral assemblies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participated in a political assembly</th>
<th>2003 (HES)</th>
<th>2004 (ISSP)</th>
<th>2008 (HES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ever</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Last 12 months</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in a political assembly during an electoral campaign</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{174}\) However, this is partly the result of the different phrasing of the questionnaire in 1990.
Religious events

The last category of examination is the attendance of religious events (table 17). It seems that the level of participation in religious events has not changed much since 1990. The majority, around 65 percent of the population, attends religious events at least once a year. The proportion of non-attendants varies between 32 and 43 percent, but the fluctuation of the results does not have a clear direction. Right after the transition, attending religious events was more fashionable, thus the ratio of people attending such events at least once in a month dropped from 23 percent in 1990 to 17-18 percent by the 2000s.\textsuperscript{175}

Table 17. How often do you attend religious services/events? 1990-2010 percentage of adult population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>at least once in a month</th>
<th>On holidays/couple times a year</th>
<th>less often /maximum once a year</th>
<th>never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990 (EVS II)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 (EVS III)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 (ESS I)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 (ISSP)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 ESS II</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 (ESS III)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 (HES)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 (EVs IV)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 (ESS IV)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 (ESS V)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of assemblies

Besides the ratio of participants, the number of events qualifies as assemblies could be a proxy for examining the practice of the freedom of assembly. There are several sources to take into account, however, none of them is complete. One of them is the data provided by the Hungarian Police about the number of events falling under the effect of Act III. of 1989 on the Right to

\textsuperscript{175} In 1999 EVS asked a different question, capturing a sense of commitment to the community as well: “How often do you spend time with church?”. A strong commitment is much less frequent then participation in religious events. Most of the people (70%) never spend time with their church. Only 16 percent of the respondents assemble with their religious community at least once in a month, 15 percent only a few times a year.
Peaceful Assembly. These might be protests or any other peaceful, public assemblies. Naturally, the data do not include assemblies held on private property (as most religious events) and spontaneous protests are probably also missing.

The second source of data is studies, applying protest-event analysis. (A. Szabó, 2009; Máté Szabó, 1993, 1995a, 1995b, 1998). Protest event analysis usually relies on the media, and it has its own methodological problems. First of all, the media covers only a minority of the events. Second, usually, one examines national newspapers. Therefore, most local events are missing from these datasets, and the given newspapers might have a strong selection bias based on their ideological background or topics of interest (Fillieule - Jiménez, 2003). In the case of Hungary, both sources, newspapers and the Police’s data have their shortcomings in their coverage of the period. The data provided by the Police, which reports the number of public assemblies is available only between 2005 and 2010. Besides, Máté Szabó (1998) analyzes and reports such statistics between 1989 and 1993.

Protest event analysis also provides only sporadic information. While there are a number of analyses covering the first quarter of the period, (Máté Szabó, 1993, 1995a, 1995b, 1998) there is much less information from the late 1990s and the 2000s. Andrea Szabó compares the number of protests on several topics in 1993 and 2003 (A. Szabó, 2009), while Berki collects the number of direct actions organized by trade unions between 1989 and 2010 (Berki, 2000, 2011).

The results published by different authors and those provided by the Police, summarized in table 18, are incomparable for various reasons. First, the definition and scope of the events considered are different: Máté Szabó, Andrea Szabó, and Berki examined protest actions, while the Police has a wider scope of events. From among events registered with the Police between 1991 and 1993, only 5-12 percent are considered protests (Máté Szabó, 1998). Berki (2000, 2011) collects actions taken by trade unions, while the other authors focus on other actors, such as non-formal social movements, civil society organizations, and sometimes political parties. Second, the sources of information are different. As it becomes clear from the data presented by Máté Szabó’s articles, the more sources are used, the more events are explored. In various

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176 Berki (2000); (Berki, 2011) uses organizational surveys as well to collect data about direct actions. Organizational documents are also often used, however the media is the most convenient source of collecting comparative data, despite its strong selection bias.

177 According to Fillieule and Jiménez (2003) the media covers between two and ten percent of the events.

178 My own calculations, based on the data presented in table 18.
articles, he counts with different numbers of protests for the year 1993: 45, 96 and 148\textsuperscript{179}. The difference in the results reflects the difference in the range of sources considered.\textsuperscript{180}

Thus, instead of comparing the different data, I just examine whether the direction of changes has any similarity. It is important to note that since the data is gathered from sources on different topics, the results should not be taken as reflecting a general tendency of practicing the freedom of assembly.

Table 18. Number of assemblies and protests between 1990 and 2010, published by different sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
<td>122</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td></td>
<td>126</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
<td>1629</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>44*</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>337</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td>2863</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>6981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td>6059</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td>4684</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td>4033</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
<td>1920</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*only until 1 July 1994

**Calculated from the numbers published (Berki 2011:2). Only such actions are considered that imply people assembling (strikes, protests, other collective actions at the workplace).

\textsuperscript{179} Szabó counts 45 events in (Máté Szabó, 1998) 96 in (Máté Szabó, 1995a) and 148 in (Máté Szabó, 1995b)

\textsuperscript{180} The methods of data collection applied by the different articles are summarized in the Appendices (Appendix 4)
The data reveals two phenomena: First, it seems that compared to the beginning of the period, the number of events has risen on every account. This is clear for direct actions on labor issues, and concerning the number of events registered with the Police. However, the direction of changes is not linear. Thus, the second phenomenon is the fall of the number of protests in the early nineties and the small number of direct actions related to labor issues in the middle of the period.

Examining the average and the total number of direct actions of labor issues by electoral and policy periods, reveals that the growth is rather continuous, especially when we count the average number of annual events by electoral periods (table 19). However, the differences between the first three periods are rather small, while that between the third and fourth and the last two periods is rather significant.

Table 19. Annual, average number of direct actions by electoral periods and the total number of direct actions per electoral periods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral period</th>
<th>Average number of direct actions/year*</th>
<th>Total number of direct actions*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-1994</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1998</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2002</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2006</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* overlapping years are included in both periods

data source: (Berki, 2011)

The results are similar if policy periods are examined. The average annual number of events was 20.3 between 1990 and 1996. 26.4 in the second period and 36.7 between 2004 and 2010. There is apparently a growth after 1996. Since the second period contains four years with the lowest number of actions (22/year), the growth compared to the previous period is mainly thanks to three years (1997, 2000 and 2003) with a higher number of events. In the last policy-period, differences between individual years could be significant, however, the lowest number of events is 26, higher than in most of the years between 1997 and 2003.

Although it is not possible to conduct such an analysis with the number of events falling under Act III. on the Right to Peaceful Assembly, the sudden spike between 2005 and 2006, from 2863 to 6981 events, is striking. Later on, the number of events return to a level similar to those of the early 1990s or 2005.
These results suggest that the number of events is influenced by political turmoils and the relationship between civil society and the state. Around 1990, general political turmoils caused by the transition affected trade unions: former socialist mass unions had to re-organize themselves, and new grass-roots organizations emerged, which could take a relatively active role in demonstrations (András Tóth - Neumann, 2010). According to Máté Szabó (1995b), trade unions organized 23-30 percent of protest events between 1989 and 1994. Berki (2000) further examined the trends of direct actions organized by trade unions. Their activity peaked first in 1997 and fell back afterward. This is in line with Tóth and Neumann’s assertion (2010) that trade unions and their large confederations consolidated during the 90s, whereas grass-roots movements vanished and the main tool of interest representation was to participate in established forums of social dialogue. In the 2000s the situation has changed and unions once again became more active in organizing extra-parliamentary actions. After 2003, they were more active in general than in the early nineties (Berki, 2011).

The results regarding protests and the number of events registered with the Police reflects a return to contentious politics after 2006. While the beginning of the 1990s saw the institutionalization of the formerly informal and politicized civil society, the stabilization of institutions gave space to the birth of the non-profit sector (Glózer, 2008; Kuti, 1998). State policies and the lack of small-scale services pushed organizations to become service providers either working together with state institutions or providing services themselves. Thus, the period between 1995 and 2005 was the most silent in this regard in the last twenty years. In 2006 a political crisis brought back contention, mostly on the right. Between 2006 and 2009 the annual number of registered gatherings (protests among them) was at least one and a half times more than in 2005. Data from the Hungarian Police also suggests that the number of protests suddenly increased in 2006, as a consequence of the non-public speech of the Prime Minister that leaked out in September. In 2005 there were 2863 events, while there were 6981 in 2006 (almost two-thirds of them (4497) took place in September, October or November). Until

181 1989 and 1991 were exceptional in this regard: in these years, only 15-16 percent of the events were organized by trade unions. (Máté Szabó, 1995b:63).
182 The speech was held on 17th September, 2006 in a non-public meeting of the ruling party (MSZP), a couple of months after national and a couple of weeks before local elections. The re-elected prime minister said that they had lied and that they had not governed in the last four years. The speech leaked out and led to protests.
183 Not all of these events are protests. Some have been announced under the effect of the Act III of 1989 on the right to Peaceful Assembly. These events can be protests, but any cultural events as well. For example, in 2005, almost half of them were organized in March, probably as a commemoration of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848-1849. Figures are based on the information provided by the ORFK (2010)
2010, the number of registered events returned to the level of 2005.\textsuperscript{184} It is also possible that in 2002 and 2006 the mass movement of Civic Circles\textsuperscript{185} (organized by Fidesz) or their demonstrations in 2006 influenced the figures. This is supported by a survey conducted in 2014 (Fokasz et al., 2014), people indicated that they remember 2006 as a year with an increased number of protests.

As a summary, we can state that on the one hand, the proportion of people practicing the freedom of assembly stagnated through the examined period, at least this is suggested by the results, after examining extra-parliamentary activities, electoral assemblies and attending religious events. On the other hand, the number of events might rose throughout the period and especially after 2002. Not only the more open nature of governance could contribute to the rising number of events, but the return of contentious politics as Fidesz started to organize its civic movement and fostered by the upheaval of the autumn of 2006.

C. Freedom of expression

Freedom of expression is practiced both publicly and in the private sphere. The well-embedded forms of anti-politics (see the Havelian or Konradian understanding of civil society in Chapter I.2) shows, that one of the crucial questions is whether people are able to express their views inside and outside of the close circles of family and friends. One way to avoid conflicts is to express views and thoughts as expected by others, while another is to avoid talking about politics at all. Democratization suggests that people start discussing public issues more openly, thus they will start to talk about politics not only in their private circles but also with their less close acquaintances.

Therefore, in the case of the freedom of expression, organized or public and non-formal or private forms of exercising the freedom of expression should be distinguished. The organized forms of expression of opinions are related to established institutions, such as media outlets, or at least requires some actor organizing a collective action. These organized or public forms could be divided into two groups:

\textsuperscript{184} In 2007, there were 6059 events, whereas there were 4684 in 2008, 4033 in 2009, and 1920 in 2010. (source: ORFK, 2010, 2014)

\textsuperscript{185} In 2002, FIDESZ lost the national elections. After the elections, they organized a mass assembly, where the Prime Minister announced the foundation of a movement, called Civic Circles and asked people to form small clubs, associations and circles everywhere around the country. The movement was the basis of mobilization for the following years, but it lost its significance later. (Gerő - Kopper, 2013)
1. **Collective actions without the physical presence that assemblies require**, such as signing petitions, boycotting or buying certain products because of political/ideological reasons, donating money, wearing political symbols.

2. **Individual actions**, such as expressing an opinion by writing an article or comment, calling into a radio show, voting or commenting by SMS on a television show.

**Private forms** of expression are measured by the *extent and frequency of people talking about politics* with their family, friends, acquaintances outside their family, as well as with their neighbors or co-workers.

Public or organized activities will be examined mostly by using EVS, HES and ESS. The differences between the questions used by the various datasets are similar to those between questions relating to the freedom of assembly. Some of the questions refer to the last 12 months (ESS), to the last couple year (HES) or “ever” (EVS). Since changing the time frame might affect the results, I publish them in separated columns in the table below (table 20). In the case of donations, the results of published research will also be taken into account (Czakó et al., 1995; Czike - Kuti, 2006), while the extent and frequency of people talking about politics will be explored on the basis of EVS and HES.

The two datasets are different. EVS asks only about talking about politics with friends, while HES applies a more diverse setting, which enables me to examine the gaps between private sphere (family and friends) and more public networks (co-workers and neighbors).

**Organized and public forms of expressing opinions**

Among organized activities, the most prevalent is to ‘sign a petition’. However, the exact result of measurement is strongly influenced by the time frame the question refers to. The highest proportion is measured when the referenced frame is “ever” (15-18 percent). As the time frame gets shorter, the proportion of people signing a petition also gets lower: when it is a couple of years, the level of participation falls to 8-9 percent and when the question refers to the last 12 months it falls to (3-9 percent).

In the direction of changes there is a further difference: EVS, which measures the highest ratio throughout the period, detects a decline in signing petitions between 1990 and 1999. After 1999, neither EVS nor ISSP 2004 show any significant change in the results. HES, which has three data points in the 2000s detects a stagnating trend of 8-9 percent throughout the decade. However, the trends of signing a petition in the “last 12 months” (ESS and ISSP) shows a more fluctuating trend between 2002 and 2010. The ratio of people signing a petition is the lowest in
2002 and in 2010, while a higher ratio is found in 2004-2006. ISSP 2004 measured a nine percent prevalence, which suits the trend of growth and decline. However, the results might be positively influenced by the topic of the questionnaire, which focuses on citizenship (table 20).

Table 20. Signing a petition and wearing a political symbol, 1990-2010 percentage of adult population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>signed a petition</th>
<th>worn or displayed political signs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ever</td>
<td>last couple years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 (EVS II)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 (EVS III)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 (ESS I)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 (HES)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 (ISSP)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 (ESS II)</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 (ESS III)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 (HES)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 (EVS IV)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 (ESS IV)</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 (HES)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 (ESS V)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Measuring the form of ‘Wearing or displaying political symbols’, which might indicate a closer affiliation to a political party or group, clearly indicates stagnation if we consider it on a broader timescale. The ups and downs of the narrower timescale are probably the results of electoral cycles (the proportion of those wearing such symbols is higher in election years).

Another public form of expressing opinions is participation in ‘boycotts or conscious consumption’. Its examination reveals two surprising phenomena: First, results regarding boycotts vary in a quite wide range among different surveys, but results do not reflect the phrasing of the questions, or at least not the way it is expected. In case the question is phrased for the ‘last couple years’ or ‘last 12 months’, prevalence is higher than when ‘ever’ is used. The importance of the applied time frame is supported by that results are changing by the various research programs. Each of them measures the similar prevalence of conscious consumption in different time points, only the EVS measures two-three percent while ESS and HES measures five to seven percent.186

186 The solution may lie in the slightly different questions. EVS used the laconic phrase “joining in boycotts” while ESS and HES explained the term a bit. Both questionnaires used the same items: “Deliberately haven’t bought, boycotted certain products?” The ISSP-citizenship applied an extended question, that was narrower in other way,
Assuming that the difference depends mostly from the phrasing of the question and that it would be similar in the early nineties as well, we could argue that the overall participation in boycotts can be around six percent, and it has a stable prevalence since the transition.

**Table 21. Joining boycotts and buying certain products, 1990-2010, percentage of adult population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Joined in boycotts</th>
<th>Bought certain products</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ever</td>
<td>last couple years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 (EVS II)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 (EVS III)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 (ESS I)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 (HES)</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 (ISSP)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 (ESS II)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 (ESS III)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 (EVS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/9 (ESS IV)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 (HES)</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 (ESS V)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second “surprise” is the prevalence of conscious consuming. It is among the most prevalent forms of expressing opinions. The data is missing from the 1990s, but through the 2000s it was between 7-10 percent. According to ESS 2002, a greater proportion of people participated in conscious consuming in the ‘last 12 months’ than later, in the ‘last couple years’. The phrasing of the question was the same and the surrounding questions were similar. In accordance with that, this form of expressing an opinion slightly decreased after the beginning of the 2000s.

