THE CRISIS/CRISES OF THE TERRITORIAL STATE
Fragmentation Discourses in the Context of Globalization and Governance without Government

Doctoral (PhD) theses
Author: Dénes-Barna Jakab

Thesis Supervisor
Univ. Prof. Dr. Gáspár Biró (†2014)
Univ. Prof. Dr. István Stumpf

Budapest
2018
1. Introduction and Synthesis

Looking at the international news, one immediately encounters some sort of crisis phenomena, which is labeled as *fragmentation* by social scientist and essayist, due to its capacity to weaken state power. Media outlets put great emphasis on presenting news about environmental pollution, global diseases like AIDS or BSE, migration, ethnic conflicts, terrorism, urban riots like the one in Charlottesville, African failed states, the consequences of the financial crisis from 2008 on, political crises like the Brexit and the Scottish or the Catalan Referendum, not least the anti-globalist and anti-westernization protests around the world.

Reading the newest social scientific works, one immediately encounters some hypothesis about the pressure which global corporations exert on states, as well the local and the global challenges of state sovereignty, - all these phenomena tied somehow to the larger process of globalization.

Research institutions and think tanks (like the famous *Fragile States Index* elaborated by the *Foreign Policy* journal) monitoring foreign politics report approximately twenty percent of the world states as instable and morally fallen, and the next forty-five percent as alarming. While the so called “crisis zones” face the anarchy and privatization of violence specific to premodern times, the more developed countries (called sometimes also “peace zones”) face the consequences of unchecked urbanization, marked by the presence of the “gated communities”, the outsourcing state activities. Besides, the worldwide proliferation of state, quasi-state and non-state actors, the balkanization (or lebanonzation, brazilianization), the institutionalization of flexible governance in foreign and domestic politics as well, – all of these are posing at the same time the question of the governability of societies.

The diversification of the international law reached such a high level that the International Law Commission, the institution empowered by the United Nations with the development and codification of the international law, was mandated between 2000 and 2006 to set up a working group for the research of the “fragmentation of international law”. The changing balance between actors interested to preserve the global balance of power and the emerging powers, interested in changing this balance, seems to foretell either the coming of a diffuse and turbulent world order replacing the unipolar one, or at least a transitional phase towards a multipolar order stretching among transnational regional power blocs.

The conviction of the author of this dissertation is that a metatheoretic frame of understanding is needed in order to comprehend the different postindustrial and postnational
crises, whose theories are often isolated each from other. The demand for such an overarching speculative framework is not unknown in theories of international relations (thereinafter IR).

Formerly, the philosophy of mechanics and *res extensa*, and the belief of social-technological progress, the idea of sublating particular identities into a universal human society (as thought by Kant in his “Perpetual Peace”) provided such a framework for analysis of state behavior and international order. This old framework considered that integration would overcome physical separation between “space containers” or “billiard balls”, and quell their conflicts. At the end of the Cold War humanity came closer than ever to dismantling these walls between peoples.

However, in the last quarter of century the course of history became different as expected. Today globalization is characterized by *individualization, separation, welfare egoism*, and also by *growing complexity and polycentrism, mutual vulnerability*, all in all by fragmentation, not by unification. No matter at which globalized social subsystem we look, we find that globalization has induced proliferation, not orderliness. This globalization has demolished state frontiers, once considered to be “imperméable”, a kind of protective “hard shell” for national societies, but without fulfilling the old universal promising.

Based on this interpretation of the unfolding globalization process, the dissertation has concluded that in the last half quarter century the narrative of *fragmentation* has become the dominant framework of understanding and explaining societies and social change in scientific and media discourses as well. Fulfilling this role, fragmentation has become an unavoidable question even for traditionalist state-centric observers.

