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***Arms Industry and Civil Defence
The Experience of War in Swedish post-war Society***

Abstract

Sweden was never drawn into the Second World War. In contrast to most of Europe's countries, Sweden escaped the world conflict almost unharmed. Nevertheless, the war made a deep impression on the Swedes which in many ways shaped the build-up of Sweden's post war society.

The aim of this article is to identify and trace the development of two major institutional complexes that both have their roots in the Second World War experiences and both have had a central but at the same time neglected position in Sweden's post-war history. First, the defence industry that was built up during the War but never dismantled afterwards. Instead, foreign policy, military doctrines, as well as public support and even the mentality of the Swedes were reformed in order to incorporate a strong defence industry in the post-war society. Sweden is still today manufactures a disproportional amount of the world's weapons. Second, a civil defence was built up that eventually turned out to be one of the strongest and most well organized in the world. Both these institutional complexes in many ways mirrored the welfare state. But as both these complexes represented Warfare – the anti-thesis of Welfare – their existence have not been regarded as representative of the welfare society built after the Second World War. The role, and even the existence, of the institutional complexes of military industry and civil defence had thus been suppressed in Sweden's 20th century historiography.

Keywords: Sweden, Second World War, military industry, civil defence

Sweden was one of few countries in Europe that was not an aggressor, not attacked by Nazi-Germany or the Soviet Union or otherwise drawn into the war. When Norway and Denmark were occupied in 1940 and Finland joined in the attack on the Soviet Union in 1941 Sweden was completely isolated and surrounded by belligerents. Up until 1943 the threat of being attacked by Nazi-Germany was believed to be imminent. Sweden reacted by proclaiming neutrality but at the same time concessions, such as trade with crucial strategic resources and transition of troops were granted Germany.

The experience of neutrality and non-participation in the Second World War was an extremely important element in the Swedish '*crisis management*' and, as such, was institutionalized in the non-alliance policy pursued during the Cold War and, more or less, up until today. The war experiences served to create two different but interrelated institutional complexes that both have their roots in the Second World War but that both have been almost entirely neglected in the historiography of the post-war period. These are the armaments industry which

has survived up until today as the world's strongest weapons industry counted per capita and the civil defence which was a thoroughly well-organized mirror of the welfare state aiming to protect the citizens from the vagaries of war just as effectively as the welfare state would protect them from the vagaries of poverty.

Although these institutions have been extremely important they have not fitted the '*Swedish self-image*' as a neutral, peace-loving country with the world's most extensive welfare state, and hence, the institutions of the arms industry and the Civil Defence have, with few exceptions, been ignored both by academic research and by popular accounts of Sweden's 20th century history.

The arms industry

Sweden's arms industry was built up immediately before and during the Second World War. The country's military forces were totally inadequate in 1939, and six years of isolation left Sweden no other choice than to provide for itself. Concentrated efforts during these years meant that Sweden at War's end possessed an arms industry capable of supplying its armed forces with everything except the most advanced modern technologies.¹

The isolation had taught the Swedes to rely on themselves. New conflicts might well lead to new periods of isolation, and an adequate defence needed to be backed up by industrial resources. The war had weakened the anti-militarist sentiments of the 1930s, and the country's leading political force, the social democratic party, was now divided between pro-militarists and anti-militarists. While the war experience remained fresh in memory, pro-militarists and military establishment succeeded in manoeuvring the defence issue in such a way as to make it a non-political issue.

The build-up of Sweden's military capability continued during the 1950s, but the motives for keeping a strong defence shifted. As the war experience waned in memory, a new conflict loomed into the foreground. The Cold War acted as a powerful catalyst in shaping the Swedish nation state. Sweden needed to justify its non-participation in the Second World War. Especially the fact that Sweden had not contributed to the war effort or to the victory over Nazi-Germany needed to be justified. Past experiences had thus to be arranged in a positive tradition.² Neutrality became not just a lucky outcome, but a norm and an objective in itself.

