Veronika Tóth-Barbalics:
The Hungarian Upper House in the Age of Dualism
With Special Regard to the 1885 Reform of the House and Its Consequences in Hungarian Politics

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Subject and Methods of Research

In the Age of Dualism, the Upper House was an essential element of the Hungarian national legislative and governmental system. According to a unanimous opinion expressed in historical assessment, the political weight and role of the Upper House was only secondary. This explains why its relevant institutional peculiarities have hardly been studied in scholarly research and in particular, there are few such comprehensive analyses as the excellent study prepared by Károly Vörös examining changes affecting members of hereditary right in 1885. In our dissertation, we seek answers to fundamental questions regarding the organization and operation of the Upper House: What were the frameworks pertaining to public law and policy that determined the political and legislative activities of the Upper House? What was the general opinion of contemporary Hungarians of the role played by upper houses in the period of the Dual Monarchy? What were the ideas formulated in the this era concerning the responsibilities, the structure of the Hungarian Upper House which originated in the feudal estates, and in this context, the political role of high nobility? How was the reform of the Upper House implemented (method and substance) in 1885? What were the organizational frameworks and forms determining its functions? Who were its members? What were the relevant social and political characteristics? How did the House operate in practice as a legislative institution, and as a political forum? What place did it occupy in practice in Hungarian political and constitutional life? To what extend did the reform in 1885 affect the powers, and the composition of the Upper House, and the activity of members? In short, we have researched the functional frameworks of the Upper House (the reform of the Upper House, organization and legal powers), the relevant persona involved (composition of membership), the relevant methods (house rules, committees, plenum) and measures (effectiveness and assessment of the activities of the Upper House). We attempt to answer these questions by organizing our research results into seven comprehensive chapters.

In the course of our research, thus in our studies concerning function, composition and activity of the Upper House, we have extended the relevant time limit to the whole period of the Dual Monarchy. However, in certain cases (e.g. when presenting views of the powers of the Upper House, house rules, and individual careers), we provide an outlook on earlier and later periods as well. We believe that in view of the historical foundations of the Upper House rooted in the era of feudal estates, the application of a long-term historical perspective is of special importance in learning characteristics of this institution. When researching individual sub-themes, we reexamine the consequences of the reform of the Upper House implemented in 1885 in the given area. Apart from the latter, however, the time focus is determined
according to the characteristics of the study subject. This explains that in the first major structural unit of our paper, namely the section on reform plan, we have chosen the 1860s as the starting time of analysis, and we have refrained from discussing previous plans concerning the reorganization of the Upper House, respectively. In our earlier studies, we reviewed the plans made from the 1790s to 1849 to restructure the then Upper Chamber, and arrived at the conclusion that restructuring plans before 1848 proposed minor changes only in the feudal estate structure and operation of the Upper Chamber, and in 1848-1849, new responsibilities involved in creating a bourgeois state offered little opportunity only to develop reforms of the Upper Chamber, and, finally, plans devised in this period are rather to be regarded as direct answers to the changing political and military situation than as long-term plans. Thus, despite the existence of relevant connecting links, we cannot consider the plans between 1790-1849 as direct predecessors of those which were formulated during the decades of the Dual Monarchy. Beside longitudinal studies, we also implement a case study analyzing a specific historical situation. By integrating the results of our previous research on the conduct of the Upper House between 1905 and 1906, we try to capture the maneuvering space available to the House in the period of political crises and the methods and strategies applied in response to the latter.

Our research is focused on the history of the Hungarian Upper House, given its institutional embeddedness, however, it was necessary for us to pay attention to other factors of Hungarian legislation (House of Representatives, ruler, government). In addition, as particular issues are concerned, we provide an outlook to foreign parliamentary institutions operating in the 19th century, especially the upper houses of constitutional monarchies, notably the Austrian Herrenhaus in respect of which we have primarily followed the research results by Gerald Strourzh.

Our complex research objective necessitates studies related to social and political history as well. In our dissertation, these are closely linked without restricting our research topic to the political social history of the Upper House. Namely, in addition, we apply inquiries related to politics, ideological history, institutional history, and, tangentially, administrative history focusing on the organization of the Upper House, the development of its competence and powers. At the same time, we follow the view of Helmut Neuhaus, who considers institutional and political history as components of modern constitutional history. We consider that the research framework applied by him to describe the modern Reichstag, according to which an institution is an aggregate of a formal system and an informal network of relationships, is applicable for researchers as well who are interested in the history of the
Hungarian Upper House. As a result of a multidirectional approach of our research topic, the range of research methods and types of sources used in our investigation is relatively wide.

In the first part of our dissertation addressing reform plans relating the Upper House and the enactment of the 1885 Reform Law, we primarily apply the method of text analysis, which includes reconstruction in this case (ideas relating the political role of the aristocracy, and the Upper House, phases of parliamentary debates concerning the reform); comparison (mutual interaction of reform plans, ideas presented by various political parties and factions) as well as philological studies relating the text of the bill (phases of the evolution of the text as a way to a compromise). While examining various reform concepts, we also apply a thematic overview after chronological discussions to recognize relevant correlations. When presenting a historical evaluation of the reform concerning the Upper House, we rely on a historiographic method. No comprehensive scholarly archontology is available concerning members of the Upper House in the period of Dualism. Recently, a compendium of biographies of the presidents of the Upper House (along with other presidents of the National Assembly) was published, but the extensive typescripted data collected by József Bölöny is limited to the names, periods in office and fundamental biographical information of various officers of the Upper House. Given the above, archontological data collection was necessary for certain other groups of the Upper House to be investigated (e.g. members delegated to the Upper House by the Croatian parliament, lifetime appointee members, Protestant church leader members). We have recorded the results of our archontological and biographical data collection in computerized data tables, and this allowed organization and classification of data according to various criteria. Based on comprehensive data collection concerning life-appointed, and elected members, and persons with hereditary membership rights as well as active members during sessions, we attempt to explore the social and political characteristics of these groups, and their roles in the Upper House by prosopographic studies. We also apply the methods of prosopography to gather informations about the activities of presidents, vice presidents and first officers. In addition to exploring group characteristics, we also lay emphasis on presenting individual characteristics by analyzing biographical characteristics. When assessing the membership composition of the Upper House, we mainly use the method of quantitative analysis, but we also rely on the tools of geneological research for members with hereditary rights. In addition to the examination of various member groups as well as individual members considered to be prominent on account of their activities or positions, we also pay attention to the analysis of institutional behavior. We also intend to focus on learning modes of operation, political organization and the
constitutional role of the Upper House. We lay special emphasis on the relationship between the Upper House and the government, which we also wish to present at the level of relevant views pertaining to legal and political science and practical operation. As pointed out by Dániel Szabó, the three, so-called regular political debates of the House of Representatives during the era of Dualism were related to the budget, addressing the ruler in response and the government program when appointing governments (prime ministers). From the aspect of understanding the political role of the Upper House, we consider it useful to examine the characteristics of these debates in the House. Of the three types of debate referred to above, we address budget-related debates (budget, final accounts and indemnity) in the present dissertation. This choice is justified by space limitations, and the fact that budget-related debates were of highest significance for the functioning of the state. Without passing a vote on the budget (indemnity) and appropriation, the government did not have the necessary financial background to conduct state affairs. In addition, out of the three types of debates, it was the budget debate which provided the most frequent opportunity for the two chambers of the Parliament to assess the financial and overall operations of the government. We assume that the analysis of the texts of budget debates recorded in the minutes of the Upper House allows us the exploration of financial and economic competence of the members of the Upper House, apart from learning their government related constitutional and political positions. From the aspect of understanding the constitutional political and professional roles of the Upper House and the relationship between the government and the Upper House, we attach special importance to learning the function of interpellations in this case, therefore, we supplement budget discussions by examining interpellations. The case study concerning the activities of the Upper House during the Fejérváry Government is intended to provide additional pieces of information for exploring the constitutional and political roles of the institution in question. We hope that a broad overview of ideas formulated between 1885 and 1918 concerning the reorganization of the Upper House will provide information on the image of the House in Hungarian political life following its reform.