These new theories of society and social change have compelled theories of states and IR in the last quarter of a century toward a revision of their state-centric axioms, and research of new forms of governance and order. Among these new theoretical reflexions the dissertation has focused on the discourses of crisis, governance, and political, organizational, and social fragmentation - which all clearly mirror the change of emphasis in the political thought of our time. All these discourses display the conviction that the recent international political order is at a turning point. Stimulated by this interpretation of the crisis (which literally means separation, selection, turning point) many schools of social science aimed at harmonizing the requirements of governance and governability on the one hand, with visions of a more entropic postmodern welfare society, with multilevel, multicentered organizational structures on the other hand.
1.1 Justifying the selection of this subject and the relevancy of this topic

1.1.1 Relevancy of the topic
Interest in the protean manifestation of crises bringing about erosion of public power, and severe problems caused mainly by acute crises are in themselves serious reasons for research. However, placing the entire topic in a systematic framework, a “fragmentation model” forecasting the direction of social changes, is justified by further reasons.

Firstly, the power vacuum phenomenon is under researched, although the sociology of globalization, research of failed states, transitology, organization sciences, and integration theories all touch upon one or more pieces of this subject. Nevertheless their parochial approach and the lack of dialog caused the appearance of separateness. Against these parochial approaches, the dissertation argues for the unity of fragmentation discourses by means of some meta-theories (institutionalism, neo-Weberianism, agent-structure debate, territorial scale and resource mobilization theories). These metatheories offer explication for the changes (“crises”) of states’ infrastructural power, for the dependence of this change from both structural and human conditions, and for the institutionalization of these isomorphic processes on different scales.

Secondly, many scientific texts contain allusions and suppositions that globalization and governance are part of the fragmentation process. At the same time they treat fragmentation as a „floating signifier”, without fixing the content of this concept. Therefore I felt it necessary to throw light on this concept and its usage by systematic research on the topic.

The fragmentation discourse originates in the 1970’s. It intensified in the 1990’s, when the transient optimism caused by the end of the cold war, and referred herein as the premonition of the “new world order” professed by among others Pope John Paul II, Gorbachev, George H. W. Bush, ended. The experiences of the Somali and Rwandan civil war and the failure of American intervention were decisive impulses that caused the fading of the naïve confidence in a peace enforcing and peacekeeping new world order. Universalistic ideas of political integration as world democracy and world governance have been overshadowed slowly, giving way to “soft integration” and “flexible governance” based on the vision of unorganized capitalism and its unintended consequences.
This representation of a global change is now accepted in social sciences, media and public thought, as well as the transfer of competences between states, local and transnational actors, accompanied by the *diffusion of power* and the *spread of the practices of experimentalist governance*. This framework of understanding is very common in current state of the art theories of states and politics.

The novelty of this dissertation is that decentralization or governance on the one hand, and disintegration on the other, are treated as two sides of the same coin. However, since both these discourses have in common the perception of global realignment, competence transfer, and crisis, as well the search for crisis therapy and the possibilities of *governability* or *good governance*, it seemed to me natural to unite them under the same topic.

On the whole it can be claimed that the “fragmentation model” developed in this dissertation is a new theoretical frame for describing current problems of international order as well as evaluating disputes in state theory. This is a suitable point of view for the description of the direction of social changes, for simplification of the rampant discourses about fragmentation, and not least mapping the content of a frequently used but vague concept. According to this last aspect, this dissertation is the first systematic analysis of this very topic in Hungary.¹

### 1.1.2 Practical utility of the research in Hungary

(1) The great mass of this research is of theoretical concern. It offers an interpretation of this topic, reconstructs the main lines of argument within Anglos-Saxon political science literature and stimulates discussions among Hungarian social scientists. However, some questions presented here are worth observing by specialists of Hungarian national and foreign politics and of Hungarian opinion leaders shaping political thoughts, because they are crucial for policy recommendations relating to crisis management and asserting national interest.

(2) Today theorists, policy analysts, and politicians too cannot choose but recognize that state centric politics is giving way to a new political space characterized by the competition of local, regional, and global players and private actors. The dominant explanations for this change are defensive theories (regardless whether they are liberal

---

¹ Hungarian political scientists have neglected the systematic and direct approach of this topic. However, few scholars have succeeded in setting up the basic framework of understanding of this problem. Among these few exceptions one can observe the writings of Sándor Csizmadia (1997, 2001), Gáspár Biró (20003), Jody Jensen (2008), László Kiss J. (2009), and my own writing (Jakab 2008). The thematic issue of *Magyar Tudomány* review (2002/6) offered too an important insight into the problematic relationship of globalization and of the civilizations.
or realist), and the post-hegemonic, postmodern, post-national, post-liberal conceptions of power sharing.