The assertion of a credible non-alignment, it was argued, necessitated a visual display of independence and capability. Perhaps the most important arena to do so has been within the field of military technology. Consequently, Sweden has invested disproportional amounts of resources in building '*neutral*' weapons of

¹ OLSSON, Ulf: *The Creation of a Modern Arms Industry: Sweden 1939-1974*, Göteborgs Universitet, Göteborg, 1977.

² STRÅTH, Bo: *Poverty, Neutrality and Welfare: Three Key Concepts in the Modern Foundation Myth of Sweden*, IN: STRÅTH, Bo (ed.): *Myth and Memory in the Construction of Community: Historical Patterns in Europe and Beyond*, Brussels, 2000, 375.

own design. Sweden's independence in security policy matters was physically visible in aircraft, tanks, artillery pieces, naval vessels and small arms invented and constructed by Swedish engineers.

Between the end of the Second World War and the end of the 1960s, Sweden's armed forces grew steadily in strength and in technological refinement. The development was never contested politically but carried out under unanimity. Military experts provided the estimates on which the defence decisions were built, and such estimates were accepted more or less without question. The members of parliament involved in defence issues were often chosen because of their reliability and long experience in defence matters. The costs were considered necessary for the assertion of a trustworthy policy of neutrality. The corporatist organisation of Swedish society meant that public support for the 'armed neutrality' was provided by voluntary organisations, trade unions, and political youth associations who organised themselves to support official policy. The most dominant corporate interests in the country – trade unions and industry – were both interested in a viable defence industry. During the 1950s Sweden possessed the fourth largest air force in the world, it pursued a nuclear research programme capable of producing nuclear weapons and, over 50 per cent of public research funds went to military research.

Industrial companies such as Bofors, Saab, Volvo, and Ericson were to various extents engaged in the production of arms, primarily for the Swedish Armed Forces but to an increasing degree for export. These companies were the technological edge of Swedish industry. Arms production was profitable, the development costs were largely covered by the buyer who was also a very reliable customer and there was virtually no competition. Technological capacity thus was built in close cooperation between state and private industry. When Sweden's third technical university was built in the end of the 1960s, it was located in Linköping next to Saab's research and manufacturing departments. The purpose was to supply the country's technologically most advanced industry – the military aircraft industry – with engineers.³

The growth of Sweden's arms industry during the Second World War formed the industrial fundament for exceptionally strong armed forces but it was not until the early post-war years that a Military-Industrial Complex was institutionalised. Three factors have been particularly important for this institutionalisation. First, the Cold War shaped the identity of the Swedes. Sweden was neutral, free from the superpower alliances and this provided a need for neutral technology, visibly free from superpower allegiances. Second, the corporative political culture of

³ STENLÅS, Niklas: *Military Technology, National Identity and the State. The Rise and Decline of a Small State's Military-Industrial Complex*. IN: LUNDIN, Per, STENLÅS, Niklas and GRIBBE, Johan (eds.): *Science for Welfare and Warfare. Technology and State Initiative in cold War Sweden*. Science History Publications, Sagamore Beach, 2010: 61-84; HOLMSTRÖM, Per and OLSSON, Ulf: *Sweden*. IN: BALL, Nicole and LEITENBERG, Milton (eds.): *The Structure of the Defence Industry: an International Survey*. Croon Helm, London 1983.

Sweden provided possibilities for an interest alliance between the government, the military, the industry and the unions around the defence issue. Third, the corporative interest alliance succeeded, at an early stage, to elevate the defence issue over the political agenda, where it was up to military and scientific experts to determine the level of the country's military needs.

A combination of factors, such as the *détente* between the superpowers, the anti-militarist sentiments following the Vietnam War, the economic setback in the beginning of the 1970s, and the ever increasing costs of the military forces eventually put an end to Sweden's military industrial complex. Starting with the defence decision of 1968 the autonomy of the military expertise was checked. Political control over military expenditures was reasserted. The political concord over the defence policy was at first dissolved, but eventually it was clear that the military forces were regarded as too costly by all political parties.