Research Results

I. The burden of an institution exhibiting feudal traits in a bourgeois state - reform plans to restructure of the Upper House
In the first part of our dissertation, we have reviewed the concepts for reorganization of the Upper House between 1867 and 1885, and have described the enactment of the Reform Law
of 1885 as well. As an introduction, we have outlined the theoretical backgrounds of the reform concepts and described the findings of contemporary Hungarian political science textbooks as well as papers concerning political science and jurisprudence regarding the responsibilities and composition of the Upper House; then, largely based on the research performed by István Schlett, we have presented the basic features of liberalism which fundamentally defined political thinking in contemporary Hungary. Then, we have assessed the reorganization concepts for the Upper House formulated between 1867 and 1883 among governments, magnates and opposition parties as well as reform plans prepared by legal scholars and political writers in various forms of relationship with the former stakeholders and published in the press or in pamphlets. Our chronological discussion allowed us the presentation of the vigorous atmosphere at the end of the 1860s and in the early 1870s, and the interaction of various ideas. We have found that the vast majority of Hungarian politicians, journalists and scholars engaged in the reform of the Upper House advocated a second chamber with an aristocratic character; differences were mostly manifest with regard to members appointed by the ruler and the government and elected (mostly by municipalities). The few exceptions included several members of the opposition (Independence Party) wishing to abolish the second chamber as well as Lajos Kossuth, who (while being outside the everyday political life of Hungary), formulated the idea of a senate composed of members elected by municipal authorities.

In the following section, we have described the enactment of the bill on the reform of the Upper House. In the text of the bill prepared by Prime Minister and Interior Minister Kálmán Tisza we have detected the impacts of the draft prepared by the Deák Party of the Upper House in 1870 as well as the pamphlet by Ágoston Trefort published in 1882. A philological study exploring various phases of text alteration allowed us to reconstruct a compromise between the prime minister and the ruler as well as the prime minister and aristocrats, respectively. We have also studied the various responses to the bill and presented newer reform plans emerging between 1883 and 1885. Among the latter, we have addressed the amended concept of Lajos Kossuth, which intended to assign to members elected by municipal authorities a complementary role only.

In the course of the parliamentary debates relating to the bill, this idea had also become one of the components of the proposals by the Independence Party, the Moderate Opposition Party and the Anti-Semitic Party. The government, however, rejected it as a concept which might strengthen the positions of the opponents of the Austrian–Hungarian Compromise of 1867. In the chapter discussing parliamentary debates of the bill concerning
reorganization of the Upper House, we have outlined the stances of the Independence, the Anti-Semitic and the Moderate Opposition Parties, respectively, and presented the approach by the latter as one to exploit the debates in the House of Representatives to weaken the position of the prime minister, trigger a cabinet crisis, and strengthen the opposition to the bill in the Upper House. We partly relied on press reports and partly on the letters of Béla Orczy, Minister a latere to István Pápay, Cabinet Office Secretary while presenting the emergence of a compromise between the government and the opposition in the Upper House lead by Count Nándor Zichy, which was also joined by the Catholic Bench of Bishops, but vigorously opposed by aristocrats grouping around Count Aurel Dessewy, Count Antal Sztáray and Baron Dezső Prónay. We have also emphasized the tactical manoeuvres by Prime Minister Tisza and the intermediary role of Count Gyula Andrássy, Sr. which were instrumental in accepting the bill by the Upper House. We have also devoted attention to three issues not discussed within the framework of legislation but related to the substance of reforming the Upper House. As regards the petition movements of municipal authorities and Jewish communities for their own representation in the Upper House, we have concluded that they did not reach massive proportions, and they had nearly no impact on the debates proceeding. Within the Calvinist denomination, the dissatisfaction related to representation in the Upper House and its extent progressed to a debate in the general convent, which was not only based on concerns related to church autonomy, but also the conflict between pro-government and opposition politicians within the leadership of the Calvinist Church.

Following a chronological overview of the reform plans relating to the Upper House, we have prepared a thematic summary in which we have examined concepts concerning necessity, vocation, composition and powers of the second chamber, as well as foreign impacts, and finally, we have summarized the common and different characteristics of plans devised between groups supporting the ruling party and the opposition, respectively. We have also examined relevant issues concerning the date of the reform of the Upper House. The low activity of the Upper House up to 1883, the hinting on the issue of reform by the government as a means of pressure exerted on the Upper House, the necessity for multilateral consultations on the reform, the irregular nature of other issues related to reorganization of the Upper House, and waiting for a calm political situation could equally play a role in the fact that the bill was submitted almost one and a half decades later, than the governmental intentions on the reform were first formulated.