Against the banal “offensive realist” (Machiavellian) approaches and the “ressentiment” of the Neo-Marxist dependency theories, these defensive conceptions offer some explanations for the intensifying leverage of small states and new ways of cooperation and interest being pursued by smaller actors. This is why conceptions about disaggregation of power, multilevel governance, and systemic interdependence can prevail over the pessimistic worldview of the country’s opinion leaders marked by the memory of our history, or more recently the dissolution of our neighbor countries, like Yugoslavia. Accommodation to these new trends is a necessary condition of success in foreign politics. This is why knowledge of the function of this new system as well as portraying future scenarios is valuable.

(3) Analyzing the actors, the root causes and patterns of governance and state failures, this understanding can improve the capacity for defragmentation, crisis prediction, prevention and management.

(4) Governance theory, including the polycentric model, may draw the attention of our policymakers to innovation within the field of inter-institutional relations. Decision-making in multi-actor organizations, the role of the veto-players, for example, can be worthwhile for local EU experts, representatives of corporate business and civil society.

(5) Lastly, but not least, drawing lessons from constructivist and soft power theories, I stress not to underrate the possibilities inherent in the discourses of Post-Westphalian politics. I recommend a closer focus on the possible adaptation of these discourses to the Central and Eastern European realities, in order to shape political thought and preferences.
1.2 Aims, methods and sources of the research

1.2.1 Aims of the dissertation
This dissertation considers social, political, organizational fragmentation as an explanation for social change, a cutaway view of fragmentation in the light of two other phenomena, the crisis of the territorial state and governance without government.

The dissertation aims to answer the following questions:

1) What sort of theories of social and institutional changes lie at the heart of the prevalent discourses of governance, crisis, and fragmentation after the cold war?
2) What explications are presented in these theories for the occurrence of crises, and what therapies for the transcendence of crises?
3) What are the unfolding trends relating to the – purported and unintended – diffusion of power?

The arguments presented in this dissertation are in fact tentative answers for older and well known questions resurfacing nowadays in different branches of state and political theory about EU integration, regionalization, and globalization. How has globalization transformed the state and the international order? What is a political community? What is power and who holds it? I intend to answer these questions by working out a realist interpretation of pluralism and polycentrism using the theoretical toolbox of IR theory, having in regard a moderate state centrism and the realities of multilevel governance, too.

1.2.2 Methods
The preponderant method is a social and political theoretical synthesis aiming at the reconstruction of a model for social change based on fragmentation phenomena, which can be applied simultaneously to micro- and macro-social facts. The main instrument of this synthesis is comparison of different isomorphic power vacuum situations against structural-historical, institutionalist and discourse theoretical standards.

Structural-historical approach, based on systems theory and historical sociology, explains the conditions for the variation (birth, crises, collapse, transformation) of different forms of states in human history. Institutionalist approach explains the conditions of an institution’s life cycle, its survival strategies under power vacuum situations. Discourse theoretical approach aims at feedback in the sociology of knowledge: comparing different variations of these fragmentation discourses to each other, to the elected meta-theoretical frameworks, and to the reality constructed in these discourses. This latter approach is reflected
in the case studies presented in chapter 6 of the dissertation, which employs a heuristic approach by comparing fragmentation discourses and the strategic culture of the basic actors of world politics.

The author of the dissertation is aware that the solution of at least three pending methodological problems is needed for the preservation of the coherence of the text. The first problem is the danger of overgeneralization caused by taking together different kinds of power vacuum episodes. This problem can be transcended by applying the same considerations that isomorphic theories of social changes already set out. I remind you that isomorphic theories subsume under the same label very heterogeneous cases, regardless of whether the similarity occurs in actors, causal process, effect, or external circumstances.²

The second problem is how the arguments laid down here can transcend the dichotomy of short range and long range, purported and spontaneous social changes. This is a well-known set of problems of the so called agent-structure debate. The answer of this problem harks back to Giddens’ theory of structuration and other theories stressing the role of intermediate entities (such as institutions, habits, or paths) between micro and macro structures, shaped by the geometry of resultant vectors and unintended consequences.

