Abstract

An interesting segment of the Greek Cause was an idea to create an independent Greek State on the part of the Great Powers. With this object, an international conference was organised between 1830 and 1832. On this conference, a Hungarian diplomat Paul Anton Esterhazy – as a minister plenipotentiary of Austria in London – represented the opinion of the Cabinet in Vienna. During this negotiation process – in favour of Greeks – Esterhazy played a special role. The aim of my study is to make an overview about Esterhazy's diplomatic mission.

Keywords: Eastern Question; Greek Cause; international relations; Austrian diplomacy; English diplomacy; Paul Anton Esterhazy's mission; Conference of London;

The Greek Cause was one of the key issues of the European diplomacy of the 1820’s. Between 1821 and 1832, it became a serious dilemma for the participants of the Concert of Europe to find a solution for the international conflict arising as the sign of the decay of the Ottoman Empire, as a result of the Greek independence movement of several decades and the social movements associated with it. After almost ten years of military and diplomatic struggle, at the end of the 1820’s the issue of the Greek State has stepped into the phase of realization, and an international conference was summoned in London with sessions held between 1830 and 1832, with the purpose of establishing the Independent Greek State. The standpoint of the Cabinet in Vienna at the Conference was represented by the London ambassador to Austria – the Hungarian-born diplomat – Prince Paul Anton Esterhazy. The goal of my paper is to give an overview on this short period of Esterhazy’s diplomatic mission and to present the significance of his proceeding during the Conference of London; furthermore to make a thematic

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The investigation of the role of the Austrian ambassador is still a mainly undiscovered part both in the Hungarian and the international literature. In the examination of Esterhazy’s activity we could use primary sources, which were all relevant from the point of view of the current topic as well. The archive materials can be found at the Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna. The collection of Diplomatie und Außenpolitik vor 1848 – Staatenabteilungen/Außerdeutsche Staaten/Großbritannien includes valuable documents according to Esterhazy’s mission.

Esterhazy was a highly qualified and internationally recognized diplomat, with an extensive network of personal relations within the European elite, however, his figure had not been able to take a more prominent place and remained in the periphery of the Hungarian historiography. The historical literature on Esterhazy until now mainly focused on his early years, on his relation with Klemens von Metternich and on his role played in the War of Independence between 1848 and 1849, where he functioned as the Foreign minister of the first responsible Hungarian Government. In performing his duties in this position he could make a good use of his more than four decades of experience in foreign affairs, the period of which is still mainly an undiscovered part of historical research. Nonetheless, Esterhazy did not merely fulfil a diplomatic service in Austria, but also represented the interests of the Austrian Monarchy in one of the most influential countries in the ground of the European diplomatic affairs. The function

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of the ambassador to London was a serious position of trust, which assumed not only close relations with the political elite of Vienna, but also required the skills of professional and social representation of the country abroad. Prince Esterhazy had excellent knowledge and experience in both fields, which he had by then proved during his former assignments in Dresden and Paris, as well as during the Congress of Vienna. The latter was of capital importance, since it became the turning point in Prince Esterhazy's carrier in Foreign Affairs.

Before the full description of the topic, I would like to give a short outline on Paul Anton Esterhazy's diplomatic carrier before the period of his ambassadorial position in London. The Prince started to work in the Austrian Foreign Ministry in 1806, and his first foreign mission was to London, when he was delegated to perform secretarial tasks at the Embassy of Austria in London. His first assignment was soon followed by another one, with his transfer to Paris. It was presumably in Paris that he made his first close work contacts with Metternich, who the same year became the Paris Ambassador of the Austrian Empire. Later Esterhazy performed diplomatic service in Dresden – at the Court of the Saxon Principality – then in 1814 he worked with Metternich again, at the Chatillon negotiations, which were meant to prepare the post-war settlement of Europe. From this point on there was a straight path to the Congress of Vienna, where he probably earned the trust of the British delegation with his performance and personality, and right after the Congress, he received his appointment, which meant for him the Austrian ambassadorial position to London. It is important to note that the Prince Regent made a special request to have Prince Esterhazy in London as the representative of Austria. In response to the request, Esterhazy the same year received his credentials from the Chancellor, and as a consequence, he performed his ambassadorial service between 1815 and 1842. The duration of his service is also very remarkable: his ambassadorial mission – lasting for 27 years – is the best proof of his correctness and expertise, the properties highlighted by Esterhazy’s contemporaries as well.