The 1970s and 1980s saw successive cutbacks of the military defence but at the same time new weapon systems, technologically more advanced than ever, were developed such as the JAS-39 Gripen fighter-bomber by Saab, conventional submarines by Kockums, artillery pieces and guided missiles by Bofors and armoured vehicles by Hägglunds. Paradoxically increasingly more components in these weapons were of foreign manufacture at the same time as the need to develop and buy weapons of domestic origin was legitimised with Sweden's non-alliance policy that made it essential not to be dependent on any of the superpower alliances.

The early 1990s was somewhat of a watershed for Sweden's arms industry. In 1990 a government commission asserted that it was necessary to cooperate with arms industries in other, mainly European, countries.⁴ The government took the lead in the restructuring of the state owned arms industries, which, a few years later was privatised and eventually acquired by Saab. In 1991 Sweden entered the European Union and, as a consequence, had to adapt its procurement regulations to European standard. Over the two decades after 1990 the Swedish arms industry have been restructured through foreign acquisitions, mergers and cross-ownerships so that it is no longer possible to speak of a national Swedish arms industry. Contemporary observers are still in disagreement whether the state have abandoned the previously effective responsibility it had assumed in the development of new arms technology or if the structures of the military-industrial complex remains, leading to over-spending, excessive arms production and over-sophistication of arms technology.⁵

However, the alliance to shape public policy around the defence issue has lost its regime status. That is a process that begun already in the late 1960s and early

⁴ *Fem rapporter från 1988 års försvarskommitté*, SOU 1990:108, The Ministry of Defence, Stockholm, 1990.

⁵ Gunnar Eliasson, Stefan Lövéén, Alf Svensson och Göran Persson, *Början till slutet för den svenska försvarsindustrin*, *Dagens Nyheter* 26 October 2009; Anna Dahlberg, *Bryt romansen med försvarsindustrin*, *Expressen* 1 November 2009.

1970s, and the consequences of which have been increasingly obvious since the end of the Cold War.

If the US military-industrial complex has been associated with a row of wars such as the Korean war, the Vietnam war, the Gulf wars and, of course, the Cold War and the nuclear arms race as well as been morally connected death, corruption and profit, Sweden's military-industrial complex has succeeded in building its legitimacy on neutrality, non-alignment, peace keeping and national pride in advanced technology. A broad interest alliance composed of all political parties (except the rather marginalised communist party), strong social actors such the interest organisations of industry and the unions as well a wide range of voluntary organisation have formed a regime which has, almost unchallenged, promoted the domestic arms industry from the Second World War at least up until the mid-1970s. Remnants of this regime remain today but from 1990 it has been unable to prevent a thorough restructuring of foreign policy, armed forces and arms industry.⁶

The civil defence

The need for a civil defense followed logically from the fact that civil society had become a more frequent and even legitimate target in war during the 20th century. The civil sphere supported the war effort both materially and morally and a basic assumption during the Second World War had been that terror bombing of civilian targets could have a decisive effect on the enemy's willingness to continue fighting. In the fully industrialized society the border between civilian and military targets was erased. A main problem for governments became how to protect their citizens. This problem would be even more acute with the advent of the atomic bomb.

The first attempts to organize civil defense in Sweden were made during the 1930s. An Air Protection Authority (Luftskyddsinspektionen) was instituted in 1937 and the regional state authorities (länsstyrelserna) were charged with the task of organizing air protection on the regional level. A volunteer air protection organization (Riksluftskyddsförbundet) was simultaneously built up.⁷

Even though Sweden was not directly involved in the war the Swedish government closely monitored the war developments. Just as the Armed Forces

⁶ Perhaps the decline of the military-industrial complex should not be overemphasized and it could be argued that it is only the forms and mechanisms of the military-industrial complex that have changed since the Cold War and that the arms industry has found strategies to survive. Although Sweden does not acknowledge any military threats in its neighbourhood and despite the fact that Sweden has almost dissolved its military forces the parliament recently decided to procure a new generation of Swedish-manufactured fighter-bombers to a cost of SEK 90 billion (approximately EUR 10 billion). It can thus be argued that the military forces have collapsed under the weight of a military-industrial complex that they can no longer support.