Thus, the forms that fit into the collective action category seem to produce a more or less stagnating trend. However, *we might presume that electoral cycles have an influence on the* [187]

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[187] In the results of 2002 a large-scale boycott from 2001 might be reflected. In 2001 Danone was about to close a popular sweets factory located in Győr with a long-standing tradition (Győri Kekszgyár). The boycott received a nation-wide attention and was supported even by celebrities (see Danone Bojkott (Danone Boycott) [http://tudatosvasarlo.hu/cikk/danone-bojkott](http://tudatosvasarlo.hu/cikk/danone-bojkott) last accessed: 11/11/2018.)
‘wearing of political symbols’. Besides, the early 1990s might exhibit a higher prevalence of signing petitions. Aside from that, another clear influence is not identifiable.

Donations

Philanthropy or any activity involving donations is usually a subject treated separately from other forms of participation. In the following pages, I will refer to philanthropic activities such as individual donations in cash or donations-in-kind to civil or political organizations, the church, people or to a cause. Similarly to volunteering, I will examine organizational and informal forms of philanthropy.

Similarly to volunteering, various definitions of philanthropy were meant under items asked by different research projects. This led to significantly different results. First of all, there were two research projects, already cited above (Czakó et al., 1995; Czike - Kuti, 2006)(Czakó et al. 1995, Czike-Kuti 2006) focusing on volunteering and philanthropy in 1993 and 2004 respectively. Apart from ESS 2002, ISSP Citizenship also asked about donating money to organizations.

The definition of philanthropy that was applied is again too different for a simple comparison: While ESS and ISSP understand philanthropy as donating to organizations (both civic and political), the projects from 1994 and 2004 understood philanthropy in broader terms (including volunteering as well): “We treated those individuals as philanthropist, who supported individuals outside of their kinship relations and closer friendship circle or foundations, associations, churches or state institutions with contribution-in-kind (clothes, food, books, toys, etc.) or money” (Czike - Kuti, 2006:78).

Czike and Kuti (2006) distinguish between donations in cash and donations-in-kind. Donations in cash are also divided into three forms: ‘direct fundraising’ (giving money to beggars, money boxes in churches or at public venues etc.), ‘philanthropy fairs’, or buying products to help a cause (e.g. postcards) and ‘organizational fundraising’ when people give money to an organization directly. They note that these forms are not mutually exclusive or in competition with each other. They often overlap (e.g. money boxes in churches can also be treated as organizational fundraising).

Different approaches taken by surveys produce different results once again. The two research projects of 1993 and 2004 measure the importance of philanthropy to a much higher degree, since they consider not only organizational donations, but all sorts. The overall ratio of the population that took part in philanthropic deeds was almost sixty (58) percent in 1993 and
almost seventy-five in 2004. (74%). In 2004, 48 percent of the adult population contributed to a cause or helped with donations-in-kind. (Czike - Kuti, 2006).

Direct fundraising mobilized most of the population, (55 %) followed by philanthropy fairs (39%). Only 21% of the population supported organizations, although this group gave almost half of all of the amount of donations reported by the respondents (47%).

Czike and Kuti (2006) do not distinguish between different organizational spheres, since the border between them is not clear and citizens are often not able to differentiate between churches and religious organizations on the one hand, and non-profit and governmental institutions on the other. ESS and ISSP asked about donations to voluntary organizations – again not necessarily distinguishing between churches and religious organizations, but excluding state institutions. According to these datasets, about 6-9 percent of the population took part in any kind of fundraising activity in 2002 and 2004. Taking their different question-designs into account, the difference between ESS and ISSP seems reasonable. The scale of donating money measured by these two surveys is similar and much lower than what Czike and Kuti found. Differentiation by the subject of donation corroborates the claim that the 13-15 percent difference between the prevalence of donations measured by ESS, ISSP and the results published by Czike and Kuti is related to the fact that they operationalized organized and non-organized activities differently. However, when various researches measure donations to political parties and groups, their results are similar. For example, HES measured 1 to 2 percent between 2003 and 2009, and Czike and Kuti (2006) also estimated the size of the group donating money to such organizations around one percent (0.8%) in 2004.

The frequency of donating gives insight into practicing this form of actions. Probably two ways of measurement this frequency come to mind: The proportion of those who support more than one cause, or the activity and the amount of the donation. Unfortunately, there is only one dataset that measures the support for more than one cause, (ESS 2002), thus, I cannot identify changes in this regard. Measuring the amount of donations is also difficult, as there are too many uncertainties involved. Although I have data from the two surveys of 1993 and 2004 concerning individuals,

188 ISSP Citizenship asked about donating and participating in fund-raising activities as well.
189 2 percent in 2003, 0.8 percent in 2008 and 2.2 percent in 2009.
190 In 2002 24 percent of the respondents gave a donation to voluntary organizations in two or more fields or activities.
and from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office concerning the organizational and sectorial\textsuperscript{191} levels, the amount people give probably depends on different economic factors. Furthermore, simply the amount of money would tell us little. It should be contrasted to inflation, GDP growth and a variety of other factors. Even then, many uncertainties would remain.

Therefore, it might be more appropriate to only measure the types of donations people give: that is money (cash), and in-kind. Czike and Kuti (2006) note that it is not only the ratio of philanthropists that has grown, but also of those that offer support through both of these types (table 22).

Table 22. Extent and types of donations in 1993 and 2004, percentage of the adult population*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of donation</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only in cash</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only donation-in-kind</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*My calculation is based on the data provided by Czike and Kuti (2006:169)

By 2004, the proportion of people providing both forms of donations got larger than that of those providing only one type of support.

From 1993 to 2004, engagement in philanthropic activities became more frequent. Among people giving donations-in-kind, the ratio of occasional donors slightly decreased, whereas the ratio of those, who gave donations at least every half year increased. I do not have the exact figures concerning donations in cash from 1993 and 2004, but it seems that the proportion of those, offering donations regularly (once in a year, once every six months or monthly) has increased. Meanwhile, the number of weekly donors decreased (table 23).

Table 23. The frequency of different types of donations, 1993 and 2004, percentage of the respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>donations-in-kind</th>
<th></th>
<th>donations in cash</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At one specific occasion</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occasionally, but several times</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{191} The non-profit sector is the sectorial level
regularly, once in a year  | 14 | 13 | 7 | 17 | 15  
regularly, in every half year | 16 | 23 | 10 | 11 | 15  
regularly, monthly | 5 | 8 | 6 | 11 | 11  
regularly, weekly | 1 | 3 | 2 | 11 | 5  

source: Czike-Kuti 2006: 169, 170 and table 3 and 4, numbers are rounded.

The 1% system

Since 1997, Hungarian citizens can **designate one percent of their income-tax** to non-profit organizations. Some studies discuss the 1% system together with donations (for example Czike - Kuti, 2006), however, it is well noted that tax designations differs significantly from donations. While donating is an act, where the individuals offer their own property, designation of the 1% of someone’s income tax is an act, where individuals only decide the fate of a public good that already belongs to the state. Nevertheless, the act of such a designation may incite a feeling of having donated, even if not in the classical sense, and it might curb motivations for donating in the classical sense (Mészáros - Sebestény, 2000; Mészáros et al., 2000). According to Czike and Kuti (2006) this does not seem to be the case. Apparently, the two acts strengthen each other. For me, the main question is not whether the one percent is a donation, but whether citizens feel that by deciding its fate they practice their rights to express an opinion. By going through the studies concerning the ‘one percent law’, I could not find a reference to the freedom of expression. Only the title of a book (Mészáros et al., 2000) and a study by Vajda and Kuti (2000) refer to the designation as a kind of “voting” about public goods and civil organizations by citizens. The note that since the decision is not about their own property, citizens only weigh the “charm and usefulness of possible beneficiaries’ aims and activities. In accordance with that, decisions concerning the one percent can be seen as a “poll” which result reflects the citizen’s opinion of civil organizations” (Vajda - Kuti, 2000:16).

There is another uncertainty, namely that the one percent system is only partly public. While the public sees only the results of the designation, the act of designating itself is anonymous. Although this is often the case for other acts of expressing opinions (especially donations) this is not a principle. Despite these ambiguities, I tend to accept that designating one percent of the income tax is a form of expressing an opinion since the aggregated results of designations might be considered as a form of public support for an organization or a cause.
Tax designation shows the greatest development through the years among all forms of expressing one’s opinion: in 1997, one million taxpayers designated their one percent to civil organizations, while in 2010 1.8 million. (NAV, 2011)

The growth of beneficiaries is also almost linear. Between 1997 and 2010, the number of supported organizations increased from 15,949 to 30,701. The ratio of growth is higher than the growth of non-profit organizations in Hungary, which can be read as a sign of growing consciousness about civil society organizations.

**Freedom of expression in the media**

The last organized form of expression that is discussed here that of communicating through the media. This category includes writing articles or comments, giving an interview, calling a radio show or voting and commenting in a text message.

I have comparable data about these forms of participation from three years (2003, 2008, 2009), thanks to the Hungarian Election Studies. The ISSP Citizenship dataset contains similar variables, but it is comparable only with regards to offline activity (table 24.).

**Table 24. Expressing opinions through the media 2003-2009, percentage of the adult population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>2003 HES</th>
<th>2004 HES</th>
<th>2008 HES</th>
<th>2009 HES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wrote an article or comment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted a journalist to express an opinion in a newspaper or on the radio</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expressed an opinion in online newsrooms, portals, political forums</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Called a radio show</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted or commented by SMS in a tv-show</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ratio of active citizens is similar throughout the six years period and remains around two or three percent for each form of expression. The solitary exception is voting or commenting by text message, which reached seven percent in 2003. Although this last form is still the most performed activity, its prevalence is declining and it was less frequent at the end of the decade than it was earlier despite the rapid diffusion of cell phones.192

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192 The first cell-phone service in Hungary was offered from 1990. In 2011, 80% of the population owned a cell phone. (Pintér, 2011)
Freedom of expression in the family, among friends and acquaintances

The extent of **practicing the freedom of expression in the private sphere** may be even more important and tells us more about the milieu of a country, than the prevalence of more formal ways of doing so. As I mentioned in chapter I.2, prior to 1989, Hungarians withdrew themselves into their closed circles of family and close friends. In contrast with the socialist rule, *it is expected that in times of freedom, people will open themselves up and that they establish more heterogeneous relations and start speaking about public issues.* A possible way of confirming these expectations is to ask people how often they talk about politics with their different acquaintances and how often they try to persuade friends about their opinions, especially concerning political issues.

In the selected datasets, various forms and questions are available for measurement. EVS and HES measure how often respondents discuss politics with their friends, and how often they try to persuade them about their political views. Unfortunately, most of the data is from the 2000s, and only EVS provides data from the 1990s, and as mentioned only about friends. But even this limited data provides a striking picture of how the number of people discussing politics with their friends decreased after 1990 (table 25). During the events of the transition, politics was an interesting topic. The sudden changes in the political structure and the new experience of speaking about public issues without the threat of any retaliation is very well reflected in the data. As the value of novelty passed and people started to experience the sometimes harsh features of politics, it lost its charm. As a consequence, in 1999 almost twice as many people claimed (24 vs 46 percent) that they never talk about politics with their friend. The proportion of people talking about politics on a regular basis also decreased (from 22 to 10 percent).

The 2000s exhibit a process of opening up. The proportion of people that ‘never talk about politics’ decreased to 37-38 percent. While the ratio of people that ‘frequently discuss politics’ has remained similar to what it was in 1999. The amount of those that ‘talk about politics occasionally’ also increased. It seems that those who really wanted to talk about politics maintained their behavior throughout the period, while for the less engaged citizens, it takes time to find politics interesting again.

Discussing politics and persuading others are somewhat different activities. The latter requires more commitment to an opinion and some confidence in its correctness. The question about **persuading others** also refers not only to friends but also to acquaintances, colleagues and sometimes kins (in 2004), which makes an exact comparison problematic. EVS in 1990 asked
people about persuading friends, kins, acquaintances, and colleagues about any opinion – not exclusively politics – and not unsurprisingly only 11 percent of the population responded that they never tried that, whereas 30 percent stated that they often try to do so. In the 2000s the questions referred to politics. Since 2003, around half of the respondents claimed that they never tried to persuade others about their political opinions and 6-8 percent responded that they try to do so frequently. Among the remaining 40-45 percent, a greater proportion seldom, whereas a smaller number tries to persuade others sometimes (Table 26.)

Table 25. How often do you discuss politics with friends? percentage of the adult population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990 (EVS II)</th>
<th>1999 (EVS III)</th>
<th>2003 HES</th>
<th>2008 EVS (IV)</th>
<th>2009 HES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>frequently</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occasionally</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>never</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 26. If you have an unequivocal opinion about a political issue, how often do you try to persuade others about it? 2003-2009, percentage of adult population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003 HES</th>
<th>2004 ISSP</th>
<th>2008 HES</th>
<th>2009 HES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequently</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seldom</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Hungarian Election Studies applied a more diverse methodology. They asked separately, how often people discuss politics within their family, with their friends, further acquaintances, their neighbors and (ex)colleagues. In 2003, they asked the question in general and referring to times around elections, probably in order to filter the effects of elections.\footnote{193 2002 was an electoral year in Hungary.} In 2008, the question referred to ‘time around elections’ while in 2009 the general question was phrased without specifying the context.

As the figures (8-9) show, more people talk about politics among family members and close friends than outside these closed circles. This is valid for 2003, 2008 as well as 2009, however, the ratio of those that never discuss politics decreased between 2003 and the end of the decade. A comparison of the two figures reveals that the situation has an effect on the extent of discussing politics outside the family and friends. The proportion of people, who do not discuss
politics even with their family and friends in general, is similar to the ratio of those who do not talk around elections either. Outside of the close circles, significantly fewer people discuss politics. For example, in 2003, 59 percent of the respondents claimed that they do not discuss politics with their colleagues, while during election periods the respective figure is five percent higher. I find similar differences with regard to neighbors (69 versus 75 percent). The differences between discussing politics in general and around elections with colleagues and neighbors show similar characteristics in 2008-2009 as well. While in 2009 52-54 percent of the respondents answered that they never discuss politics with their colleagues or neighbors, when the question includes elections the figure is 58 and 68 percent, respectively.

Between 2003 and 2008-2009, the ratio of people discussing politics has increased. This holds for discussing politics in general as well as around elections. This increase affects the proportion of people ‘seldom’ discussing politics, while the overall proportion of people discussing politics ‘often’ remains roughly the same.

*The trends of practicing the freedom of expression* might be the most difficult aspect to evaluate based on policy periods or electoral cycles since most of the data is sporadic. *It seems, however, that there are two directions of changes:* Participation in organized and collective actions seems to stagnate in most cases, with the exception of donations and designating the 1%. The prevalence of these two forms (especially the latter) is growing throughout the period. Designation of the 1% is related to a policy action, although its growth is linear since its introduction, regardless of electoral cycles or policy periods. As for donations, I am only able to identify the growth between 1993 and 2004, but I could not connect this to any policy or electoral periods.

Private forms of expressing opinions have non-linear change. It seems, that the events of 1989-1990 contributed to the temporary vitalization of discussing politics. A setback followed this exceptional period, after which, in the 2000s a slow opening was experienced. Since the data from the 2000s starts in 2003, I cannot be sure whether this is due to the relative openness of political opportunity structures.
Figure 8. How often do you discuss politics with… 2003 and 2009, Hungarian Election Studies, percentage of the adult population

Figure 9. How often do you discuss politics or elections with… at the time of elections? 2003 and 2008, percentage of adult population
D. Taking part in public affairs

Based on Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a citizen has the right to take part in elections, to be elected, and to influence politics directly or through a representative. There are well-established institutions that provide the means to practice such a right, such as national and local elections, national and local referenda, as well as popular initiatives. A less institutionalized way of practicing this right is to contact politicians when an issue comes to mind, going to their office hours or writing letters to them.

The data about participation in elections can easily be accessed through the website of the Hungarian National Election Office.\footnote{Választások, Népszavazások (Elections, Referenda): \url{http://www.valasztas.hu/valasztasok-szavazasok} last accessed 11/11/2018.} The extent of participation in national referenda is also accessible for the entire period, however, data on local referenda is published only since 1999. Due to this and the different nature of national and local referenda (thus, participation in local popular votes indicates practice for only a settlement or a county), I will use only the number of local referenda and disregard turnout rates in the examination.