The exploration of Esterhazy’s entire ambassadorial mission can be the objective of a more comprehensive research programme. During the nearly three decades spent in the English capital, the Prince had to mediate in, and manage various international affairs. Since I am concerned with the topic only ten months within the framework of a research programme the time was too short for a complex exploration of the entire period between 1815 and 1842, therefore I have chosen to

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5 RESS: 200.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid. 202–203.
present Esterhazy’s behaviour and political attitude through the examination of a partial problem related to the Eastern Question. At the same time, later on I would like to broaden my research area and to elaborate the entire diplomatic career of Paul Anton Esterhazy. The recent subject is based on the Greek Cause, the international background of which covered a decade by itself (1821–1830). However, the period I have chosen to explore, includes only the last stage of the Greek–Turkish conflict, the years during the Conference of London – held with the purpose to establish the independent Greek State – and its preliminary sessions (1829–1832).

Although the Greek Question appeared on the agenda of European diplomacy starting from 1821, actually the European Great Powers did not want to deal with the matter substantially, since it was considered as the internal affair of the Ottoman Empire. On the Congress of Laibach Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, France and Russia clearly declared their distancing from the case, letting the Porte manage the crisis by themselves. Significant changes came only due to the interaction and mutual effect of the social, political and economic factors. This process had several aspects: the first one is the so-called philhellenic movement arisen in Europe (mainly in England and France). The second one is the economic interests – this point tied Great Britain and Russia because the assurance of the unobstructed trade on the Mediterranean Sea (and the Black Sea) was a vital point in the policy of London and St Petersburg. Moreover, from the Russian side, the Greek movement made a considerable chance to broaden Russian influence in the Balkan Peninsula. In order to avoid this situation Great Britain encouraged the creation of an Anglo–Russian alliance in the favour of Greece. This cooperation expanded with France and a trilateral alliance come into being against the Porte (1827) and brought changes to the power relations in the Balkans. In addition to these factors, the conflicts escalated between St Petersburg and Constantinople in 1828 resulted in a declaration of war between the two countries. Even though the Russo–Turkish war theoretically, on the level of the Russian rhetoric, was independent from the issue of the Greek independence, the events of 1828–1829 in the long run still had an impact on the evolution of the

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Greek Cause. The original casus belli of the Russo–Turkish war was a diplomatic conflict between St Petersburg and Constantinople because of the Turkish proceedings in the Danubian Principalities, but the direct root cause of declaration of war against Russia on the side of the Porte was the allied action at Navarino in October 1827. In that way the Russo–Turkish war joined the Greek Cause at this point.¹¹

As part of the short international review of the Greek Question, we would like to cover the directives of the Cabinet of Vienna concerning the case. The Austrian Foreign Affairs lead by Metternich pursued a consistent policy as regards the War of Independence during the 1820’s, firmly supporting the Laibach standpoint even when one of their main allies, Russia opposed to the principle of neutrality, advocating for Great Power mediation in order to resolve the ongoing conflict in the East. This strategy of isolation is curious from the viewpoint of Vienna, since it seems to go completely against the Austrian foreign policy of the previous years. For comparison, between 1815 and 1821 Austria took a very active part in the control of the European Affairs: after the Congress of Vienna Austria took major part in resolving the conflicts first in the course of the student movements in the German States, then in the revolutions in South Europe.¹² During the seven years after the Napoleonic Wars there was virtually not one European issue in which Vienna would have remained passive, not even on the level of diplomacy. As opposed to that, in the case of the Eastern Question on the agenda in 1821, namely in the discourses urging the settlement of the Greek–Turkish situation, Austria definitely stepped back and decided not to participate, or just in moderate form.¹³ Until that point, the way of dealing with the Greek Cause could not be revealed in Metternich’s foreign policy, the main concept of which after 1815 was focused around the Congress System and the System of the Holy Alliance. The essence of the Austrian conservative foreign policy was formed by the basic principles of the reason for existence of the dynastic power and the aspiration to suppress the enlightened national and revolutionary ideas.

