

Introduction: Philosophical discourse on the modern concept of Literature

The term “literature” and “language of literature” is to be conceived as a phenomenon of modernity and not as a more than 2000 years history of a tradition beginning with Homer. Its historical starting point can be determined somewhere around the famous concept of Goethe: “Weltliteratur”. It is from the beginning a concept *in disunion*: it is in the same time designates a new form of mediation [Vermittlung] and a practice of schematism what is not a mediating one. This later schematised form will be called hereby as *schematised schematism* to be able to differentiate it from the kantian concept of schematism what is in fact a mediating one. The disunion between schematized schematism and the language of literature (the essence of the mediating activity of literature) today became a rift, and the language of literature is about to disappear in it, its defining power seems to be evaporating. This process of disappearance can be described as the reduction of the language of literature (the word-thing) to signs and signification.

I. Sketch (The language of literature in and for itself)

1. The immanence of the word

a. Word-Thing

The *Que c'est que la littérature?* presents an inevitable analyse of the phenomenology of the word-thing. No one saw it more clearly than Sartre that the poetic activity in essence is

nothing else than treating words as things. Still, his distinction between word-thing and sign in its final consequence leads to the schematization of the language of literature. It is a well known and most controversial fact, that Sartre assigned a sign-based usage of language to the writer of prose. By this he sacrificed the language of prose to the schematism: if the language of prose was no other than a tool and not word-thing then one would not have any possibility to save the extraordinary in literature.

To become a thing the word has to be extracted from the system of indications. The thing is a suspended indication. The tool disappears in the indication; the tool becoming a thing suspends the system of indications constituting its body. This is the base of the possibility that transforming the sign into a thing means the suspension of the schematised schematism, the revealing its very work.

b. Definition

The language of literature is not something like an expression of the inner in the outer. The poet does not stand on the border between inner and outer, his or her idea does not become shared by revealing something very immense. The intimacy of a poet is not more than the intimacy of anybody else. He or she has no other inner world than the inter-subjective world we all have, where one must establish his or her intimate world. The poet is not more “sentimental”, not “smarter” nor “deeper” than anyone else. And he or she does not express the same intimacy in a more beautiful manner than any of us either: his or her task is not to dress in pretty clothes the naked intimacy. In that case he or she would only say commonplaces in an elaborated language. The language of literature in a strict sense does not express anything. The poet *shares the extraordinary*. The language of literature is not expression, but sharing, making visible for all of us the strangeness what adhere to all familiar words.

c. Critique

The language of literature questions the factuality. It questions whether it is right to consider the events of the world as facts. By revealing the extraordinary, that is a new reality, it

criticizes the factual reality we live in an everyday manner. But it questions at the same time the reality in general: the world as the general structure of this factuality.

d. The absolute

The constitution of the literary object is an absolute one. Taking an example from Virginia Woolf's *Mrs. Dalloway*: an unknown person sits in a dark car that is identified by the characters of the novel as a member of the royal family. In the immanency of the literary sharing the facticity (schematized objectivity) of the object is destroyed but it is reconstituted as a literary object: as in the sharing immanently constituted object, as an object viewed by the characters of the novel, appealed by their language, incorporated into their flow of consciousness, an object given by the focalized viewpoint of the narrator, what by no means can be identified to a „real“ object, there is no possibility to tell who is in the car “for real”, because in the scene of the novel it is not appearing directly, only by the means of mediators, whom are though unable to identify it, create its identity nonetheless. This constitution is absolutely primal and independent of any transcendent reference.

e. The transcendence in the immanence

For the philosophy of the immanence as Deleuze creates it, and what in the field of the theory of literature (first of all in the case of Barthes) appears as radical intertextuality, the enigma does not exist. It does not exist in a different way than to Husserl, who unmakes the enigma in the phenomenological reduction. For the philosophy of immanence the enigma, the extraordinary cannot be given at all since there is nothing what would not be immanent. A not expected revolution, something what not wanted nor foreseen (what Derrida calls “ce qui vient”, something arriving from beyond the horizon) is rejected by this assumption. By the affirmation of immanent forces one rejects the possibility of something unforeseen breaking into my world through the means of reading. That there is transcendence in the immanence of the language of literature means that reading is not based on repetition but on unrepeatability.

f. The enigma

The immanence of the word is an enigmatic one. Henry James was the one who presented with the utmost force the inseparability of the appearance and the ghostliness. The immanence of the word as the language of literature creates reduces the world and the inter-subjective perspective given with the world to phenomena and to modes of appearance. But all such reduction creates necessarily the ghostly, the haunting of the extraordinary in the familiar. *The Turn of the Screw* is literally the inquiry of this ghostly “other side”. The first person narration presents the interpretation of the signs constituting the world of the protagonist. This world is for a certain extent intersubjective: it can be communicated to others. But its tragedy emerges from its unshareability. The narration tries to present this unshareability. By unshareability one means more than mere error in communication or misinterpretation of the signs, because there is no “right” meaning to which this misinterpretation can be opposed. There is only another interpretation slowly characterizing through the series of events in the other character of the novel and eventually in the reader too. In fact what becomes questionable is the interpretation itself: if there is no pre-established meaning of a sign, if there is no more truth in itself, if there is only appearance and nothing else, then the mode of appearance becomes ghostly.