We have devoted a separate chapter on the reception of the reform of the Upper House in Austria and Hungary as well as its historical evaluation. We have stressed that the reform
of the Upper House strongly bore the imprint of power relations in the dualist state system, moreover, after the reorganization, the social composition of the Upper House rather reflected (albeit in a fragmentary manner) than catalyzed social changes. During the reorganization of the Upper House in 1885, the old members elected fifty members on a one-off basis out of aristocrats slated for losing membership as a result of the reform. Given the nature of this elect, it rather reinforced the feudal and not the democratic characteristics of the Upper House. We believe that one of the greatest shortcomings related to the reform was that the governments did not even make use of the available correction options and their appointment policies allowed civilian elements to achieve membership to a limited degree only. Moreover, we consider it to be a serious failure on behalf of liberal government that no Jewish religious leader achieved membership in the Upper House even after Judaism had become a received religion (Act 42 of 1895). After the Bánffy Government, having overcome many difficulties, finally managed to achieve a successful vote for the Act of Reception in the House, it did not even attempt to implement its enactment.

II. Implementation of the reform of the Upper House.
An element of paramount importance for the reform in 1885 was the imposition of 3,000 forint of land and housing class tax as a requirement for exercising membership rights of those persons entitled to hereditary memberships. Based on archival sources, we have described data collection performed by the Tisza Government concerning land tax imposed on the aristocracy. We have addressed in detail the invitation and registration of families with hereditary rights and their members before and after 1885, the relevant responsibilities of the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior, the municipal authorities, the courts, the Upper House's Office, the Certification Commission and Court in order to learn the avenues for those motivated to become members of the Upper House, and to what extent the Upper House or the government had a precise idea of this most populous membership group. We have used specific examples to illustrate the problems and abuses in assessing and registering membership eligibility as a result of deficiencies in legislation and failures of official bodies involved in data reporting and registration.

We have presented the last session of the old Upper House as well as the inaugural meeting of the new House, and, in this context, we have also touched upon the issue of members' seating schemes.
III. Institutional frameworks and factors of operation of the Upper House

In the chapter addressing legal powers and competence of the Upper House, we have determined the position of the House in the relational system of constitutional and political power factors by taking written and customary law as well as governmental power balances into account. Based on relevant literature, we have pointed out that in Hungary, the importance of the second chamber (the then Upper, i.e. first Chamber of the feudal Diet) had started to decrease in the 18th century, moreover, the progressive decrease in importance of aristocratic upper houses was a general European phenomenon. However, we have also stressed that foreign upper houses were not necessarily characterized by such loss of importance as the Hungarian Upper House. We have described the rights of the Upper House related to the ruler and the government as well as its legislative powers. We have presented a number of cases in which, in the view of aristocrats, the prevailing proceedings of the government or the House of Representatives conflicted with current legislative provisions. We have addressed in detail when and how the Upper House exercised its right to legislative veto and amendment. Apart from presenting the relevant cases, we have also tried to explore why the Upper House exercised these rights so rarely. We have considered the explanation for this to be in power relations within the Hungarian governmental system (extensive governmental powers of the ruler, excessive power of the government within the state organization, and parliamentary dominance of the governing party), the conservative-liberal government policies, and a significant governmental influence over the Upper House as well as the fact that, apart from exceptional cases, the ruler did not support the political activities of Hungarian conservative aristocracy... We believe that the lack of interest of members of the House was not only a component, but also a consequence of the lack of weight of the Upper House. We have found various reasons to explain why the Upper House exhibited a lower level of legislative activity after 1885. We have explained the shifting of importance of legislative themes from fundamental and comprehensive laws to codifying detailed questions with the weakness of the opposition in the Upper House. We have pointed out that although a membership appointed for life made it possible for the Upper House to assess bills from a specialized point of view, due to the legislative process and the appointed members being members of the ruling party, however, the House was unable to play such a role. At the end of the chapter, we have described the judicial powers of the Upper House over ministers indicted by the House of Representatives and in the verification and immunity cases of its own members as well as the participation of members elected by the House in adjudication of disciplinary, financial liability and retirement matters of judges and crown prosecutors.
In the chapters on the officers of the Upper House, we have described the official responsibilities and political roles of the president following a chronological presentation of presidents and vice presidents of the House. As regards the latter, we have found that while in the first decades of Dualism, the President of the House made in numerous cases a stand against the government, the prevailing governments ensured from 1884 on that their reliable supporters fill the positions of the President and Vice President. In the course of a prosopographic analysis of presidents and vice presidents of the Upper House, we have reviewed the previous careers of these officers, with special regard to their political and legislative activities. We have examined their ages at which they assumed the relevant positions, the duration of their tenures as well as the reasons for their departure. As a result of our investigation regarding nobility and membership rights, we have found that after 1885, a light shift towards a civil character was discernible especially for vice presidents. As regards selection of the presidents and vice presidents of the Upper House, we have also discovered that in some cases denominational aspects also prevailed. We have presented the changing responsibilities of the four clerks (eight after 1869) elected from the members of the Upper House on the basis of house rules and decisions. We have examined the composition of the college of clerks according to membership rights, and found that apart from hereditary members, the college of clerks included lord lieutenants before 1885 and after the reform of the Upper House, lifetime appointed and elected members, as well. We have presented the responsibilities of the First Officer of the House elected by the Upper House, and the careers of four aristocrats filling this position in the age of Dualism. We have also addressed the issue of remuneration for officials in the Upper House, comparing it to the remuneration of their counterparts in the House of Representatives, briefly discussing the responsibilities of the Office of the Upper House as well as the development of office and service staff members and their salaries.