The Chancellor considered the Greek Uprising as an event outside the European matters, which was one of the reasons for Austria’s distance from the occurrences.¹⁴ Secondly, in the existing international relations

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¹⁴ BUCHMANN, Bertrand Michael: Militär; Diplomatie, Politik. Österreich und
Katalin Schrek: Interpretation of Prince Paul Anton Esterhazy's Diplomatic Role and Thematization of His Reports during the Negotiations on the Independent Greek State (1829–1832)

from the geostrategic point of view Austria focused on the preservation of the Ottoman Empire's integrity, since maintaining the Porte's integrity and authority could prevent the expansion of Russia to the south and its acquiring political influence in the Balkans. The region was important for the Habsburg Monarchy, since starting from the end of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century it became one of the main directions of the potential expansion of the Empire. For this reason from the 1680's Austria more often intervened in the affairs of the region; and during the 18\textsuperscript{th} century it got involved in several wars with the Porte. By the end of the century, when the Western European political scene coming into focus, the Balkan issue became marginal for Austria. Naturally, the Balkan Peninsula remained an integral part of the sphere of interest for the Habsburg Monarchy, but after the rearrangement of the priorities in the foreign policy, the Government of Vienna devoted less attention to the region, pursuing a more reserved policy and staying away from the conflicts in this area. Nevertheless, Austria had an important function at the Balkans, since it played a role of counterbalance against Russia and was the protector of the status quo at the same time. In this task, Great Britain became the main ally of the Cabinet of Vienna.

Thus we can clearly state that despite the fact that the Greek Cause in a sense fitted into the series of the revolutionary movements of the 1820's, which were the main subjects of the Congresses in Troppau, Laibach and in Verona, Metternich's policy still handled the Greek uprising separately from the revolutions in Spain and Italy, considering the Greek Affair as a sub issue of the Eastern Question. Besides, the Austrian attitude applied to the War of Independence was adjusted to the political principles applied towards the Ottoman Empire, and ceased to follow the methods formerly used in the management of European affairs. It must be noted that this difference in judgement can be observed only in the political control of the Greek National Movement by Austria, but not in its evaluation by them.

After the introduction of the main guidelines of the international situation and the Austrian diplomacy it is time to describe the nature of the relationship between Prince Paul Esterhazy and Metternich, with respect to the major common views determining the long-term cooperation of the two statesmen. In the first part of the paper, we have already mentioned that the paths of Esterhazy and Metternich crossed at a very early stage of Esterhazy's diplomatic career. They first met during Metternich's ambassadorship in Paris, and then we could see how Esterhazy helped the Chancellor's work during the last years of the Napoleonic Wars. Metternich and Esterhazy presumably had developed

a good, confidential liaison. Metternich and Esterhazy had essentially a relationship based on trust, the clearest manifestation of which was the fact of Esterhazy’s delegation by Chancellor Metternich to one of the most influential and greatest European partners of Austria.

The London Conference on Greece was held with the mutual agreement of the three Great Powers: Great Britain, France and Russia. Austria officially did not take part in the Conference, since the right of the organization and the management of the international conference was owned by the members of the trilateral alliance. Since due to the previously described policy at the Balkans Austria maintained his principles of non-intervention even after an anti-Turkish Great Power cooperation had started to form (1826–1827), it did not join the coalition established by the Treaty of June 6, 1827; and as a consequence missed the official participation at the Conference of London. Therefore, Esterhazy’s position and the nature of his actions in connection with the Greek Cause must be defined from this perspective. The first and most important factor is his status: Esterhazy attended the Conference not as a participant, but as an observer, and as such, he did not have the same rights as the representatives of the other three states. He was not authorized either to participate or make decision in specific cases. Nevertheless, he can still be considered as someone who had major role in the formation of the diplomatic events even during the negotiations in London.