g. The non-univocity

In case of the language of literature we face a particular problem of constitution, one that makes it impossible to be described as constitution through corrections (according to Husserl every object is given by a continuous flow of corrections). If one calls adequate constitution of the object (of *Sinn*) that ideal limit what presents itself in every correction-like constitution as the ultimate point of the constitution and as opposed to the infinite number of concrete acts as principally finite and closed meaning (*Sinn*), then we can see that due to the above mentioned ghostliness and enigmaticness the object of the language of literature would never become adequate. If one considers the literary work as a subject of infinite interpretations that is still no more than a form of constitutions through corrections. The interpretations “enrich” the meaning of the work but its still the “same” work, its identity has not been questioned. If we point out that this identical “meaning” is a phantasm it does not discredit it. On the contrary: faithful analysis has to show that this is a necessary phantasm (a transcendental

one), what one cannot leave behind. Thus all interpretation what tries to be faithful to the literary work have to take into account this absolute pole, and construct its analysis accordingly. On the other hand the activity of the language of literature is more than the constitution of more than one possible meaning. While it does constitute a meaning it is shadowed by a non-intentional sense what cannot be understood as the *horizon* of the positioned object, thus does not part of the world of this object.

2. The transcendence of the language of literature

a. Reduction

In the aesthetic phenomenology it is a prevalent opinion since its origins that the phenomenological reduction can find an ideal example in artistic activity. Moreover the very task of the phenomenologists could be the mere following of this activity to reach the bracketing of factuality that is the phenomenological “*Einstellung*”. This might even be the defining character of phenomenological approach in aesthetics: the artistic work does not represent the world, but it is not a simple productive force either like any other act in the world. The work of art has a reductive relation toward the world. But the reductive activity of the language of literature cannot be described as reflection: the language of literature creates a world, the world of the extraordinary. It does not create the uninterestedness of the object in the Kantian nor in the Husserlian sense.

Phenomenalization and word-thing

According to phenomenology the syntheses of the phenomena are produced through three corrections: in the correction of perception the object is schematized in a spatio-temporal correction, it is given in an never ending approximation as sensual meaning. In historical correction the object is schematized in the institution of its historical origin: as continuous historization. Lastly in the intersubjective correction the object is schematized as common, as given to every possible subject. The hereby differentiated moments of schematization suppose

the unity of the object and sensual, historical and intersubjective phenomena as the profiles (*Abschattungen*) of this object. On the other hand the language of literature when it creates a word-thing it makes this schematization its object thus what is given for it as unity is the schematization and not a world-object.

c. The silent side of a word

What distinguishes the disunion characterizing the language of literature from the forms of determination is its relation to schematism. The definition schematizes that is phenomenalizes: it creates the phenomenon. The disunion is non-schematic. It does not mediate between the thing and the phenomenon, it opens up the thing: it traces what is not appearing on it, what suspends the definition of the thing. Beyond definition is the debris what cannot become phenomenon. The word as thing is not only a revelation of a branch of meanings but a grabbing of the birth of meanings in the very moment when undefined becomes defined when pre-linguistic become linguistic. This moment is double-sided: on one hand it is the birth of the meaning, on the other hand it is the sinking of the undefined into silence. The language of literature keeps its connection to the descended, the undefined. To meanings what are strange, weird even seem dangerous in everyday communication

d. e. f. Mode and rebellion

It is Baudelaire who first established the language of disunion as the paradigm of modernity. That is why it is a mistake to take him either as the poet of novelty or the poet of negation. Benjamin saw well the modern transcendence, what Baudelaire's language creates. The disunion appears with the stranger in the familiarity of the city: "Paris becomes an object of lyrical poetry first with Baudelaire. This poetry is not that of the nationalism (*Heimatkunst*), it is rather an allegorical view, that of the alienated ones, of what the object is the city. This is the regard of the *flâneurs*..." For Benjamin the *flâneur* is the position what constitutes a completely different world than the naive poet living in harmony with nature or the sentimental one who tries to reach its harmony again through reflection. For Baudelaire nature was always suspicious, he never tried to submerge in it through the absolute.

The poetry of Baudelaire presents modernity as disunion and as schematized form in the same time: the voyager on one hand travels purely for the travel and to reform the world into unfamiliarity, and on the other hand for the novelty, for schematized tourism. It is a revolution, not in the sense of the destruction of the old world, but in the sense of making it disunited.