Comparing the changing house rules in the Upper House and the House of Representatives, respectively, we have found that rules for the formers were amended much less frequently. In the Age of Dualism, the Upper House only implemented major amendments to the house rules on two occasions, namely in 1872 and 1886. The amendment in the year following the reform of the House was of a greater extent, but even in this case, the house rules for the House kept numerous fundamental elements of those accepted in 1848. One reason for this was the opposition of the members (partly the presidents) due to a (mis)interpretation of Act 3 of 1848. Over the years, a significant part of proceedings and powers became part of customary law or, having been included in individual house decisions,
were integrated into the house rules in 1872 and 1886, respectively. This phenomenon, namely that procedures having been followed for a long time in practice were recorded in writing only subsequently, could also be observed for the House of Representatives in some cases, such as the application of the committee-based mode of operation. As regards several details of house rules of the Upper House, the impact of the House of Representatives can be clearly demonstrated. Starting from the end of the century, the developments of the rules of procedure of the two houses gradually diverged from each other because no obstruction by the opposition took place in the Upper House, and the issue of introducing disciplinary rules similar to the House of Representatives was not raised. We have discovered several common fundamental elements between the house rules of the Upper House in 1886, and the standing orders of the Austrian Herrenhaus in 1875, nevertheless there were a number of differences in specific issues between the two regulations. In legal terms, it was an important difference that several elements of the operation of Cisleithanian legislation were regulated by law, whereas in the Hungarian parliament, the same ones were not regulated by the house rules. Comprehensive settlement of the interaction between the House of Representatives and the Upper House took place in the form of a joint parliamentary resolution in 1886, in accordance with Act 7 of 1885. This regulation covered mutual intercommunication of the decisions in the two houses, joint meetings for the purpose of elections, election of joint committees and reviewing the wording of bills accepted by both houses before submission to the ruler, but it did not address the issues or legal powers or jurisdiction related to internal operation of the two chambers.

Permanent committees in the Upper House appeared in 1867-1868, similarly to the House of Representatives. In the Upper House, the frequent shortage of time available for negotiations, and the passivity of a significant number of members ruled out the introduction of a class system similar to the House of Representatives. Three special committees (financial, legal and judicial, commercial and transportation) existed in the Upper House. Due to a lack of interest by members, however, the functioning of committees was faltering. Apart from professional considerations, this was the frequent reason for referring cases needing preliminary negotiation to a tripartite commission formed from the members of the three committees. The entitlements of a committee system were retained in the Upper House even after the reform. The house rules adopted in 1886 specified seven permanent committees apart from the committee delegated to edit the address in response to the throne speech: the verification, the immunity, the economic, the minutes' authentication committee, as well as the three special committees mentioned above. Except for the economic committee, these
committees were operational even before reforming the Upper House. The economic and immunity committee was elected for the whole term of parliament, the other committees were elected for one session each. The immunity committee was created by a general, while the other ones by a relative majority of votes. The number of members was determined by the Upper House on a case-by-case basis. As opposed to the House of Representatives, the number of committees in the Upper House did not increase, however, their total staff number had doubled over the years and exceeded forty members in 1916.

IV. Evolution of the composition of the Upper House between 1885 and 1918

In our dissertation, we have examined the evolution of the composition of the Upper House membership by analyzing the membership categories of the House. In order to get a complete grasp of the relevant changes, we have extended the starting date limit of investigation to 1865 in some cases. We have placed particular emphasis on examining the largest membership group, i.e. aristocrats with hereditary membership rights. We have found that although the archdukes of the Royal family of legal age were, based on their hereditary rights, members of the Upper House, and were even invited on account of a royal approval, they did not participate in the sessions. Afterwards, we have devoted a longer analysis to the descendants of Hungarian aristocratic families. We have complemented the analysis by Károly Vörös about the impacts of the reform of the Hungarian Upper House on the political representation of Hungarian aristocracy by a wider range of investigations (using more types of sources and using some novel aspects as well as considerations wider in their time range). We have examined in what way their numbers and proportions within the members' group changed as a result of the reform bill. The proportion of members with hereditary rights exceeded 80% both at the beginning of the period of Dualism, and in 1884, whereas both following the reform bill, and at the end of the era, it approached or even reached 60% (including archdukes). Relying on our data table concerning families invited between 1865 and 1885 and correcting the list included in Act 8 of 1886, we have provided a more accurate specification of the number of aristocratic families with membership rights in the Upper House (254 families). According to a list published in the press in May, 1885, we have described the distribution of aristocratic hereditary members liable to pay at least 3000 forints of land tax according to tax amount, rank or specific families. We have examined aristocratic families with hereditary rights by dividing them into three broad categories, and explored the characteristics of membership in the Upper House of clans or families considered to be of national (Hungarian) origin, naturalized by the legislature (indigena) and obtaining hereditary
membership rights after 1885. At least one member in 81% of families invited between 1865 and 1885 ended up appearing in the Upper House, and around half of the ever-absent members were indigenas, whereas the proportion of naturalized members among all clans was 30%. We have used numerical data to show that the reform contributed to the progressive absence of indigena aristocratic families from the Upper House, and we have somewhat refined the statement of Károly Vörös according to which the Hungarian aristocracy was completely freed of indigenas after the reform, as far as political representation was concerned. Although they suffered heavy losses in numbers due to the bill, the families of counts of national origin (out of whom especially those in the Transdanubia region) succeeded in keeping their positions in the Upper House to the greatest degree. Baronial families of Hungarian origin, however, can be regarded as the biggest losers of the reform: four-fifths of the families of Hungarian origin leaving the House in 1885 belonged to this group. We have determined the ratio of aristocratic families left out of the Upper House in 1885 (48-62%, depending on the calculation methods), and that of aristocratic families reentering subsequently (11%) as well as the cessation of membership as a result of extinction of the paternal line. This latter had nearly the same order of magnitude as the number of donations of hereditary membership rights (nearly 30 families). Upon following the subsequent progress of naturalized families not verifying compliance with the tax census required for membership in 1885 and thus compelled to leave the Upper House, we have found that they have reentered subsequently to a small degree only. Several studies have confirmed that there was only a slight change in the subsequent years in indigena families with hereditary membership rights after the reform (Autumn, 1885). In 1885, the option provision theoretically affected at least one third of indigena clans, however, only a slight part of indigenas previously having remained absent from sessions of the Hungarian Upper House lost their membership due to the necessity of option. Nevertheless, we have devoted a significant analysis to this issue, because we believe that learning identity forms of indigena aristocracy is greatly helped by exploring the factors along which the choices, if any, were made. We have tried to use prosopographic collection of material and following individual careers to grasp the reasons why those members of indigena clans with membership entitlements in the Austrian legislation, and with an option to choose, selected Cisleithanian or Hungarian membership, respectively. It seems that the Hungarian Upper House was selected by those members of the indigena clans with estates in Hungary who had less chance of membership in the Austrian Herrenhaus, especially in cases in which they were tied by family relations to the country. Not surprisingly, upbringing, studies, kinship relations might
have played the greatest role in selection, in addition to estates held in Hungary. In addition to kinship relations, emotional attachments could be also detected. We have arrived at a similar conclusion, when examining the small number of indigena aristocratic groups speaking in public sessions of the Upper House. Members of naturalized families speaking in the Upper House had assimilated to the Hungarian ethnicity (this had frequently taken place even in their grandparents' generation), and they were also connected to Hungary and the Hungarian nation by their studies, places of residence and public activities, and generally, by their marriages, as well. Similar features can be observed in the evolution of memberships of families of foreign origin not obtaining Hungarian aristocratic ranks by relevant laws as well as the activities of their descendants in the Upper House.