For agenda initiatives, since their aim is to put a question on the agenda of the Parliament, the number of initiatives is in itself a relevant indicator. However, both the data about referenda and initiatives have a shortcoming. In their case, mostly it is only the number of successful initiatives (in the case of which the necessary number of signatures were collected) is available. The case is better for national referenda, since secondary literature refers to cases in which the number of necessary signatures was not collected or the initiative was withdrawn (Gulyás, 1999) and the National Election Office releases the number of initiated referenda by electoral periods. For local referenda and agenda initiatives, the only available annual data was published by Kukorelli (2009), who does not differentiate between local and national causes or between referenda and initiatives.

Contacting a politician was frequently measured by surveys in a comparable way, such as the European Social Survey and the Hungarian Election Study\footnote{ISSP citizenship in 2004 also applies a question on contacting a politician. However, because of the different design and the varying results, I decided to exclude this data from the analysis.} in the 2000s. In their case, only the time frame is different. As in other forms of participation, the ESS asks the question with reference to the last 12 months, while HES does it for the past few years.
In the following section, I firstly provide a review on the participation in national elections and referenda, secondly on the number of local referenda and popular initiatives, focusing on the 2000s. Finally, I introduce the figures of contacting a politician between 2002 and 2010.

**Participation in elections and referenda**

Between 1989 and 2010, there were six national and local elections and six national referenda. In 2004, the country joined the European Union, thus in 2004 and 2009, additionally there were European Parliamentary elections (only party lists).

Electoral participation is probably the most thoroughly examined political activity of Hungarians. For example, the whole Hungarian Election Studies program is designed to study voting behavior. Longitudinal studies, analyzing how and why Hungarians vote are available (Angelusz - Tardos, 2005; Karácsony, 2009; Kern - Szabó, 2011; Kmetty, 2013). Most of these studies note that although the extent of participation in any kind of elections or popular votes is much higher than any other forms of participation, it is ranked as low and in European comparison and similar to figures of other countries’ in the Central and Eastern European region (Angelusz - Tardos, 1996, 2005).

Parliamentary elections always had a higher voter turnout than local elections. Participation in the former always exceeded the latter by at least 10 percent. The direction of trends, however, is different: The participation in local elections increased from 40 to 53 percent until 2006 and fell back to 46.6 in 2010. Participation in national elections shows stability: with one exceptional year, 1998, participation is around 65-70%. Interestingly, the setback in 1998 is followed by the highest level of participation in 2002. In comparison with the election in 2002, voter turnout decreased both in 2006 and in 2010.

Voter turnout for national referenda fluctuates even more than for national or local elections. In 1990, only 14 percent of those eligible participated, while in 1989 and in 2008, more than

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196 These were: the four yes referenda (Négyigenes népszavazás) in 1989; the referendum on the election of the President in 1990; the referendum on joining the NATO in 1997; the referendum on joining the European Union in 2003; the referendum on introducing a patient’s fee in the Health care System and on the double citizenship for Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries in 2004; the referendum on health care fees and tuition fees in 2008.


198 As far as the first round is concerned.
50 percent. Voter turnout at the two European Parliamentary elections are quite similar (table 27).

Table 27. Participation in elections and national referenda in Hungary 1989-2010, percentage of eligible citizens*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National, Parliamentary Elections**</th>
<th>Local Elections**</th>
<th>European Parliamentary Elections</th>
<th>National referenda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Electoral Office (www.valasztas.hu)

*The table contains those years only, in which an election or referendum were held.

**First rounds of elections

The number of initialized referenda and popular initiatives could give a more precise picture about the scope of the intentions to participate in public issues. The number of such initiatives (agenda initiatives and referenda) between 1990 and 2008 is collected by Kukorelli (2009). For the period of 1990 and 1997, Gulyás (1999) collects the initiatives that lacked the necessary number of signatures to be processed or those that were opposed by the National Electoral Committee or the Constitutional court. He lists 9 attempts of referenda. Only two of these led to actual referenda, in 1990 and 1997 respectively.

The tools of direct democracy were less frequently used in the first half of the period, while more and more frequently after 2002 (Kukorelli, 2009). The year 2006 seems to be a breaking point in this regard. Between 2006 and 2007, the growth of the number of initiated actions was more than 700%. Although, it is worth to note that the numbers had already been increasing before. In 2002 and in 2005, there was also a significant growth as compared to the previous year (table 28).
Table 28. The number of initiated national referenda votes and agenda initiatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No*</th>
<th>% of growth compared to the previous year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989–1997</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>157%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>211%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>702%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>-32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kukorelli (2009)

*my calculation

Local popular votes

The National Election Office released\textsuperscript{200} the number of initiated referenda by electoral periods since 2002. According to their statistics, between 2002 and 2006 there have been 100 initiated referenda, while between 2006 and 2010 there were 1022 (NVI, 2018b). However, the yearly distribution of this data is not available and I do not have data on popular initiatives, this also indicates a significant growth after 2006.\textsuperscript{201}

The number of local popular votes or local referenda is also released by the National Election Office since 1999.\textsuperscript{202} This data is also discussed by Kukorelli (2009) and (Adrienn Tóth, 2012). Tamás (2014) also examined the frequency of popular votes, although only for three selected periods. The novelty of her research was to examine local referenda in the early 1990s as well.

\textsuperscript{200} Statistics from (NVI, 2018b)

\textsuperscript{201} The composition of actors initiating referenda has probably also transformed. Until 2006, the main actors behind attempts of initiating referenda were mostly political parties or the government. However, this must have changed with the increasing number of attempts.

\textsuperscript{202} (NVI, 2018a)
Thus, Tamás selected the periods of 1990-1993, 1999-2001 and 2007-2009. This is the only research, which reports data from the nineties. According to Tamás, there were 79 local referenda in the period of 1991-1993 (2014:148).

Table 29. Local referenda 1999-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Valid and successful</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Összesen</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Kukorelli, 2009; NVI, 2018a)

Table 29 shows a different picture than those on national referenda. The numbers fluctuate and it is hard to identify a clear direction. On the one hand, the early 2000s seem to be less intense than the early nineties. On the other hand, the number of referenda is growing (although some years experience an exceptionally low number of initiated referenda).

By examining the average number of initiated national referenda, agenda initiatives and local referenda per year in electoral cycles (table 30), I can clearly differentiate between the trends regarding national and local actions: The number of initiated referenda on the national level increased between 2002-2006 and even more after the political crisis of 2006. During the 2000s the annual mean number of local referenda is lower than in the early 90s. Between 2002 and 2006, it increased a bit, but it decreased once again in the last electoral period (table 30).

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203 It is important to note that the source of her data is somewhat different due to a different method of data collection and sources. In the second period, the author mentions 58 referenda, while the Election Office’s data mentions only 51.
Table 30. The average number of national and popular votes/year by electoral cycles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral cycle</th>
<th>National popular votes and agenda initiatives</th>
<th>Local popular votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990–1994</td>
<td></td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994–1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998–2002</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002–2006</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–2010</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contacting a politician

**Contacting a politician or a representative** is a primary way of getting involved in public issues. In every measurement, its prevalence is around 10 percent or even higher. ESS data shows that in election years (2002, 2006, 2010) contacting a politician becomes even more prevalent. In line with earlier research, (Róbert-Szabó, 2017), results of the HES seem less dependent on elections. In accordance with both datasets, the extent of this practice seems stable. It changes by three to five percent in electoral cycles, but it does not grow or decrease in a linear direction (table 31).

Table 31. In the last 12 months, have you contacted a politician, elective, representative, of the local or national government, 2002-2010, ESS, percentage of adult population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contacted a politician</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1603</td>
<td>1427</td>
<td>1450</td>
<td>1499</td>
<td>1529</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unfortunately, data is available only from the 2000s and from periods under the reign of two left-wing governments. However, it is quite clear that even the turmoils of 2006 did not have a permanent effect on the number of people contacting politicians and if this type of participation has grown during the examined twenty years, it has reached its peak by the early 2000s and stagnated until 2010 (table 32).

Table 32. In the past few years have you contacted a politician or local elective?, HES 2003-2009, percentage of adult population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>contacted a politician</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1506</td>
<td>3114</td>
<td>1521</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
II.2.9. Summary

This chapter has two aims: First, to examine, whether exercising the freedom of association, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of expression and the right to take part in public issues became more prevalent in the two decades following the Revolution in 1989. Second, to investigate how institutional characteristics of the new system and its changes shaped these trends. As for institutional changes, four aspects were examined: The constitutional framework (the Constitution and fundamental laws on the examined rights), policy changes concerning the civil society and the examined freedoms, political opportunity structures (electoral cycles) and turmoil of the political system. To examine trends of exercising rights I used the action-based approach I have developed in the previous chapter.

Four hypotheses were formed:

H1: In general, among democratic institutions, one could expect gradually increasing activities in relation to most of the examined rights.

H2: The general expectations would, however, not indicate that the trends should be linear. Policy changes sometimes supplement, sometimes counteract the influence of the general framework. Thus, the increasing administrative load in the first half of the 1990s might slow down while the changes introduced in 1997 and 2004 foster associational participation.

H3: Between 1990 and 1994, political opportunity structures might gradually close, which is in line with the regulation becoming more professionalized and, in some cases, stricter. Between 1994 and 1998, regulation gradually clarified the way popular votes could be used. Moreover, the one percent system was introduced, which might contribute to the growth of the number of popular votes initiated and associational activities. However, closing opportunity structures between 1998 and 2002 might counteract the positive influence of these policy changes. After 2002, establishing the National Civil Fund, and introducing a Civil strategy indicates the opening of opportunity structures which should vitalize associational participation and consequently assemblies and other forms of expressing an opinion.

H4: Protesting and expressing opinions could be the most intense during times of crises. Therefore, the years after the transition itself and the period after 2006 should be the most intense. Thus, I expected that people will engage the most in protest activities, signing petitions, participating boycotts or talking about politics after 1990 and 2006.
The first hypothesis was clearly proven false. Although in some aspects the prevalence of participation or exercising rights have increased, in most aspects, they are stagnating at best. Associational participation, measured by individual engagement (membership, belonging and volunteering) or by the number of acts registering associations, decreases throughout the period. Participation in different kinds of assemblies stagnates as well. The changes in the frequency of activities aiming to exercise rights to take part in public affairs, such as electoral participation, and contacting politicians do not have a clear direction. The changes in the latter reflect electoral cycles only as its prevalence becomes higher in electoral years.

Only private forms of freedom of expression (discussing politics) seems to grow in the 2000s, following a setback in the early nineties. One of the surprises is, thus, that sometimes the early nineties show more vitality than later periods.

The second hypothesis also proved to be false: policy periods rarely have an identifiable effect on practicing rights. There are, however, exceptions, namely rights related to a given policy, such as the case of designing the one percent of personal income tax to civil organizations. Similarly, one can observe that trying to initiate a referendum and attempts of agenda initiatives became more prevalent following the clarification of the legislation.

The case of political opportunities (H3) seems to be different. It seems that the level of individual participation is not affected by electoral cycles. Registering associations or the number of assemblies and to a smaller extent, the number of initiated local referenda is influenced by the electoral cycles. When opportunity structures are open, the number of such attempts is higher, while closing opportunity structures decreases them.

Finally, political turmoils (H4) undoubtedly have an impact on exercising the freedom of expression in the private sphere (discussing politics). Political upheavals motivate people to talk about politics, however, expectations formed during times of social and political change can have an adverse effect as well. (by discouraging interest in politics when expectations prove to be exaggerated). Political turmoils probably have an impact on practicing the freedom of assembly, and taking part in public affairs: both, the number of assemblies and the number of referenda initiated as well as popular initiatives show an unexpected growth after 2006. Although the number of assemblies returns to the level experienced before 2006, attempts to initiate referenda seems to grow further.

To summarize the results, two main tendency is identifiable: 

First, exercising freedom rights measured by individual forms of participation mostly remain stable throughout the period,
while attempts on the “event” level (registering associations, number of assemblies, number of initiated referenda) seems to be influenced by political opportunity structures or political turmoils. Thus, it seems that the proportion of people ready to participate is similar throughout the period, which is probably caused by strong structural causes, while openness of opportunity structures or unexpected events might increase the level of their organizational activity.
II.3. The Role of Associational Participation in Explaining Political Participation

II.3.1. Introduction

The lengthy evaluation offered in chapter II.2 of trends in exercising rights shows that despite the institutional framework, the main trajectory of practicing political freedoms in Hungary was characterized by stagnation, or even decline between 1990 and 2010. Although the frequency of protests or attempts at popular votes increased, the extent to which people practice their rights had stayed mostly unchanged since 1990. This main feature is associated with suspicion towards politics and political institutions, creating an environment in which political participation is an unfavorable choice for citizens (Gerő - Kopper, 2013; Hajdu, 2012; E. Sik - Giczi, 2009).

In such an environment, the role of associations might be even more important than expectations around the transition suggested. Associations are expected to counterbalance the structural constraints of the given environment by creating a micro-milieu in which participation appears to be an important social norm, and which fosters participation by developing democratic skills. Thus, even when participation stagnates on the national level, the thesis about the influence of associational participation on political participation might still be valid.

Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship between associational and political participation in the Hungarian context. In line with the expectations formulated at the time of the transition, this relationship should be a strengthening one: people involved with associations are more likely to practice other forms of (political) participation.

The expectations toward civil society as an associational sphere are similar to those that the Tocquevillian or neo-Tocquevillian approach proposes: a universal mechanism through which political participation is supported by associational engagement. However, this universal mechanism is taken for granted, since it is a fruit of research grounded in the old democracies.204 Thus, the main body of this literature does not problematize whether the mechanism is working (when it is working) because of the general characteristics of associations, or democratic

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204 As Tocqueville examined the role of Associations in the United States in the 19th century, the neo-Tocquevillian research also proposes that processes in the USA or regions with a longer tradition of democracy are universal (Foley - Edwards, 1996; Putnam, 1995a, 1995b; Putnam et al., 1993; Tocqueville, 2006).
experience may play a role in it. In the latter case, associations and their members have to
develop or learn these mechanisms (Korkut, 2005; Roßteutscher, 2005). Only with a
longitudinal analysis the tracks of such a ‘learning process’ could be found.

Although advocates of the neo-Tocquevillian approach expect associational engagement to
increase the probability of participation in general, a differentiation between two types of
political participation should be considered: **electoral and extra-parliamentary participation**. This is due to the different prevalence and different characteristics of groups
practicing the two types of political participation.

Besides types of political participation, **types of associations** should also be defined. Although
the associational sphere is often treated as a unified pool of civil organizations promoting the
same values and behavior, this view is clearly false. Associations differ by the values they
promote, their fields of activity or how much participation they require. Their various
characteristics might attract different groups and cause different outcomes.

Thus, to conduct the analysis, I have to use a dataset which allows the longitudinal examination
of the relationship between various types of associations and electoral and extra-parliamentary
participation. To do that, there is only one dataset that covers the examined period: the three
waves (1991, 1999, 2008) of the European Values Study (EVS, 2011), in which both
associational and political participation were addressed in a comparable way.

First, I will briefly discuss the definition of political and associational participation used for the
sake of this particular analysis. Then, based on the literature, I will explore whether
associational engagement has any impact on political participation and how the types of
associations might influence that relationship. Before turning to Hungary, I review other
possible determinants of political participation, and finally, I will present the data I am using
and the results of the analysis.

### II.3.2. Political participation

Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that the outcome of activities in civil society is
expected to be the application of rights, most importantly rights connected to the democratic

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205 Roßteutscher (2002) argues that although associations indeed play an important role in developing certain
communication skills, fostering a better understanding of politics, this does not lead to a democratic culture in
itself. Instead, associations mirror the dominant political culture of their environment. Thus, associations produce
better informed, more active members of the society, who acquire the dominant political culture better than the
average citizen.
participation in the polity’s matters. By emphasizing rights, I focus on political participation as a voluntary action “by people in their role as citizens, not as, say, politicians or professional lobbyists” (van Deth, 2014:352) even if they are not aware of that role.

The separation of activities by rights, as introduced earlier, is more of an analytic approach than a representation of how rights are practiced. Therefore, in an explanatory examination, it is worth applying them together rather than separately. On the one hand, political activities are connected to more than one freedom right. For example, an act of protest is an act where freedom of assembly might be most important, but freedom of expression is also present. On the other hand, since the socio-economic background is a highly influential factor in explaining participation, people who engage in one particular activity might be more likely to engage in other forms of participation as well (Brady et al., 1995; Gallego, 2007).