⁷ NYBERG, Marie: *Luftskydd i Göteborgs och Bohus län 1937-1945 ...det civila försvarets framväxt före och under andra världskriget*, Länsstyrelsen i Göteborgs och Bohus län, Göteborg, 1985, 3.

after the Battle of Britain concluded that air power was essential in modern war other authorities drew the conclusion that bomb shelters for the protection of civilians were necessary on an entirely different scale than previously understood. While the Armed Forces after the atomic bombs over Japan concluded that extensive investments in nuclear research were necessary in order to understand and develop modern weapons, other authorities drew the conclusion that the bomb shelters built up until then were completely inadequate.⁸

The civil defense is somewhat of a blind spot in the history of 20th century Sweden.⁹ This is remarkable considering the tremendous importance the military defense and its civil counterpart were assigned during the Cold War. All citizens were in one way or another taken into account in the civil defense planning, either as service personnel or as in need of protection.

A consequence of the war was that a government commission was assigned to review the need of civil defence measures. The Commission proposed a thorough reorganization and in 1944 a Civil Defence Act was passed by the parliament requiring all citizens between 16 and 65 years of age who were not doing military service to perform civil defense service. The Air protection authority was reformed and had its name changed to the Board of Civil Defense. It was now a civilian authority in which the tasks of city evacuation and forest fire prevention were also included.¹⁰

The war also spurred a frenzied expansion of bomb shelter construction. The Civil Defence Act of 1944 distinguished between common and private bomb shelters. Common bomb shelters were the responsibility of the municipalities and were supposed to protect civil defence personnel, civilians who had lost their home, travelers etc. Private bomb shelters were the responsibility of each and every owner of a building if the civil defence planning so required, which it did in all urban areas of more than 200 inhabitants. Shelter space should be calculated so that all people that could be expected to stay in the building also had place in the shelter.¹¹

⁸ The question of adapting the bomb shelter construction planning to nuclear threats was dealt with by the 1948 Governmental Commission on bomb shelters: *Skyddsrum åt civilbefolkningen: betänkande avgivet av 1948 års skyddsrumsutredning*. Inrikesdepartementet, Stockholm 1950. SOU 1950:13. Inrikesdepartementet, Stockholm, 1950.

⁹ The only scholarly literature that exists is a few articles dealing with the cultural aspects and the history of mentality of the Cold War. CRONQVIST, Marie: *Utrymning i folkhemmet. Kalla kriget, välfärdsdyllen och den svenska civilförsvarskulturen 1961* IN: *Historisk tidskrift* 2008:3 (2008a); CRONQVIST, Marie: *Vi går under jorden. Kalla kriget möter folkhemmet i svensk civilförsvarsfilm* IN: HEDLING, Erik and JÖNSSON, Mats (eds.): *Välfärdsbilder. Svensk film utanför biografen*, Statens ljud- och bildarkiv, Stockholm, 2008, 166-181; CRONQVIST, Marie: *Det befästa folkhemmet. Kallt krig och varm välfärd i svensk civilförsvarskultur* IN: JERNEK, Magnus (ed.): *Fred i realpolitikens skugga*, Studentlitteratur, Lund, 2009: 169-197; CRONQVIST, Marie: *Om kriget kommer till Ditt hem* IN: *Ikaros: Flygvapenmusei årsbok 2009*, Flygvapenmuseum, Linköping, 2010, 91-103.

¹⁰ *Skyddsrum. Betänkande avgivet av 1969 års skyddsrumsutredning*, SOU 1972: 50. Allmänna Förlaget, Stockholm, 1972: 44.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 45.

The act was not repealed at the end of the war. Even if the building of bomb shelters were no longer enforced, the act became a norm for the development of civil defence for the future. Shelters no longer had to be constructed in already existing buildings but the regulations of the Act were incorporated into subsequent building statutes.¹² A nation-wide bomb shelter system capable of protecting most of the country's 7-8 million inhabitants was thus integrated into civilian planning and built up during peace time.