After 1885, the number of hereditary members underwent only a slight change from one year to the next. These could be sometimes related to the aspirations of aristocrats holding confirmed hereditary memberships to become representatives, the frustrations of such aspirations, and, in other cases, the entry of new hereditary members. In the longer term, a moderate increase of the number of members could be observed as a result of the membership of new families with hereditary rights. Our research results have confirmed and refined the previous literature data on direct impact of the reform, but it has also come to light that changes to hereditary membership in 1885 proved to be decisive for the remaining period of the existence of the House. When enumerating persons or families reacquiring or losing their hereditary memberships after 1885, respectively, it can be clearly established that expectation in the rows of the governing party regarding progressive refreshment of membership in the Upper House – as worded in 1885 – had proven to be excessive. In the case of Transylvanian aristocratic families, the atypical trends after 1885 pointed toward the necessity of further exploration of regional contexts.

We have also dealt with the issue of representative and lord lieutenant statuses of aristocrats from families with hereditary rights. At the beginning of the reform of the Upper House, nearly one third of lord lieutenants were aristocrats, but only slightly more than one third of the latter, i. e. one-ninth of all lord lieutenants could comply with the required land tax census. In 1885, one fifth of the lord lieutenants kept his membership in the House (as hereditary, elected or appointed members). However, at the end of the relevant era, less than one-twentieth of lord lieutenants were aristocrats exercising their hereditary membership rights in the Upper House. We have found that following the reform, members of families retaining their house memberships assumed mandates as representatives to a greater extent than their counterparts paying lower land taxes in the whole period of Dualism. In the House
of Representatives, the number of aristocratic MPs was fluctuating, but among them, the group with verified hereditary membership of the Upper House exhibited stability. As regards party affiliations of members in individual aristocratic families, our findings have partly confirmed the findings of the historical literature, and partly, they have shown a more complex and dynamic picture.

Act 7 of 1885 enabled the ruler to grant an unlimited number of hereditary membership rights to persons of merit paying land tax of at least 3000 forints. Proposals for such grants were made by the Hungarian government. In the period between 1885 and 1918, as opposed to granting aristocratic ranks (barons), hereditary membership rights were granted only in small numbers, a total of 32 families gained hereditary memberships from 1885 to 1918. Most of such grants took place in 1895–1896 and 1917, and current political goals did not play any role in either case, long-term political goals, however, are discernible in the years of 1895–1896. Whereas Act 7 of 1885 determined the conditions of membership in the Upper House by applying civic criteria, such civic action patterns were acknowledged to a very limited degree only when granting hereditary membership, as it is clear both from motivations of the government proposals, and the occupations of those promoted. Nobody could gain hereditary membership rights purely on the basis of personal merits, even if he had a sufficient land ownership. In grant proceedings merits of the ancestors, political and public activities, exemplary economic management and charity were listed as grounds for promotion. The new members were most often landowners, with a few wholesalers, bankers and factory owners. There was nobody Jewish among new hereditary members, as opposed to those appointed for life. Only those families could obtain this right who were related to the old Hungarian aristocracy and for whom land estates meant a way of life, and who were born Christians. We have also shown that political reliability also played a role when hereditary membership rights were granted. More than one third of those receiving hereditary memberships in the Upper House were pro-government representatives, and this ratio is the same as the figure characterizing the persons gaining lifetime membership between 1885 and 1918. However, lifelong members included a large number of senior state officials, which was less characteristic of new hereditary families. Short-term political criteria, however, prevailed less in the course of granting hereditary rights of membership (due to the ruler's resistance, as well), than during appointment of lifetime members, although in the former case, the government was not restricted by the number of members. Thus, the theoretical option of granting hereditary membership, as discussed by Károly Kecskeméti was only slightly used by the government in practice, and, apart from political reliability, other factors were also
given significant emphasis, when selecting those receiving hereditary rights. Descriptions of occupations carried over from the minutes of government meetings to the ruler’s resolutions, and in turn to the Royal Books also highlight ownership of large estates by the grantees. Many of the families recently receiving hereditary rights had long held land estates or held them without investment purposes, but less than 4% of lifetime members were landowners only. The granting of hereditary membership right was generally prepared by the government in a very circumspect manner (obtaining information on the candidate's origin, lifestyle, family and social ties, image among the local population, magnitude of his estate and their anticipated division, expected public reaction) but occasionally, it was sufficient that the relevant person was a landowner from an old aristocratic family. The latter was also a consequence of strict criteria applied to the candidates. Each government was willing to recommend only families readily fitting in with the old aristocracy for hereditary membership, which limited the range of selection.

We have devoted particular attention to lifelong members of the Upper House. On account of this membership group introduced by Act 7 of 1885, the ruler or the government were enabled to send their supporters to the legislature, thus, the Upper House could acquire a meritocratic nature. Persons gaining membership on account of their professional merits could promote professional discussion of relevant issues, which was not guaranteed by hereditary membership. The institution of appointed members is also interesting from a socio-historical perspective, because in principle, it made possible a mitigation of feudal characteristics of the institution and a membership of new socio-economic elites in the Upper House. We have surveyed the evolution of the number of members appointed, the appointment policy, and listed the conditions for obtaining membership. Then, we have examined the nearly one hundred and fifty-strong membership group appointed between 1885 and 1918 from the aspect of origin, rank, awards previously received from the ruler, denomination, and ethnicity. The assessment of the number, composition of the group of life-long aristocrat members and votes by roll-call has equally shown that governments took advantage of the potential in lifetime membership to influence the Upper House. In 1885, the Cabinet also used the relevant appointments to mitigate the impact of the reform, with regard to aristocrats not meeting the census, descendants of Transylvanian regalists and lord lieutenants. The government also applied lifelong appointments to correct the impact of the reform at another point, namely the representation of the Jewish denomination in the Upper House. It can be also regarded as a symbolic expression of the policies of Hungarian government toward ethnic minorities that only the Croats were represented constantly among appointed members,
although in small numbers. Although government appointments preferred persons of noble origin for a long term, even civil-born candidates had the opportunity to obtain membership of the House in this way. This trend intensified after 1910, which can be connected to a political alliance between the Party of National Work government and the capitalist economic elite, as well as the war boom. Lifetime membership in the Upper House had theoretically made possible for some of the bourgeoisie of Jewish origin to move from business life to public service and politics. Overall, introduction of the institution of lifetime membership in 1885 had eased the social exclusivity of the Upper House, and increased its professional potential but without changing fundamentally the institution's character.