Although political participation is more likely among people from a better social background and political participation could be defined as a distinct type of action, two important distinctions should be made. First, the distinction between associational participation and political participation. As noted in chapter I.3, I define associations as organizations or groups (with an organizational structure) that are independent of state and market organizations, are voluntarily joined primarily by natural persons, established for the sake of a common aim, and should be distinct from profit-making (Braun, 2014; Freise - Hallmann, 2014). These common aims could be anything, but since they are ‘common’, associations deal with issues of a community. As such, associational participation could also be considered a form of political participation (Norris, 2002a). However, in my view, it is different from other forms of participation.

Associations, aside from other instruments of participation, do not necessarily target public aims, political or economic institutions. An association might focus on its own members or on leisure activities without any attempt at causing changes in the political (or economic) system. Furthermore, not only do such non-political associations exist, but they are, in fact, the majority of associations. Second, in the approach I am using, associations are assumed to be the incubators of other political activities. They should have the strongest socialization effect

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206 This is despite the fact that the expansion in the repertoire of politically motivated activities provides a great challenge to the existing classifications (van Deth, 2014).

207 The idea behind this restriction is that associations can serve those functions through face-to-face contact. Thus, associations formed by organizations cannot fulfil the function of political socialization.

208 Associations have an organizational structure which is independent of state and market organizations.
among forms of participation. Thus, they serve as the influential factor, the independent variable in a model built by the relationship between different types of participation.

The second distinction should be made between forms of political activities based on the probability that they are exercised together. As Dalton (2014) notes, there is strong evidence that certain forms of participation tend to form clusters of activities. There are several dimensions that might be considered as a theoretical background of such clustering: most importantly, their difficulty, such as the risk and time they involve, or the channel through which they influence the system, or the amount of cooperation they require (Teorell et al., 2007; Verba et al., 1973).

Based on these dimensions, several groupings of activities have been proposed. Teorell et al. (2007) or Ekman and Amnå (2012) suggest that channels of representations should be used as a main dimension of differentiation. As Ekman and Amnå (2012) note, certain forms of participation once seen as non-institutionalized or exceptional have become part of everyday politics. Thus, the risk and effort attributed to them are also changing. Therefore, it would be better to emphasize whether they are connected to representative institutions, or to the direct participation of the citizens. This distinction is supported by empirical observations. Based on these considerations and their empirically well-grounded position (see Dalton, 2014; Teorell et al., 2007) and partly following Ekman and Amnå, I label these types as electoral and extra-parliamentary participation. The former category is constituted of participation in national and local elections, or popular votes, while the latter is understood as more dynamic collective actions, which put pressure on politics, e.g. protests, boycotts or signing petitions.

II.3.3. Associations and political participation

According to the classical Tocquevillian tradition, political participation should be fostered by associational involvement on different levels. First, members of associations shall engage in public and organizational issues, and through these, they acquire skills to cooperate, negotiate and make decisions. All of this leads to an increased interest in politics, increased political efficacy, and tolerance towards others’ opinions (Archon, 2003; Edwards, 2009; Maloney -

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209 Verba et al. (1973) list the scope of the expected outcome as well (e.g. local or national), but this is not relevant given the data I will use in this chapter.

210 Although on a practical level my human rights approach fits into the mainstream understanding of political action, there are important differences as well. Teorell et al. (2007), for example, exclude activities as discussing politics among “friends, relatives and peers” (Teorell et al., 2007:336), which I would encounter as a form of exercising fundamental rights. However, as noted, in this chapter this difference does not have further relevance.
Second, people engaged in associations find partners for common or collective actions more easily and, as such, associations serve as a network pool of mobilization (Teorell, 2003; Vráblíková, 2013).

The Tocquevillian theory also suggests that associational participation should increase the probability of engagement in both types of political participation. Robert Putnam’s famous argument that the decline in associational engagement is directly linked to the decline in electoral participation is a well-known example of the assumed linkage between associational and electoral participation. (Putnam, 1995a, 1995b). This assumption is backed by further evidence. Norris (2002c) finds that trade union and party membership or religious attendance increase electoral participation, and Armingeon (2007) points out that voting is more prevalent among trade union and sports club members. However, in a regression model with the control of socio-economic background, Armingeon does not find any statistical relationship between associational involvement and electoral participation.

It is also well documented that in western settings, participation in associations increased the level of participation in elite-challenging actions, as in protests, signing petitions and strikes or boycotts. (Armingeon, 2007; Putnam et al., 1993; Stolle, 2001; Stolle - Rochon, 1998; Welzel et al., 2005).

However, Stolle and Rochon (1998) found important differences by associational sectors in three western countries. They demonstrate that associations are influential on political engagement primarily in the field of political, community, economic and cultural organizations, even more than on the politically more embedded activity fields of group rights, and social and personal interest organizations.


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211 Besides involvement, associations create an environment in which public debates are more likely to happen, thus they contribute to a vital public sphere. Also, they are seen as a force of legitimation and control mechanism of democratic institutions (Warren, 2001). These functions are important, however their examination is not the subject of this chapter.

212 According to Norris (2002b) the relationship exist on the country level as well and country level membership and church attendance rate is linked to voter turnout.

213 Sweden, Germany and the United States.

214 Dekker (2014) used the fourth wave (2008-2009) of European Values Study and the sixth wave (2012-2013) of the European Social Survey, while Vráblíková (2013) used the ISSP citizenship dataset from 2004. Although there are differences between EVS and ESS, Dekker obtained similar results by applying a somewhat different variable. Using the EVS 2008, Dekker defined political participation with the following items: Taking part in a
Dekker (2014) conducted a similar analysis using the fourth wave of the European Values Study (2008-2010) examining the correlation between associational and extra-parliamentary participation in Europe. Armingeon and Dekker both found only a weak, while Vrabliková a stronger relationship between associational engagement and extra-parliamentary participation. Their conclusions are also somewhat different: Armingeon (2007) argues that self-selectivity explains political participation better, while Dekker (2014) concludes that the general thesis of associational impact might be false, and the relationship might exist only in particular types of associations.

A. Types of associations and their differences

Typologies of associations are mainly based on associations’ main activity (purposive-activity typologies) or on some analytical-theoretical aspects. Purposive-activity typologies tend to rely more on the empirical observations of organizations’ activities, while analytic-theoretical categorization applies aspects theoretically embedded into organizational sociology, such as the associations’ internal organization, or the type of membership they have (Smith et al. 2016). As it is clear from the categorization applied by Dekker (2014), Stolle and Rochon (1998), or the categorization proposed by Smith et al. (2016) surveys targeting individuals as respondents usually apply an activity-based typology.

These typologies vary from applying three to ten categories (in measurement tools even more). According to Smith et al. (2016), the problem with these typologies is that they mix up activities with membership types. For example, youth organizations could be advocacy organizations for representing young people’s interests, organizations providing services for them, or clubs based on a membership recruited from the youth. As another example, Maloney and Roßteutscher (2007) and van der Meer et al. (2009) suggest that three types of associations should be differentiated based on their relation to the sub-systems of a society. Leisure organizations are connected to the private sphere, activist organizations to the state, and interest organizations to the economy. Although this typology tries to build on one dimension, Smith et al. argue that typologies as such always refer implicitly to membership types as well.²¹⁵ In response, Smith lawf...
proposes a ten-category\textsuperscript{216} typology based only on the activities of organizations. This attempt does not seem to be entirely successful either since the authors propose categories with unclear content or activities, such as “social movement organizations/associations and activism”, or “community improvement-protection-economic development-poverty alleviation associations” (Smith et al., 2016:100).

The reason why such attempts are only partially successful is probably that associations’ impact is influenced by more than one of their characteristics. Thus, their activity field is only one of them. Furthermore, it is a characteristic which is likely to be in correlation with other important features of associations, such as their internal organizations or membership types. As a consequence, the typology should also take other features into account. For the political socialization effect, three important characteristics are emphasized.

First, connected to the activity field, the mechanism might work differently for associations aiming to influence the state or politics. Members of political parties and political or activist organizations dealing with highly politicized issues probably also participate in direct political actions more readily. This assumption is supported by the Arato-Cohen model (1992) in which political and civil society, although both are associational spheres, are differentiated. In this theory, political society is seen as a sphere tied to political institutions. On the other hand, while civil society clearly engages in political activities as well, it might be more involved in issues less directed at political institutions.

Second, the political socialization effect of associations assumes that there is an internal organization of associations which favors the development of democratic virtue. This internal organization would require a democratic decision-making structure, relatively low hierarchy and frequent face to face contacts between members. (Korkut, 2005; Putnam, 1995a) As a counter-example Putnam (1995) mentions “checkbook” or tertiary associations – mainly trade unions and professional organizations – in which members are required only to pay their membership fees, thus the Tocquevillian processes might not be working properly.

Third, the values proposed by the association might be important. Gellner (1994) proposes that religion might support attitudes that are against the recognition of basic human rights or might counteract deliberative processes: the obligation to the transcendent leads to the unquestioned respect of authority, hamper the development of self-reflectivity and doubt, which are essential to democratic societies. These characteristics will hamper political participation, which might be based on criticizing and challenging authority.

In contrast, Tomka (2009) claims that in Central and Eastern Europe religious organizations counterbalance atomization and that they practically serve as the basis for civil society. He also argues that belonging to a religion fosters participation since religious people have a moral standard which makes them sensitive to social and political issues. The counter-argument on the impact of religious moral standards returns to the Tocquevillian tradition and reminds us that the seeming correlation between these moral standards and participation is a result of belonging to a community, not of religious values themselves (Becker-Dhingra, 2001).

Chambers and Kopstein (2001) argue that it is important to distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ associations. While good associations (explicitly or implicitly) promote democratic values, bad civil society promotes non-democratic values, mainly the exclusion of certain groups from the polity. At this point, rather than assessing the argument that bad civil society might undermine democracy, I merely point out that even Chambers and Kopstein recognize that extremist groups also foster political participation and have a socialization effect similar to ‘good’ associations.

The pool of bad, or non-democratic associations might be larger than that of extremist groups. Letki (2003, 2004) examines the socialization effect of membership in the socialist state party. She finds that after 1990 even this type of membership increases the likelihood of political participation. Thus, it seems that regardless of the values promoted by associations, their positive impact on political participation still holds.

In sum, based on these important dimensions, I propose a simple typology of associations, following mainly Maloney and Roßteutscher (2007) and Meer-Grotenhuis Scheepers van der Meer et al. (2009) for the purposes of this analysis. In this typology, I identify four categories of associations: political and activist, non-political, interest and religious associations. Based on the distinction of being political or not, political and activist associations (parties and associations with the primary aim to influence the political system) must be differentiated from the others. On the other side of being political, there is a diverse pool of non-political
associations. These associations might target public issues (for example, the state of the healthcare system) or might mainly aim to function as leisure organizations.

Associations’ internal structure might be the easiest to capture based on the members’ required presence in the organizations. Interest organizations (e.g. trade unions) tend to work on a representative basis where the majority of work is done by the leaders and administration, while other organizations require more frequent participation. The debate on religious values indicates that religious associations might differ from other associations in having their proposed value set, and also in their internal organizational structure.

Although openly non-democratic associations could be in a fifth category, generally it is not possible to distinguish them based on their activity. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear whether these associations have a different impact on participation than other ‘democratic’ associations.

II.3.4. Other determinants of political participation

Although the role of associations might be important in fostering political participation, there are other factors at play as well. First of all, civic skills developed by associations might be learned somewhere else, most importantly in the family or in education. (Beck-Jennings, 1982; Verba, 2015) The basic assumption is that higher educational attainment provides more favorable conditions to develop the necessary language, communication and organizational skills (Brady et al., 1995) According to Brady and colleagues (1995), the very same skills might be acquired in the workplace when the job requires making decisions, working in teams or giving speeches. Ayala (2000) however criticizes Brady and colleagues for overestimating the importance of the workplace. Using the same dataset, he shows that voluntary organizations (associations and the church) have twice as large an impact on developing civic skills as involuntary organizations.

The claim that civic skills might be developed elsewhere, especially in education, yields a counter-argument of associations’ socialization effects. The self-selectivity thesis states that people who join associations are already interested in politics and have the necessary skills. Thus, associations do not have an educative role, instead, they have a mere selection bias (Armingeon, 2007).

The resources model proposes that the set of civic skills is only one of the factors that serve as resources for participation. Besides civic skills, people need 1) time and money, 2) psychological engagement and 3) recruitment networks to engage in political actions (Brady et
al., 1995). Although the importance of these factors is widely accepted, their role is much less clear in explaining participation than that of associational participation.

Usually, the amount of free time is negatively correlated with having a family or a high-ranked job, while it might correlate positively with income or wealth. As the biographical availability argument puts it, the fewer time constraints someone has, the less costly the participation in terms of time expenses is. That is why younger people tend to participate more in protest activities (Schussman - Soule, 2005). Although this argument should apply to pensioners or the unemployed as well, political participation among these groups is generally lower than among the employed. Thus, the amount of free time seems to account only among people who already want to participate: the more free time someone already engaged in some kind of participation has, the more she/he will take part in political actions. Money, on the other hand, seems to contribute only to certain forms of participation that require money, as for example donating to a political cause (Brady et al., 1995).

Political participation is certainly influenced by psychological engagement, usually measured by values and attitudes concerning public life and politics. These values, however, are not necessarily the results of associational participation, but more likely acquired in the family or during education. Ronald Inglehart (1971, 2008) argues that the development of these values is influenced mainly by two factors: the fulfillment of the basic needs connected with survival, and the circumstances under which one’s formative years were spent. Inglehart sees the latter as more important, since the individual’s basic values shaped during childhood are unlikely to radically change in adulthood. He identifies two main sets of values: Materialist values focus on the individual’s physical and economic security, and post-materialist values emphasize more the “needs for belonging, esteem and intellectual and self-expression” (2008:132). By this approach, the value set mediates the impact of economic growth and stability. When everyday struggles of survival disappear, people start to care about political issues, social problems and so on, thus post-materialist values are expected to influence political participation, most importantly extra-parliamentary actions (Inglehart - Welzel, 2005b).

Both post-materialist values and civic engagement have a strong relationship with interest in politics, public issues and confidence in institutions. Confidence in political institutions might matter for the outcomes of participation. Governments’ responsiveness has been shown to have a relationship with civic engagement and political participation. Confidence in state institutions can be seen as an indicator of this responsiveness since to express political opinions, a belief that institutions will acknowledge citizens’ concerns is needed (Kim, 2015). Evidently, interest
in politics and public issues is always in strong correlation with political participation. It is considered an important precondition of participation, which is shaped by political socialization. Thus, it is also mostly formed by early life socialization in the family and schools, and as such is expected to be influenced, at least partly, by socio-economic background (Beck-Jennings, 1982).

The resource model intends to explain how social and economic background have a strong explanatory power in the models examining participation. It is generally noted that variables such as gender, age, size of settlement and level of education have the largest or at least considerable effect on participation. Men are generally more willing to participate than women, and the more educated one is, the more likely one is to participate. The impact of age is not always linear: it is different for voting when the middle-aged or older people tend to vote with a higher probability, while younger people are more likely to engage in extra-parliamentary actions (Gallego, 2007; Inglehart-Welzel, 2005a; Stolle-Rochon, 1998; A. Szabó-Oross, 2012). Also, since participation might be time-consuming and risky, especially for extra-parliamentary participation, people with family might participate less (Inglehart-Welzel, 2005b).

The last factor influencing political participation is social or recruitment networks. In this, there are mainly two factors taken into account: the size and heterogeneity of the ego’s network. While the general assumption is that the size of egocentric networks is positively correlated with participation, its heterogeneity is more complex (Gerő-Hajdu, 2018). While the possibility of deliberation between various groups is stated as desirable, the heterogeneity of egocentric networks might lead to undesirable consequences, as discouraging people from engaging in public debate, because they want to avoid conflicts (Noelle-Neumann, 1974), and causing uncertainty (Mutz, 2002).