The third methodological challenge is represented by the inherent limits of traditional, state-centric social and political theory. These paradigm obstacles are largely analyzed under the label of methodological nationalism and territorialism. The author of the dissertation stresses that the problems of long range prediction are mitigated by genealogic techniques applied by social constructivist and historical sociological approaches, as well as by the comparative techniques which aim at the generalization of institutional isomorphy of power vacuum situations. These limits of traditional state and political theories cast a light upon the importance of historical analogies and counterfactual inferences in IR theory, since this is a discipline, which, according to the late Gáspár Biró (Biró 2003: 4), my former thesis supervisor, „plays a mediator role between philosophy and history, and between political practices”.

1.2.3 Bibliography and sources of the dissertation

In the implementation of my goals, I relied heavily on Anglo-Saxon political science literature, and as a mirror of this, on the book of Bertrand Badie and Marie-Claude Smouts (Badie, Smouts 1998) representing a French insight in IR theory. On a smaller scale I relied on reports, empirical researches, working papers of international think tanks, and the declarations of some well-known personalities.

My original intention was to research this subject confined to the IR theory. However, because the multi-disciplinary and syncretic character of this discipline, the representation of the globalization issue on the whole spectrum of social sciences, and the large field of application of flexible governance from public administration to corporate business and from European to global politics, an interdisciplinary approach was needed. Therefore I used arguments lent from theories of globalization, governance, regionalism, EU integration, sociology (mainly urban-, political and historical sociology), nationalism, comparative political sciences, transitology, geopolitics, security studies, organization studies, economics, public international law, history of ideas, social geography, and philosophy.

My conclusions on the diffusion of power stem from skepticism about maximization of power: on the one hand in the defensive realism of Waltz (1979: 126-127), on the other hand in the prudential pluralism of The Federalist Papers. Furthermore, this skepticism is grounded in facts relating to the infrastructural power as portrayed in geopolitics and political sociology, namely the existence of multiple power channels, the lack of fungibility of the power resources, the influence of new actors, and the effects exerted on the power holder even by small power vacuums. Therefore this prudentialism is not fully susceptible to being traced back to the normative attempts to restrain state power in domestic politics.

A further task was to choose among the many branches of IR, a discipline characterized by the plurality of paradigms. I thought that the constructivist-institutionalist platform which evolved after the third and fourth great paradigm debate (see Wendt 1992, Ikenberry 2001: 10-17, Keohane 2002: 283) is well-grounded and fits the aims of this dissertation.

However, considering the antagonism between many strands of IR, I always tried to find a middle way in the description and explication between conflicting theories. For example, I relied on the existing consent about the role of the grand strategy of the USA in the process of globalization of flexible governance between mainstream liberal and realist theories (Keohane 1982, 2002, Krasner 1999, Nye 2004, Ikenberry 2001, 2011), critical

My aim was to exhaust academic literature on fragmentation, since so far writings published in the last thirty years can be tracked for researchers interested in the subject. Some of these writings (Soja 1971, Harvey 1989, Appadurai 1996, Clark 1997, Bouchanine 2002, Rosenau 2006, Cattaruzza 2010, De Búrca, Keohane, Sabel 2013) influenced me decisively. Some other writings coincidental with my research (mainly Zürn, Faude 2013) gave me positive feedback that my aims, published in one of my articles (Jakab 2008), are legitimate.


My interpretation of globalization was also shaped by macro sociological theories on the interpenetration of societal systems, the primacy of the political system, and the problem of the “overload” of the state. Another emphasis fell on administrative resources and techniques of state control. This last issue is portrayed as government-, state, or just institutional capacity in governance and institutional theories (Peters, Pierre 1998: 224, Kersbergen, Waarden 2004: 155, Börzel, Risse 2010: 119). Former Neo-Weberian theories labeled this the issue of “administrative technologies” having a role in the development of the modern nation state [of special attention is Michael Mann’s (Mann 1986b) conception of the infrastructural power].