The uniqueness of Prince Esterhazy’s position can be described with the duality of his participation at the Conference as an outsider and as a mediator, at the same time. This contradiction can be resolved by understanding the true nature of Esterhazy’s role in this context, which can rather be regarded informal than formal, and the Prince himself as a constant member of the background consultations throughout the sessions of the Conference of London. It is especially important as regards the British Government, which lead continual consultations with Esterhazy (and through him with the Austrian Government), even during the most active period of the British–French–Russian trilateral cooperation. It was especially true for the Wellington–Aberdeen period between 1828 and 1830. The English diplomacy could rely on Esterhazy’s mediation and opinion, since the cooperation with Austria became crucial for the Foreign Office in order to compensate the aspirations of France and Russia. This phenomenon could be more strongly experienced in 1829, the year of the victory of Russia over the Porte, as well as the year when the Cabinet of Paris, in response to the changing situation in the Balkans and the Near East, came forward with a detailed partition plan of the Ottoman Empire. According to the project of the French Prime Minister, Jules de Polignac, Russia would

obtain control over the Danubian Principalities, and receive Armenian territories; Austria would broaden with some Western Balkan areas as Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia and Dalmatia together with the Principality of Serbia. France would get Luxemburg and expand her territories to Belgium. Finally, Great Britain would take advantages not in Europe, but in the overseas with Dutch colonies. Under such circumstances, Prime Minister Wellington, and the leader of the British Foreign Office, Lord Aberdeen, took extremely great care to keep the partnership of Austria, sharing common political views on the issue of the Turkish integrity. So during this period Esterhazy’s role and position definitely increased in value.

The observations and reports written by Esterhazy in London and forwarded to Vienna between 1829 and 1832 contain useful information on the handling of the Greek Question, and more importantly, on the relations of the three allies during the negotiation process. One of the sorest points was the shaping of the British–Russian relations, notably the difficulties of the period following Russia’s victory in the 1828–1829 Russo–Turkish war. The newly strengthened influence of Russia at the Balkans due to the Treaty of Adrianople, as well as the altered Russo–Turkish relations caused a great dilemma for the Wellington Government. The conflicts and clashes between St Petersburg and Constantinople manifested on the scene of diplomacy, which created to a certain extent equal position even during the disputes, with no shift in favour of any of the parties. Due to Russia's military victory in the war and her capacity to defend politically their own interests, Russia gained a significant advantage over the Porte, and the Ottoman Empire was temporarily forced to a subordinate position, which caused many concerns both to the British and to the Austrian leadership in Foreign Affairs.

By the end of the 1820’s a new international situation was formed simultaneously with the Greek Cause, leading to a change in the status quo of the Balkans. Esterhazy’s London reports from 1829 were mainly grouped around this circumstance, and reported about the criticism of

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17 SCHROEDER: 658.
19 No. 17. Prince Esterhazy. Opinion du Duc de Wellington sur la campagne Russe
the British Cabinet concerning Russia. In his reports, the Prince repeatedly referred to the details of the Russian military operations, about which he learned from British and other international sources.\textsuperscript{20} As part of the Russo–Turkish war, he also reported about the blockade of the island of Crete by the Russian Fleet and the British–French responses to that.\textsuperscript{21} The event is of great interest, since through Esterhazy’s records, besides gaining insight to the details of the Russo–Turkish war we can also picture the difficulties of the British–French–Russian trilateral alliance and the aversions of the allies towards one another. The war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia drew the attention of the British and French Government to the risks implied in the ambitions of their common ally in the Balkans. Nevertheless, the concerns due to the expansion in the Balkans were more typical of Great Britain, since Britain did not want to lose their control over the Eastern Mediterranean as well as their economic interests and privileges in the region. Lord Aberdeen’s reaction included in Paul Anton Esterhazy’s report from May 8, 1829, was partially in response to that.\textsuperscript{22} Based on the Prince’s despatch, the British Foreign Minister demanded for a detailed report on the events from Prince Lieven, the Russian ambassador, expressing his protest against the situation.\textsuperscript{23} Although Aberdeen did not question Russia’s right to act in accordance with the Treaty of July 6, he considered Russia’s actions exaggerated, and made a recommendation on the modification of the provisions of the Agreement of 1827, presumably in order to eliminate any similar Great Power actions in the future.\textsuperscript{24} Esterhazy’s full awareness of the ongoing events was also shown by the fact that the Prince was well-informed about the internal affairs and

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\textsuperscript{22} No. 18. Prince Esterhazy. Concernant le blocus de l’île Candie par la flotte Russie. Londres, le 8 mai 1829. IN: Ibid.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
representation of the other states. He had close relations with the ambassadors of the other European Great Powers to London, and in many cases, he presented detailed reports on the information mediated by the Russian ambassador (K. A. Lieven) to the British Government and the instructions and despatches of the British ambassador at St Petersburg (Lord Heytesbury). He had up-to-date information about the reforms were planned by the Russian Government in Moldavía and Wallachia and transmitted detailed summary on the advantages of the possession of the Danube Delta.