The nuclear attacks against Japan prompted the government to rethink not only the nation's military planning but also the civil defence measures undertaken so far. A new government commission was appointed in 1948 with the purpose to review the question of how the appearance of the new weapons would affect the civil defence preparedness. The commission concluded that the shelters built so far were totally inadequate for the protection of citizens in the nuclear age. What had previously been labeled '*normal shelters*' were re-categorized as 'house shelters' and the few shelters that had up until then been categorized as 'full protection shelters' were re-labeled '*normal shelters*'. In order to provide full protection, shelters needed to be built in rock below ground. For economic reasons such shelters had to be relatively large with an ability to shelter between 2,300 and 1,000 persons. Shelters should not only be able to protect people during an ongoing attack but should also house them for longer periods, to store provisions and to filtrate air and water. In targetable areas no one should have a longer distance than 400 meters to the nearest shelter.¹³

The 1951 revision of the Civil Defence Act was based on the findings of the commission but recommendations of the commission were so far-reaching that they were economically impossible to follow. Full protection shelters were prioritized but were mainly directed to the central parts of the bigger cities. The main responsibility was placed on the municipalities and on the property owners. The civil defense requirements were simply integrated into building plans and building regulations and as the public buildings and residential blocks of the welfare state were erected, so were the bomb shelter system of the '*warfare state*'.¹⁴

However, the bomb shelter system envisioned by the 1948 bomb shelter commission was never fully realized. The early planning was based upon limited experiences of nuclear warfare from the end of the Second World War. In the mid 1950s the development of nuclear weapons made it necessary to reassess the strategies of the civil defence. Protecting citizens within nuclear targetable urban centers was deemed impossible. Emphasis was instead placed on evacuation and relocation. In 1972 roughly 4,5 million bomb shelter places existed for a population of c. eight million. Only 57,000 of them were full protection rock shelters and these were located in the centers of the largest cities where they

¹² Ibid. 46.

¹³ *Skyddsrum för civilbefolkningen: betänkande avgivet av 1948 års skyddsrumsutredning*, SOU (1950):13, Norstedt, Stockholm, 1950.

¹⁴ SOU (1972): 50: 46-50.

were planned to house personnel with strategic duties that could not be relocated.¹⁵

The Civil Defence was not just a question of bomb shelters. On the central level there was the Civil Defense Board that acted under the Government. On the regional level civil defense issues were handled by the county councils and on the local level the municipalities were charged with the defense task. In the latter half of the 1950s the organization of the Civil defence was thoroughly reviewed by two governmental committees. Their results were published in 1958 and based on their proposals the Civil Defence was profoundly reorganized in the following years.¹⁶ The number of 352 civil defence areas was reduced to 114. A local civil defence organization was instituted within every such area, composed of six different service branches. On the regional level 22 mobile civil defense support corps' were formed. A permanent civil defence education center was established for higher civil defence officers who were supposed to be educated for 60 days. Lower officers were to be educated locally and were required 30 days of education.¹⁷ The organization for home protection was considered obsolete in the new, well organized and well exercised civil defence, and was abolished. The previous duties of espionage and sabotage control were transmitted to the police. The new civil defence was to have strictly civilian duties. The new organization was estimated to cost SEK 76 million per year for the next ten years out of which more than half was allocated to the construction of bomb protection shelters.¹⁸

The six branches of the Civil Defence that were present in every local civil defence area were the Command Corps (ledningskåren), whose purpose was to coordinate the civil defence and which amounted to 44,800 persons in 1968; the Rescue Corps which was composed of mechanized units with the purpose of clearing wreckage (31,000); the Fire Corps which was composed of peace-time fire departments reinforced by volunteers and civil defence personnel (53,400); the Medical Corps whose task it was to build provisional hospitals and to transport injured to regular hospitals (39,000); the Protections Corps which was charged with the task of nuclear decontamination and to assist in evacuation (20,000); and the Guard Corps which was an armed branch with police duties (36,000). All in all the Civil Defence of the 1960's amounted to between 200,000 and 300,000 persons organized locally and in mobile corps units.¹⁹

It has been argued that civil defense plans were paperwork (fortunately) never to leave the desks on which they were written.²⁰ While there might be some truth

¹⁵ Ibid. 50.