Albeit Neo-Weberian authors are skeptical about imminent globalization of the nation state, Tilly, Mann, Giddens, Scocpol, Schmitt, Rokkan, and Skinner conceive the state as heavily dependent on external conditions, rather than as a standstill or teleologically fulfilled perfect entity. Within IR academic writings John Ruggie’s (1998 [1993]) ideas about the connexion of modernity and territory, and the Neo-Weberian insights on the long process of monopolization of public power of Spruyt (1994) and Thomson (1994) proved most useful for this dissertation,

On the margin of the connection between power, space and institutions one can legitimately inquire about the connection of this research and other social sciences having space as their object. However, it seems that the openly syncretic approach in IR after the
great paradigm debates in IR precludes any older rivalry between IR, geopolitics, and political geography. Adherents to new geopolitics are aware that the above mentioned disciplines, and also political economy, share much common interest together (see Agnew, Corbridge 1995: 1). As I have already suggested, the interdisciplinary approach concerning fragmentation stretches far beyond the one indicated by Anew and Corbridge. *The object of this interdisciplinary approach is the global diffusion, division, and transfer of power* among local, state, and transnational layers, between public and private, and old and new type of actors, in a world missing strong states and strong hegemonic powers.

Apropos of “fragmentation discourses” in the title, it is necessary to clarify my *position towards postmodern and discursive political theories*. Although the postmodern fashion one experienced in Hungary of the 1990’s is over, its influence worldwide on the relationship between institutions is still strong. This influence is mirrored in the dissertation in the statements about methodological nationalism and territorialism, the diffusion of power, as well in the epistemological subdivisions of the dissertation into *meta-theories – fragmentation discourses – strategic culture*. For the purpose of this dissertation I define discourse as larger units of thought (texts, narratives) grouped around certain issues, playing a major role through science, media or language in constructing social reality, and exerting “soft” power by naming and describing facts. From this point of view the dissertation is an implicit discourse analysis, which aims at comparing different variations within the same discourse, confronting discourses with metatheories and the social reality (strategic culture, political thought) they construct.

Against radical postmodernism, the author of this dissertation not only rejects the incommensurability of discourses, but sets them against meta-theories. There are two reasons why I consider it a mistake to confer truly “creative force” to performative speech acts in IR. On one side, giving credit to constructivist realists, I consider that micro discourses (ideas, identities) in many cases are subject to external power techniques. This is what we can infer from theories of “organized hypocrisy”, “structuration of preferences”, or “securitization”. The ethnocratic role of modern cultural and identity politics within the nation state also reveals the same sort of external instrumentalism. On the other side and in a different context, the agent-structure debate also puts great emphasis on placing social constructivism and “social epistemes” beyond individual human will.
1.3 Conclusions of the dissertation

1. The dissertation sets out the general argument that in the Post-Cold War era a peculiar philosophy of governance has become effectual and legitimate. Surveying the attached bibliography, I observed that state of the art political science writings build upon one or another part of this philosophy. If not directly, then through appeal to fear. All the more one can observe the institutionalization of this philosophy in corporate management and in the running of non-governmental organizations.

The core of this philosophy stems from the arguments around the proper state structure and function of the federal government of the USA and its public finances. This American philosophy of governance exerted a worldwide influence, forming a global pattern of behavior for other actors and countries’ domestic politics. This influence expanded through economic, social, ecological, demographic, technologic and cultural changes of globalization. The penetration of these ideas has been effective especially due to the propagation and/or voluntary imitation of an American way of life and a pragmatic approach (as in “geoeconomics”), American ideas about “good governance”, and Post-Fordist corporate business, urban development, and integration into economic, political and military structures developed by the US.

Mainstream strands of IR (realism, liberalism) recognize the American roots of this philosophy, but, unlike dependency theories, reject the idea of a “planned imperialism”. Rather they define the result of isomorphic and systemic changes in other countries’ life as unintended consequences in a multiplayer space. Comprehending the system-formative role of the USA in such a way goes hand in hand with ascribing the US and its hegemonic leadership a limited capacity and responsibility.