In 1885, the selection of fifty persons (typically, aristocrats) entitled to preserve their memberships for a lifetime, was a result of a compromise between the government and peers before the bill was put on the agenda. Despite the list of candidates compiled by aristocrats disgruntled by the reform and the scattering of votes, this compromise list ended up prevailing. Most of the elected members were persons supporting the government's policies and were frequently tied to the latter as representatives or lord lieutenants. Therefore, to that extent, the election compensated the government for the reduction of number of members for appointment, to which the government consented, in order to have the bill accepted in the Upper House. However, selection of elected members was not subject to political considerations only, but election also offered an opportunity for aristocrats being key members of the House, or worthy of recognition on account of their families or own activities to keep their memberships.

Prior to the reform of the Upper House, Catholic prelates held about fifty seats, which number decreased by one-third during the reform by excluding titular bishops. The reform in 1885 did not affect the seven Serbian and three Romanian Orthodox church leaders. After the reform, the Calvinist and Lutheran churches had six leaders each (based on their offices held and seniority) and the Unitarian church had one leader as members of the Upper House. We have used several examples to illustrate the dependence of filling the offices of Catholic and Orthodox prelates on the government or the ruler. In the case of Protestant church leaders, the government had no such influence, so only the dispatch of a letter of invitation by the Interior Minister could delay an invitation of a church leader not supporting the government's position to the Upper House. We have pointed out as a relevant phenomenon that despite the fact that after 1885 only half of Protestant church superiors had memberships in the House at one time, due to their strong willingness to obtain mandates as representatives, even these positions were difficult to fill at some times.
We have tried to determine the common and different characteristics of the careers of 22 representatives delegated by the Croatian parliament. Out of the latter, we have described in detail the careers and speeches of six persons regularly addressing the plenary sessions of the Upper House. We have also addressed the issue of the language of their speeches as well as the issue of Hungarian language skills of the Sabor delegates.

V. Activity in the Upper House
Following our studies on the social composition of membership groups and their positions with respect to the government, we have turned to the activities of members in the Upper House. First, we have tried to grasp the activities of Magnates on the basis of textual sources for attendance of sessions, and then, by analysis of numerical figures, assessing the evolution of number of persons requesting invitation to the House and those presenting their invitations, comparison of the number and duration of sessions in the House of Representatives and Upper House, respectively, and the persons addressing plenary sessions of the Upper House. The results of our study have confirmed the findings of historical literature that during the period of Dualism, the activity in the Upper House was significantly lower than that of the House of Representatives. However, it has turned out that the activity level fluctuated within the era. The number of aristocrats addressing the House was largest in the parliamentary period between 1865–1868; the number of speakers decreased by one third during the next parliament, and largely stagnated up to the reform of the House in 1885. After the reform of the House, further decrease could be observed, which was connected with a reduction in its membership. Church policy debates of the 1890s brought about a temporary revival, with the number of speakers reaching the pre-reform value, then a large drop occurred, and some upturn could be observed after 1906 only. We have recorded that whereas in the two decades preceding the reform of the House, the group of most active members (speaking on the merits of relevant issues more than ten times during a single parliament, or at least half a dozen times during several parliaments) numbered more than fifty aristocrats, but this number was only twenty in the more than three decades afterward. Our investigations have also helped to uncover deeper reasons for this generally low activity. Apart from political indifference exhibited by some of the hereditary members forming the majority of the Upper House, the factors limiting the political and constitutional maneuvering space and the frequently short time available for debate also contributed to this passivity. Numerical comparison, however, is not sufficient for evaluating the activities of the Upper House (e.g. considering obstruction in the House of Representatives), but content analysis of the speeches is also necessary. On
the one hand by analysis of roll-call votes, we have outlined the range of issues of special importance to the Upper House, and, on the other hand, on the basis of distribution of yes and no votes we have tried to learn of political behavior of groups with different membership rights pertaining to origin. In 1883–1884 and in the 1890s, church policy issues had a large-scale mobilization effect. In the period after 1885, more than half of 38 roll-call votes held in the House took place while debating church policy bills. Later, other issues raised by opposition politicians and groups in the Upper House proved to be generally unsuitable to obtain majority of the members. In the Age of Dualism, lasting more than half a century, only three of the 52 roll-call votes involved no-confidence towards the government. The subject of the vote in 1875 was the budget, in 1893 the resolution proposal for rejection of the government's church policy, in June 1905 the no-confidence motion against the Fejérváry government. The two latter motions were accepted by the Upper House. Ca. 40% of members participated in voting on rejection of the government's church policy and only one-fifth participated upon adopting the motion against the Fejérváry Government, which was without a majority in the House of Representatives. When debating the motion of no confidence in 1893, the aristocrats dissatisfied with the government's church policy tried to give momentum to their action by presenting themselves as advocates of the people's will in this regard. In contrast, members and supporters of the government considered, in accordance with their view of the function of parliamentarism and representative government, the House of Representatives elected on the basis of popular representation and the government holding the confidence of a parliamentary majority as representatives of the popular will. The great majority of lord lieutenants participating in roll-call votes and later, members with lifetime appointments and Protestant church leaders always voted in observance of the government's interests, just as Catholic and Orthodox high priests (with the exception of church policy issues). During the voting, the groups of knight-bannerets (zászlósurak), hereditary and elected members were generally divided in the course of voting.