¹⁶ *Civildövsarsutbildningen. Avgivet av särskilt tillkallad sakkunnig*, SOU 1958:12, Inrikesdepartementet, Stockholm, 1958; *Civildövsarets organisation. Huvudbetänkande avgivet av 1953 års civildövsarsutredning*, SOU 1958:13, Inrikesdepartementet, Stockholm, 1958.

¹⁷ EK, Kurt: *Civildövsaret. Att skydda och rädda liv*. Civildövsarsstyrelsen, Stockholm, 1968: 7, 11-13.

¹⁸ SOU (1958): 13: 80.

¹⁹ EK, Kurt: *Civildövsaret. Att skydda och rädda liv*, Civildövsarsstyrelsen, Stockholm 1968: 18-30.

²⁰ CRONQVIST (2008a): 456. GARRISON, Dee: *Bracing for Armageddon. Why civil defence never*

in such a statement – at least for countries that did not spend much on their civil defence such as the U.S. and the U.K. – Swedish authorities made their utmost in order to test and put into practice the new organization they had built. Every year the National Defence College held exercises during which top level civilian organization leaders and political decision-makers were prepared for their war-time tasks by way of role playing.²¹ Starting in 1958 a row of evacuation exercises were held in different Swedish cities. The purpose was to test the evacuation organization and to prepare both the population and the civil defence personnel for their tasks. Trollhättan/Vänersborg was evacuated in 1958, Västerås in 1960, Stockholm in 1961 and Malmö in 1962. Stockholm evacuation April 23, 1961 was hailed as the most ambitious evacuation exercise ever undertaken. Some 225,000 citizens were indirectly involved but probably not more than 30,000 actually evacuated the city to a number of reception points around Stockholm where they were greeted by civil defence workers and volunteers. The exercise was regarded by contemporary observers alternatively as a fiasco or as a great success. While critical media regarded it as too much of a Sunday pick-nick without any sense of impending disaster, military authorities criticized it because a high degree of the male participants had war-time military duties and would most likely be absent from the capital in case of a real emergency.²²

Parallel to the national civil defense organization, a volunteer civil defense organization was built up. In 1937 a state commission suggested that local civil defence units should be united to form a national organization in order to achieve efficient coordination. The original purpose of the organization was air protection but in 1945 it was renamed the Civil Defense Union (Civilförsvarsförbundet). By then it had 0.6 million members (out of a population of little more than seven million). The tasks of the Civil Defence Union were popularly labeled: „*the bucket, the shovel, the sponge and the sand box*”. Focus was placed on the duties of fire-fighting, rescue, black-out, and evacuation. In peace time the most important activities were to inform and educate the population.²³

From 1945 onwards the membership figures of the Union dwindled. The state's increased responsibility for the civil defence and the institutionalisation of national civil authorities and erection of the state civil defence organisation during the 1950 made the volunteer civil defence somewhat superfluous. The realization that fire-fighting and blackouts would not be sufficient in a nuclear war and the strategic shift from protection to evacuation added to this process. During the 1960s the Civil Defence Union found a new *raison d'être* under the label '*self-protection*'. Citizens were now educated to protect themselves from all havocs, not only in times of war. Even if a renewed interest for self-defence was evident

worked, New York 2006.

²¹ GRIBBE, Johan: *En inre angelägenhet för fritt tankeutbyte: synen på västsamverkan i Försvarshögskolans krigsspel 1952-1979*, Kungliga Tekniska högskolan, Stockholm, 2003.

²² CRONQVIST (2008a): 451-476.