2. An important segment of this bibliography defines this philosophy as polycentrism. The hallmarks of polycentrism are its multilevel and multiplayer character, in which simultaneous games exert mutual influence on each other. Partially similar –anti-universalistic - consequences arise from the discourses about the partition of the world to North and South, “West and the Rest”, “time zones of development”, “Old and New Europe”, and “Peace versus Conflict Zones” or conceiving of society as poliarchy, heterarchy, or heteronomy with multiple power channels.

The most specific form of polycentric governance is the fragmented American metropolitan administration, counting above ninety thousand actors. Other examples are
international regimes and the European Union. One can further add the common pool resources, a subject not elaborated in this dissertation, but called by Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom the islands of polycentric governance.

Since polycentrism define itself as the counterpart of the closed organizational model of the traditional nation state with monolithic command and exclusive membership, many researchers reject its commensurability with domestic politics, and rule out "domestic analogy".


3. The author has followed a separate train of thought, considering this leadership philosophy organizational fragmentation, although embedding it in a much larger theory of globalization and a social change model based on fragmentation.

For the purpose of this dissertation I define fragmentation as the differentiation, division, separation, or proliferation of institutions, decisions, powers, functions and actors, as well the resulting social, political, and organizational patterns and pathways (room for maneuver and forced tracks, too). In addition to the already mentioned examples, I have to add the polarity and balance of power, hegemonic decline, fragmented party system (especially its dominant version), new actors (new states, quasi and proto states, private actors), regionalism, nationalism, federalism, administrative decentralization and devolution, cultural/civilizational cleavages, and joint decisions. At the extreme of the fragmentation continuum, the traditional forms of disintegration, namely institutional collapse, governance failure, implosion of public power, such as imperial collapse, state failure, civil war, revolution, rebellion, and riots, also belongs here.

As a pattern for social change, the fragmentation model can be characterized by the following traits:  
- Like every institutional model, it has a general scope: fragmentation can occur in isomorphic shape on all levels of space (local, nationwide, global) and in every institutional setting (politics, family, business, civil society). All the more, the model can be expanded to structural-functional descriptions of the relationship of the whole and the parts, and among parts, system and environment, based on system theory.
Against discreet ontology, this model is based on ontological continuity, an unobservable, gradual transition between centralized, polycentric and disintegrated organizational forms and patterns, between concentration, diffusion and vacuum of power, in such a way that governance without government can become an extreme case of polycentrism, and the extreme case of governance without government can become a borderline case of a softer Hobbesian anarchy. Indeed, this continuity creates terminological ambiguity, taking fragmentation merely as question of gradualism on an imaginary ladder, placing polycentrism and disintegration on the same coordinate system.

Against irreversible change, the model assumes cyclic or pendular changes, stressing that institutional breakdown is followed by re-equilibration or path adjustment.

It also conceives social change as part of scalar restructuring in a multilevel context, in which higher integration on one level causes lesser integration on the neighboring level. The tendency of quick globalization and transnationalization of local identities and movements, including ethnic separatism and low intensity conflicts, are good examples of scalar relationship, since transnationalization often means neglect for the national arena.

Logical structure and rules of the fragmented and polycentric organizational model and game are similar to Madison’s scheme for division of power in large states. The isomorphic variations of this scheme are present in federations, consociationalism settings, geopolitical balance (especially the “divide and rule” strategy, labeled by Friedrich Ratzel as the art of levelling downward, “eine Art Nivellierung nach unten”), and today – with the emphasis put elsewhere – in theories of interdependence and governance.

The core of the logical structure of this organizational model is striking a balance between the whole and parts, or between parts. According to defensive realist accounts, if power maximization is unfeasible in certain areas of governance, then a careful disaggregation of power (decentralization, planned diffusion, delegation, or outsourcing) will be the second best option for governance, a disaggregation which preserves the greatest room for maneuver for the main power center. Unfeasibility of power maximization can refer to the insufficiency of political consent, financial, technical or organizational resources, or the hindrances of strong cultural, normative, and pragmatic barriers. Organization theories point in this respect to complexities of the external environment and the growing interdependence of an organization. Against a mere normative argument, the disaggregation of power is not an objective in itself, but a forced track under the constraints of power vacuum, part of an adaptation and compensation strategy of prudentialism. The effectiveness of this strategy is dependent on the art of governance, which is, the comprehension of the measure of
the right balance. Compensatory character is evident if we take multipolarity as a substitute for strong hegemony; flexible geometry EU a surrogate for a federative EU; and governance a forced track for the scarcity of resources in the welfare state.