As a more general feature of interpersonal relations, generalized interpersonal trust is often examined as a determinant of political participation. (Letki, 2004) People who trust people they do not personally know will be much more likely to publicly support a cause. The mechanism behind this phenomenon is that a high level of trust shall eliminate the free-rider problem and decrease the perceived costs of political participation (Welzel et al., 2005).
II.3.5. Associational engagement and political participation in Hungary

Although research on political participation in Central and Eastern Europe is growing (Ekman et al., 2016), the discussion of the role of associations in fostering participation in the region is rare. In relation to electoral participation, Bernhagen and Marsh (2007) found that party and union membership have positive correlation with voting in Eastern Europe. Letki (2004) examined the role of associations in discussing politics, supporting a party and party membership. By analyzing data from 1994, collected in ten Central and Eastern European countries, Letki found that engagement with each type of association (lifestyle and professional, labor, and community) and even membership in the Communist Party prior to 1989 had a positive correlation with the aggregated index of the three forms of political participation. However, this result might not be so robust at present, or the relationship might have changed since around the millennium, Armingeon (2007) did not find any relationship between associational and electoral participation and identified only a weak explanatory power for extra-parliamentary forms of participation in four Eastern European countries. In his analysis, associational engagement performed best with boycotting and buying certain products, while it had a negligible relationship with protesting.

On the Hungarian level, Kmetty and Tóth (2013) found that associational membership in itself does not have any impact on voting. They find, however, that the local milieu could be important. On the one hand, the higher the number of associations in a settlement the more voter turnout increases. On the other hand, the more institutionalized the associations are, the lower the turnout will be.

Kern and Szabó (2011) and Susánszky et al. (2016) examined the role of associational engagement in explaining political participation. Kern and Szabó (2011) find that the more associations someone is involved with, the more likely he or she is to participate in a wide range of non-electoral political activities. Susánszky et al. (2016) point out the importance of activity fields. While participation in human rights and social-care associations increases the likelihood of participation in demonstrations critical of the government, engagement with religious associations and organizations dealing

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217 Armingeon’s analysis does not include Hungary.
218 Including non-electoral forms of participation, as contact with a politician and forms closer to my definition of extra-parliamentary participation, as participation in demonstrations (Kern - Szabó, 2011:45).
with issues of national culture (preservation of culture, aiding Hungarians across the borders etc.) supports participation on pro-governmental demonstrations.

These few available research results suggest that some kind of correlation between associational and both types of political participation should be expected. However, it is likely that this relationship should be different with electoral and extra-parliamentary participation.

The most important reason for expecting a difference lies in the extent of the two types of political participation. While extra-parliamentary participation is outnumbered by associational participation, electoral participation is three or four times larger than the former. Thus, in explaining electoral participation, associational participation should have a minor role.

This leads to the different characteristics of groups of participants by type. While the groups engaging in extra-parliamentary participation have similar socioeconomic backgrounds to those who belong to associations, voters show more differences. Mainly better-educated men living in Budapest or in larger cities are more likely to be engaged with associations. The relationship of age and associational participation is changing: while traditionally the younger generations seemed to be more engaged (Kern - Szabó, 2011), the differences between the younger (under 30) and middle-aged (30-60) slowly dissolves throughout the period of 1990-2010 (Susánszky - Gerő, 2013). The correlation with religiousness is changing too: since the early 1990s when there was no correlation it has become a significant and positive one (Susánszky - Gerő, 2013).

For both electoral and extra-parliamentary participation, education and income are important predictors, and men are more likely to participate than women. (Kern - Szabó, 2011; Róbert - Szabó, 2017; A. Szabó - Oross, 2016). The role of other socio-demographic variables is ambiguous: Age has a U shaped effect in explaining electoral participation. The willingness of electoral participation is increasing with age until around 65 and then starts to decrease. (Angelusz - Tardos, 2003; Kern - Szabó, 2011) Among participants of extra-parliamentary forms, younger generations were more active (Kern - Szabó, 2011), however, this correlation impact seems to dissolve, and the middle-aged or older generations became as active as the youth (Susánszky et al., 2016). Probably in relation with age, the married are more likely to vote.

Social networks are important for both types of participation. However, it seems that for electoral participation, in contrast to extra-parliamentary participation, it is important only to have friends rather than to have many friends. Also, to engage in extra-parliamentary activities, having a heterogeneous (consisting not only of relatives) egocentric network is important (Gerő
Both types of political participation are correlated with the type of settlement, however differently. People tend to be the most active in elections in small villages and in the capital (and the least active in smaller towns), while the size of settlement has a positive, linear correlation within participation in extra-parliamentary activities (Angelusz - Tardos, 2005, 2006; Róbert - Szabó, 2017). Extra-parliamentary participation – especially demonstrations – is overrepresented among inhabitants of the capital (Kern - Szabó, 2011).

As for values and psychological engagement, interest in politics\footnote{The European Values Study measures the 'importance of politics'. However interest in politics and importance of politics are different concepts it is plausible to assume that the two have strong correlations: those, who are strongly interested in politics, probably attributes greater importance to the subject than others, whose interest is weaker.} is a defining factor for both types of participation. (Kmetty, 2015; A. Szabó - Oross, 2012) Satisfaction with the current state of democracy also seems to be important, however, as Susánszky et al. (2016) show, under a right-wing government it works differently for critical and pro-government demonstrators. While participants in demonstrations criticizing the government are unsatisfied, pro-government demonstrators are satisfied with democracy. A recent research strengthens the view that the most active citizens have more confidence in institutions than less active ones. (A. Szabó - Gerő, 2015).

Religiousness improves the likelihood of electoral participation (Angelusz - Tardos, 1996, 2006), while the clear indication of how religiosity influences extra-parliamentary participation is missing. Róbert and Szabó (2017) suggest that its influence depends on the ideological background of the governing party. While under right-wing governments religious citizens exploit institutional channels of participation more (e.g. contacting a politician or representative), during the reign of left-wing governments religious people were more active in extra-parliamentary participation (as demonstrations, signing petitions etc.). It must be noted that the latter impact might be the result of the time-coverage of the analysis since it applies data between 2002 and 2015. The events of 2006 might have had a significant effect on protests in the period between 2006 and 2010 when a left-wing government ruled, but right-wing parties and groups became more active on the streets than they had previously been.

The characteristics of the associational sphere in Hungary also suggest that the relationship between associational and political participation might be weak or weakened through the period and that it might not be that strong or true for all types of associations.
First, many of the registered associations and foundations are not actually functioning as associations or are not working at all. There are many of them established as a fund-raising tool for public schools or other institutions, they do not have an independent organization or activities. Besides, there are small organizations which might be small enterprises in reality, since it is a well-known tax avoidance strategy to establish non-profit organizations instead of small enterprises (Bocz, 2009). But here size has major importance. Since inequalities among organizations in the associational sphere are large, one could expect that at least half the organizations have only a couple members or volunteers in which, although there are face to face contacts, the frequency of meetings might be low, the way of dealing with issues is quite informal, thus the environment they provide does not serve as a ground for developing citizens’ skills. Also, because of the small number of members, these associations might not fulfill the role of mobilization.

Second, many associations founded after the transition were the formalization of associations of the different groups of the pre-transition opposition, such as the human rights or environmental movement, or the re-establishment of trade unions or local associations (Kuti, 1998). In other words, political associations were established by people who were already active in politics, thus in these cases, a self-selection mechanism might have taken place. Trade unions and cultural or other local and non-political associations might have worked prior to 1989, although to a limited extent. Therefore, they may have been able to perform the socialization mechanism in 1991.

Third, the internal structures of associations might not always support skills development. As opposed to a small organization’s informality, larger organizations might become too formalized and bureaucratic. The sphere has been through a considerable level of professionalization since the early 1990s (Bocz, 2009). As Kmetty and Kmetty and Tóth (2013) have found, the level of formalization is counteracting the impact of associations on the local level.

Lastly, in larger and more professionalized organizations the danger of becoming checkbook organizations is more viable. Tóth (1995) and Korkut (2005) argue that in the internal structure

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220 As noted, I treat foundations as “association-like” organizations.
221 The problem with the size of organizations is highlighted by the ratio of members serving as officers of associations. In 2003 and 2009 besides participation HES asked about the role of respondents employed in associations. In 2003, 25%, in 2009, 29% of the people belonging to associations served as officers, which seem to be very high percentages.
of Hungarian trade unions and interest organizations hierarchy is important and they require no more than minimal participation of their members.

II.3.6. Hypotheses

The general assumption is that there is a correlation between associational and political participation. Based on the universal mechanisms proposed, this correlation should appear at any time during the period examined, regardless of the extent of participation. Thus, the first hypothesis is:

H1: The correlation between associational and political participation will be positive throughout the period.

In the early nineties, however, the newly established political associations could have been exposed to a self-selection mechanism, thus

H2. At the beginning of the period, the correlation between engagement with political associations and any type of political participation might be weak or missing. Later, the selection bias might change, and the correlation appears.

Although it is possible that the self-selection bias remains and together with growing professionalization and differences in the internal characteristics of associations might cause that:

H3: At the beginning of the period, the relationship between associational and political participation will be the strongest in the case of trade unions, but later professionalization and the development of internal mechanism of political socialization cause that the this difference between trade unions and other types of associations might vanish.

H4. The relationship between participation in religious associations and extra-parliamentary associations is changing from a lack of correlation to a positive correlation. With electoral participation, participation in religious associations will have a continuous positive correlation.

II.3.7. Method of analysis, dependent and control variables

In this chapter, I use the three waves of the European Values Study (EVS). EVS is an international survey program conducted every nine years. In Hungary, four waves have been
carried out, but only the three waves carried out after 1989 included questions about associational and political participation.

*Associational participation* in empirical terms is understood as belonging to or volunteering for any voluntary organization. The surveys asked their respondents whether they belong to and volunteer for any voluntary organization of a 14-item list, from ‘sports and recreation’ to ‘trade unions’. To examine the different types, I used the aforementioned four categories of associations: 1. ‘political and activist’ and 2. ‘interest’ organizations, 3. ‘non-political associations’ and 4. religious associations. All categories are constructed as dummy variables, where ‘1’ indicates that the respondent belongs to or volunteers for the given type of organization and ‘0’ if not. Table 33 introduces the prevalence of each category from 1990 to 2008.

**Table 33. Associational participation by the four types of associations, EVS 1990-2008, percentage of the adult population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political associations</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-political associations</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest associations</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious associations</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Besides the continuous decline in overall participation, it is important to note that the changes between 1990 and 1999, and between 1999 and 2008 are different in nature: for the decline during the first decade, the loss in trade union membership is responsible. During the second decade, a more general loss of membership is observed. While participation in trade unions declined further, participation in political and religious associations also decreased significantly.

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222 Political parties and groups, human rights, peace movements and environmental associations, 223 Trade unions and professional associations. 224 Welfare organizations, voluntary health organizations, sports and recreation, cultural activities, local community actions, youth work, women’s groups, consumer groups and others. 225 Trade unions lost almost 80 percent of their members between 1990 and 1998. The changes in the participation by activity fields between 1991 and 2008 is reported in the Appendices (Appendix 3).
Extra-parliamentary participation is measured by four items: participation in demonstrations, unlawful strikes and boycotts, and signing petitions. The four items were aggregated by Principal Component Analysis into a single continuous variable. The higher the value, the more participatory the behavior of the respondent.

As table 34 shows, the extent of extra-parliamentary participation did not change much throughout the period. The only significant changes occurred with joining strikes. The reason for the larger proportion of “might do” in 1991 is that in this year, the question referred to official strikes. Despite the change of question, I decided to include this item in the principal component. I ran the following regression models with different variables, without strikes, but the results were similar and the explanatory power of the model is somewhat better. Thus, it seems that the principal component including each of the four items is a good proxy for participation.

Table 34. Extra-Parliamentary participation 1991-20088 EVS, percentage of the adult population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>have</td>
<td>migh</td>
<td>would</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>done</td>
<td>t do</td>
<td>never</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed a petition</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attended lawful</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>demonstration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined in boycotts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined (unofficial)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strikes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Electoral participation was asked about in all of the waves. It should be noted that the question asked about the willingness of participation in a future election, not participation in a previous election.

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226 In 1990, the Hungarian questionnaire had a mistranslation and asked about official strikes, which explains the relatively high willingness to participate.

227 Data loss is prevented by imputation. Missing cases are replaced by the mean of the four items. The process did not change the direction and nature of correspondences found in the model without imputation.

228 It is important to consider these items as a proxy of participation, since the repertoire for participation is constantly changing and expanding. This is especially true with the introduction of new online platforms of participation and with new, online and mobile communication tools (van Deth, 2014). However, despite this extending repertoire, it seems the willingness to participate is similar in the period. (see chapter II.2 and Róbert - Szabó, 2017).
one. As such, it inquires the intention of participation, which cannot be taken as equal to participation. That is the reason I apply a dummy variable with only two categories: 1) Non-voters, i.e. the respondents who clearly indicated they would not vote or would cast a blank vote or do not know if they would vote, 2) voters, who said they would participate in the elections.

Table 35. The ratio of respondents that would and would not participate in the national elections, 1991-2008 EVS percentage of the adult population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would not vote</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would vote</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures are changing and not necessarily in line with electoral participation. Besides methodological reasons, the difference might be attributed to the time of the surveys. While in the first and second waves the survey took place in the year following the elections, in 2008 it was conducted in the middle of the election cycle.

Control variables

Control variables are defined by the resources model of participation and by the most important socio-demographic determinants explored in the literature.

Socio-demographic variables: gender, age, and age squared to control the non-linear relationship of age and electoral participation and the size of the settlement.

---

229 The question was worded as "If there were to be a general election tomorrow, would you vote?"

230 The possible answer in 1991 and 1999 was designed as if voting was almost equal to choosing a party. Respondents could choose an ‘other party’ option, but they did not have the possibility to say that they would go to the polls but did not know which party they would choose. In 2008, respondents first had to tell if they would vote, and if they marked ‘yes’ then they had to choose a party. This might contribute to the higher proportion of voters that year. I have run a regression model with a variable in which respondents of the survey in 2008 who did not choose a party were registered as non-voters. The results are the same. This has not changed the results of the regression model.

231 The willingness to participate seems to be low in 1991 and in 1999. Another research conducted prior to the elections in 1990 suggests that willingness to participate was 10 percent higher. (Angelusz - Tardos, 1996).


233 1. male 2. female.

234 Included in the analysis as four dummy variables: 1. 0-5.000 inhabitants, 2. 5.001-20.000 inhabitants, 3. 20.001-500.000 inhabitants, 4. Capital.
Resources: EVS provides the possibility to measure material and cultural resources. Cultural resources are measured by the level of education, economic resources by employment status and monthly income. Employment status might be an indicator of free time together with marital status. The latter is also an indicator of social networks, to which EVS does not offer any other measurement comparable through the period.

Psychological engagement and values: Interest in politics is measured through the importance of politics in the respondent's life, left-right scale, generalized trust and confidence in institutions, the position on the materialism, post-materialism scale, belonging to a religion and religious attendance.

The correlation of associational participation and extra-parliamentary and electoral participation will be tested by two types of regression models. Since the dependent variables are on a different measurement level, the correlation of associational participation with extra-

---

235 Since in 1991, the only variable about educational level is the age when the respondent completed their education. This is the variable I am using in every wave.
236 A four-category variable, included as dummy variables: employed, retired, unemployed/housewife and others
237 Included only into the model of electoral participation, since after several trials, it does not show any correlation with extra-parliamentary participation, but increased the missing cases for the last waves by 246 cases. On the other hand, in the case of electoral participation, even if the variable has no significant correlation with the dependent variable, the explanatory power of the model increases. Monthly income is aggregated into 11 ranks in each of the waves. In the variable involved, the first six ranks appear separated and the highest five are aggregated into one category.
238 '0' living alone, '1' cohabited.
239 Since the standard question, 'How interested are you in politics?' is missing from the second wave. Instead the question about the importance of politics is included in all the waves: “Please say how important politics is in your life:” Respondents could answer on a 1-4 scale. In the analysis, 1 stands for not at all important, while 4 means very important.
240 Participation might be influenced by the political wing of the government since oppositional actors could be more active in extra-parliamentary actions. During the fieldwork of the 1990 and 1999 wave, a right wing government, while in 2008 a left wing one was in office. To control this impact, I included the left-right scale divided into three categories: Left (0-4), middle (5), right (6-10).
241 ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ The possible answers are: ‘Most people can be trusted’ or ‘Can’t be too careful’.
242 In this chapter, confidence in institutions is measured by an average of answers given to six items: confidence in the education system, police, parliament, civil service, social security system, and the justice system. The question was: “Please look at this card and tell me, for each item I read out, how much confidence you have in them” (A great deal, quite a lot, not very much, none at all). Missing cases were imputed with the average of the other answers when there were at least five answers out of six, then a principal component was computed.
243 Materialism-post materialism is measured by the four-item battery of forced choice question, applied by Inglehart (2008). When the respondent chooses only materialist or post-materialist values, her position will be a clear materialist or post-materialist one.
244 The frequency of participation in religious events (practically never, on holy days, or at least once a month) for the religious community and belonging to a religious denomination (yes/no) for religious values.
parliamentary participation will be tested with a linear regression model, while with electoral participation a logistic regression model is used.