An interesting thematic unit and a part of the former issue in Esterhazy’s reports was the question of capability or incapability of the operation of the trilateral alliance. The questions of disagreement between France, Great Britain and Russia concerning the Greek Cause and the future situation of the Ottoman Empire soon became an obstacle for a good cooperation within the alliance. The main problem was caused by the conflicts of interest between the members of the coalition, those existing even before the formation of their alliance, but suspended by the parties in order to resolve the Greek–Turkish conflict. However, the aspirations to acquire political influence in the Balkan region, and moreover, over the Ottoman Empire, soon started to dominate the discourse of the allies. Esterhazy gave regular reports on the diplomatic manifestations of these problems.

The second bigger thematic unit of Esterhazy’s reports was the definition of the English strategy used against Greece. The nature of the support given to the Greek Provisional Government was always a key issue for the Government in London. The amount of the subvention

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repeatedly caused dilemmas for the Cabinet of St James, since there were many differences between the notions of the Greek Provisional Government and the British concept of establishing the independent state, especially in territorial issues. The Foreign Office wanted to determine future borders of the autonomous Greek state based on the principle of „uti possidetis”. The „uti possidetis” is a term used in international law, and it implies that a certain territory will be possessed by its present owner. Concerning the Greek Cause the position of the British Government was exactly that, namely, the established state would possess the territories acquired during the military conflict against the Porte. To some extent associated with that, in his reports Esterhazy several times mentioned the British aspirations and plans of sustaining the Ottoman Empire, which was fully in accordance with the Austrian geostrategic interests. In one of his reports, Esterhazy wrote about the conception of Wellington regarding these efforts. The Prince emphasized, that the British Prime Minister is aware to the necessity of a common arrangement of the European Great Powers in this question, and that he is committed to the preservation of the Turkish Empire.

The cooperation of the leading European States appeared in the context of the Boundary Commission negotiations several times, since he believed that the current situation is equivalent with the waver of the system created in 1814–1815.

With regards, the designation of the Greek–Turkish demarcation line some other notions were revealed as well, such as the Russian concept of natural borders. The period of the Boundary Commission negotiations was presumably the most decisive one, when Esterhazy had the chance to support the British Cabinet in the most contentious issue of the discussions on the Greek State. Although Great Britain was in favour of the realization of the sovereign Greek Kingdom, London required the support of the Government of Vienna, since it was not in any sense in their interests to let the newly formed state in the Balkans gain too much

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32 No. 40. Prince Esterhazy. Cite les points principaux qui dans la pacification entre la Russie et la Porte (...). Londres, le 12 octobre 1829. IN: Ibid.
territories due to the great support from Russian side from the beginning. The alternative of such over-expansion would imply the possibility of the establishment of a strong Balkan state with strategically excellent location and under Russian protectorate, which at the same time could function as a gateway of the Russian Empire to the Mediterranean area. Esterhazy became a participant of a quite paradoxical situation, when by being a delegate of Austria, outside the trilateral alliance, he virtually supported the British Cabinet in order to help them regain the balance over the Russo–French predominance. The true significance of Paul Esterhazy’s participation at the Conference of London was exactly in this context.