- The initial negative assessment towards disintegration is replaced by a neutral evaluation, sometimes progressivism. In the background of this new assessment lies the consideration according to which fragmentation can be apportionment (proliferation of smaller, but stable units) rather than break-up (irreversible decomposition), therefore a great emphasis is laid on emancipation, innovation, and diversification. On the other side, apportionment, as we can see in the question of the “unbundling” and transfer of sovereignty towards supranational entities, is a functional division of labor before any territorial materialization.

- According to this model, impersonal social structures and actors within a structure are both agents of social change. Political, organizational, and social dimensions of change become apparent in the functioning of “optical resolution”. Observers of short time periods, such as rational choice institutionalism and public choice, focus characteristically on political and organizational fragmentation. They portray fragmentation as patterns of behavior, characterized by intentionality, or as by-products of games between players and of procedures of institutions. This policy oriented approach presented in the dissertation covers issues like geopolitical balance, joint decision traps, veto players, institutional design, and power sharing in divided societies. On this level of analysis we encounter an apparently iron law of the competences of the actors, according to which the monolithic power and the coordination capacity of an institution is weakening as a function of the proliferation of actors, sectors, and functions.

Observers of longer periods (such as macro sociologists or historical institutionalists) embed these patterns in path dependency of impersonal social structures, particularly in ethnic, social, economic, and geopolitical ones, as well as in the critical junctures and crises within these structures. A kernel of voluntarism is also conferred to these longer range processes. Geopolitical grand strategies and the long range institution and identity building policies of the EU are both well-known efforts to change, or to conserve the existing overarching structures of world order. My dissertation gives place to both approaches.

- The emphasis in the issue of social control is laid on hybrid, polycentric, networked and decentralized ways, which can be dissociated from the traditional pyramidal, and from the market-like control, too. In the order of descending severity one can enlist the delegation, shadow hierarchy, resource dependency, organized hypocrisy, and mutual control by best practice imitation or open method of coordination on the basis of expert reputation.
- Against the linear model of failures, this model distantly resembles Polybius’ cyclical theory of degeneration of government forms, Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction, and the negative dialectics of Frankfurt School. The dissertation throws light upon flexible forms of organization and decision, which, besides specialists in organization studies, political scientists and opinion leaders also identify with the possibility of innovation, sometimes the basis of order in a Post-Westphalian system. Not incidentally, I draw attention to the influence decision specialists and complex organizational models directly exerted upon state theory and the thinking about international order.

4. On the basis of the already enlisted conclusions I can buttress the main hypotheses of the dissertation, that in the context of the erosion of the territorial and sovereign order of the state system caused by the global space revolution, transnational and European governance, as well as the globalization of domestic governance, we can witness a metamorphosis and expansion of the fragmentation discourse. Due to this paradigm change, fragmentation discourse, referring originally to the dissolution of political and social orders, has been augmented by the theory of flexible forms of governance, and on a larger scale, the historical geography and sociology of state. Experimentation in flexible governance, regionalization and localism, and other strategies of secessionism in a broad sense are also parts of this paradigm change.

5. Another contribution of my dissertation is a four plus two class typology for the simplification of fragmentation discourses, refining my former classification (Jakab 2008). These are macrosociological approaches based on systems theory, the homeostatic approach based on functionalism, the voluntarist approach based on competition of actors, and the polycentric approach based on governance without government. Besides, I attempt to proceed on further simplification. In this way the political strand of the resource mobilization theory (the so called RM1 theory) and the life cycle theories of the new institutionalism proved to be theories promising to incorporate all other approaches into a single theory of fragmentation as social change.