II. Engrossment

a. Sign and phenomenon

When we treat the language of literature as phenomenon we are speaking against the semiotization of this language. The semiology is not simply a mode in the fields of the humanities of the late twentieth century. In reality the schematized schematism, the society of identical-speaking produce it necessarily as its own reflection. Its carefully designated extension does not put into danger the power of signification and the factuality based on it.

b. The schematized intentionality of everyday intersubjectivity

In the communication of inter-subjective community the language – as any other activity – bed into a goal-scheme system what defines the possible usage of the language by the speaker. By goal-scheme system here one understands the system of possibilities what constitutes the world of objectivity for the speaking (acting) member of the community. The world of objectivity that is the world of possible targets of intentional acts constitutes as common world what makes it impossible to conceive certain objects as only mine, unreachable by others. The intentional act (in this case the act of speaking) “finds its target” only if it fits into this world, it is “confirmed” only when designates a common object. If it is not the case one have to correct one’s act of speaking (the communicative language corrects one’s act of speaking in the second sense of correction). That is what we call the constitution of everyday world.

c. d. e The language of literature as intentional structure: the modification of disunion and reduction

In a phenomenological sense the object of an intentional act is constituted in the act as a *phenomenon*. In the language of literature we have to separate a moment, what appears on the phenomenon by virtue of the disunion. The intentional correlates of the language of literature are not only phenomena, but on the phenomena shows up something what is not apparent. To be able to consider the language of literature intentional action we have to take into account the non-apparent. Every case when we meet an *action* the non apparent, the not-schematized, the extraordinary is always there. Only by relating to the extraordinary can the act become an action, that is more than simple repetition. While not only literary language confers disunity to communicative reality, we have to take note of the other characteristic of the language of literature as intentional structure: it differs from communication by the fact that it is *reduced*. It positions its object as an essence though it objectifies the essence as well. That's what we called *thingness* of the word previously.

f. The possibility of making a distinction between transcendent an immanent correlate

The language of literature constitutes two intentional correlates: structure and world. These can be described as immanent and transcendent correlates. Ingarden pointed it out that even in case of objects independent of human constitution "we cannot decide which one is a 'constituting' and which one is 'constituted'". This observation is essential. The state of affairs does not constitute the object what we grasp in it nor the object does not constitutes the state of affairs in what it is possible to be grasped. Whether one is prior to the other can only be decided by the point of view we take. It is evident that the two are not independent of each other, but we cannot say they are correlates of each other. If in the ordinary perception of the world we grasp an object, this grasp remains partial and given only in a profile. If say we make our point of view primordial we could say it is this point of view what let the object be our (thus and thus shaded) perception. On the other hand when we realize that it is nonetheless a grasping of an *object*, that is something independent of our perception, thus we transcend our limited point of view, then we have to say this object itself is what makes our

perception possible. Accordingly the structure and the world of the literary work are both constituted objects of the language of literature and one cannot decide which one has a priority over the other one.

g. Literariness and literary work as transcendental phantasms

Beside the correlates of the language of literature we have to mention two phantasmal objectivities what have its origin in the language of literature as well. Literariness as an abstract generality and literary work as abstract singular are connected to its mediative nature. But as the language of literature is a middle where extremities are destroyed, the extremities itself can only become objects in themselves by an abstraction – the schematized schematism.

h. Event and action

The word-thing is new form of origin. It is simplification to see a demon to exorcise in origin. The question of the origin is much more complex than we could say that *all* origins are metaphysical or *the* origin is metaphysical. The word thing as origin is not an event: the event can only be present in the field of phenomenalization as repeated. Every event what happens in this field – be that by the continuity of correction or the rupture of revolution what institutes a new system of corrections – happens in the form of definition that is repetition: in the correction as an exchangeable element, in the revolution as “farce” of the repetition (Marx). However the world-thing does not repeat, or it not merely repeats. While it repeats (it refers to other words as a sign), it embodies such contexts what were not given before in any form. Nonetheless one cannot say that it would create by his own right. Everything what is reality is repeated. And one cannot say either that it would create something unreal, like an imaginary world. The virtuality what connects it to reality (that it works in the reality that is I the corrections) disallow to treat it as an unreal origin (imaginary creation). The nature of its originality has to be grasped in this disunited structure: it is an undefined not repeated origin what does not creates anything what could not be recreate, reread.

III. Appendix. Critical concept-history for a language of literature

The appendix examines some key concepts of the phenomenology of literature and of language what plays major role in our analyse: the critical relation as the origin of the language of literature. (Georges Poulet and jean Starobinski) 2. The monism of the writing (Jaques Derrida). 3. The new dualism of language (Pauls Ricoeur). 4. Paul de Man's phenomenology of language. 5. The critique of the worldly experience (Edmund Husserl).

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