In addition, concerning the further results of the Greek Conference Esterhazy’s reports helped to understand the degree of significance of the Eastern Question problem related to the European issues as well. In 1830, another revolutionary period started in Europe: riots against the reigning power broke out first in Paris, then in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands and later in Poland. Although all the three events have their own specific significance, it was the Belgian Uprising that drew the attention of the leading European Great Powers, since it brought the threat of elimination of the artificially established state, formed in 1815. Therefore, the Great Powers gathered in London with the purpose to find a solution to the Greek Cause, acting in response to the Belgian–Dutch confrontation, had to add to their agenda the issue of the Belgian independence. Therefore, the Conference to handle the Greek Question soon turned to a Conference to deal with the Belgian issue, overshadowing the Eastern problems and pushing them to the background. Esterhazy’s reports sent to Vienna clearly reflect this tendency. While Esterhazy’s despatches from 1829 and, to smaller extent, from 1830 contained rich source material on the negotiations concerning the Greek War of Independence and the position of the Ottoman Empire, starting from the year of 1831 his ambassadorial reports on the Eastern Question spectacularly reduced. We should note that it did not happen as a result of a change in Esterhazy’s interest, it rather happened due to the developing changes in the international relations. To achieve the Belgian autonomy was regarded as an issue of great interest, since it brought the first significant change in the continental status quo, created by the Congress of Vienna. At the same time, besides Belgium there were other issues deserving attention as well, such as the Spanish internal crisis and the state of affairs of the Portuguese colonies in South America. All these factors lead to a situation when simultaneously with the European issues coming into view, by 1831 the current problem of the Eastern Question was rapidly

settled, and after the completion of the Greek–Turkish border arbitration dispute it practically lost its significance. Esterhazy’s ambassadorial reports from that moment mainly focused on the Belgian, Spanish and Portuguese issues, and the topics concerning the Greek Kingdom were displaced from the focus of attention.

During the examination of the short interval of Esterhazy’s ambassadorial service in London we came to the following conclusions concerning his role and the content of his reports. While performing his duty of representing the official Austrian foreign policy, as well his ambassadorial service in general, Esterhazy by 1830 found himself in peculiar circumstances: Austria was not invited to the Conference summoned on the issue of establishment of the Greek State, but despite of that Paul Esterhazy had to play an important role during the background negotiations. During the consultations of Great Britain and its allies on the Greek Cause, Esterhazy became the main symbol and representative of Austrian temperance. Acting informally, as a participant outside the Conference, he was still able to enforce the basic factors of the Austrian standpoint represented in the Greek Question. Besides, he was a powerful support for the British Administration as well, who were strongly in need of Esterhazy’s assistance, finding him a great external ally.

One of the main features of his diplomatic reviews and reports is the correctness of the rendered data, as well as his accuracy in presenting the local (British) political relations and responses. Transmitting of the British perspective is decisive part of his despatches, but at the same time, his reports are far from being one-sided. Esterhazy, besides presenting the state of things in England, describes the major factors influencing the British politics in a much broader context, with constant referral to the internal events, and British responses to different international affairs, especially in reference to the Russian Empire. His view is not exclusively centred around the British events; he tried to make an overview about the main political features of the European Great Powers, so he gives us an insight to the driving forces and motives of the French and Russian foreign policy as well. Despite all these benefits, we must note that Esterhazy’s reports sent to Vienna are mainly factual and contain little personal opinions or reflections, and they almost entirely lack personal conceptions, commentaries or remarks. The Prince in most of the cases strives to be factual and his reports seem to reflect the attitude of the Cabinet in Vienna. Independent notions or spontaneous attitudes, adjusted in accordance with the situation can rarely be found in his reports. In point of Greece Esterhazy was the representative of moderation and a supporter of the British conceptions, at the same time he contributed to the
compensation of French and Russian ambitions, and to the maintenance of the European balance of power.

In conclusion, it can be stated, that Esterhazy performed a professional and expert ambassadorial representation both in general and as regards the specific period examined by us. In the Greek Cause, he represented the policy of the Cabinet of Vienna, while in his communication and relations with Great Britain he assured the conditions for a stable long-term alliance cooperation. The full discovery of Paul Esterhazy’s diplomatic work requires further research, which would be necessary if we want to have a complete and detailed picture about the nearly three decades of Esterhazy’s diplomatic mission. Esterhazy’s significance can also be described by the fact that as an acknowledged politician taking part in the international political sphere, he was an outstanding figure of the 19th century Hungarian history, therefore a more complex further research of his portrait would certainly fill a gap in the field of historiography.