To account for the extent of the influence of associational participation, and to see how this influence might be affected by the control variables, first I will present the results without control variables. (Models I and II, table 36 and 37). If there is a significant relationship in Model I, this could be the result of the associations’ own effect or the interplaying variables used as control variables in Model II. Model II includes control variables. If the relationship of associational participation with political participation remains on a statistically significant level in Model II, I might conclude that associations’ own effect is also at play.

II.3.8. Results

Results are presented in tables 36 and 37. In Model I, coefficients of the relationship between associational and political participation without control variables are presented, while in Model II coefficients for models with control variables.

First of all, it seems that there are important differences between the model for electoral and extra-parliamentary participation, even without including the control variables. In the case of extra-parliamentary participation, there are only two cases out of 12 where the correlation in Model I is non-significant. Eight of the other ten cases are significant on the p<0.01 level. Statistically significant relationships between associational and electoral participation are less prevalent. Only half of the cases are significant on the p<0.05 or p<0.1 level.

The missing correlations occur between participation in political and religious associations and extra-parliamentary participation in 1991. In the third and fourth waves (1999 and 2008), engagement in both types of associations shows a significant correlation with extra-parliamentary participation. However, the direction of this correlation is inverse: political associations have positive, while religious associations have a negative correlation with extra-parliamentary participation.

With electoral participation, engagement in non-political associations has a statistically significant relationship throughout the period. Political and religious associations in 1991, while participation in interest associations in 2008 show such a relationship with electoral participation. It seems that the expectations towards electoral participation should not be high, probably given the differences between the extent of electoral and associational participation.
Table 36. Correlations of associational and extra-parliamentary participation. 1991-2008 OLS regression, standardized β coefficients

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political associations</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.088**</td>
<td>0.095***</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td>0.06**</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Non-political associations</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.186***</td>
<td>0.118***</td>
<td>0.125***</td>
<td>0.122***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interest associations</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.158***</td>
<td>0.066**</td>
<td>0.065**</td>
<td>0.114***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Religious associations</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>-0.1***</td>
<td>0.054**</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.07*</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
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**Socio-demographic variables**

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<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>-0.173</td>
<td>0.34*</td>
<td>0.18</td>
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<td><strong>Age2</strong></td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>-0.48**</td>
<td>-0.29*</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender (ref: men)</strong></td>
<td>-0.128***</td>
<td>-0.54*</td>
<td>-0.05**</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Marital status (ref: living alone)</strong></td>
<td>-0.11***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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**Resources**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age completed education (zscore)</strong></td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td>0.167***</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Employment (ref: employed)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>empl: retired</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.014*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>empl: unemployed</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.17*</td>
<td>0.04*</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>empl: other</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size of town (ref max 5000)</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000-20,000</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.06**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000-500,000</td>
<td>0.098***</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Capital</strong></td>
<td>0.146***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.05*</td>
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**Political values**

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generalized trust</strong></td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Confidence in institutions (z score)</strong></td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.1***</td>
<td>-0.085***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Importance of politics (z score)</strong></td>
<td>0.1843***</td>
<td>0.07**</td>
<td>0.124***</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Left-right orientation (ref: left)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right orientation: center</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.06*</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-right orientation: left</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-materialist orientation (ref: materialist)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.9***</td>
<td>0.1***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Post-materialist</strong></td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.87***</td>
<td>0.15***</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Religiousness**

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belonging to a religious denomination</strong></td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attendance on religious events (ref: never)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on holy days or less frequently</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.06*</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>at least once a month</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R2</strong></td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.1 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
Table 37. Correlations of associational and electoral participation. 1991-2008 Binomial Logistic Regression odds-ratios

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political associations</td>
<td>2.1***</td>
<td>1.92***</td>
<td>1.45**</td>
<td>2.06***</td>
<td>2.72***</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-political associations</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>2.14**</td>
<td>1.23</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest associations</td>
<td>1.52*</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.76*</td>
<td>0.55**</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious associations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-demographic variables</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>1.1***</td>
<td>1.07***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.999***</td>
<td>0.999***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (ref: men)</td>
<td>0.69**</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Size of town (ref max 5000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.000-20.000</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.71</td>
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<td>20.000-500.000</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.63**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age Completed education (z score)</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>1.41</td>
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<td>Marital status (ref: living alone)</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>0.71*</td>
<td>1.14</td>
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<tr>
<td>empl: retired</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.64</td>
<td>0.83</td>
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<td>empl: unemployed</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.99</td>
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<tr>
<td>empl: other</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<td>0.98</td>
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<td>Monthly income (ref 1st rank)</td>
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<td>2nd</td>
<td>1.500</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<td>3rd</td>
<td>2.096</td>
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<td>.992</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>1.338</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>1.075</td>
<td>1.95*</td>
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<td>7th-11th</td>
<td>1.229</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>0.42</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized trust</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.68**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Confidence in institutions (z score)</td>
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<td>1.04</td>
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<td>Importance of politics (z score)</td>
<td>1.29***</td>
<td>1.22**</td>
<td>1.5**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.44***</td>
<td>0.6**</td>
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<td>Right</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.065</td>
<td>2.9***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0.93</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1.17</td>
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<td>Religiousness</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belonging to a religious denomination</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attendance on religious events (ref: never)</td>
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<tr>
<td>on Holy days or less frequently</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least once a month</td>
<td>1.9**</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.64**</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*p<0.1  **p<0.05  ***p<0.01
The comparison of Models I and II, shows only a small difference for electoral participation between the two models. The inclusion of control variables eliminates the co-effect of political associations in 1991, and interest and non-political associations in 2008 is eliminated.

The comparison in the case of extra-parliamentary participation shows a more diverse picture. First of all, in most cases the coefficients are smaller in Model II than in Model I. This is most conspicuous in 1999, where the correlation between engagement with non-political associations and trade unions and political participation becomes non-significant, and the level of significance decreases in the case of religious associations as well. In 2008, the changes in the coefficients are largest in the case of interest organizations and religious associations.

In Model II, it is possible to detect the direction of correlations or relationships, and in the cases of extra-parliamentary participation, the strength of correlation could be estimated as well. Non-political associations’ impact seems to be strongest in 1991 and 2008. In the case of engagement with political associations, a significant correlation appears in 1999, which remains similarly strong in 2008. The correlation between engagement with interest associations and extra-parliamentary participation vanishes after 1991, while a weak correlation appears in the case of religious associations, however with a different precursor: in 1999 it is negative, while in 2008 it is positive.

Based on the results, H1 seems to be valid only for extra-parliamentary participation. The effect of associational participation is weak, the $R^2$ varies between 7% and 4% for Model I, which means that the majority of the explanatory power in Model II belongs to other factors. It is also true that, as Dekker (2014) expects, this correlation exists only with particular types of associations.

H2. is proved to be valid, however, self-selection or the impact of control variables play a role only in the case of electoral participation.

H3. is only partially valid: First of all, when control variables were included, interest associations had a positive, statistically significant relationship only with extra-parliamentary participation. With electoral participation, the relationship is non-significant for the entire period. In 2008, control variables weaken (eliminate) the initial relationship between participation in interest associations and electoral participation.

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Surprisingly, the coefficients also changed for religious associations and the relationship became significant, which refers to multicollinearity between engagement with religious associations and some control variables.
H4. is also valid partially, since religious associations have a positive relationship with electoral participation only in 1991, and associational participation lost its explanatory power entirely by the last wave. The nature of the relationship between engagement in religious associations and extra-parliamentary associations changed from neutral to a negative and then to a positive relationship, but there is only a weak correlation both in 1999 and 2008.

II.3.9. Discussion

The debate on associations’ impact on political participation assumes a universal mechanism, grounded in the general characteristics of associations, as the main cause of this impact. This assumption is then made more complex by acknowledging that the universal mechanism might work differently in various types of associations. The direction of correlation between associational and political participation is not clear either. Some say that engagement in political associations impacts political participation more than participation in other types of associations, while others argue in a different direction.

The results obtained have shown that the relationship between associational participation and political participation is changing. Not only in general, but it is changing also by particular types of associations. If the changes were a result of a learning mechanism, thus associations developed their socialization mechanisms through gaining experience, the changes would be linear: from a weak or no correlation towards a strengthening one. It is clear that in Hungary this is hardly the case.

Behind the hectic changes, there might be the transformations that took place in the associational sphere and in politics. The associational sphere went through a considerable development in numbers: the institutionalization of the formerly informal oppositional organizations, the relatively strong environmental movement, the first generation of human rights organizations and, naturally, many non-political organizations. Nevertheless, their foundation was seen as a new democratic opportunity, and in practice, citizens had to deal with bureaucratic, organizational issues. The transition affected interest associations as well: former socialist mass unions had to re-organize themselves, and new grass-roots organizations emerged, which played a relatively active role in demonstrations (András Tóth - Neumann, 2010). According to Máté Szabó (1995b), trade unions organized 23-30 percent of protest
The number of direct actions organized by trade unions peaked in 1997 and fell back afterward. (Berki, 2000) This is in line with Tóth and Neumann’s assertion (2010) that trade unions and their large confederations consolidated during the nineties, grass-roots movements vanished and the main tool of interest representation was to participate in established forums of social dialogue. In the 2000s, the situation changed and unions became more active in organizing extra-parliamentary actions. After 2003, they were more active in general than in the early nineties (Berki, 2011).

The development of a professionalized, less conflict-ridden role is similar to the processes political and non-political associations experienced. First, in the nineties service provision became increasingly important for associations (Bocz, 2009). While the beginning of the 1990s saw the institutionalization of the formerly informal civil society, which had a strong political character, the stabilization of institutions gave space to the birth of the non-profit sector (Glozer, 2008; Kuti, 1998). State policies and the lack of small-scale services pushed organizations to become service providers either working together with state institutions or providing services themselves. Thus, the period between 1995 and 2005 has been the most silent period in the last twenty years. During the 1990s and the early 2000s organizations developed a similar strategy of interest representation as trade unions: they influence politics through negotiations and policy recommendations rather than by direct pressure (Gerő - Fonyó, 2013).

The more contentious politics returned after 2002 with a new Fidesz strategy, which affected the associational sphere, and mobilizations as well. The events of 2006 contributed to the re-emergence of contentious politics. The crisis in 2006 activated a new group: right-wing and extreme right protesters, embedded in religious organizations. This is the period when Jobbik, an extreme right party gains enough support to enter Parliament in 2010 (András Tóth - Grajczjár, 2015). This is well reflected in the relationship of the left-right scale and extra-parliamentary participation: in 1990 the position occupied on this scale was not important. In 1999 being in the middle of the scale had a negative correlation with participation, while in 2008 being “right-wing” increased the likelihood of participation compared to being left-wing (see table 36).

The relationship between engagement in religious associations and extra-parliamentary participation also fits into the previous knowledge about the influence of the government’s political ideology on the use of non-electoral means of participation. As Róbert and Szabó

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246 1989 and 1991 were exceptional in this regard: in these years only 15-16 percent of the events were organized by trade unions (Máté Szabó, 1995b:63).
(2017) put it, under a right-wing government citizens with a religious background tend to use such institutionalized channels as contacting a politician, while under a left-wing government they turn to the repertoire of expressing direct pressure (e.g. protests). This picture is supported by the negative correlation between participation in religious associations and extra-parliamentary participation in 1999 and its reversal to a positive one by 2008.

Despite the changes in the statistical relationship explored and the complex processes highlighted here, it is worth noting that engagement with non-political associations has a stable influence on political participation. This leads to the conclusion that when I examine the role of associations in supporting and developing political participation, I should look into three distinct factors.

In the case of non-political participation, universal socialization, information distribution, and social networking factors operate. In other cases, with changes in the associational sphere and the political structure, a self-selection mechanism, or the impact of other control variables are responsible for the presumed influence of associations. In the case of religious and political associations, agency, which is neglected by the neo-Tocquevillian literature, might play an important role. Their changing relationship with political participation suggests that they do not serve only as a terrain for socialization or simply a networking site, but more as mobilizing agencies. Thus, their relationship with political participation (especially its extra-parliamentary forms) is changing according to their actual role in mobilization.

II.3.10. Summary

In this Chapter, I have examined the extent associational participation influenced electoral and extra-parliamentary participation in Hungary between 1991 and 2008. Tocquevillian and neo-Tocquevillian theories on associations and civil society propose that associations have a crucial role in fostering political participation. The main assumption is that associations serve as an incubator of a system of universal values and skills supporting democratic political participation, they are sites of information distribution and developing social networks.

These mechanisms are presented as universal mechanisms, emerging from the general characteristics of associations. However, empirical research points out that the relationship between associational and political participation is changing with time, by region or by types of associations.
To examine the validity of the assumption about the universal mechanism in the Hungarian case, I have presented an empirical analysis of the three waves of the European Values Study between 1991 and 2008. In this analysis, political participation was defined as electoral participation on the one hand, and extra-parliamentary participation on the other, while associational participation is based on the belonging and volunteering to four types of associations: political, non-political, interest and religious associations.

The results reveal that the relationship between associational and political participation differs for the two types of political participation. Associational participation has a more frequent and perhaps stronger relationship with extra-parliamentary associations than with electoral participation. At the end of the period, the relationship between associational and electoral participation vanishes entirely.

The relationship of associational and extra-parliamentary participation is also changing through the period, however not consistently for the different types of associations. While this relationship is missing for political associations in 1991 and appears from 1999, the existing relationship between belonging to other types of associations and extra-parliamentary participation vanishes by 1999. In 2008, the relationship is revived with engagement in non-political associations.

The varying results suggest that in the case of non-political associations, the results captured the presence of socialization processes, information distribution or a social networking effect. However, the analysis has revealed that a self-selection mechanism also takes place when associations collect people interested in politics or have the necessary background.

Besides the Tocquevillian and self-selection mechanisms, the changing relationship between engagement in religious associations, political associations, and extra-parliamentary participation suggests that a third mechanism is at play: these associations are not only the terrain of social networks, but also serve as mobilizing agents.

This last suggestion, however, cannot be examined on a dataset designed for the general purposes of understanding political behavior or value systems, but has to be taken to the field and one might need to look into the operation of associations, both with quantitative and qualitative tools.
Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have explored the meanings and expectations towards Hungarian civil society around the time of the Velvet Revolution, examining how these expectations met reality in a twenty-year time span.

Civil society, for the sake of the empirical examination, is understood as a sphere of voluntary associations. The expectations I have identified and examined are twofold: First, the associational sphere should expand itself and the pool of citizens engaging in exercising their civil and political rights. Second, participation in voluntary associations should foster individual engagement in political participation and political activities described in terms of the language of civil and political rights.

The definition of civil society and the expectations towards it are based on a systemic review of the Hungarian and English scholarly literature published between 1985 and 1995. Based on this review, in Chapter I.2, I have identified five main categories of the usage of the concept. 1) Civil society as a social order identifies civil society as the Western society and focuses on the structural relations between the sub-structures of a whole society. 2) A dualistic model, which redefines the Hegelian distinction of the state and civil society. This approach understands civil society as a sphere including everything outside the state. 3) A dualistic model under state socialism, which equates civil society mainly with the second society, the non-formal structures of society. 4) Civil society as a mediating sphere, in which civil society is understood as a non-state, non-economic sphere of organizations (and movements), mediating between the state and the society and providing important functions of social integration. 5) Civil society as the opposition under socialism refers to the networks and organizations of the dissident groups prior to 1989.