We have also examined to what extent the aristocrats in various membership groups were present among those addressing public sessions. The proportion of hereditary members among speakers was lower by some twenty percentage points than their proportion within the entire membership both before and after the reform. Three quarters of members addressing the sessions before and after 1885 were, however, hereditary members, nearly three-quarters of those had also remained members of the Upper House, apart from their hereditary rights, as well. Before 1885, the ratio of lord lieutenants and after 1885, that of appointed members was significantly (more than one and a half times) higher among speakers than among the entire
membership. Overall, the proportion of church leaders among speakers also exceeded their proportion among the entire group of members. Out of the latter, when compared to their membership proportions, Protestant church leaders were the most and Orthodox church leaders were the least active after 1885. After changing the relevant scale, we have also analyzed individual activities when examining the speeches in which we have also presented the thematic aspects of the addresses of certain aristocrats characterized by significant activity. This provided an opportunity to explore similarities and differences of political behavior within membership groups. Church members addressed the plenary sessions of the Upper House most frequently in relation to issues of church policy and education, thus, they showed activity during church policy-related conflicts, i.e. in 1883–1884, and between 1893 and 1895, as well as 1907, when debating the subsequent "lex Apponyi" (Apponyi's law). They were also active at the parliamentary period in the years 1865-1868 when, debating issues in connection with Austrian-Hungarian relations and the Hungarian constitution, nearly all groups of membership exhibited higher activity than subsequently. Orthodox and Greek Catholic church leaders were mostly motivated to address the House when ethnic minority issues were on the agenda. Some Catholic bishops also contributed to political issues, but this was more typical of Protestant lay magistrates. As regards Calvinist bishops addressing the Upper House, we have found that in speeches of political nature, they usually supported governments of the Liberal Party and the Party of National Work. The same can be established of the majority of lay leaders of the Calvinist Church with memberships in the Upper House, but some Lutheran church leaders supported the opposition as well.

VI. The Upper House as a political factor

After analyzing the activities of members, we examined the institution as a political factor from a specific point of view, the relationship between the government and the Upper House. After describing the political and legal theories concerning the no-confidence powers of the House of Representatives, we have presented the various views of the budgetary powers of the Upper House, then addressed the course and participants of budget- and indemnity-related debates, the forms of expressing no confidence during negotiations and other aspects of the discussions. We have established that the method of debating the budget typical until 1918 was developed in 1870, moreover that the reports of the relevant committee of the House did not provide a detailed opinion on appropriations for each ministry, but detailed debates at plenary sessions allowed relevant criticism. Such no confidence was first declared indirectly, i.e. certain members pointed out that their yes vote on the budget did not imply support for
the government's program. Within the scope of budget negotiations, the first serious political debate took place in the mid-1870s when the majority of government supporters came from lord lieutenants, and church members, while the opposition mainly consisted of hereditary members, who also gave rise to individual no-confidence declarations, as well. During budget negotiations, this procedure was the most common manifestation of opposition even after the reform of the House (i.e. expression of individual opinion on rejecting the budget without making a motion for a resolution). Another type of opposition manifestations could be observed in 1891, when dissatisfaction with the government's policy (church policy) was voiced during a session for budget negotiations but outside the scope of the budget debate. Two years later, such dissatisfaction was expressed in the form of a resolution proposal in the course of budget negotiations. However, the adoption of a no-confidence motion against the government's church policy was still not accompanied by the rejection of the budget. During the budget negotiation, the opposition position was occasionally not manifest by a general rejection of the proposal, but by rejection of an appropriation article authorizing the government to implement the budget. Initially, only individual statements were made regarding rejection of appropriation, some years later, in 1897 Count Aurél Dessewffy made a motion for rejection of the appropriation by the Upper House. Initially, indemnity negotiations were only formal in the House, but from the end of the century on, they gained political overtones. We have followed the changing views of Count Nándor Zichy (a key member of the opposition in the Upper House) concerning the confidence nature of the budget and the indemnity vote, while successive governments kept challenging such powers of the Upper House all along. Up to the coalition government, Baron Dezső Prónay was the most active opposition speaker during budget and indemnity debates, apart from Count Nándor Zichy and Count Aurél Dessewffy. Despite their vigorous activities they could never achieve majority in the Upper House for rejecting the budget or the appropriation, respectively. Similarly, during negotiations for final accounts, even if some disgruntled voices dissatisfied with the governmental budget process were sporadically heard, the House approved the final accounts in all cases.

Describing the budget and indemnity negotiations of the 1910s, we have determined that conflicts between parties in the House of Representatives exerted a more direct impact during negotiations in the Upper House. The activity level in the House during budget negotiations started to increase even in the early 1910s, due to the fact that opposition members of the Upper House were trying to take over the role of the opposition, which was stripped of their means for action by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, István
Tisza. In later periods, indemnity negotiations in the Upper House remained vigorous during the war as well, for reasons similar to the ones increasing the activities of the House of Representatives. The increase in activity in the Upper House signified the involvement of new members and partly, a new style coming in vogue. Out of the orators of the Upper House, some of new members emerging in the 1910s were adherents of Count Gyula Andrássy, Jr. (and the Constitutional Party, like Count János Hadik and Prince Lajos Windichgräetz), but not all of them. Count Henrik Apponyi and Count József Pálffy-Daun acted as adherents of István Tisza, Count Sándor Festetics voiced democratic demands. Voices of the opposition became even sharper later on (Count János Hadik during the Lukács and Tisza Governments and Count Róbert Żeleński during the Wekerle Government) in which the personality traits of certain aristocrats also played a role along with the increasingly brutal political style in the House of Representatives. Although this sharper tone in the Upper House was limited to a few speakers only, it is noteworthy that such addresses could even take place in the second chamber, which had been hitherto characterized by a more reserved tone. However, the most vocal members were not the most influential ones. At the beginning of the 1910, the majority of the Upper House clearly supported Party of National Work government without sharing Żeleński's extremely conservative ideas. Indemnity negotiations during World War I provide information for learning of the positions taken by members of the Upper House (with special emphasis on the landowning aristocracy) in the most important policy issues. Moreover, the resolution of the House adopted during the indemnity negotiations, which was intended to promote an agreement of the Wekerle Government and the Party of National Work opposition shows in what way the aristocracy attempted to influence government policy. By acting as a mediator between the government, the opposition and the ruler, the Upper House met the expectations regarding its purpose, however, it was trying to influence the Wekerle Government towards acceptance of the demands of the Party of National Work. The decision did not influence decisively the course of events, the latter was determined by the balance of power within the House of Representatives and the intransigence of István Tisza towards major expansion of suffrage. Earlier, at the beginning of 1899, when the Bánffy Government's crisis was triggered by obstruction, certain hereditary members also attempted to move the Upper House to act as an intermediary in the form of an address to the ruler. The motion, however, was not endorsed by the majority. Notwithstanding, the role played by the Upper House as an intermediary in the budget debates was not general, and during church policy debates, it even acted as a party intensifying the relevant conflicts. Budget negotiations made possible for aristocrats to present their positions related to certain issues of the economy,
culture or other specialized fields to the general public. All member groups were involved in such specialized negotiations even if the degree and professional standard of their involvement was not equal. The choice of subjects was equally influenced by the activities, professions and personal interests of members.