6. The final conclusion of my dissertation is that the so called “fragmentation model” is an adequate theory for describing and explaining several historic, macrosociological, institutional factors present in the analysis of IR, as well as of current political events. As
such, this model is a theoretical toolbox which is suitable for explaining and comparing the future consequences of present day facts: it is also * explicans, not only explicandum.

Structural-historical researches, explaining changes in geopolitical polarity, shifts in state size and number of relevant actors portraying change as a pendular movement on an imaginary centralization/fragmentation scale, are well known applications of this model.

In order to test the heuristic capacity of this fragmentation model, Chapter 6 introduces a less known application, and I have analyzed the occurrence of fragmentation discourses in the strategic culture of major actors present in current IR, such as the USA, the EU, ethnic and religious identity movements, and the international community. This analysis proved that while identitarianism and international community are willing to influence the fragmentation process in one way (the former to increase, the latter to decrease and stop), the grand strategies of the USA to conserve her hegemonic status, and the EU, a peculiar transnational actor and also a “proto-state”, confer different roles in their short and long range projects to fragmentation as a vehicle promoting their objectives. In the long range, the EU intends to achieve stronger regional integration. Unlike the EU, the USA is preparing herself for a multipolar transit and growing diffusion of power in global affairs. However, in the present, I’ve demonstrated that the USA uses fragmentation as space for maneuvering her hegemonic affairs, while fragmentation certainly is a reason for frustration and a predicament for the EU, a forced track due to its multiple diversity.

7. The dissertation reassembles those future trends which IR observers assign to globalization of governance, the processes of differentiation, division, separation and/or proliferation.

According to many observers, social relations are characterized by growing complexity, fragmentation and hybridization. These processes facilitate the moving of system borders between domestic and international, inside and outside, public and private, political and civil, war and trade, and we witness a growing diffusion of political power.

First, the diffusion of power is a quantitative issue, relating to the occurrence in the arena of politics of a great number of old and new actors. Secondly, it is the issue of the changing role of the politics itself: its depoliticization, and its oversimplification into sheer economic, redistributive and administrative functions. Thirdly, diffusion means the pressures of a postmodern legitimacy of governance, growing welfare expectations, demand for more voice, democratic constraints for power sharing, and decision traps in public decisions. Fourthly, it is about the availability of military and information technologies for smaller
groups and individuals, which many observers interpret as the expropriation of power and empowerment of the individual.

State actors are mutually, albeit asymmetrically, vulnerable. The relationship of stronger powers towards weaker actors is “diffuse reciprocity”, and great powers in many instances avoid real multilateralism in favor of a selected “minilateralist” cooperation. Nevertheless, global politics have become less hierarchical as small actors benefit from a much larger leeway in this multichannel system.

Based on the above statements on the diffusion of power, the author’s prognosis for the consequences of the crisis of a partially globalized world is that following the effacement of world government and good governance theories it is unlikely that the strengthening of the Westphalian state, or a robust hegemonic control, is feasible anymore in history. The Pendular model of social change suggests that the recombination of the current components will result in the reactivation of certain pre-modern medieval, and even tribal pathways. By adaptation to current expectations, “back to the future” scenarios will result in a functional overlapping system of transnational control and multilevel governance. This non-territorial organization will enhance the role of rich and powerful cities, regions, and individuals, which certainly will exert notable influence upon transnational governance.

8. Finally, I propose a refutation of a popular delusion about fractionalization. Contrary to widespread beliefs, high fractionalization does not necessarily bring about instability, and as such does not represent high risk. Conflict researchers have found that an inverted U-shape curve explains the connection of fractionalization and the occurrence of conflicts. These specialists confirmed that while few power centers will strive for changing the balance of power, in a system with a high number of power centers (which is high fractionalization without polarization) explosiveness will be extinguished by the division of destructive forces and passions.
2. List of relating publications of the author to the subject of dissertation

Book chapters:


Articles:

- A területi fragmentáció metaelmélete felé. Társadalomkutatás, 26 (2), 2008/június, 244-266.

Translation:

3. Selected bibliography

Börzel, Tanja – Risse, Thomas, Governance Without a State: Can It Work? Regulation & Governance, Vol. 4, No. 2 (June 2010), 113-134.