Although the five models define civil society differently, voluntary associations are always found in the core of their definition. Furthermore, they attribute an important role to associations in developing democratic skills and values or creating a pool for mobilization and information sharing. As an outcome, these groups of authors expect that with time people will increasingly realize their civil and political rights, especially rights connected to associations and political participation. I often refer to the increasing realization of rights as the process of democratization, since it would lead to continuously expanding participation in the polity’s matters.
Therefore, the main expectations are formulated in the language of human rights. This is also based on the literature, since the language of human rights undoubtedly penetrates the corpus. To formulate the expectations by applying the idea of fundamental rights makes possible that civil society is at the same time a communitarian, association-based idea, but the expected outcome of its activity is imagined as growing individual-level participation, bringing as much plurality into the political system as possible. Civil and political rights create a bridge between communities and individual level participation. Although the rights connected to civil society could be realized only in a community, or at best in cooperation with others, they are connected to the individuals. In principle, this contradiction guarantees the balance between the need for communities to exercise rights, and pushes people to communicate and cooperate with each other since, in principle, it should not be possible to realize interests by simply overruling others. This way, these rights also secure that the forming communities do not oppress individual freedom, or the freedom of those who chose to remain outside these communities.

It would be simplistic to pretend that each category of the usage of civil society is the same in the end. In my view, however, their main difference is connected to the mechanisms by which associations come into the picture in the eighties as one of the main forces of democratization. The way authors perceive this process is strongly connected to their definition of civil society. For example, theories presenting civil society as a social order emphasize long-term historical processes creating the necessary conditions for associating. Because of that, these theories lead to pessimistic views regarding the chances of building a new democracy. Dualistic models propose that tensions in the social structure lead to the realization of interests, which leads to the development of associations based on these interests. This is an unconscious way of democratization, while the ‘mediating sphere’ and ‘opposition’ approaches emphasize the more classical, Tocquevillian effects of civil organizations reformulated by Adam Michnik’s new evolutionism. According to this approach, civil society organization serves as the main network for the diffusion of democratic values and skills necessary to operate under democratic conditions. The autonomous sphere of civil society mediates between the state and society by proposing democratic mechanisms and suggesting that people are able to influence the state’s operation.

Evidently, these are, in the same way as my synthesis, normative concepts and ones which are seen as unfulfilled by the vast majority of the literature published in the 1990s and 2000s. Despite the often sharp criticism of the notion of civil society, when I looked into this literature,
I found hardly any empirical attempts at following the tendencies of civil society from the point of view of its impact on individual level participation or exercising rights. Only officially registered organizations are followed longitudinally, but not doing more than merely describing their numbers and main organizational characteristics, such as their age, income and main activities.

This is because of the widely accepted view that the project of civil society has failed. As I argue, this simple judgment is partly due to the mixing up of civil society as a political strategy by the opposition on the one hand, and civil society as a concept used in social sciences, on the other. The boundaries are blurry for several reasons, but while the failure of the strategy means the abandonment of the strategy, which could be stated several years after the Velvet Revolution, **the democratization processes unfolded by civil society take more time and should be examined based on longitudinal data.**

It is true, however, that **the strategy of civil society was abandoned after the transition.** Nevertheless, I argue that it is hardly the outcome of a conscious decision. Political actors abandoned the strategy because of their assumptions about the mechanisms that are supposed to lead to the development of associations. **These assumptions lead to parallel strategies and the interplay between them leads to a blind spot, which might explain why the strategy of civil society was abandoned after the transition.** My argument is that there are four distinct, implicit factors built into these ideas of democratization, and a fifth, external factor leading to the abandonment of the strategy of civil society:

1. Using the notion of autonomy in two different ways but treating them as the same: While the notion of second society defines autonomy as avoiding state control and being left alone, other approaches define autonomy as autonomous action, aiming at political participation and the active exercise of freedom rights.

2. Forgetting that opposition groups lacked embeddedness, and expecting the democratization of second society, which would mean fostering its participation, despite its different criteria of autonomy.

3. The assumption that voluntary associations have to and will be based on common interests, which are based on a shared social status, therefore they are always bound to distinct social groups.
4. The necessary focus on legal institutions: The programs and reforms of the opposition focused on the establishment of the legal framework, which is necessary, but not sufficient for establishing and maintaining a new democracy.

5. The fifth factor is the rapid and unexpected nature of the regime change. This caught the supporters of civil society unprepared, and the elections every four years pushed the political actors towards strategies effectively maximizing votes. This marginalized the idea of further democratization, since the principles of civil society including the idea of individual freedoms lacked popular support in contrast to values of consumption, economic rights or raising living standards (Ferge, 1994).

The abandonment of the strategy of civil society and the perception that it failed to fulfill its role had a further consequence. In describing and explaining voluntary organizations, the theory of the non-profit sector became the dominant approach (see Glózer, 2008; Kuti, 1998). Although this seems a minor issue, I argue that it is hardly possible to understand processes of democratization based on non-profit theories and when voluntary organizations and democratization are in the focus, civil society is still a better concept to use.

The reasoning behind my argument is that the two broadly defined groups of theories rely on different theoretical cores and have different assumptions and questions. Non-profit theory asks the questions why someone acts for the public good or why someone does voluntary, non-paid work. According to the non-profit theory, this could be explained on the grounds of rational choice, motivations or selective incentives. ‘Civil society’ theories in principle cannot deal with these questions since their inquiry focuses on how to introduce human rights into the relationship of the state and its citizens. The main assumption that implicitly guides the attempts at answering this question is that human rights inherently belong to the individual. Thus, participation in the public sphere and governing their own life are part of the nature of the citizen. Selective incentives in this approach are not required to foster participation, but they can be a tool to block participation, especially when they are coming from the state or the economy.

Civil society examines problems to which non-profit research is blind. The models, non-profit economic theories propose, require democracy and market-oriented economy. Civil society theories target the development of democracy (and sometimes the market), which is the framework for non-profit theories. Probably this is the explanation of why Hungarian researchers adopted the non-profit framework in the early nineties. The problem of democracy
seemed to be solved, at least on the institutional level. As it is easily observed, the failures of democratization have recently redirected the attention of non-profit researchers to the notion of civil society.

Undoubtedly, the data which non-profit researchers based in the Hungarian Statistical Office provide is an invaluable resource. This data is often used for the purposes of research on civil society. Problems arise from the divergent theoretical core, often seen as questions of data collection. **These questions are treated as “solved” by paying a seemingly small price: the data offered by non-profit research is seen as information about an organized civil society which cannot reach informal actors of civil society.** However, this approach does not only abandon informal actors but treats civil society organizations as non-profit, excluding parties and other formally political actors by default. As a further problem, this type of data alone cannot take the impact of associations into account. Thus, for my purposes it is better to a) use the concept of civil society (and voluntary associations for operationalizing empirical research) b) use individual-level data provided by nationally representative surveys.

Because of the limits of the dissertation, **the empirical examination focuses on the scope of realizing civil and political rights and the impact of associations on the practice of these rights.** At first sight, examining the realization of rights is an easy task, since there are numerous indices available. However, when I tried to apply them to following the changes, I faced serious problems. It turned out that these indices are able to follow institutional changes only, such as changes in regulations or state policies, but they do not capture the extent people exercise their rights.

*Therefore, in Chapter II.1, I needed to develop a method which is able to capture the changes in exercising freedom of association, freedom of expression, the right to peaceful assembly and the right to take part in public life.* This is an **action-based approach** of measuring human rights, since it takes the actions of citizens into account.

After laying down the basics for such a methodology, I was able to **examine the extent of exercising these rights.** Along with the aim of examining whether exercising the four fundamental rights became more prevalent during the two decades after the Velvet Revolution, I identified **how the institutional characteristics of the new system and its changes shaped these trends.** Four aspects of institutional change were examined: **the overall framework (Constitution, and fundamental laws about the given rights), policy changes concerning civil society, political opportunity structures (electoral cycles) and turmoil of the political system.**
To the first question about the extent of exercising rights, the overall answer is not surprising. Although in some aspects the prevalence of participation or exercising rights increased, in most aspects they were stagnating at best. Associational participation stagnated or even decreased throughout the period, as measured by individual engagement (membership, belonging and volunteering) or by registering associations. Participation in different kinds of events, qualifying as assemblies also stagnated. Trends of the realization of the right to take part in public issues do not have a clear direction. The realization of this right is measured by electoral participation, participation in popular votes, numbers of popular initiatives and contacting politicians. The only systematic change is that the prevalence of contacting politicians is related to electoral cycles, becoming more prevalent in electoral years. Private forms of freedom of expression (discussing politics) seem to grow in the 2000s, following a setback in the early nineties.

Policy periods rarely have an identifiable effect on exercising rights. There are two exceptions: Firstly the case of tax designation, which is a form of expressing opinions, created by a certain regulation. Secondly, when the regulation about referenda and popular initiatives was clarified in 1997, this clarification gave an impetus to initiating these forms of direct democracy and consequently to exercise the right to take part in public affairs.

Political opportunity structures have a more significant influence. Although it seems that the level of individual participation is not affected by electoral cycles, registering associations, the number of assemblies and, to in a smaller extent, the number of local referenda initiated is influenced by them: when opportunity structures are open, the number of these attempts is higher, while closing opportunity structures lower them.

Finally, political turmoil undoubtedly has an impact on some forms of exercising freedom of expression in the private sphere (discussing politics). Political upheavals motivate people to talk about politics, however, expectations formed during times of social and political change might have a counter-effect, by discouraging interest in politics when expectations proved to be exaggerated. Political turmoil probably has an impact on practicing freedom of assembly, and on the right to take part in public affairs: the number of assemblies, referenda initiated and popular initiatives all show an unexpected growth after 2006. Although the number of assemblies returns to the level experienced before 2006, the attempts to initiate referenda seem to be growing further.
Thus, two main tendencies are identifiable: **First, exercising freedom rights measured by individual forms of participation mostly remains stable throughout the period, while attempts on the “event” level (registering associations, number of assemblies, number of referenda initiated) seem to be influenced by political opportunity structures or political turmoil.** Thus, it seems that the proportion of people ready to participate is similar throughout the period, which leads to strong structural causes, while openness of opportunity structures or unexpected events might increase the level of their organizational activity.

In Chapter II.3, I examined the extent associational participation influenced political participation in Hungary between 1991 and 2008. The practice of rights, when translated into political action, might be better examined together than separated analytically. For this reason, in this chapter, I differentiated between extra-parliamentary (protests, boycotts, petitions and strikes) and electoral participation. The core expectations toward civil society around the transition are very similar to the mechanisms Tocquevillian and neo-Tocquevillian theories propose about the relationship between associational and political participation. Thus, associations serve as an incubator of a system of universal values and skills supporting democratic political participation; they are sites of information distribution and developing social networks.

These mechanisms are presented as universal, emerging from the general characteristics of associations. However, empirical research points out that the relationship between associational and political participation is changing with time, by region or by types of associations. Based on the available classifications and the examination of the characteristics of associations which might influence the impact of associations, I have identified four types: political, non-political, interest and religious associations.

To examine the relationship between engagement in associations and political participation in the Hungarian case, I have presented an empirical analysis of the three waves of European Values Study between 1991 and 2008. The results reveal that the relationship between associational and political participation differs for the two types of political participation. **Associational participation has a more frequent and perhaps stronger relationship with extra-parliamentary associations than with electoral participation.** At the end of the period, the relationship between associational and electoral participation vanishes entirely.

The relationship of associational and extra-parliamentary participation is also changing through the period, however not consistently for the different types of associations. While this
relationship appears only from 1999 in the case of political associations, the existing relationship between belonging to other types of associations and extra-parliamentary participation vanishes by 1999 and re-appears in 2008 for engagement in non-political association only.

The varying results suggest that in the case of non-political associations, the presence of socialization processes, information distribution or the social networking effect might be captured. However, the analysis reveals that a self-selection mechanism, whereby associations collect people interested in politics or have the necessary background to mobilize resources for participation might also be present.

Besides the Tocquevillian and self-selection mechanisms, the changing relationship between engagement in religious associations, political associations, and extra-parliamentary participation suggests that a third mechanism is at play: these associations are not only the terrain of social networks but also serve as mobilizing agents.

Finally, what are the answers to the questions I initially raised? What is the impact of civil society on democratization? The results suggest that the picture is far more complex than the often repeated claims about the weakness and failures of civil society imply. Firstly, belonging to voluntary associations has a correlation with exercising rights. As the theory suggests, this relationship should be causal, thus associations support the realization of rights or participation. Unfortunately, the data does not allow us to decide about the direction of casualty. Thus it might be possible that, as Hannah Arendt suggests, any kind of participation serves as a wake-up force for human dignity. But associations certainly have a role in this circle, in which action leads to increasing consciousness, and this consciousness leads to more action.

This role might be twofold. First, the often-emphasized political socialization and mobilizing effects might be present. Mechanisms developing democratic and organizing skills, or building social networks require permanent engagement and hardly evolve in acts that require only momentary engagement, as participation in a protest. Therefore, it might be a plausible conclusion that associational engagement explains political participation.

Secondly, associations might not only serve as a terrain for socialization and do not provide a possible pool of networking and mobilizing but act as mobilizing agents. Thus, under different circumstances, they mobilize different groups and might also foster different types of participation. This way, as expected, they are active participants of democratization processes.
However, it seems that the other parts of the expectations have failed. *Although associations are able to contribute to the mobilization of certain social groups, they were unable to increase the proportion of people realizing their rights.* At this point, however, I need to admit that the analysis was unable to explore the exact role of associations in this phenomenon. To examine the capacity of associations to include new members, a different research design would be needed. Data should be collected on the organizational level from associations, and in parallel, on the individual level from their members in a way that associations and the activities their membership is engaged in could be followed, fluctuation rates and the inclusion of new people could be tracked. This data is not available and certainly not for the examined period. This type of research is ahead of us.

It is also important to point out that institutional processes were also unable to foster the realization of rights, with the much larger pool of resources and tools that the governments and state institutions controlled. Although these institutions certainly influence the extent people realize their rights, the strength of this influence is not clear. It is also not clear whether associations are only observing this process, or are somehow counter-balancing it, slowing down the eruptive influence of state (and economic) institutions. I believe that this is a question that is becoming more and more pressing.

It is also clear that the two terrains, namely political and state institutions and civil society, are interrelated. Political turmoil and political opportunity structures have an impact on associational participation, while associations might contribute to the legitimacy of a given regime through mobilization. Sometimes associations serve more as “transmission belts” mobilizing loyal citizens, while on the other hand they might give a possibility to raise concerns. This, rather than a clear bottom-up or top-down direction, points to the interrelatedness of the two directions.

Even more importantly, I must emphasize that the proportion of people gathering in associations or engaging in extra-parliamentary ways of expressing their opinions hardly changed throughout the period. Certainly, there are shifts in the membership of associations working in different fields, or probably the issues of strikes and protests are changing, but the proportion and characteristics of people is very similar throughout the twenty years. Thus, the prevalence of such activities might be deeply embedded in the structural characteristics of Hungarian society. What matters greatly is not only its value structure, as for example the dominance of material values, or the refusal of tolerance and its closed character (Keller, 2010), but probably also its hierarchies on the micro and macro level, processes in the families and the methods
applied in education (D. Sik, 2014; A. Szabó, 2018; I. Szabó et al., 2010). Therefore, it seems hard to escape the ‘paradox of democracy’ as it was foreseen by Ernest Gellner or Ralf Dahrendorf, or the power characteristics of this society developed by the long-term processes Jenő Szűcs described.

And the scene is changing. First, with the various crises in the late 2000s, contentious politics strengthened in Hungary and worldwide. (Della Porta, 2015; Della Porta - Alice, 2014; Gerő - Kerényi, 2017; Van Til - Krasztev, 2013). Populist and authoritarian tendencies are on the rise. Based on the argument that the concept of civil society is always connected to the processes of democratic development, it is not a surprise that the concept has lately come into fashion again both in political sociology and in public discourse. With rising populism and authoritarian tendencies, the question is not how to amend the “system”, but how to secure freedoms and democratic institutions. Under the growing tensions, civil society has entered into the discourse in three different regards. The expectations formulated towards civil society that it will counterbalance authoritarian tendencies have re-appeared in a manner similar to that around the Velvet Revolution. (Cizewska-Martynska, 2015) Second, as Carothers and Brechenmacher (2014) argue, there is a closing space for human rights and civil society organizations in many countries. This means changing regulations is unfavorable for independent civil society organizations and the closing political opportunity structures.