As opposed to the dispute related to the powers of the Upper House related to the budget, the right of interpellation of magnates was beyond question, as it was enacted in Act 3 of 1848, and included in all house rules from 1848 on. Between 1867 and 1885, 65 interpellations were submitted in the Upper House, whereas in the subsequent period of more than thirty years, the number of interpellations submitted was 47. Thus, similarly to the number of speakers in plenary sessions, interpellation activity decreased in the period after the reform, but at the same time, the intensity curves of the two activities are progressing differently. This was related to the fact that in certain periods, the surge in the number of interpellations was a result of certain magnates' motivations to address questions to members of the government. A great majority of interpellations were submitted by hereditary members, but interpellations were also submitted by nearly every membership group. In several cases, a relationship could be detected between the subject of questions addressed to ministers and the group affiliation of the interpellating member. It was widely believed that deliberations in the Upper House could not be based on events in the other chamber: interpellations of some magnates, however, affected governmental activity in the House of Representatives as well. In the early 1910s, the number of interpellations sharply attacking members of the government increased and the parties submitting interpellations frequently rejected the Minister's response. However, even in the case of these interpellations, the majority of the Upper House took notice of the ministerial response, as it had been previously done almost every time.

We have examined the conduct of the Upper House during governmental crises on account of the example of the political crisis in 1905–1906. By using the minutes of the Upper House, the national press and private correspondence, we have reconstructed the sequence of political events organized in the House against the Fejérváry Government along with the composition and number of members in groups opposing or supporting the government, respectively. We have found that the activities of the Upper House against the government at this time did not contribute to a settlement. We have suggested that the essentially aristocratic character of the Upper House in the whole period of Dualism had also played a role in this fact.
In respect of the relevant parties, our research has confirmed a previous finding by Dániel Szabó according to which political party formations or factions were not typically present in the Upper House after the early years of the Age of Dualism. The general view of the vocation of the Upper House, the basic stance of a significant portion of active members in support of the government, and the conduct of Catholic bishops manifest in the fact that they only cooperated with conservative aristocrats in votes related to church policy, but they did not collectively cooperate in organizing political parties counteracted the formation or persistence of political parties. However, some of the members of the Upper House ended up joining party politics in other ways, i.e. they assumed mandates as Representatives, participated in forming parliamentary parties or aligned their actions in the Upper House to political actions of parties in the House of Representatives.

The potential role of the year 1885 as a watershed in the history of the Upper House
The reform of the Upper House had important consequences for the composition of membership without radically changing the latter. During the Age of Dualism no change to the powers of the Upper House had occurred. The watershed nature of 1885 with regard to the standing orders of the House cannot be clearly detected, and (apart from the new type of verification process) the house rules of 1886 only contained a few elements which had not been previously part of the functioning of the institution. As regards civil servants, it can be confirmed that a more intensive enforcement of governmental criteria in selecting Presidents and Vice Presidents had even started from 1884, i.e. before the reform. The year 1885 did not bring any change for first officers. Starting from 1885, members appointed for life were also involved in committees and in the college of clerks, this, however, did not fundamentally modify the functioning of the Upper House. The reform of the House did not represent a watershed either in the legislative functioning of the institution or its political weight. The government did not even intend to make this a purpose of the reform, since strengthening an institution with continued conservative leanings would have been contrary to their interests. Events in 1894–1895 demonstrated the limits of restructuring in 1885 for the government and the conservative aristocracy alike. The government was able to secure a majority by relying on the ruler's support only. At the same time, conservative aristocratic politicians had to face the fact that their base mainly consisting of Catholic bishops and born members was much more limited.
VII. The issue of reform of the Upper House after 1885.

The activity of the Upper House after 1885, the level of which was even lower than before (except for the period of conflicts in church policy) was favorable for the government's ambition for rapid and unimpeded legislative work, but in the long term, it resulted in a further decline in the prestige of the institution. In the long run, this included the emergence of a new social demand for radical reforms. The reform in 1885 did not represent a standstill on the issue of restructuring the House. In the last part of our dissertation, we have briefly reviewed the ideas voiced between 1885 and 1918 concerning a further reorganization of the Upper House. According to our results, restructuring of the House was first put on the agenda in the 1890s, as the House defied the liberal government policy, later, as the electoral reform emerged into general notice. At the first time, these ideas were spawned by anger against conservative aristocrats and they had an intimidating nature, at the second time, however, settlement of political electoral law was in the foregoing, and the option of restructuring was raised conditionally, in the event of greater extension of political electoral rights. Due to its trust in "assurances" of its retention of political power integrated in the Electoral Act of 1913 (Act 14 of 1913) and its need for support by the landowner aristocracy against democratic mass movements, the government did not even address the option of a moderate reform of the Upper House. According to our research so far, the notion of an upper house partially elected by the municipalities was manifest again in the restructuring ideas raised by the opposition in the House of Representatives and in the early 1910s, both the Constitution and the Independence Party, respectively supported this notion in line with seeking the opposition's base in the relevant county organizations as opposed to the government's administrative centralization efforts. From 1916 on, as the opposition renounced the Treuga Dei accepted when the War broke out, restructuring the Upper House became a regularly voiced claim of the Independence and the Radical parties. But no detailed reform plans were elaborated. Until Autumn of 1918, only a few people had called for abolishing the second chamber, which may have related to the fact that the republican movement had no broad mass support. In the Summer and Autumn of 1918, however, which saw rapid changes of the political system, events did not allow development and discussion of any institutional reform.

During our research, we have faced numerous issues requiring more extensive research for learning of relevant events and gathering necessary data for investigation. Beside reconstructing relevant events and detecting respective proportions, we have also tried to interpret the latter. However, further research going beyond the scope of this dissertation will still be necessary to draw the appropriate conclusions.
Studies and articles relating to the theme of the dissertation