²³ Civilförsvarsförbundet 1977.

during Cold War tensions of the 1980s and the state actively encouraged the Union with regular funding, it is clear that the organization has found it difficult to formulate a sufficiently urgent role in the state led civil defence organization of the Cold War.

Conclusions

Both the arms industry and the Civil Defence were built up as reactions to the Second World War, a war which Sweden was never drawn into. Both can be regarded as forms of crisis management in a small neutral state. It was, however, during the Cold War – another anticipated crisis – that these two institutional complexes became central and well-integrated parts in Swedish society.

The Swedish Civil Defense can be regarded as a mirror image of the welfare state in the same way as the military defense has been.²⁴ The welfare state went to great lengths in the ambition to protect its citizens from vagaries of poverty, unemployment, disease and also saw as its duty to provide for education and elderly care. In the same way it sought to protect them in the event of war and physical destruction from foreign powers. The welfare state needed to be protected (both in military and civil senses) and the Swedish non-alliance policy in the Cold War meant that the Swedes had to do this themselves. Thus, during the Cold War Sweden did not just have one of the strongest (per capita) military defenses in the world but also one of the most well developed civil defences.²⁵ In this sense the Swedish ‘civil defense state’ distinguished itself from other ‘civil defense states’ in the same way as the Swedish welfare state has been regarded as distinct from other welfare states.

The connection between civil defence and welfare has been made before as has the connection between civil defence and neutrality. Lawrence J. Vale has asserted that the Swiss developed the world’s most extensive civil defence programme (comparable only to that of Sweden) because in a non-nuclear armed state civil defence issues were politically uncontroversial and a demonstration from „a state that is determined to be able to counter any threat to its sovereign existence”.²⁶ Marie Cronqvist has, in several articles dealing with Cold War culture in Sweden, pointed to the interrelatedness of what she calls ‘the story of the people’s home’ or ‘the story of welfare’ with that of ‘the story of the cold war’. In her Swedish variety of the cultural history of the Cold War the dull threat of

²⁴ LUNDIN, Per and STENLÅS, Niklas: *Technology, State Initiative and National Myths in Cold War Sweden: An Introduction* IN: LUNDIN, Per, STENLÅS, Niklas and GRIBBE, Johan (eds.): *Science for Welfare and Warfare. Technology and State Initiative in cold War Sweden*, Science History Publications, Sagamore Beach, 2010: 1-34.

²⁵ In 1983 only Switzerland spent more resources per capita than Sweden on civil defence measures. VALE, Lawrence J.: *The Limits of Civil Defence in the USA, Switzerland, Britain and the Soviet Union. The Evolution of Policies since 1945*, Macmillan Press, Houndmills and London, 1987: 9.

²⁶ Ibid. 122.

nuclear destruction could be dealt with by way of incorporating it into the idyllic welfare state self-image of the Swedes'.²⁷

The connection between civil defence and welfare, thus, seem to be a close parallel to the connection between warfare state (military defence and arms industry) and welfare state, which has also been made by several authors. In this case it has been argued that powerful 'myths' – in the sense of shared truths – were needed to shape and provide sanctions for collective action. The myths of modernity and neutrality were such 'collective truths' which made it possible to rally the entire nation behind the national projects of welfare and warfare.²⁸ Ann-Katrin Hatje has made a similar connection between welfare state and defence and points to the fact that military concerns were much more prominent than commonly understood and that Sweden underwent a form of militarization in which all sectors of society were affected by military planning so that Sweden became a society under armed peace.²⁹ It should be added, however, that the 'myth' of modernity or of the rationally planned welfare state has made this militarization invisible to contemporary observers and historians of the 20th century alike.

²⁷ CRONQUIST (2008a): 474. CRONQUIST (2008b): 166-181. CRONQUIST (2009): 169-197. CRONQUIST (2010): 91-103.

²⁸ LUNDIN and STENLÅS (2010): 4-6.

²⁹ HATJE, Ann-Katrin: *Svensk välfärd, genus och social rationalism under 1900-talet*, Umeå Universitet, Umeå 2009: 30-31.