Third, both the concept of civil society and civil society organizations have become part of the political discourse. Political actors like to point out “real” and “pseudo” or “fake” civil society organizations, to control the discourse on what and who is “civil”, thus, as Jeffrey Alexander (2006) points out, to define who belongs to the polity. They argue that fake civil organizations only serve ill interests, the other side of the political terrain, which tries to ruin the polity. Through these fake civils, they identify the actors who are against the nation and their supporters. As a consequence, civil society as a pool of actors and as an important element of the political discourse becomes a frontier of a sharpening political conflict.

In this conflict, the enemies of the nation are mainly organizations critical of populist governments and organizations standing on the ground of human rights. Although the conflict takes place mainly in the discursive arena of politics, the Russian, Hungarian and Israeli anti-NGO laws, labeling civil society organizations as foreign agents, point out that governments started to use more direct policy tools to exclude civil society organizations from the political arena, or to occupy their resources. Such a labeling practice might strike us as extreme but regulations with the intent of controlling the resources of civil society organizations and
applying restrictions about accepting foreign funding are in effect in more the 40 countries (Dupuy et al., 2016).

Nevertheless, most of these countries were never considered established democracies. There are a few countries, however, such as Hungary, Poland and Israel, which belong to the pool of countries that are relatively rich (in a global comparison), consider themselves democracies, where democratic institutions have been perceived as well established until recently, but who are taking a populist, or even authoritarian turn, including an anti-civil society stance (Filc, 2018; Gerő et al., 2017; Herman et al., 2016).

The research on discourses about civil society, the conflicts between populists and civil society organizations is the last and maybe most important direction this research could turn to. Thus, not only associations and participation, but conflicts also need to be examined to understand the role of civil society in building and maintaining a democracy and to understand, and more importantly, to explore the circumstances under which civil society and its friends are able to achieve positive results in this conflict.
## Appendices

1) Categories, Subcategories and indicators of Freedom in the World’s ranking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Rights</strong></td>
<td><strong>Electoral Process</strong></td>
<td>Is the head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Are the national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Are the electoral laws and framework fair?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Pluralism and Participation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Are there a significant opposition vote and a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Do cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups have full political rights and electoral opportunities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Functioning of Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Is the government free from pervasive corruption?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it operate with openness and transparency?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Liberties</strong></td>
<td><strong>Freedom Of Expression And Belief</strong></td>
<td>Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: In cases where the media are state controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the survey gives the system credit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Are religious institutions and communities free to practice their faith and express themselves in public and private?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of extensive political indoctrination?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Is there open and free private discussion?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Associational and Organizational Rights</strong></td>
<td>Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations? (Note: This includes civic organizations, interest groups, foundations, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rule of Law</strong></td>
<td>Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is there an independent judiciary?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct civilian control?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights</strong></td>
<td>Do citizens enjoy freedom of travel or choice of residence, employment, or institution of higher education?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, political parties/organizations, or organized crime?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2) The validation of data used to examine the practice of political rights

Building timelines is a challenge, especially when a single longitudinal research program, which covers the whole examined period, executes its data collection rounds frequently enough and comparable, is not available. In my case, there is only one research program which covers the examined period between 1990 and 2010 and which contains data about participation: the European Values Study program (EVS). Since it is conducted in every nine years, which is quite rare, I have to apply other datasets to examine trends of participation.

The European Social Survey (ESS) is an ideal candidate to supplement the EVS since Hungary has participated in every round of the European Social Survey program. The ESS started in 2002 and repeated in every two years, thus it covers the period of 2002-2010. Although the ESS measures political participation in its every round, only the first round has variables about associational engagement. As a control and further possibility of an inquiry, I used the data of the Hungarian Election Studies collected in 2003, 2008 and 2009\(^\text{247}\) and the “Citizenship” data of the International Social Survey Programme from 2004.

Since associational and political participation, as well as engaging in other forms of exercising rights is influenced by socio-demographic variables, to compare the different datasets it is inevitable that I know whether the distribution of the collected data is similar to the Hungarian population’s distribution at least regarding some important variables. Therefore, in this Appendix, I examine whether these databases, compared to the National Census, conducted in every 10 years are reliable sources. I will examine the:

- The five waves of European Social Survey (ESS 2002-2010)
- ISSP Citizenship 2004

Validating data

Participation is highly influenced by demographic features. To be sure that the data used gives reliable results, I examined the datasets whether they can be treated as representative to the Hungarian adult population by some of its characteristics. I chose four variables to examine: gender, level of education, age and the distribution of population among types of settlements.

As a reference point, I use the National Census from 1990, 2001 and 2011. In the case of gender and educational level, the survey data and the census could be grouped in the same way. Respondents of the surveys by age are grouped almost in the same categories than the census. There is only one minor difference between them: the surveys I apply were conducted on the adult (18+) population\(^\text{248}\) except for the ESS. In the case of the ESS, such as in the analysis in

\(^{247}\) The dataset form 2008 and 2009 is partly a result of a panel-study: The sampling in 2009 was based on the respondents of the data collected in 2008. In 2008 3122 respondents answered the questionnaire, from which the researchers were able to find 1523 respondents. The sample in 2009 was supplemented with the inclusion of new respondents, thus the total sample included 2980 people. (Kmetty, 2013) Therefore despite its panel-characteristic, the data collected in 2009 was also intended to be nationally representative.

\(^{248}\) The ESS collects data from the 15+ population, but I deleted the respondents younger than 18 from the database to make it more comparable to the others.
chapter II.2, I left out the respondents under 18. From the published data on the census, the closest lowest age groups are the 15-19 and 20-24 years old cohort. For the analysis, I chose to include the 15-19-year-old group as well.

The most difficult is to apply the same settlement categories to the different datasets, since some of the data ask about the different types of (ESS) settlements or the size (EVS) only.

**Gender**

The numbers provided by the censuses are generally very similar to those in the survey data. Their proportion remained the same through the 21 years: around 47% male and 53% female. The examined datasets have a similar proportion, with one exception: Two rounds of the ESS, in 2004 and 2006 experience a larger deviation from the censuses. The proportions of males are 41.5 in 2004 and 42.3 in 2006, consequently, the percentages of females are 58.5 and 57.7. (table 40)

**Table 38. Gender by the National Census 1990-2011, percentage of 15+ population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 39. Distribution of respondents by gender, EVS, percentage of 18+ population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EVS II</th>
<th>EVS III</th>
<th>EVS IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 40. Distribution of respondents by gender, ESS, percentage of 18+ population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ESS 1</th>
<th>ESS 2</th>
<th>ESS 3</th>
<th>ESS 4</th>
<th>ESS 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td>1431</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>1503</td>
<td>1535</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 41. Distribution of respondents by gender, HES and ISSP 2004, percentage of 18+ population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1507</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>3120</td>
<td>2980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Age**

The comparison of the distribution of age in the datasets and the national censuses shows larger differences than the distribution of gender. The EVS in 1990 under-represents the younger generation and over-represents the middle-aged group. The difference is around eight percent
in the first and five in the second case. In the younger group, it is more than the standard deviation would allow (+1.6) with a 95% confidence interval, even if one take into consideration that the first age category of the census involves the 15-17 years old population. The ESS datasets are similar, throughout the 2000s: they underrepresent the younger generation (the lowest proportion is 33.9% in 2006, the highest is 37.6% in 2010) and somehow over the middle-aged and elderly group. The largest the difference between ESS and the national census regarding the middle-aged group is in 2002 (around six percent). In 2004, 2008 and 2010, both of the two older groups have a higher proportion only with one or two percentages. HES and ISSP seems to be closer to the censuses, the difference between these and the censuses remains between one and three percent in each age group.

Table 42. Age in three categories by the National Census, percentage of 15+ population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-39</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-59</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 43. Distribution of respondents by age, 1991-2008, percentage of 18+ population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EVS II</th>
<th>EVS III</th>
<th>EVS IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-39</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-59</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>997</td>
<td>1513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 44. Distribution of respondents by age, ESS, percentage of 18+ population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ESS 1</th>
<th>ESS 2</th>
<th>ESS 3</th>
<th>ESS 4</th>
<th>ESS 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-39</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-59</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td>1431</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>1502</td>
<td>1535</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 45. Distribution of respondents by age, HES and ISSP 2004, percentage of 18+ population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-39</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>38.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-59</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1502</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>3115</td>
<td>2980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Education

Educational level is one of the most important predictors of any type of participation. Therefore, any significant deviation from the national data could seriously affect the measured extent of participation. Since in the National Census I applied the percentage of the 15+ population to count the proportion of each educational level, one could expect somehow lower ratios of the higher two levels.

There are two noteworthy deviations are experienced. First, in 1991 in the lowest level of education and in completed secondary education. In this case, the data collected by EVS in 1991 underrepresents those, who did not finish primary education with almost seven percent, and over-represents those who finished secondary education with nine percent. Second, the second round of ESS overrepresents those, who completed the secondary and higher education.

Table 46. Education by the National Census, percentage of the 15+ population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uncompleted primary education</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed primary education</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed secondary education</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education (At least BA/college degree)</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 47. Distribution of respondents by educational level, EVS, percentage of the 18+ population 249

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EVS II</th>
<th>EVS III</th>
<th>EVS IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uncompleted primary education</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed primary education</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed secondary education</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education (At least BA/college degree)</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 48. Distribution of respondents by educational level, ESS, percentage of 18+ population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ESS 1</th>
<th>ESS 2</th>
<th>ESS 3</th>
<th>ESS 4</th>
<th>ESS 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uncompleted primary education</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed primary education</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed secondary education</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education (At least BA/college degree)</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1556</td>
<td>1431</td>
<td>1467</td>
<td>1502</td>
<td>1533</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

249 Based on the age, the respondent completed education.
Table 49. Distribution of respondents by educational level, HES and ISSP 2004, percentage of the 18+ population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uncompleted primary education</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed primary education</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed secondary education</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education (At least BA/college degree)</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1507</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>3122</td>
<td>2969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Type of settlement

The type of settlements is the most difficult variable to compare. The national census applies 5 categories: capital, county-centers, cities with county rights, towns and villages. The ESS and ISSP apply different categories, while HES aggregates the second and third categories. EVS measures the size of the cities. Despite these differences in the metrics, the overall picture is that the datasets fit the national censuses. The differences between the censuses and the surveys are usually small, only one or two percentages. The only exception is the second round of the ESS, where the number of people living in a big city was 62%, which means that this wave almost did not reach anyone from the countryside (table 51). Fortunately, the regional distribution of the respondents is similar to the census, thus the large proportion of ‘big cities’ does not mean the overrepresentation of the capital. As a comparison, ISSP counts that 34.5% of the respondents lives in a large city, which is much closer to the national censuses results (35.2% percent of the Hungarians live in Budapest or in county-centers).

Table 50. Distribution of the 18+ population by the type of settlement by the National Census 1990-2011, percentage of the population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement Type</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County-centers</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities with county rights</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villages</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 51. Distribution of the 18+ population by the type of settlement, ESS and ISSP 2004, percentage of the 18+ population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement Type</th>
<th>ESS 1</th>
<th>ISSP 2004</th>
<th>ESS 2</th>
<th>ESS 3</th>
<th>ESS 4</th>
<th>ESS 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburb of a City</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country village</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm or home in countryside</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1609</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>1421</td>
<td>1469</td>
<td>1503</td>
<td>1535</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 52. Distribution of the 18+ population by the type of settlement, EVS (percentage of the population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement Type</th>
<th>EVS 1991</th>
<th>EVS 1999</th>
<th>EVS 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 50,000 inhabitants</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-50000 inhabitants</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below 5000 inhabitants</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1514</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 53. Distribution of the 18+ population by the type of settlement, HES and ISSP 2003-2009, percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement Type</th>
<th>HES 2003</th>
<th>HES 2008</th>
<th>HES 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County-centers</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villages</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>33.33</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1507</td>
<td>3122</td>
<td>2980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data validation suggests that most of the applied survey is good for examining trends of participation. The only dataset which shows multiple deviations from the census is the second round of the ESS. However, the highest educational level and the capital is not as overrepresented as the people living in larger cities. Since this dataset is only interesting regarding extra-parliamentary participation, I decided not to exclude it from the analysis. However, it must be noted that the data resulted from this particular dataset might overrepresent the people who engage in any type of participation.

In a smaller extent, the EVS’s data, collected in 1991 deviates in some aspect from the census in 1990. Age and education differ from the results of the national census, younger generations are over-, while the group with the lowest educational level is under-represented. Those who completed secondary education are also over-represented. If I accept that younger generations and those who attend higher levels of education tend to participate more likely than others, both deviations might decrease the extent of the measured participation in 1991. However, I do not have other data from the early nineties, and deviations are not that large, which would suggest the exclusion of this data from the analysis.
3) Associational participation by activity fields

Table 54. Belonging and volunteering to a voluntary organization or group by activity fields (belonging), 1991-2008, EVS, percentage of the adult population*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Belong</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>Belong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. welfare organization</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. religious organization</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. cultural activities</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. trade unions</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. political organization</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. local community action</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. third-world development/human rights organization</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. professional organization</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. youth work organization</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. sports and recreation organization</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. women’s groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. peace movement</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. voluntary health organization</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. environmental, ecology and animal rights organization</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. other groups</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 55. Membership, participation, volunteering and donating money in voluntary organization or group by activity fields, 2002, ESS, percentage of the adult population*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity Field</th>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Participated</th>
<th>Belong (member+participate)</th>
<th>Volunteer</th>
<th>Donate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sports/outdoor activity club</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultural /hobby activity organization</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trade Unions</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>business/professional/farmers organizations</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consumer/automobile organizations</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>humanitarian organizations</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>environmental/peace/animal organizations</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religious/church organizations</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political Party</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>science, Education, teacher organization</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social club</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other voluntary organization</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>26.50</td>
<td>19.00</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1610.00</td>
<td>1610.00</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td>1610</td>
<td>1610</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 56. Membership in voluntary organizations or group by activity fields, 2003-2009 HES, percentage of the adult population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>HES 2003</th>
<th>HES 2008</th>
<th>HES 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sports club</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cultural organization</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trade union</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professional organization</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political organization</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social movement, civil society organization</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religious, church organization</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>welfare organization</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local group</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>environmental organization</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kaláka, house building community</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local event organizing</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>local sports event organizing</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1507</td>
<td>3122</td>
<td>2870</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 57. Membership in voluntary organizations or group by activity fields, 2004, ISSP Citizenship, percentage of the adult population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>ISSP Citizenship, 2004, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>political party</td>
<td>1,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trade union</td>
<td>10,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>church, religious organization</td>
<td>29,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sports group</td>
<td>2,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other voluntary organization</td>
<td>3,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>40,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4) The sources of protest event analysis: journal articles and datasets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>title</th>
<th>author</th>
<th>period of data collection</th>
<th>scope of collection</th>
<th>methods</th>
<th>sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Szabó, M. 1995a</td>
<td>Szabó Máté</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>protests</td>
<td>Protest-event analysis</td>
<td>One daily and one weekly newspaper (Magyar Hírlap, Magyar Narancs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szabó, M. 1995b</td>
<td>Szabó Máté</td>
<td>1989 01.01.-1994.07.01.</td>
<td>protests; Events falling under the effect of the III Act of 1989</td>
<td>Protest-event analysis</td>
<td>• three daily newspapers and two weeklies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• (Magyar Hírlap, Magyar Nemzet, Népszabadság, Heti Világgazdaság, Magyar Narancs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szabó, M. 1998</td>
<td>Szabó Máté</td>
<td>1989-1994</td>
<td>protests</td>
<td>Protest-event analysis/Registered events</td>
<td>• Media sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Szabó, A. 2009</td>
<td>Szabó Andrea</td>
<td>1993, 2003</td>
<td>protests</td>
<td>Protest-event analysis</td>
<td>three daily newspapers: Népszabadság/ Magyar Nemzet/ Magyar Hírlap)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Erratum

On page 116 the source of the data for voter turnout is not cited. The source of the data is the Voter Turnout Database published by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

The corrected text should be phrased as:

As a single indicator, I use voter turnout to evaluate this particular right based on the election held in 2010 or in the prior year.

Although similarly to the situation experienced in the case of the other rights, the voter turnout was the highest in Sweden in 2010 (84.6%) the overall picture of the five countries is different. France, Estonia and Hungary had a similar, relatively low voter turnout, (60.4%, 61.9% and 64.4%) while Italy was closer to the Swedish rate with its 78.1 percent voter turnout. (IDEA 2018)

Reference: